Crawford v. Cuomo, Second Circuit, Amicus Brief re: Sexual Abuse of Prisoners 2014
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Case: 14-969 Document: 45 Page: 1 07/21/2014 1275958 40 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPE ALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT Thurgood Marshall U.S. Courthou se 40 F oley Square, N ew York, NY 10007 T elephone: 212-857-8500 MOT[QN JNFOnMATlON STATEMENT l>ocket Number(s): Motlon ror: _1_4_-_9_6_9 _-C_V ____________ _ _____ _ C~a=p~ti~on~[~u~se~s~ho~rt~t~it~ lcl~-------- Leave to file amicus brief James Crawford and Thaddeaus Corley, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Set forth below precise, complete statement of relief sought: Andrew Cuomo, et .al., Defendants-Appellees. Leave to file a brief of amici curiae in support of Plaintiffs-Appellants. MOVIN~RTY: New York Civil Liberties Union, et LJPlainti ff 0 Appellant/Petitioner MOVING A'rroRNEY: Defendant Appellee/Respondent al. OPPOSING PARTY: Andrew Cuomo, et al. ..J DI Amicus Curiae Erin Beth Harrist OPPOSING ATI'ORNEY: Frank Brady - - - - - - - - - - - ---'-- [name of attorney, with firm, address, phone number and e-mail] New York Civil Liberties Union Office of the Attorney General of the State of New York 125 Broad Street, 19th Floor New York, NY 10004 The Capitol Albany, New York 12224 212-607-3300; eharrist@nycl u .org 518-486-4 502; frank.brady@ag.ny.gov ~--------------------~ Court-Judge/Agency appealed f r o m : - - - - -- -- - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Please check appro priate boxes: FOR EMERGENCY MOTIONS, MOTIONS F OR STAYS AND INJUNCTIONS PENDING APPEAL: Has mo~ notit;i.W,opposing counsel (required by Local Rule 27.1): L{J Yesl J No (explain):_by"""'p_tior_ie_o_n _ _01_-1_6-_14_ _ _ __ __ Opposin~unsel 's position on LJ Unopposed O D No Has request for relief been m1:1de below? D ves Has this relief been previously sought in this Court? O ves Requested returo dale and explanation of emergency:_ _ _ _ __ __ 0 No motion: opposed [{Joon 't Know Does opposing counsel intend to file a response: 0 Yes 0 No [{Pon't Kno w llJ No ls oral argument on motion requested? O Has argument date of appeal been set? D Yes [l] No ves Signature of ~n~ J torney: ~ -J:::. ___ _ Date: 07/21/2014 Z ~ Form T-1080 (rev. 12-13) (requests for oral arg\lment w ill not necessarily be granted) Tfyes, enter elate:_ __ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ __ _ _ Service by 0 cMIECF 0 Other [Attach proof of service] Case: 14-969 Document: 45 Page: 2 07/21/2014 1275958 40 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT ---------------------------------------------------------------------){ JAMES CRAWFORD & THADDEUS CORLEY, Plaintiffe-Appellants, v. ANDREW CUOMO, as Governor of the State of New York, in his official capacity; BRIAN FISCHER, Corrunissioner of Depa1tment of Corrections and Community Supervision, in his official capacity; Superintendent WILLIAM P. BROWN, in his personal and official capacities; Superintendent WILLIAM LARKIN, in his official capacity; Conections Officer SIMON PRJNDLE; and JOHN DOE CORRECTIONS OFFICERS 1-8, 14-969-cv Defendants-Appellees. ----------------------------------------------------------------------)( AFFIRMATION OF ERIN BETH HARRIST JN SUPPORT OF MOTION BY THE NEW YORK CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, THE LEGAL AID SOCffiTY OF NEW YORK, HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENSE CENTER, PRISONERS' LEGAL SERVICES OF NEW YORK, AND THE UPTOWN PEOPLE'S LAW CENTER FOR LEAVE TO SUBMIT AMICI CURIAE BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS JAMES CRAWFORD AND THADDEUS CORLEY Erin Beth Harrist declares under penalty of perjury, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746, that the following is true and correct: 1. I am a staff attorney at the New York Civil Liberties Union Foundation ("NYCLU") and a member of the bar of this Court. The NYCLU is a nonprofit, Case: 14-969 Document: 45 Page: 3 07/21/2014 1275958 40 nonpartisan organization with approximately 50,000 members, founded in 1951 to protect and advance civil rights and civil liberties in New York State. I submit this affirmation in support of the motion of the NYCLU, the Legal Aid Society of New York, Human Rights Defense Center, Prisoners' Legal Services of New York, and the Uptown People's Law Center to appear as amici curiae in supp01t of PlaintiffsAppellants. The proposed brief of amici curiae is attached as Exhibit A. This motion and accon1panying proposed brief, filed within 7 days of PlaintiffsAppellants' brief, complies with the time for filing pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 29(e). Plaintiffs-Appellants consent to the filing of this brief. DefendantsAppellees have been notified of intent to file this brief and have not, to date, taken a position on whether or not they consent. 2. In this case, Plaintiffs-Appellants alleged that a corrections officer had repeatedly squeezed and fondled their penises while issuing threats and sexual comments, resulting in emotional and psychiatric distress. The District Court held that the Plaintiffs did not state a cause of action under the Eighth Amendment because each Plaintiff only experienced lhe alleged abuse during one incident and there were no aJlegations of physical injw·y, penetration, or pain. 3. The amici cur;ae brief addresses two points not briefed by Plaintiffs- Appellants, which amici curiae submit are relevant to the Cowt's ruling on the appeal. First, the District Court's ruUng that penetration or physical injury is 2 Case: 14-969 Document: 45 Page: 4 07/21/2014 1275958 40 required to state a claim under the E ighth Amendment is a common misinterpretation of this Court's ruling jn Boddie v. Schnieder, 105 F.3d 857 (2d Cir. 1997) that has sown confusion in both district courts within this Court's jurisdiction and in appellate courts across the country. This case presents an opportunity for the Court to correct this misunderstanding of the Boddie ruling and clarify that sexual abuse in the prison context does not need to include penetration or physical injuty, consistent with controlling constitutional principles regarding what constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. 4. Second, drawing from federal and state laws reflecting cu1Tent standards of decency, amici curiae propose a bright-line rule that cruel and unusual punishment includes any intentional contact by a corrections officer with a detainee's genitalia or other intimate areas that is either unrelated to official duties or where the officer has the intent to abuse, arouse, or gratify sexual desire. This rule is consistent with the federal regulations promulgated under the Prison Rape Elimination Act, the New York Penal Law, and forty-six other states and will bring a much needed consistency and humanity to Eighth Amendment law. 5. The proposed amici curiae are well-positioned to address these issues. The NYCLU frequently litigates and advocates on behalf of the constitutional righls of incarcerated New Yorkers, including their Eighth Amendment rights. See, e.g., Butler v. Suffolk County, l l-cv-02602 (E.D.N.Y.) (suit against Suffolk County 3 Case: 14-969 Document: 45 Page: 5 07/21/2014 1275958 40 alleging that the conditions of its correctional facilities violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution). The Legal Aid Society of New York, through its Prisoners' Rights Project, seeks to ensure the protection of prisoners' constitutional rights, including on behalf of prisoners who have experienced sexual abuse. See, e.g., Amador v. Andrews, 03 Civ. 0650 (S.D.N.Y.) (putative class action brought by women prisoners challenging the policies of State prison officials that enable staff sexual abuse to persist). The Human Rights Defense Center (HR.DC) publishes Prison Legal News and other reference materials for prisoners and reports extensively on the sexual abuse of prisoners by jail and prison staff. Both the Legal Aid Society and HRbC were involved in the development of the standards promulgated pursuant to the Prison Rape Elimination Act. Prisoners' Legal Services of New York provides civil legal services to indigent inmates in New York State correctional facilities, including claims of sexual abuse and cruel and inhuman treatment. The Uptown People's Law Center advocates for the civil rights of prisoners and litigates class actions and individual cases on behalf of prisoners. 6. On behalf of the NYCLU and the other amici curiae> I respectfully request leave to file the attached proposed amici curiae brief in support of PlaintiffsAppellants. 4 Case: 14-969 Dated: Document: 45 Page: 6 07/21/2014 1275958 40 July 21, 2014 New York, New York &~4~~ New York Civil Liberties Union Foundation 125 Broad Street, 19th Fl. New York, New York 10004 (212) 607-3399 eharrist@nyclu.org 5 Case: 14-969 Document: 45 Page: 7 07/21/2014 Exhibit A 1275958 40 Case: 14-969 Document: 45 Page: 8 07/21/2014 1275958 40 -CV United States Court of Ap,peals For the Second Circuit JAMES CRAWFORD and THADDEUS CORLEY, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. ANDREW CUOMO, as Governor of the State of New York, in his official capacity; BRIAN FISCHER, Commissioner of Department of Corrections and Community Supervision, in his official capacity; Superintendent WILLIAM P. BROWN, in his personal and official capacities; Superintendent WILLIAM LARKIN, in h is official capacity; Corrections Officer SIMON PRINDLE; and JOHN DOE CORRECTIONS OFFICERS 1-8, Defendants-Appellees. ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE THE NEW YORK CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, THE LEGAL AID SOCIETY OF NEW YORK, HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENSE CENTER, PRISONERS' LEGAL SERVICES OF NEW YORK, AND THE UPTOWN PEOPLE'S LAW CENTER IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS JAMES CRAWFORD and THADDEUS CORLEY ERIN BETH HARRIST COREY STOUGHTON CHRISTOPHER DUNN New York Civil Liberties Union Foundation 125 Broad Street, 191h Floor New York, N.Y. 10004 (212) 607-3300 (For continuation ofAmici Appearances See Inside Cover) Case: 14-969 Document: 45 Page: 9 07/21/2014 1275958 LANCE WEBER SEYMOUR W. JAMES, JR ROBERT JACK Human Rights Defense Center PO Box 1151 Lake Worth, Florida 33460 (561) 360-2523 DORI A. LEWIS Prisoners' Rights Project Legal Aid Society 199 Water Street New York, N.Y. 10038 (2 12) 577-3530 KAREN MURTAGH MELIS SA LOOMIS Prisoners' Legal Serv ices of New York 41 State Street, Suite M l 12 Albany, N.Y. 12207 ( 518) 445-6050 ALAN MILLS Uptown People 's Law Center 4413 North Sheridan Chicago, Illinois 60640 (773) 769-14 10 Alforneysfor Amici Curiae continued 40 Case: 14-969 Document: 45 Page: 10 07/21/2014 1275958 40 RULE 26.1 CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 26.1 , counsel for amici curiae hereby disclose that the New York Civil Liberties Union Foundation, Human Rights Defense Center, Prisoners' Legal Services of New York, Legal Aid Society's Prisoners' Right Project, and Uptown People' s Law Center are nonprofit corporations. They have no parent corporations and no corporation directly or indirectly holds 10% or more of the ownershjp interest in any of the amici. Case: 14-969 Document: 45 Page: 11 07/21/2014 1275958 40 Table of Contents INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................... l INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE ............................................................................. 3 ARGUMENT .... ···················-····························-··················· ................................... 6 I. Intentional Contact With a Detainee's Genitalia Unrelated to a Corrections Officer=>s Official Duties or Undertaken With Intent to Abuse, Arouse, or Gratify Sexual Desfre Is Cruel and Unusual Punishment. .............................................................................................. 7 A. Binding Precedent From the Supreme Court and This Court Defining "Cruel and Unusual Punishment" Requires Adoption of the Rule Proposed by Amici and Rejection of the District Court's Rule ..... .................................................................................... 7 B. "Contemporary Standards ofDecemcy" Require the Court to Adopt the Rule Proposed by Amici and Reject the District Court's Rule. ···-····························-··················· .................................. 11 IL The Standard Propo sed by Amici Is Necessary to Bring Humanity, Coherence and Consistency to Eighth Amendment Law Governing Sexual Abuse in Prisons and Jails ........................................................... 16 CONCLUSION ...................................................................................................... 22 Case: 14-969 Document: 45 Page: 12 07/21/2014 1275958 40 Table of Authorities Cases Amador v. Smith, No. 10-CV-06702 (W.D.N.Y. May 9, 2013) .......... ...... ....... 13, 20 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) ................................................................. 12 Boddie v. Schnieder, 105 F.3d 857 (2d Cir. 1997) ............... .......................... passim Boxer Xv. Harris, 43 7 F .3d 1107 (11th Cir. 2006) ................................................ 19 Calhoun v. DeTel!a, 319 F.3d 936 (7th Cir. 2003) ....................................... .......... 20 Castro-Sanchez v. N.YS. Department of Corrections, 10-Civ-8314 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2012) ............................. ...................................................... 17 Copeland v. Nunan, 250 F.3d 743 (5th Cir. 200 ]) ................................................. 19 Doe v. Barrett, No. 3:01cv519, 2006 WL 3741825 (D. Conn. Dec. 19, 2006) .................................................................................... 20 Farmer v. Brennan , 511 U.S. 825 (1994) ................................................................. 9 Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) ........................................................... 11-12 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) ................................................................... 9 Harry v. Suarez, No. 10 Civ. 6756, 2012 WL 2053533 (S.D.N.Y. June 4, 2012) .... ...................... .. .................................... .. .............. ...... 22 Holton v. Moore, No. CIV.A.96CV0077, 1997 WL 642530 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 15, 1997) .......................... .................................... .. .............. ...... 18 Hudso11 v. Mc Millian>503 U.S. 1 (1992) .............................. .............................. 9-1 0 Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984) ............................. .. .............. .............. ...... 10 11 Case: 14-969 Document: 45 Page: 13 07/21/2014 1275958 40 Hughes v. Smith, 237 F. App'x 756 (3d Cir. 2007) .. .. ............................................ 22 Jrvis v. Seally, No. 9:09-cv-543, 2010 WL 5759 149 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 2, 2010) .. .................................................................................. 18 Jackson v. Madery, 158 F. App'x 656 (6th Cir. 2005) ........................................... 19 Johnson v. Enu, No. 08-cv-15 8, 2011 WL 3439 179 (N.D.N.Y. July 13, 2011) .................................................................................... 22 Jones v. Rock, No. 9:12-cv-0447, 2013 WL 4804500 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2013) .................................................................................... 17 Joseph v. Federal Bureau ofPrisons, 232 F.3d 901 (lOu1 Cir. 2000) ..................... 13 Lewis v. Fischer, No. 08-CV-3027, 2009 WL 689803 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 12, 2009) ................................................................................... 20 McEachin v. Bek,. No. 06-CV-6453, 2012 WL 1 113584 (W.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, 2012) .................................................................................... 17 M ontero v. Crusie, 153 F. Supp. 2d 368 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) ..................................... 22 Rodriguez v. McClenning, 399 F. Supp. 2d 228 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) ......................... 20 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) ........................................................... 12, 13 Samuels v. Strange, No. 3:08cv1872, 2012 WL 4754683 (D. Conn. Oct. 4, 2012) ..... .................................................................................. 17 Sanders v. Gifford, Civ. No. 9: l l-cv-0326, 2011 WL 17925 89 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 5, 2011) ..................................................................................... 18 Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2000) ............................................. 20 Solomon v. Michigan Department of Corrections, 478 F. App'x 318 (6fu Cir. 2012) ............................................................................................... 18-19 United States v. Walsh , 194 F.3d 37 (2d Cir. 1999) ............................................... 10 111 Case: 14-969 Document: 45 Page: 14 07/21/2014 1275958 40 Washington v. Harris, 186 Fed. App'x 865 (11 th Cir. 2006) ................................. 19 Whitley v. Albers:> 475 U.S. 312 ( 1986) .................................................................. 12 Williams v. Fitch,, 550 F. Supp . 2d 4 13 (W.D.N.Y. 2008) ............................... 2 1-22 Williams v. Prudden, 67 F. App'x 976 (8th Cir. 2003) .............................. .. .......... 20 Statutes, Rules and Regulations 18 Pa . Cons. Stat. § 3 124.2 ..................................................................................... 15 18 U.S.C. § 2244(b) ................................................................................................ 14 18 U.S.C. § 2246(3) ·············-···························· -··················· .................................. 14 28 C.F.R. § 11 5.6 .............................................................................................. 13, 21 28 C.F.R. § 115.1 1 ............... -............................................................ .. .................... 13 28 C.F.R. §§ 115.3 1-35 ........................................................................................... 21 28 C.F.R. § 115.76 ............... _............................................................................ 13-14 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/1 J-9.2 ......................................................................... 15 Ala. Code§ 14-1 1-3 1 ........... .................................................................................. 15 Alaska Stat. § 11.41.427 ........................................................................................ 15 Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann.§ 13-14 19 ............................................................................. 15 Ark. Code Ann.§ 5-14-127(a)(2) ... ....................................................................... 15 Cal. Penal Code§ 289.6 ......................................................................................... 15 Colo_ Rev. Stat.§§ 18-7-701 , 18-3-404 ...... .. .... ............................................ ......... 15 Conn. Gen. Stat.§§ 53a-73a .................................................................................. 15 lV Case: 14-969 Document: 45 Page: 15 07/21/2014 1275958 40 Del. Code. Ann. tit. 11, § 769 ··········· ················-················· ·· ................................. 15 D.C. Code§ 22-3014 ........... ·····························-··················· ................................. 15 Ga. Code Ann.§ 16-6-5. 1 ································· -···················································· 15 Haw. Rev. Stat.§ 707-732(e) ······················ ·· ····-······· ·· ······························ ···· ···· ····· 15 Idaho Code Ann. § 18-61 10 . ·····························-······································· ............. 15 Ind. Code Ann.§ 35-44.1-3-10 ··········· ········· ·····-······· ··--········································· 15 Iowa Code 709.16 ············································· -···················································· 15 Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21 -5512 ·· ·-·················· ··········-···· ··· ············ ............ .. .......... ......... 15 Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann.§§ 510.120, 510.020 ·········-···················································· 15 La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14: 134.1 ............................................................................... 15 Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. Tit. 17-A, § 255-A ................... .. ........................................... 15 Md. Code Ann. Crim. Law§ 3-314 ....................................................................... 15 Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 268, § 2 1A ················ ·· ····-······· ············ ................................ . 15 Mich . Comp. Laws§ 750.520b .............................................................................. 15 Minn. Stat. Ann.§ 609.345(l )(m) .............. .. .................................... .. .................. . 15 Mo. Rev. Stat.§§ 566. 101, 566.145 ............. ... ................................. .. ........ .......... . 15 Mont. Code Ann. § 45-5-502 ................................................................................. 15 Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 28-322 ............................................................................... 15 Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann.§ 212.187 ........ ........................ ............................................. 15 N.Y. Penal Code§ 130.05 ................................ ...................................................... 14 v Case: 14-969 Document: 45 Page: 16 07/21/2014 1275958 40 N.Y. Penal Code§ 130.52 ································-··············································· 14, 21 N.Y. Penal Code§ 130.60 ... ·····························-··················· .................................. 14 N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann.§§ 632-A:2(I)(n)(l), 632-A:4 .............................................. 15 NJ. Stat. Ann. §§ 2C: 14-2, 2C: 14-3 ··········· ······-··················· ................................. 15 N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-9- 12 ... ·····························-··················· ................................. 15 N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-27.5A ··· ·············· ········· ·····-······· ································ ............. 15 N.D . Cent. Code § 12.1-20-07 ·························· -··················· ................................. 15 Ohio Rev. Code. Ann.§§ 2907.03, 2907.06 ·····-······· ············ ............ .. ................... 15 Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 163.454 ···························-··················· ................................. 15 R. I. Gen. Laws~ 11-37-4 ·································-··················· ................................. 15 S.C. Code Ann.§ 44-23-l 150(c)(2) ·················-······································· ............. 15 S. D. Codified Laws§ 22-22-7.4 ······················-··················· ................................. 15 Tenn_ Code Ann. §39-16-408 ····················· ·· ····-······· ································ ............ . 15 Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 39.04 ··························-··················· ................................. 15 Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-412(4) (5) ············· ·· ····-··················· ............ .. .................. . 15 Va. Code Ann.§§ 18.2-67.4, 18.2-67.10 ······ ··· ·-······························· ····················· 15 W. Va. Code Ann.§§ 61-8B-2, 61-8B-7 ··········-··················· ................................. 15 Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 9A-44.170 ··············· ·-······································· ............. 15 Wis. Stat. Ann. § 940.225(2) ····························-··················· ................................. 15 Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-303 ... ·····························-··················· ................................. 15 VI Case: 14-969 Document: 45 Page: 17 07/21/2014 1275958 40 INTRODUCTION 1 This case presents an ideal opportunity for the Couit to coITect an indefensibly narTow inte1pretation of unconstitutional sexual abuse in prisons and jails under the Eighth Amend ment arising from a seventeen year-old decision of this Court. The District Court below misread Boddie v. Schnieder, 105 F.3d 857 (2d Cir. 1997), to create a rule that a detainee victimized by a coITections officer must allege penetration of a body cavity or a physical injury in order to state a claim for sexual abuse under the Eighth Amendment. Because the Plaintiffs' allegations in this case involved forcible, threatening, and inappropriate groping of the plaintiffs' genitals, but not penetration or physical injury, the District Court dismissed the ir complaint. This Comi should expressly reject this rnisreacting of Boddie and hold that cruel and unusual punishment includes any intentional contact by a coITections officer with a detainee's genitalia or other intimate areas that is either unrelated to official duties or w here the officer has the intent to abuse, arouse, or gratify sexual desire. This ml e derives directly from federal and state laws enacted for the purpose of defining and prohibiting sexual a buse in prisons and jails. Such legislative enactments are precisely the objective source m'1terial identified by this 1 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 29(c)(5) and Local Rule 29.1 , Amici state that no party's counsel authored the brief in whole or in part; no party or party' s counsel contributed money that was intended to fund preparing or submitting the brief; and no person-other than Amici, its members, or its counsel -contributed money that was inten ded to fund preparing or submitting the brief. 1 Case: 14-969 Document: 45 Page: 18 07/21/2014 1275958 40 Court and the Supreme Court as defining contemporary standards of d ecency and informing the scope of the Ejghth Amendment ,s protections. The Supreme Comt and this Cowt' s foundational case law defining "cruel and unusual punishment" also supports this rule because that case law focuses on the objective characteristics of the punislunent and the subjective intent of the perpetrator. The Dist1ict Court's rule, by contrast, is inconsistent with contemporary standards of decency and finds no support in the Supre1ne Court or this Court's case law, including Boddie itself, which makes no mention of a requirement to plead penetration or physical injury. The bright-line rule proposed by Amici would bring humanity, rationality and coherence to an area of law that for decades has lacked all three. Boddie held that sexual abuse violates the Eighth Amendment but did not define "sexual abuse" other than to suggest that isolated instances of sexual harassment did not suffice to state a claim. Since Boddie was decided nearl y two decades ago, the question of bow to distinguish single instances of unconstitutional sexual abuse from nonactionable sexual harassment has bedeviled courts across the country. Many courts in this Circuit and beyond have, like the District Corn1 here, wrongly interpreted Boddie to dismiss claims for a wide range of serious sexual assault and abuse perpetrated by conections officers on persons in their custody, including forcible groping or fondUing of genitals or breasts and forced kissing. 2 This inco1rect Case: 14-969 Document: 45 Page: 19 07/21/2014 1275958 40 interpretation leaves an enormous gap in the Eighth Amendment' s protection from grossly inapprop 1iate, offensive, and damaging instances of sexual abuse by 0 corrections officers. Other courts, finding such a gap indefensible, have rejected the notion that penetration or physical injury is necessary to state a claim, resulting in a lack of consistency both within this Circuit and across the country. This Court's a1ticulation of the rule proposed by Amici would restore much-needed clarity to this area of law and ensure that inhumane sexual abuse in prisons and jails is not tolerated. INTEREST OF AMI CI CURIAE The New York Civil Liberties Union (NYCLU) is a nonprofit, nonpartisan organization with approximately 50,000 members fo unded in 1951 to protect and advance civil rights in New York. The NYCLU advocates for the constitutional rights of all New Yorkers, including those w ho are incarcerated, and seeks to ensure individuals can obtain redress in the courts for constitutional v iol ations. The Legal Aid Society of New York i s a private, nonprofit organization that has provided free legal assistance to indigent persons in New York City for over 125 years. Through its Prisoners' Rights Project, the Society seeks to ensure the protection of prisoners' constitutional and statutory tights. For more than a decade the Pri.soners' Rights. Project has been a vigorous advocate on behalf of prisoners who have expe1ienced sexual abuse, through litigation in the federal and 3 Case: 14-969 Document: 45 Page: 20 07/21/2014 1275958 40 State courts and through legislative advocacy. Examples include our work in Amador v. Andrews, No. 1:03-cv-00650 (KTD) (S.D.N.Y. filed Jan. 28, 2003), a case on behalf of a putative class of women prisoners who challenge the policies of State plison officials that enable staff sexual .abuse to persist; particip ation as a member of the National Prison Rape Elimination Commission's Standards Development Expert Committee; and testimony before a sub-committee of the U.S. House Judiciary Commjttee relating to the Commjssion 's recommended Standards. The Human Rights Defense Center (HRDC) is a nonprofit charitable corporation headquartered in Florida that advocates on behalf of the human rights of people held in state and federal prisons, local jails, immigration detention centers, civil commitment facilities, Bureau of Indian Affairs jaiUs, juvenile facilit ies and military plisons. HRDC's advocacy effo1ts include publishing Prison Legal News (PLN), a monthly publication that covers criminal justice-related news and litigation nationwide, publishing and disttibuting self-help reference books for p1isoners, and engaging in litigation in state and federal courts on issues concerning detainees. PLN has reported extensively on the sexua I abuse of prisoners by jail and prison staff. In addition, HRDC submitted comments to the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) regarding the proposed P1ison Rape E limination Act (PREA) standards in 2010 and 2011 to suppo1t the greatest possible 4 Case: 14-969 Document: 45 Page: 21 07/21/2014 1275958 40 protections for prisoners against being sexually assaulted and raped while m custody. Prisoners' L egal Services of New York (PLS) is a nonprofit o rganization that h as provided civil legal services to indigent inmates in New York State coITectionaJ facilities for over 38 years. PLS receives over 8,000 requests fo r assistance annually and serves as legal counsel to imnates on a variety of claims in the state and federal courts regarding condition s of confinement, including claims of excessive force, sexual abuse, cruel and inhuman treatment, deliberate indifference and violations of due process. PLS has a significant interest in insuring that incarcerated ind ividuals are treated fairly and humanely and are free from sexual abuse. As such, PLS was one of th e amici in Amador v. Andrews, No. 1:03- cv-00650, a case brough t by The Legal Ai d Society of New York challenging state policies that allow sexual abuse of prisoners to continue. The Uptown People's Law Center (UPLC) was fou nded in 1975 by former coal miners and their widows in an effort to secure black lung benefits for disabled coal miners. UPLC has been a leading voice for prisoner civil rights for over thirty years. It actively represents prisoners in both class action matters as well as indivjdual cases, including denial of adequate medical care, excessive force matters, denial of religious rights, discriminatio n, access to the courts, due process and cruel and un usual punishment. UPLC also engages in regular outreach to 5 Case: 14-969 Document: 45 Page: 22 07/21/2014 1275958 40 young people in the commtmity in an attempt to prevent them from becoming involved in the c1iminal justice system. ARGUMENT In this case, the District Comt held, pursuant to a misinterpretation of this Court's decision in Boddie v. Schnieder, that a corrections officer who on two separate occasions "squeeze[d] and fondle(d]'" the two plaintiffs' penises, while issuing threats and sexual comments and, in one case, "grabb[ing plaintiff] tightly around his neck," did not commit sexual abuse in violation of the Eighth Amendment because each was "only a single incident" and the plaintiffs did "not allege physical injury, penetiation, or pain." Crawford v. Cuomo, No. 9:13-cv406, 2014 WL 897046, at *4-5 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 2014). The Comt should take this opportunity to disavow the District Comt's cramped understanding of cruel and unusual punishment and adopt the clear, prevailing standard of what constitutes unacceptable sexual abuse in a prison or jail reflected in contemporary federal and state law. Boddie does not support the District Court's ruling and, even if it did, the Court would be compelled to abandon Boddie by the evolution of the standard of decency that has taken place in the seventeen years since that decision. By clarifying that any intentional contact by a conections officer with a detainee's genitalia or other intimate areas, such as the gi·oin, anus, breast, inner thigh or buttocks, that is unrelated to officiial duties or 6 Case: 14-969 Document: 45 Page: 23 07/21/2014 1275958 40 undertaken with the intent to abuse, arouse, or gratify sexual desire constitutes cruel and unusual pun ishment, the Court would create an enforceable and coherent bright-line rule defining the Eighth Amendment's prohibitions. The Court should reverse the District Court's dismissal of the complaint in this action, which clearly states a claim under the appropriate constitutional standard. I. Intentional Contacet With a Detainee's Genitalia Unrelated to a Corrections Officer's Official Duties or Unde1·taken With Intent to Abuse, Arouse, or Gratify Sexual Desire Is: Cruel and Unusual Punishment. Binding precedent and contemporary legislative enactments make clear that the definition of unconstitutional sexual abuse in a prison or jail turns not on penetration or physical injury but on whether the sexual contact is incidental to legitimate duties- such as a pat-fiisk or strip search-or, by contrast, whether it is undertaken with subjective intent to abuse the detainee or gratify the sexual desire of the coITections officer. Boddie did not hold otherwise. If it had, it would have to be abandoned iin light of contemporary standards of decency. A. Binding PrecedentFrom the Supreme Court and This Com1 Defining "Cruel and Unusual Punishment" Requires Adoption of the Rule Proposed by Amici and Rejection of the District Court's Rule. Relying on Boddie v. Schnieder, the District Comt found that the sexual abuse alleged in this case did not state an Eighth Amendment claim because the forcible groping of the plaintiffs' genitals, which allegedly went beyond what was necessary to execute a legitimate pat-frisk search and was undertaken for the 7 Case: 14-969 Document: 45 Page: 24 07/21/2014 1275958 40 purpose of abusing the plaintiffs, involved no penetration of any body cavity and did not result in p hysical injury. As an initial matter, the District Court misread Boddie. Boddie did not establish a rule that physica] injury or penetration is required to state an Eighth Amendment claim. No such holding-nor any words of that nature-appear in the Court's decision. To the C{)ntrary, the Court in Boddie rightly acknowledged sexual abuse is constitutionally cognizable not only when it leaves physical scars or b1uises but also because of its psychological impact on the victim. Boddie, 105 F.3d at 861 ("Sexual abuse may violate contemporary standards of decency and can cause severe physical and psychological harm.") (emphasis added). Boddie established that a line exists between actionable "sexual abuse" and non-actionable "isolated sexual harassment,.,, and classified the particular facts of that case as falling into the latter category, but it did not create the categorical rnUe requiring allegations of penetration or physical injury that the Dist1ict Court applied to the facts of this case.2 Beyond Boddie, case law from the Supreme Court and this Cowi both before 2 Boddie also established that "severe or repetitive" sexual harassment by a corrections officer can be "objectively sufficiently serious enough to constitute an Eigbtb Amendment violation." Boddie, 105 F.3d at 861. This case does not call upon the Court to further define when a series of acts of harassment, none of which standing alone would violate the Co nstitution, is sufficiently "severe and repetitiven to amount to an Eighth Amendment issue. Instead, this case asks the Court to hold that any single incident that in itself constitutes criminal sexual abuse and a vioDation of federal law is sufficiently serious, standing alone, to constitute an Eighth Amendment violation. 8 Case: 14-969 Document: 45 Page: 25 07/21/2014 1275958 40 and since Boddie underscores the error in the District Court's decision below and makes it clear that the rnle proposed by Amici, not the District CoUJ1's rnle, is correct. Whether behavior constitutes "cruel and unusual punishment" depends on whether it was "objectively, sufficiently serious" and whether the defendant subjectively had a "sufficiently culpable state of mind." Farmer v. Brennan , 51 l U.S. 825, 834 (1994); see also Boddie, 105 F.3d at 861. Evaluating whether intentional contact by a corrections officer with a detainee's genitalia or other intimate areas was either unrelated to official duties or had the intent to abuse, arouse, or gratify sexual desire properly turns on the objective circumstances of the incident (i.e., did the corrections officer touch particular areas of the body) and the subjective purpose or intent of the officer (i.e., was the touching Uegitimately related to official duties or, by contrast, undertaken with intent to abuse, arouse, or gratify sexual desire). The exemption for touching related to official duties also aligns with the long-standing principle that the Eighth Amendment prohibits unnecessa1y and wanton acts- punishment that is "so totally without penological justification that it results in the gratuitous infliction of suffering." Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 ( 1976). And the inclusion of any touching that has the subjective intent to abuse the victim or arouse or gratify the perpetrator's sexual desire compo11s with the Supreme Cow1's clear h-0ldjng that "[w]hen prison officials maliciously and 9 Case: 14-969 Document: 45 Page: 26 07/21/2014 1275958 40 sadisticall y use force to cause harm, contemporary standards of decency always are violated." Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992). Indeed, after Boddie, in a case pertaining to sexual abuse in prisons, this Court recognized that these factors- and not the question of injury caused by the punishment- are the proper relevant factors in definjng whether conduct is cruel and unusual. In United States v. Walsh, this Court noted that whether the behavior alleged was "purely unwaffanted and served no penological purpos.e weighed in favor of the cause of action, not against it" because "it is the sadistic and unwananted nature of the behavior, beyond what society expects its criminals to endure as punishment for their misdeeds, that renders the punishment ' cruel and unusual."' 194 F .3d 3 7, 49 & n.8 (2d Cir. 1999). A rule requiting plaintiffs to allege physical injury to state a claim for sexual abuse would be directly contrary to the Supreme Comt"s decision in Hudson, which held that when "prison officials maliciously and sadistically use force to cause harm," the Eighth Amendment is violated "whether or not significant injwy is evident. Otherwise, the Eighth Amendment would permit any physical punishment, no matter how diabolic or inhuman, inflicting less than some arbitrary quantity of injury." 503 U.S. at 9; see also Hudwn v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 530 (1984) (calculated harassment unrelated to prison needs may constitute c1uel and unusual punishment). As held by the Supreme Court, the linchpin of the inquiry is 10 Case: 14-969 Document: 45 Page: 27 07/21/2014 1275958 40 the subjective motive and whether the acts are penologically justified, as Amici argue here. Thus, the District Court's reading of a requirement to establish penetration or physical injury into this Comt's decision in Boddie was contrary to Boddie and other controlling caselaw. The Court should explicitly reject such a ruJe and adopt, instead, the clear and legally compelled rule articulated by Amici. B~ "Contemporary StandaTds of Decency" Require the Court to Adopt the Rule Proposed by Amici and Reject the Disttict Court's Rule. Even if Boddie had announced a rule that penetration or physical injury is required to state a claim of unconstitutional sexual abuse, this Court must still detennine whether societal expectations and standards regarding sexual abuse in prisons and jails have changed in the seventeen years since Boddie was decided. They have. Federal and state laws are consistent in their prohibition of any intentional contact by a corrections officer with an inmate' s genitalia or other intimate areas either (a) that is umelated to official duties or (b) where the officer has the intent to abuse, arouse, or gratify sexual desire. Given this nationally unifonn societal standard and the consistent state-level trend that preceded its codification in federal law, there can no longer be any doubt that the conduct at issue in this case violates contemporary standards of decency. "To determine whether a punishment is cruel and unusual, coUits must look 11 Case: 14-969 Document: 45 Page: 28 07/21/2014 1275958 40 beyond historical conceptions to ' the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society. ',, Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 58 (2010) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976)). "This is because the standard of extre1ne cruelty is not merely descriptive, but necessarily embodies a moral judgment. The standard itself remains the same, but its applicability must change as the basic mores of society change.,, Id. ( internal quotation and citation omitted). Cruel and unusual punishments consist of behavior that is "unconsistent with contemporary standards of decency and repugnant to the conscience of mankind." Whitley v. Albers~ 475 U.S. 312, 327 ( 1986) (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103). In defining "contemporary standards of decency," the Court must look to "objective indicia of consensus, as expressed in pai1iculai· by the enactments of legislatures that have addressed the question . _ . for essential instn1ction." Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 , 564 (2005); see also Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311- n2 (2002) ("[T]he clearest and most reliable objective evidence of contemporruy values is the legislation enacted by the country's legislatures.,,). Both a high nun1ber of legislative enactments prohibiting certain conduct and a consistent trend toward prohibition strongly indicate that contemporary standards of decency have evolved to classify that conduct as "cruel and unusual." Roper, 543 U.S. at 565-67 (holding that the rejection of the juveni le death penalty "in the 12 Case: 14-969 Document: 45 Page: 29 07/21/2014 1275958 40 majority of states" as well as the "consistency of the direction of change" toward abolition establish ed that the practice violated the Eighth Amendment). Federal regulations promulgated pursuant to the Prison Rape Elimination Act (((PREA'') in 2012 mandate that all correctional facilities in the United States adopt and enforce a "zero tolerance" policy "toward all fonns of sexual abuse." 28 C.F.R. § 115.11 (a). PREA's regulations have several definitions of what constitutes sexual abuse and include "[a]ny ... intentional contact, either directly or thr ough the clothing, of or with the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or the buttocks, that is unrelated to official duties or where the staff member ... has the intent to abuse, arouse, or gratify sexual desire." 28 C.F.R~ § 115.6. 3 "Termination shall be the presumptive discipl inary sanction for staff who have 3 The rule proposed by Amici is not intended to exhaust the subject of prison sexual abuse. PREA reflects the contemporary standards of decency relating to sexual abuse in prisons and conduct that violates PREA should be actionable under the Eighth Amendment. For instance, PREA' s regulations also define sexual abuse to include "[c]ontact between the mouth and any body part where the staff member . . . has the intent to abuse, arouse, or gratify sexual desire" and "[a]ny display by a staff member . . . of his or her uncovered genitalia, buttocks, or breast in the presen ce of an inm~te, detainee, or resident." 28 C.F.R. § 1J 5.6. AEthough these b ehaviors are not at issue io the instant case, they should also constitute conduct actionable und er the Eighth Amendment. Cf Amador v. Smith, No. 10-cv-06702 (W.D.N.Y. May 9, 2013) (order denying motion for summary judgment w here female prisoner alleged a series of "esca lating sexually offens ive behavior" by a male officer that included sexual comments, kisses, exposure of bis genitalia, and touching of her breasts and buttocks). By contrast, otber courts, relying upon Boddie in the same erroneous manner that the district court did here, have rejected s imilar acts as the ba sis for an Eighth Amendme11t claim. See, e.g., Joseph v. U.S. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 232 F.3d 901, 902 (10th Cir. 2000) (unpublished decision) (citing Boddie for the proposition that a correc tions officer who " touched [plaintiff] several times in a suggestive manner and exposed ber breasts" to an inmate did not state an Eighth Amendment claim because of the lack of physical injury). The fact that the gap is so large b etween what prevailing law defines as unacceptable and w hat district courts have found to be constitutionaUy unacceptable provides additional reason for this Court to correct the record on Boddie. 13 Case: 14-969 Document: 45 Page: 30 07/21/2014 1275958 40 engaged in sexual abuse" and all such tem1inations "shall be reported to law enforcement agencies, unJess the activity was dearly not criminal." 28 C.F.R. § l 15.76(b), (d). The federal government also makes any non-consensual "sexual contact', in a federal prison a felony punishable by up to two years in prison, where "sexual contact" is defined as "the intentional touchjng, either directly or through the clothing, of the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks of any person with an intent to abuse, humjliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person." 18 U.S.C. §§ 2244(b), 2246(3). The New York Penal Law- in provisions enacted three years after Boddiemirrors the language of PREA. The Penal Law classifies as Class A misdemeanors both "Forcible Touching" and " Sexual Abuse in the Second Degree.·~ "Forcible Touching" occurs when a "person, intentionally and for no legitimate purpose, forcibly touches the sexual or other intimate parts of another person for the purpose of degrading or abusing such person; or for the purpose of gratifying the actor's sexual desire." N.Y. Penal Law § 130.52. "Sexual Abuse in the Second Degree" is when a person "subjects another person to sexual contact ... when such other perso-n is incapable of consent by reason of some factor other than being less than seventeen years old," and further provides that any incarcerated person is inherently "incapable of consent." Id. §§ 130.60, 130.05(3)( e), (f). New York is no outlier in this regard. Forty-six states and the District of 14 Case: 14-969 Document: 45 Page: 31 07/21/2014 1275958 40 Columbia criminalize the intentional or forcible touching of intimate body parts, often in criminal statutes specifically targeting the prison or jail context.4 (The only exceptions are Mississippi, Oklahoma, FloTida and Vermont.) The District Court's limited definition of unconstitutional sexual abuse is inconsistent with contemporary standards of decency as defined by PREA and state criminal laws. For that reason, the Com1 should reverse the District Comt's dismissal of the Plaintiffs' Eighth Amendment claims and hold, as a rUJJe, that any intentional contact by a corrections officer with an inmate's genitalia or other intimate areas that is either unrelated to official duties or involves the intent to abuse, arouse, or gratify sexual desire meets the standard for unconstitutional sexual abuse. 4 See A la. Code§ 14-11-31; Alaska Stat.§ 11.41.427; Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann.§ 13-1419; Ark. Code Ann. § 5-1 4-127(a)(2); Cal. Penal Code§ 289.6; Colo. Rev. Stat.§§ 18-7-701 , 18-3-404; Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 53a-73a; Del. Code. Ann. tit. 11 , § 769; D.C. Code § 22-3014; Ga. Code Ann.§ 16-6-5.1 ; Haw. Rev. Stat. §707-732(e); Idaho Code Ann.§ 18-6110; 720 fll. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/ 11-9.2; Ind. Code Ann.§ 35-44. 1-3- 10; Iowa Code 709. 16; Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-55 12; Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann . §§ 5 10.120, 5 10.020; La. Rev. Stat. Ann.§ 14: 134.1; Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. Tit. 17-A, § 255-A; Md. Code Ann. Crim. Law§ 3-314; Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 268, § 21A; Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.520b; Minn_ Stat. Ann. § 609.345(l)(m); Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 566.101 , 566. 145; Mont. Code Ann. § 45-5-502; Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 28-3 22; Nev. Rev .. Stat. Ann. § 212.187; N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 632-k2(I)(n)(l), 632-A:4; N.J. Stait. Ann. §§ 2C~ 14-2, 2C: 143; N .M . Stat. Ann.§ 30-9-12; N.C. Gen. Stat.§ 14-27.5A; N .D. Cent. Code§ 12. 1-20-07; Ohio Rev. Code. Ann. §§ 2907.03, 2907.06; Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 163 .454; 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3 124.2; R. I. Gen. Laws§ 11-37-4 ; S.C. Code Ann.§ 44-23-l l50(c)(2); S. D. Codifi ed Laws§ 22-22-7.4; Tenn. Code Ann. §39-16-408; Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 39.04; Utah Code Ann. § 765-412(4), (5); Va Code. Ann.§§ 18.2-67.4, 18.2-67.10; W. Va. Code Ann.§§ 61-8B-2, 61-8B-7; Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 9A.44. l 70; Wis. Stat. Ann. § 940.225(2); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-303. 15 Case: 14-969 TI. Document: 45 Page: 32 07/21/2014 1275958 40 The Standard Proposed by Amici I s Necessary to Bring Humanity, Coherence and Consistency to Eighth Amendment Law Governing Sexual Abuse in Prisons and Jails. The rule proposed by Amici- that unconstitutional sexual abuse should be defined as any intentional contact by a conections officer with a detainee's genitalia or other intimate areas that is either unrelated to official duties or where the officer has the intent to abuse, arouse, or gratify sexual desire- is not only compelled by the Supreme Court, this Court's precedent defining cruel and unusual punishment, and contemporary standards of decency. It is also compelled by the need to make the law defining unconstitutional sexual abuse consistent, rational, and predictable both by lower court judges called upon to interpret it and corrections officers called upon to comply with it. The persistence of the flawed notion that sexual abuse is defined by whether the plaintiff can show penetration or physical injury bas resulted in incoherent rulings among New York's federal district courts and among the federal circuits and in the improper dismissal of cases alleging egregious instances of sexual abuse in prisons and jails. The District Court in this case is not alone in misinterpreting Boddie to categorically exclude from the Eighth Amendment's reach instances of sexual abuse that do not involve penetration of a body cavity or physical injury. Several district comts in this Circuit have made the same mistake, often in cases where the sexual abuse alleged is shocking to the conscience and utterly inconsistent with the 16 Case: 14-969 Document: 45 Page: 33 07/21/2014 1275958 40 punishment we expect the incarcerated to endure. See, e.g., Jones v. Rock, No. 9: 12-CV-0447, 2013 WL 4804500, at *3-4, 18-20 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2013) (citing Boddie and finding that allegations that a coITections officer "shoved his fingers between Plaintiff's buttocks with such force that one of bis fingers, along with Plaintiffs pants and unde1wear, invaded Plaintiffs anus," "groped Plaintiffs genitals and squeezed them until Plaintiff cried out in pain" while threatening plaintiff and taunting him for being a virgin, failed to state a claum because "Plaintiff has not alleged that he sustained any physical injury as a result"); Samuels v. Strange, No. 3:08-CV-1872, 2012 WL 4754683,, at *2-4 (D. Conn. Oct. 4, 201 2) (finding that allegations that a corrections officer pulled down plaintiff's pants and fondled his genitals for an extended period of time failed to state a claim because, citing Boddie, " not all sexual assaults of a prisoner by a guard or corrections officer violate the Eighth Amendment"); Castro-Sanchez v. N Y.S. Dep't of Corr. Servs. , No. 10 Civ. 83 14, 2012 WL 4474154, at *1 -3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2012) (citing Boddie and finding that allegations that a corrections officer "pulled down plaintiffs pants and groped his buttocks" while laughing and using the term "Pue1to Rican motherfucker" did not state a claim); McEachin v. Bek, No. 06-CV-6453, 2012 WL 111 3584, at *6 (W.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, 2012) (relying on Boddie to conclude that allegations that a coITections officer "tried to stick his fingers in [plaintiffs] rectum" while punching him in the head while he was 17 Case: 14-969 Document: 45 Page: 34 07/21/2014 1275958 40 handcuffed did not state a claim because it was an " isolated incident, which did not involve actual penetration"); Sanders v. Gifford, Civ. No. 9: ll-cv-0326, 2011 WL 1792589, at * 1-2 (N.D .N.Y . Apr. 5, 20 11) (finding that allegations that a con-ections officer "grabbed [plaintiff's] scrotum and squeezed hard" and " took his ID card and swiped it in between Plaintiffs buttocks" failed to state a claim relying on Boddie); lrvis v. Seally, No. 9:09-CV-543, 2010 WL 5759149, at *l , 4 (N.D_N.Y. Sept. 2, 2010) (relying on Boddie to find that allegatuons that a conections officer, on one occasion, forced plaintiff to "bend at the waist," and "spread [his] butt cheeks" while the officer was "rubbing his crotch," and on another occasion "grabbed plaintiff's naked butt cheek while stroking [the officer's] exposed penis with his other hand'" did not state a claim); Holton v. Moore, No. CIV.A.96CV0077, 1997 WL 642530, at * I-2 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 15, 1997) (citing Boddie and finding that allegations that a c01Tections officer "put his hands down [plaintiff's] pants trying to pa11 his cheeks coming in touch with his anal" and ''unzipped [plaintiffs] pants and touched his penis" did not state a claim). Other federal circuits- specifically , the Fifth, Sixth and Eleventh Circuits- have also relied on Boddie to limit the scope of the Eighth Amendment and dismiss claims alleging similar unconscionable facts. 5 5 See Solomon v. Mich. Dep 't of Corr. , 478 F. App 'x 318, 320-2 1 (6th Cir. 2012) (unpublished decision) (citing Boddie for the proposition that a corrections officer who "pressed bjs erect penis into [plaintiffs] buttocks during a search and made sexually suggestive remarks about 18 Case: 14-969 Document: 45 Page: 35 07/21/2014 1275958 40 These courts' decisions not only extend Boddie far beyond its actual holding but also are, for the reasons stated above, inconsistent with this Court's and the Supreme Comt's interpretation of the Eighth Amendment. The fact that these misapplications of Boddie have had such widespread influence reinforces the need for this Court to clarify its ruling and b1ing this Circuit 's Eighth Amendment jwisprudence back in line with contemporary constitutional n01ms. These couTts' interpretations of Boddie are not only wrong, they have created a split both within this Circuit and among the federal appellate comts on the definition of unconstitutional sexual abuse in prisons and jails. Several other New York district courts- as well as the Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuitshave defined unconstitutional sexual abuse consistently with PREA and the defin]tion of c1iminal sexual abuse and rejected a rule that turns on the question of penetration or physical injury, resulting in a body of case law that is in-econcilable [plaintiffs] buttocks" did not violate the constitution); Boxer Xv. Han·is, 437 F.3d 1107, 111 l (11th Cir. 2006) (citing Boddie for the proposition thatt: a corrections. officer' s solicitation of an inmate ' s "manual masturbation . . . under the threat of reprisal" did not state a claim); Washington v. Harris, 186 f . App'x 865, 865-56 (I 1th Cir. 2006) (unpublished decision) (holding that a corrections officer who "crept up behind" an inmate, grabbed his genitals, kissed him aod threatened to perform oral sex on him did not state a claim); Jackson v. Madery, 158 F. App 'x 656, at 661 (6th Cir. 2005) (unpublished decision) (citing Boddie for the proposition that allegations of a corrections officer "rubbing and grabbing [plaintifFs] buttocks in a degrading and humiliating manner . . . does not rise to the level of cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment" ); Copeland v. Nunan, 250 F.3d 743 (5th Cir. 2001) (unpublished decision) (citing Rnddie for the proposition that a prison employee w ho fondle<l plaintiff's penis and anus on three occasions did not state a claim because it was not a " violent sexual assault', and plaintiff had not alleged "lasting physical injury"). 19 Case: 14-969 Document: 45 with the cases previously c ited.6 Page: 36 07/21/2014 1275958 40 This Col!.lrt should follow the compelling reaso ning of these courts and define unconstitutional sexual abuse in a prison or jail in a manner consistent with contemporary standards of decency, bringing clarity to the law within the Second Circuit and contributing to the resolution of the split among the federal appellate cou11s. A rule that any intentional contact by a conections officer with a detainee's gen1talia or other intimate areas that is either unrelated to official duties or done with the intent to abuse, arouse, or gratify sexual desire violates the Eighth Amendment creates a bright line already familiar to correctional institutions, which are under an existing legal obligation to comply with PREA. Individual corrections 6 See, e.g. , Amador v. Smith, No. IO-CY-06702 (W.D.N.Y. May 9, 20 13) (holding that allegations that a corrections officer fondled plaintiff's breasts and forcibly kissed her, while making sexual cormnents, stated a claim); Lewis v. Fischer, No. 08-CV-3027, 2009 WL 689803, at *1-2 , 4-6 (E.D.N. Y. Mar. 12, 2009) (holding that allegations that a corrections officer in the course of a pat-frisk "put[] his hand into [plaintiff's] pants and fond![ ed] his penis and squeeze[ed] his testicles" stated a claim); Doe v. Barrell, No. 3:01-CV-519, 2006 WL 3741825, at *I , 10 (D. Conn. Dec. 19, 2006) (holding that allegations that a prison doctor "forc[ed plaintiffJ into a chair, pulling down his pants and touching his genitals" stated a claim); Rodriguez v. McC!enning, 399 F . Supp. 2d 228, 232, 237-38 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (holding that allegations that a corrections officer "conducted the pat-frisk in an inappropriate manner that included caressing [plaintiffs] chest and repeatedly groping his genitals and buttocks" stated a claim) ; Calhoun v. DeTel!a, 3 19 F.3d 936, 938-40 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding that allegations that a corrections officers forced plaintiff to perform "provocative acts" while they made ·~sexual ribald comments" during a strip search stated a claim notwithstanding the lack of penetration or physical injury); Williams v. Prudden, 67 F. App'x 976, 977 (8tll Cir. 2003) (unpublished opinion) (holding that allegations that a corrections officer " ground his pelvis against [plaintiff], grabbed her breast" :and verbally harassed plaintiff stated a claim notwithstanding lack of alleged penetration or physical injury); Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1196-98 (9th Cir. 2000) (noting the N inth Circuit' s longstanding rule that "no lasting physical injury is necessary to state a cause of action" and upholding a claim based on allegat1ons that a corrections officer requested oral s,e x, groped plaintiffs buttocks and pressed his penis into plaintiffs clothed buttocks without penetration). 20 Case: 14-969 Document: 45 Page: 37 07/21/2014 1275958 40 officers are trained on PREA's provisions 7 and are on notice that the same behavior that would expose them to constitutional liability under the proposed rule already exposes them to criminal liability in New York and the vast majority of other jurisdictions. The proposed rule is also consistent with coITections officers' responsibility to perlorm pat-down and strip searches for legitimate penological purposes. The rule does not make every touching of an inmate's genitals or other sensitive body parts unconstitutional. It requires a plaintiff to prove that such touching was either unrelated to the coITections officer's official duties or undertaken with intent to abuse, arouse, or gratify sexual desire. Cf 28 C.F.R. § 115.6 (requiring these elements under PREA); N.Y. Penal Law§ 130.52 (requiring proof that the forcible touching was conducted for no legitimate purpose and for the purpose of degrading or abusing the v ictim). Requiring plaintiffs to meet th is burden ensures that incidental or legitimate touching in the course of a penologically justified search could not subject a coITections officer or institution to liability, just as such conduct does not violate PREA or state criminal laws.8 7 Indeed, given the PREA requires that correctional institutions train officers and staff on the law's provisions and the institution 1s policies to prevent instances of sexual assault and abuse. See 28 C.F.R. §§ 11 5.31-35. 8 For example, a number of courts have dismissed Eighth Amendment claims predicated solely on allegations of touching plaintiffs' genitals in the context of a pat-frisk or strip search, where the plaintiff had not alleged facts tllat would support a conclusion that the touching was unrelated to the search. See, e.g., Williams v. Filch, 550 F. Supp. 2d 413 (W.D.N.Y. 200 8) (granting 21 Case: 14-969 Document: 45 Page: 38 07/21/2014 1275958 40 incoherent state of this Circuit's district court jurisprudence, clarification of the definjtion of unconstitutional sexual abuse and adoption of the clear rule advocated by Amici would be likely to d iscow·age the filing of claims against con-ections officers who are merely executing lawful searches by making clearer what facts must be pied to state a claim under the Eighth Amendment. CONCLUSIO N For the for egoing reasons, the Court should reverse the District Court's dismissal of Plaintiffs, complaint and adopt a iule that any intentional contact by a coITections officer with a detainee's genitalia or other intimate areas that is either unrelated to official duties or done with the intent to abuse, arouse:) or gratify sexual desire constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. summary judgment where corrections officer "handl[ ed] the tip of [plaintiffs] penis,, in the course of a body cavity search, where X-rays showed the presence of a metal object secreted in the plaintiffs foreskin); Hany v. Suarez, No. I 0 Civ. 6756, 2012 WL 2053533 (S .D.N.Y. June 4, 201 2) (dismissing complaint where plaintiff alleged solely that corrections officer " placed one of his hands" on plain tiffs genitals "for five to six seconds" in the course of a pat-frisk search); Johnson v. Enu, No . 08-CV- 158, 2011 WL 3439179, at * 13-15 (N. D.N.Y. July 13, 201 I) (dismissing a complaint stating that a corrections officer's "hands bad come into contact with [plaintiffs] groin area while secur ing [plaintiff] for transport"); Montero v. Crusie, 153 F. Supp. 2d 368, 373, 375 (S.D.N.Y. 2001 ) (dismissing complaint alleging solely tha.t on several occasions a corrections officer touched plaintiffs genitalia in cou rse of pat-frisk searches); Hughes v. Smith, 23 7 F. App' x 756, 759 (3d Cir. 2007) (dismissing a claim predicated solely on allegat ions of "a single pat-down frisk in which the correctional officer allegedly touched [plaintiffs] testicles through his clothing"). Such results would be entirely consistent with the rule advocated by Amici in this case. 22 Case: 14-969 Dated: Document: 45 Page: 39 07/21/2014 1275958 40 July 21 , 2014 New York, N.Y. Isl Erin Beth Harrist E RIN BETH HARRIST COREY STOUGHTON CHRISTOPHER DUNN New York Civil Liberties Union Foundation 125 Broad Street , 19th Floor New York,, NY 10004 (212) 607-3300 eharrist@ nyclu.org 23 Case: 14-969 Document: 45 Page: 40 07/21/2014 1275958 40 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE I hereby ce1tify that this brief, according to the word-processing program with which it was prepared, complies with Rule 32(a)(7) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure in that it contains a total of 6, 108 words. Isl Erin Beth Harrist ERIN BETH HARRIST