



# developmental vocational institution

staff  
safety  
evaluation

September 26 - 30, 2005



California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation

Corrections Standards Authority

600 Barrett Drive

Sacramento, California 95814

[www.cru.ca.gov](http://www.cru.ca.gov) 916-443-5073

STATE OF CALIFORNIA - DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION

ARNOLD SCHWARZENEGGER, GOVERNOR

## CORRECTIONS STANDARDS AUTHORITY

600 Bercut Drive  
Sacramento, CA 95814  
916-445-5073  
www.csa.ca.gov



November 30, 2005

Secretary Roderick Q. Hickman  
California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation  
1515 S Street, Room 502 S  
Sacramento, CA 95814

Dear Secretary Hickman:

In response to your concern about prison and juvenile institutional staff safety the Corrections Standards Authority (CSA) Staff Safety Evaluation Team conducted an evaluation of the Deuel Vocational Institute (DVI) September 26-30, 2005.

As noted in the report, the most significant issues are the result of crowding and the physical plant limitations related to the institution's mission as a reception center. Despite these issues, institution staff reported feeling safe in their duties. Staff further reported a high degree of confidence in the management of the institution.

We are simultaneously forwarding the report to interested members of CDCR in order that they may begin considering input into any areas under their jurisdiction. We are requesting a response from DVI management to the findings of this evaluation within 30 days of receipt of the report. Prudence dictates that a corrective action plan (CAP) also be developed; however, monitoring a CAP is beyond the scope of CSA and is the responsibility of the Division of Adult Institutions.

The enclosed report along with the CAP will be presented to the CSA at the next scheduled meeting. If you have any questions or comments, please feel free to contact me.

Sincerely,

Handwritten signature of Karen L. Stoll in cursive.

Karen L. Stoll  
Executive Director (A)

cc: Steve Moore, Warden  
Wendy Still, Associate Director  
John Dovey, Director  
Karen Wong, Risk Management  
Sandra Duveneck, Human Resources  
Armand Burruel, Fiscal Services  
George Sifuentes, Facilities Management

Enclosure

TABLE OF CONTENTS

BACKGROUND ..... 1

EVALUATION METHODOLOGY ..... 1

FACILITY PROFILE ..... 3

    Current Usage ..... 3

    Population Summary ..... 4

    Staffing ..... 5

REVIEW OF DOCUMENTATION ..... 7

    Staff Assault Incident Reports ..... 7

    Training ..... 10

    Safety Equipment ..... 12

PHYSICAL PLANT ..... 14

STAFF INTERVIEWS ..... 18

    Interview Process ..... 18

    Custody Staff - Interviews with Managers ..... 18

    Custody/Treatment Staff - Interviews with Supervisors ..... 20

    Custody Staff - Interviews with Line Staff ..... 21

    Interviews with Non-Custody Staff ..... 23

SUMMARY/CONCLUSION ..... 24

ENTRANCE LETTER..... Attachment A

DATA MATRIX..... Attachment B

DESIGN CAPACITY vs. CURRENT CAPACITY..... Attachment C

STAFF QUESTIONNAIRE..... Attachment D

EVALUATION TEAM MEMBERS AND ASSIGNMENT ..... Attachment E

## BACKGROUND

In March 2005, Secretary Roderick Hickman requested that the Corrections Standards Authority (CSA) develop a plan to evaluate staff safety issues at all of the state's adult and youth detention facilities. At the May 19, 2005 meeting of the CSA, the proposal was presented and accepted. On May 24-25, 2005, a panel of state and national subject matter experts was convened to establish the criteria by which the evaluations would be conducted. Based on those criteria, a team was developed and a timeline of evaluations was established.

On July 5-8, 2005, a team comprised of staff from the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) CSA, Adult Operations and Juvenile Justice conducted the first Staff Safety Evaluation at Mule Creek State Prison (MCSP). The evaluation protocol consisted of a request for advance data on staff assaults, including victim and perpetrator data; a preliminary site visit of the physical plant; random interviews with various custody and non-custody staff; a review of applicable written policies and procedures governing the operation of the institution; and a review of documentation including incidents of staff assaults, staffing levels, inmate population and safety equipment.

## EVALUATION METHODOLOGY

Deuel Vocational Institution was selected as the second adult facility for review and the MCSP evaluation protocol was followed. An entrance letter was sent to Acting Warden Steven R. Moore informing him of the September 26-30, 2005 site visit dates and the proposed operational plan (Attachment A). The criteria panel had suggested using a data matrix to record information from incident reports (CDC 837) of inmate assaults on staff to determine if any trends could be identified. The institution staff was asked to review the reports and complete the matrix before the site visit (Attachment B). The evaluation team asked that all incident reports and related documentation be made available during the site visit. As the evaluation progressed, the team identified other information appropriate for review and staff at the institution provided copies of existing documents or researched their records for information.

The Facilities Standards and Operations Division of the CSA led the evaluation team (Attachment E). The evaluation began on September 26, 2005 at the institution with an entrance conference with Acting Warden Moore, appropriate institutional administrative staff and evaluation team members. The conference included an operational overview of the institution by Acting Warden Moore as well as an overview of the evaluation process by CSA Field Representative Robert Takeshta. Following the entrance conference, the evaluation team members were provided a tour of the institution.

Using a conference room as the base of operation, the team broke into workgroups and began the review process but continued to meet daily to discuss their observations. Documentation was reviewed relative to the physical plant configuration, policies, safety equipment, staffing levels, staff assaults and inmate population. The group looked for any trends or related issues.

The physical plant team reviewed the institution design as it related to staffing and the inmate population. The purpose of the review was to identify any issues that would affect staff safety,

such as poor physical plant design/maintenance, inmate crowding, limited visibility, insufficient supervision or lack of communication.

Institutional managers as well as staff and supervisors on each of the three watches were interviewed to provide an opportunity to identify their concerns regarding staff safety issues. A questionnaire was developed in preparation for the review to ensure some consistency among the interviews (Attachment D). The responses were categorized and a summary of the responses is included in the Staff Interview section of this report (page 17-23). Conflicts between the documentation, the staffs' perception of the practice and staffs' concerns for safety issues were noted during the interviews and are included in this report. The review team also made observations and those are noted.

An exit conference was conducted with Acting Warden Moore and the institution management staff to provide a summary of the results of the evaluation. The exit conference included a presentation of the team's perceptions and observations as well as a summary of comments made by staff.

## FACILITY PROFILE

Deuel Vocational Institution (DVI), located near Tracy, California, was first opened in 1953 as a general population institution with extensive vocational training programs and Prison Industry Authority programs. The facility construction, often referred to as a "telephone pole" design popular in the 1950s, is based on a long central corridor that extends the length of the institution. Buildings extending from each side of the corridor contain several inmate housing units, a medical unit, visiting areas, library, and other program areas. The housing units are of linear design with interior corridors. The administrative segregation unit is a linear design with corridors separating the cells from external walls.

The Reception Center is located at one end of the central corridor and the former vocational shops and plant operations are located at the opposite end. Perpendicularly intersecting the central corridor at the center of the institution is a second corridor. The gymnasium, inmate dining rooms, chapels and Prison Industry Authority shops are located off of both sides of this second corridor.

The institution was originally constructed to house 1249 inmates in single cell linear housing units. A 299-bed reception center was added in 1959 but deactivated in 1974 and converted into a Management Control Unit. In 1978, a second bed was added to existing cells to convert them to double occupancy cells. A 108-bed Minimum Security Facility (MSF), located outside of the secure area of the main complex, was added in 1981 to house support service inmates that worked on the farming operation and performed institutional maintenance. In 1987, 100 more beds were added to the MSF. The reception center was reactivated in 1988 with nearly 1000 beds. Today, the reception center population has expanded to include all but about 400 beds within the main security area of the institution. Current capacity in the main facility is 2875; there are 228 beds in the MSF and 10 beds in the Fire House (FH). In addition, 960 emergency beds have been added in various portions of the facility. This brings the total number of beds to 4073.

### Current Usage

DVI is currently used as a reception center for the intake of up to 500 parole violators and new commitments per week from several counties located in Northern California. Parole violators make up nearly 75% of the inmates processed through the Reception Center (RC). The RC is intended to be a temporary housing area for up to 90 days to allow the correctional counseling staff time to decide where best to transfer the inmate for more permanent housing.

Intake services include compiling historical information on each inmate including criminal records, life histories, history of conduct while in custody, medical histories, gang affiliations, psychological background, educational level and/or vocational skills. A medical unit is available to those inmates in need of medical, mental health and substance abuse treatment.

Generally, RC inmates are considered to be medium to high security inmates. Many of the new arrivals have special classification needs. In addition to the difficulties associated with avoiding conflicts of housing rival gang members, staff must also separate inmates because they have

"dropped out" from some previous gang affiliation and are now targets for assaults. Gang dropouts, inmates requiring special housing because of the high profile nature of their crimes, and inmates who received threats from other inmates are classified as Sensitive Needs Yard (SNY) inmates and are housed in two cell blocks within the reception center awaiting transfer to a facility with designated SNY housing.

Mental health issues further complicate the classification and housing process. Enhanced Outpatient Program (EOP) inmates and Clinical Care Case Management System (CCCMS) inmates have been identified as having varying levels of mental health needs which delays the reception center processing time until there is an available bed at an appropriate institution.

The transformation from a vocational training facility to a reception center has reduced the number of mainline inmates to a point where most of the vocational programs have been terminated. Prison Industry Authority continues to employ about 125 inmates and the MSF inmates are utilized for general maintenance, operation of the dairy farm and the Fire House. About 50 inmates are participating in educational programs such as the Correctional Learning Network (to teach life skills), GED, High School Diploma (through the Tracy School District), and the College Program (on-line). The educational staff also works with nearly 2000 inmates in the Bridging Education Program, a program available to eligible inmates in the RC that includes 30 minutes of cell-front instruction by the programmer and 6.5 hours of in-cell study.

DVI has been selected for implementation of a pilot program developed in response to a recent court case ruling that prohibits blanket segregations by race in CDCR institutions. The integration program is limited to the RC and is in the initial development stages, but will ultimately include the mainline inmates. No implementation date has been established at the time of this writing.

DVI is the inmate transportation hub for Northern California. Teams of officers, based at DVI, move inmates between institutions throughout California. Several times every week, when moving inmates between northern and southern California institutions, crews must layover for the night at DVI before continuing on their route. Each busload of as many as 38 inmates must be processed, housed and cared for by custody staff until the following day.

The processing of 500 incoming inmates each week requires that staff release or transfer an equal number of inmates to make beds available. Inmates may be released from custody at DVI but more often they are transferred to another institution. The Receiving and Releasing (R&R) process occurs primarily during the weekdays and the frequent movement requires staff to be constantly vigilant in completing their duties.

### Population Summary

The total institution bed count is 4073 (Attachment C). On the first day of the evaluation, the inmate count was 3,827, with 3,606 within the secure perimeter and another 221 inmates at the minimum-security support services area. To accommodate the population, the institution has added 960 emergency beds (E-beds). E-beds are temporary beds that have been placed in building dayrooms, walkways and the gymnasium. Currently, 432 inmates are housed in the

gymnasium including 300 Level I-II inmates housed in one area and 132 overflow RC inmates housed separately in the bifurcated gymnasium.

Staffing

On September 25, 2005, the initial day of the evaluation, the funded staffing was established at 763.64 custody personnel, which includes the ranks of Correctional Officer through Warden. That number includes 87.64 vacant positions. The below listing reflects the ranges of custody classifications

- Managerial Custody staff at DVI consists of the Warden, Chief Deputy Warden, 3 Associate Wardens and 4 Captains.
- Supervisory custody staff consists of Correctional Lieutenants, Correctional Counselors IIs (CC II), Correctional Sergeants and Senior Medical Technical Assistants (SMTA).
- Rank and file custody staff consist of Correctional Officers, Medical Technical Assistants (MTA) and Correctional Counselors I (CC I). Of the 504 Correctional Officers currently assigned to DVI, 40 are part-time intermittent (PIE) Correctional Officers.

There are 403.41 allocated non-custody positions with 43.91 vacancies. Additionally, 15 custody employees were off on long term leaves (over 3 months) as were seven non-custody employees.

See Table I below for a summary of positions, vacancies, long-term leave and staff availability.

Table I				
	Allocated Positions	Vacancies	Long-term Leave	Available Staff
Custody Staff	763.64	87.64	15	661
Non-Custody Staff	403.41	43.91	7	352.5
Total	1167.05	131.55	22	1013.5

**Finding:** Shift replacement of custody positions may be a contributing factor to staff assaults.

**Discussion:** The institution has a 13.4% vacancy rate among the custody line staff. Shift replacement must be found to replace vacant officer positions, officers off on long term leave (over 3 months for the purpose of this review), officers absent to attend training and officers off on a short term basis for all other types of leaves. As a result, the number of volunteers is insufficient to fill the required posts and officers must be ordered to work overtime. The records reviewed by the team reflect that an average of 30 officers must be ordered to work overtime each day, often after working their assigned 8-hour shift. Officers working shift replacement overtime may be tired, preoccupied or performing at less than their full potential because they are working assignments in which they are unfamiliar. The team was unable to confirm if staff injuries occurred at a higher frequency during overtime shifts than during regular shifts.



**Finding:** Administrative staff responsible for the Prison Industry Authority facilities reported a need for additional relief staff to provide supervision of inmate workers.

**Discussion:** Seven staff are currently assigned to provide instruction and supervision to inmates within the five shops that comprise Prison Industry Authority operations at DVI. Two of these staff function as maintenance staff and provide coverage within the shops when one of the regularly assigned staff is not on duty. On average, two of the seven staff are not on duty each day of the week. As a result, equipment and building maintenance is not occurring. Additionally, the Prison Industry Authority administrator reported that he is often called upon to provide supervision of inmate workers within the shop areas due to an inadequate number of available staff. The institution is encouraged to examine the staffing level of the Prison Industry Authority.

## REVIEW OF DOCUMENTATION

The Data/Documentation Review Team reviewed available documentation, records and policy manuals to identify any trends or common themes among the incidents. The items reviewed included:

- Incident reports for staff assaults or attempted assaults (CDC 837).
- Staff Assault Review Committee Minutes.
- State Compensation Reports (SCIF) for assaults on staff.
- Inmate appeals (602).
- Inventories of authorized safety equipment.
- Use of Force Executive Review Committee (ERC) findings.
- Facility training records
- Corrective action plans from previous audits and inspections.
- Employee safety grievances.
- Daily chronological/watch commander's report.
- Involuntary overtime by inverse seniority records.
- Staffing information.
- Classification records.
- Inmate files.
- Department Operations Manual (DOM) – Relevant sections only.
- Restricted Department Operations Manual (Red DOM) – Relevant sections only.

### Staff Assault Incident Reports

**Finding:** After a collective review and discussion of the above listed documents, there were no obvious trends identified relative to the issue of staff battery. Other than inmate classification (see discussion below), no issues were identified as being significantly consistent among the various incidents.

**Discussion:** Sixty-nine incidents of battery or attempted battery on staff were reported during the time period, January 1, 2004 through May 1, 2005 at DVI. The institution reports that 78 staff members were victims of battery or were injured during incidents:

- Seventy-two victims were from the ranks of correctional officers and two were correctional lieutenants. The remaining victims included two MTAs, one CCI and one physician.
- Sixty-two of the victims were male and 16 were female.
- Forty-four of the victims were white, 6 were black, 19 were hispanic, and 9 were reported as Other.

**Finding:** With the exception of age, the victim demographics are generally consistent with those of the overall institution. Younger officers were involved in a higher incidence of staff assaults.

**Discussion:** The average age of the victims was approximately 35 years with 7.7 years of service while the average age of all staff is 45 with 9.9 years of service. Thirty-three victims had less

than 4 years of experience while 13 victims had 15 or more years of experience. Management expressed concern with no longer being able to assign new staff to work with more veteran staff as a part of the training process and to balance the experience levels on each shift. Post and bid rules have prohibited such reassignment of staff

**Finding:** Race, age and county of commitment of the involved inmates do not appear to be significant assault factors.

**Discussion:** No significant variances were noted when comparing the race, age or county of commitment of the assaultive inmates to that of the overall facility inmate population. White inmates were involved in 28 incidents; black inmates were involved in 25 incidents; Hispanic inmates were involved in 17 incidents; and the remaining 7 were dispersed among the other races.

The inmates had been committed from 19 counties with none being unusually represented. Commitments from Sacramento and San Joaquin counties had the highest frequency with 15 and 13 inmates respectively. Some counties initially appeared to be underrepresented; however, many were taking their prison commitments to San Quentin State Prison during the reporting period. San Quentin reduced the number of intakes they will accept resulting in an increase in intakes at DVI.

The average age of the involved inmates was 33, not significantly different from the prison population's average age of almost 36, and they had been incarcerated for an average of 1152 days, including 122 days at DVI.

**Finding:** The vast majority of the staff assaults did not result in serious injury to the victim staff member or to other personnel involved in the emergency response.

**Discussion:** In the reports reviewed, no serious injuries<sup>1</sup> were initially reported by the victims and few required medical attention following the initial treatment at the institution's infirmary. In all but nine incidents, no staff workdays were lost. Six of the 69 incidents reviewed resulted in staff being off work for over one day. In the most serious case, no serious injuries were initially reported; however, one staff member has been off duty for over 168 days as a result of injuries and has not returned to work. The Return to Work Coordinator added that only three instances of staff being injured during emergency responses had occurred during 2005.

**Finding:** Accidental injuries are not a frequent occurrence.

**Discussion:** The evaluation team reviewed staff injury reports for the period from January 2004 through May 2005. The evaluation team noted that staff injuries occurring as a result of responding to emergency alarms are significantly less at DVI (three injuries from January 1, 2005 to present) when compared to other institutions. The living areas and support facilities at DVI are all accessible by connecting indoor corridors that span north to south and east to west.

---

<sup>1</sup> A serious injury is defined by Title 15, Section 3000 as a serious impairment of physical condition, including, but not limited to, the following: loss of consciousness; concussion; bone fracture; protracted loss or impairment of function of any bodily member or organ; a wound requiring suturing; and disfigurement.

The corridors allow for unobstructed emergency response because of the concrete floors that are smooth and void of any irregularities such as potholes or uneven surfaces. DVI has also marked the center of the corridors with an orange lane designated for responding staff during emergencies, non-responding staff and inmates step to the side allowing responding staff clear passage.

**Finding:** Timely documentation of reviews for incidents of accident/injury of custody staff needs to occur.

**Discussion:** Reviews following accidental injuries are not being conducted for custody staff. The Safety Officer conducts accident and injury reviews of incidents involving non-peace officer staff but was unaware of any follow-up being completed for custody staff. The Safety Officer said the injury package, including the form IIPP-5 that is used to report the findings of the review, was not being completed for all injuries of custody staff and he does not follow up to ensure that it is completed by the injured employee's supervisor. The Safety Officer said he is not made aware of staff assault injuries and confines his actions to accidental injuries in the workplace. The facts surrounding specific injury cases and staff assault cases are not discussed at the safety meetings. The review team suggests that one person be designated to oversee the required review process, maintain the appropriate documentation, and share any lessons learned with the appropriate personnel.

**Finding:** Inmates with high security classifications or serious mental health issues are more likely to commit assaults on staff. Length of stay for these inmates may also be an influencing factor.

**Discussion:** All but one of the 69 incidents involved inmates still classified as being in RC. Thirty-three of the incidents involved inmates with high security classifications or serious mental health issues. Twenty-one of the incidents occurred in the administrative segregation units. Ten of the incidents occurred in the medical/mental health treatment area.

Six of the incidents involved Enhanced Outpatient Program (EOP) inmates. EOP inmates, while generally described as mental health patients because of their diagnosis, require a significantly higher level of clinical care than do other mentally ill inmates. Twenty-three of the incidents involved Clinical Care Case Management System (CCCMS) inmates who are also diagnosed with mental illness but not requiring the heightened level of care of EOP inmates.

As previously stated, CCCMS and EOP inmates are more difficult to place in the CDCR system because of limited the bed space available to those classifications. As a result, the processing time in RC is often extended past the 90-day period that CDCR uses as a benchmark for their reception centers. Of the 16 inmates involved in staff assault that were designated as being CCCMS, 6 had been at DVI longer than 90 days and the group average was 126 days. Of the 4 EOP inmates, 3 had been at DVI longer than 90 days and the group average was 241 days.

**Finding:** Inmate manufactured weapons were not factors in assaults on staff.

**Discussion:** Inmate manufactured weapons were not involved in any of the incidents reviewed. Inmates threw or attempted to throw an unknown liquid substance on staff in 15 of the incidents. In the remainder of the cases reviewed, inmates battered or attempted to batter staff by striking, kicking or otherwise unlawfully touching with their hands and or their feet. Doors or gates were used as weapons in three incidents and a food tray in another.

**Finding:** Insufficient data were available to determine if gang affiliation was a contributing factor related to staff assaults.

**Discussion:** In the reports reviewed, only seven documented that the involved inmate was a gang member and no single gang was identified in a significant number of incidents. The majority of inmates involved were RC inmates and their gang involvement, if any, had not yet been validated at the institution.

**Finding:** Hours of the day and months of the year may be factors in assaults on staff.

**Discussion:** The frequency of incidents was highest during the third watch with 36 occurrences; second watch had 32 incidents while only one occurred during first watch. The probability of being the victim of a staff assault may be higher during third watch because the number of available staff is significantly less than that of the second watch. Although the data were insufficient to draw any conclusions, the frequency of incidents was highest during the month of December in 2004 with 8 assaults and lowest in August 2004 with only one incident. The frequency of occurrences was evenly distributed among the days of the week.

### Training

**Finding:** Documentation received by the evaluation team confirmed that custody staff, non custody staff, and all new employees at DVI are receiving mandated training in addition to all other required departmental and site specific training.

**Discussion:** The In-Service Training (IST) manager receives a list of required formal training topics from the Office of Training and Professional Development (OTPD), CDCR headquarters. The training topics identified by the OTPD are specific to employee job classifications at the institution. The IST manager provided documentation of mandated training and institutional orientation training for both custody and non-custody staff. Mandated training topics are specified by the California Penal Code, California Code of Regulations - Title 15, and the Departmental Operations Manual (DOM). The institution may add training that would be considered site-specific. Depending on the institution's mission and construction, site-specific training topics are determined by the training manager and subject to final approval by the Warden. The following are the training requirements for the various employee classifications.

- Custody employees up to the rank of correctional lieutenant are receiving 40 hours of required annual training in addition to 12 hours of on the job training (OJT) via module segments. Management classifications (Captain through Warden) receive mandatory annual training during Administrative Officer of the Day (AOD) training.

- Non-custody employees are receiving 10 hours of formal classroom training annually in addition to 32 hours of OJT module segments.
- Orientation training is provided to all custody and non-custody CDCR staff upon their assignment to the institution, regardless of their experience level or previous assignments. The orientation training includes 40 hours of classroom instruction specific to departmental requirements and institutional needs.

In addition to the above annual training requirements, each employee may attend or request additional training from the IST department. Monthly training bulletins are available to each employee and provide a schedule of all upcoming monthly training classes and/or OJT modules.

Each employee's training year begins on his/her birthday rather than on a calendar or fiscal year cycle. A training summary is generated during the last quarter of each employee's annual training cycle listing all successfully completed training classes as well as a list of any required courses yet to be completed. The employee and the supervisor have an opportunity to schedule any needed classes before the cycle ends. The training files reviewed contained documentation that regular, ongoing training was being performed. The training manager reported that all employees, with the exception of those on extended leave, were compliant with the training mandates.

**Finding:** No special training is provided to staff members who act as training officers for purposes of orientation training.

*^*  
**Discussion:** Supervisors and managers interviewed said the orientation provided to new employees is limited to the 40-hour orientation process. No specialized training officers are utilized for the training/orientation. Supervisors and managers interviewed said the officers performing orientation training are determined by the post and bid process rather than a formal selection process. In the past, training officers were selected based on the manager's personal assessment of the staff selected to provide the orientation. The officer bidding to that assignment now trains new staff. No formal process is used to recruit and select trainers. No special training is provided to staff members who act as training officers.

**Finding:** No formal training program is in place to provide "field training" to newly appointed peace officers. The team suggests the CDCR Adult Division consider developing a formalized institutional training program for new recruits and an abbreviated program for newly transferred officers.

*FTO Program*  
**Discussion:** All deputy sheriffs, police officers and the majority of local juvenile and adult correctional officers are required to complete a formal training program under the direction of a specially selected and trained officer. The program is designed to ensure the trainee is exposed to most situations that would be routinely encountered during the assignment and instructed on the expected performance. The training program ensures the employee performs within the applicable law, the department's policy and in a safe manner. The training officer observes the employee's performance at regular intervals, documents the progress, and provides any

necessary remedial instruction. The trainee must demonstrate competence before being allowed to function alone in the position.

**Finding:** The review team was unable to find documentation of institutional orientation training being provided to contract employees who provide short-term services at the institution.

**Discussion:** In order to maintain a sufficient number of staff to provide mandated services, temporary vacancies are filled with temporary workers sent to the institution by contract employment services. Examples include replacement health care workers such as registry nurses and physicians. Building and maintenance contractors performing repair or construction work would also be included in this category. These employees may only work one day at the institution or they may work for a few days. They are not state employees. Even though the responsibility for orientation training may reside with the employment service, the In-Service Training (IST) manager and the Warden recognized the information may better be delivered by CDCR staff. We discussed some options such as using a checklist generated by institution staff or a short video and acknowledgment produced by CDCR to ensure that a basic standardized orientation is provided in a consistent manner to all contract employees. At the exit conference the evaluation team was advised that a checklist had been developed and implemented as a result of this finding.

### Safety Equipment

**Finding:** The CDCR requires that the institution provide identified custody staff with specific personal safety equipment. The institution is required to provide personally fitted stab-resistant vests to specific employees. DVI is compliant in issuing equipment as specified in policy.

**Discussion:** The soft body armor stab-resistant vest inventory records were reviewed. The armory sergeant informed the review team that all custody staff have been fitted and issued personal stab-resistant safety vests. All new custody staff are immediately fitted for a vest and issued a temporary vest during the interim.

**Finding:** The Medical Technical Assistants (MTA) and Correctional Counselors (CC) who are custody staff, are not fitted and issued stab-resistant vests.

**Discussion:** The soft body armor stab-resistant vest inventory records were reviewed and it was noted that the MTAs and CCs who are custody staff are not issued vests. Vests are available for these officers to use when they plan to go into an area of significant risk; however, they are not routinely worn in their normal assignments.

While these classifications are not first responders to alarms, they could be present or in the immediate vicinity when emergency response is needed. Absent a policy direction for the distribution of vests (and the classification of employee designated to receive vests), the team suggests that consideration be given to including the MTA and CC classifications among the staff to be issued vests. Alternatively, institution administrators must ensure that there is a pool of clean, serviceable vests made available for these employees.

**Finding:** Officers transferring to other institutions are not permitted to keep their vests.

**Discussion:** The soft body armor stab-resistant vests are issued to staff depending on their facility specific assignment. With the exception of transfers to Kern Valley State Prison, officers transferring or promoting to other CDCR institutions must surrender their personally fitted vests before leaving. The team suggested allowing the officer to continue to use their issued vest and purchase a new vest for the replacement staff person if needed. This would allow officers to retain the vests for which they were fitted and provide new, fitted vests to new officers.

**Finding:** The institutional armory and sub-armory used for the storage and ready dispersal of lethal weapons, less lethal weapons, munitions and related emergency equipment are maintained in proper and secure order.

**Discussion:** The evaluation team toured the armory and sub armory, and examined documentation pertaining to required inventory and maintenance of lethal weapons, less lethal weapons, munitions, and all emergency equipment.

The institution's main armory consists of a freestanding concrete building located outside of the institution's secure perimeter and is enclosed with a chain link fence topped with razor wire. The armory is under constant observation (24/7) by an armed staff assigned to a tower adjacent to the armory structure. Access to the armory is restricted to specific authorized personnel or personnel authorized by the watch commander during extreme emergencies. The tower officer has direct control of armory access.

The institution's sub-armory is maintained inside of the central control room which is contained in a secured armed location within the institution's secured perimeter. The sub-armory maintains lethal weapons, less lethal weapons, munitions and emergency equipment.

During the tour of the armory and sub armory, the evaluation team noted that appropriate entry and exit log books were in place and evaluation team members were required to sign in and out. All required inventory controls and documentation was found to be appropriate and current.



## PHYSICAL PLANT

The facility is constructed in a linear fashion. An intake area, 12 cellblocks, educational areas and a library are primary features situated along a central corridor extending east and west that is over ¼-mile long. Intersecting this corridor approximately midway is another corridor providing access to the four dining halls, three chapels, the gymnasium, and Prison Industry Authority shops.

The cellblocks have similar designs. The cells are situated across from one another, three stories high, along a wide central corridor that extends the length of the block. The administrative segregation cells have an exterior corridor. A typical cell contains two bunks, a toilet and washbasin. The dayrooms in several wings have been converted to a dormitory on the lower floor.

Persistent crowding has lead to conversion of program space into dormitories and the bifurcation of the large gymnasium into two large dormitories. These dormitories contain single, double and triple bunk configurations. Bathroom and shower facilities are located within each dormitory.

Intake and release functions occur at the far west end of the main corridor. Vocational shops are located at the far east end and the Prison Industry Authority shops are located at the northeast end of the shorter corridor across from the gymnasium.

Outside recreation occurs in a large exercise yard located within the secure perimeter in the northwest portion of the facility. Three small outside exercise yards are provided. One is located between the East and West Hall and is utilized by inmates with Protective Custody classifications. The others are located next to the K Wing and J Wing. Inmates on administrative segregation utilize these yards.

An infirmary is located along the main corridor and provides health care services to the inmates. Additionally, four Outpatient Housing Unit (OHU) rooms are located within the infirmary. Two of these OHU cells are padded.

**Finding:** Within the receiving/intake area, an inadequate amount of space is available for processing up to 500 intakes received each week.

**Discussion:** The receiving/intake area was originally designed to process 25 inmates a week. Since DVI transitioned from a vocational institution to a reception center, records indicate that the number of new intakes has increased to approximately 500 inmates per week. The dramatic increase in intakes in the relatively small intake area has hindered custody staffs' ability to safely performing the necessary functions of escorting, searching and processing new intakes.

**Finding:** The facility is crowded. As a result, 960 emergency-beds are utilized throughout the institution. This was accomplished by placing double bunks in the hallways of the housing units (known as Broadway beds), converting inmate program spaces into dormitories and converting the entire gymnasium into inmate housing areas.

Discussion: Emergency-beds (broadway) observed within the open central corridors of the cellblocks pose a significant risk to officer safety due to poor visibility created by the height of the double bunks. Additionally, inmate personal items hanging from beds obstruct visual observation of the inmates.

The gymnasium was bifurcated several years ago as a means of creating living spaces to temporarily alleviate crowding. As a result, the gymnasium is no longer available for its intended use. The large inmate population taxes the remaining outside exercise areas and, in turn, limits the amount of yard time available to inmates, especially during inclement weather. The gymnasium was not intended to be used for housing inmates and measures need to be taken to return this space to its intended use.

Finding: The evaluation team encourages the Division of Adult Institutions to consider utilizing a facility with a modern podular design as the regional reception center.

Discussion: This facility was originally designed as a vocational institution, which it successfully operated as for many years. Currently, the mission of this institution has changed to that of a reception center for Northern California which is ill-served by the design. The staff has accepted this change and has made the best of the shortcomings and limitations the facility design has presented. DVI is better suited as a vocational center and its design does not lend itself to being a reception center.

Finding: The constant non-stop program movement of inmates in a "telephone pole" design institution creates opportunities for inmates to attack each other or staff.

Discussion: Statistics support that there is a greater frequency of staff assaults in the west corridor. The east/west corridor is approximately ¼-mile in length, and the housing wings branch off of the west corridor. Due to program requirements, there is constant movement of RC inmates from their housing wings along the west corridor, and inmates use this opportunity to attack their enemies. Staff has suffered various injuries from interceding to prevent injuries to inmates.

Finding: Security cameras are currently located in several locations, including employee entrances to the institution and in the Z and Y dorms, PLA shop areas and on the J and K Wing exercise yards. Adding cameras in other locations may enhance safety and security.

Discussion: The institution should consider placement of security cameras in strategic areas of the cellblocks and other areas of the institution. Additionally, these cameras should provide a digital recording. These systems have shown to be useful in supplementing staff supervision of inmates and can be used to exonerate staff wrongly accused of misconduct and provide evidence in incidents of inmate misconduct. A needs assessment for camera placement is recommended being mindful of the added responsibility to control room staff for monitoring additional cameras.

**Finding:** The placement of convex mirrors within the law library would allow staff to provide better inmate supervision. Library indicated that they were unable to view around corners into blind spots.

**Discussion:** The evaluation team observed several blind spots within the library where the placement of a convex mirror would improve supervision and aid staff. The evaluation team encourages plant operation and DVI administrative staff to consider the placement of mirrors in the law library.

**Finding:** Clergy staff were unaware of emergency procedures or their responsibilities during an emergency. Additionally, office equipment located within the chapel areas has not been regularly inventoried.

**Discussion:** Updated post orders that address emergency procedures for the clergy staff are needed. Inmate workers were observed inside one chapel area utilizing a double edge razor blade as a means to open boxes. These blades were not on specific inventories and the clergy staff were not able to account for the number of razor blades to which the inmate workers had access. Appropriate tools and office equipment need to be identified, as does a means of inventorying the tools and equipment utilized in the chapels.

**Finding:** There are a number of maintenance and/or capital improvement issues (identified below) in need of attention in order to improve staff safety.

**Discussion:** Many of the projects have been identified by DVI management as needing repair and in many instances, funds have been identified to correct the problems. However, the evaluation team encourages DVI management to ensure that the following issues are addressed:

- The asphalt surface areas of the outside exercise areas located between East and West Halls and the K Wing are in need of repair. Large chunks of loose asphalt and rocks accessible to the inmates were observed within these exercise yards. The loose material can be used as weapons and the subsequent potholes create a trip hazard for staff responding to incidents. Institution administrators have secured funding to resurface these areas. Ensuring that the necessary repairs to these exercise yards are completed is encouraged.
- The railing along the stairway leading up to the ~~X~~<sup>Dorm</sup> Wing is low. The low railing height presents a risk to officers and inmates. The department should consider raising the height of the stair rail along this stairway.
- One of the window frames in the stairwell leading to L3 protrudes into the stairwell when opened. These windows are opened during the summer months as a means of providing ventilation to the stairwell. Because of the low height of this window, staff is at risk of striking the window frame. Consideration should be given to restricting the distance the window can be opened into this stairway, or preventing the window from opening at all.
- Some of the individual standup holding tanks located in the release and receiving area and in the K Wing are not equipped with Plexiglas shields to prevent inmates from spitting at passing inmates or staff. The department is encouraged to place Plexiglas shields on all individual standup holding tanks.

- Staff and inmates reported the drinking water at the facility had a bad taste, odor and color. Plant operation staff reported the facility water is safe for drinking, but fails to meet a "secondary" water quality standard (unenforceable) due to the taste and smell. Elevated levels of manganese in the drinking water are responsible for the poor water quality. Plant Operations staff said repairs to the water supply system are in the works. The institution is encouraged to expedite these repairs.
- The DVI Fire Department fire truck holding tank has a significant water leak. Staff reports the truck must be refilled several times per day. Records indicate the DVI Fire Department responded to 160 fires last year and 130 this calendar year. The department is encouraged to make the necessary repairs the fire truck.
- The kitchen is in desperate need of repair and refurbishment. Much of the cast iron has deteriorated, large portions of the floor tiles are broken or missing, paint is peeling and electrical conduits are rusted exposing electrical wires. Evaluation team members observed a rodent and roaches in food preparation areas during the tour of this area. An environmental health evaluation is needed to assess the extent of repairs.
- Fire Department staff reported the fire suppression sprinkler system in the Prison Industry Authority portion of the facility has obstructions in the pipe (resulting in low water flow) and is in need of repair. Due to the age and function of this portion of this facility, it is essential that the fire suppression system is fully functional. The department is encouraged to ensure the fire suppression system is in proper working order.
- The roof at the staff living quarters at the DVI Fire Department appears to leak. Water damage is evident in the ceiling and walls. The department is encouraged to obtain an environmental health evaluation and make necessary repairs to the roof of this area.

**Finding:** The fire exit in the Muslim Chapel, as identified on the posted emergency fire exit map, is blocked by several items of furniture.

**Discussion:** The institution is encouraged to keep all identified fire exits clear.

**Finding:** Evaluation staff noted a large amount of combustible material in the staff areas and in inmate sleeping areas.

**Discussion:** This facility was constructed during a time when smoke detection equipment and fire suppression systems were not required. The institution is encouraged to enforce policy and procedures, in conjunction with the fire authority, that identify and limit the amount of combustible material in staff and inmate areas.

## STAFF INTERVIEWS

### Interview Process

The Staff Safety Evaluation Team conducted random interviews with custody and non-custody staff at Deuel Vocational Institution (DVI) from Monday, September 26 through Friday, September 30, 2005. Members of the evaluation team interviewed staff about safety related issues (e.g., safety equipment issued to staff and their perception of personal safety at the institution). The list of specific questions asked by the interview team is included as Attachment D.

The team conducted random interviews with DVI staff during the first, second, and third watches at the following work locations: receiving and release, reception center medical and mental health clinics, reception center records, West and East halls, C, D, E, F, G, H, J, K, L Wings, X, Y, Z dorms, canteen, chapels, education building, infirmary, kitchens, the minimum facility, and inmate visiting. Custody staff classifications interviewed included: the associate wardens, correctional and facility captains, lieutenants, sergeants, correctional officers, medical technician assistant, correctional counselors I, II, III, and the fire chief. Reception Center classifications included: senior psychologists and psychologists. Non-custody staff classifications included: the medical physician, dentists, psychiatrists, healthcare manager, registered nurses, licensed vocational nurse, laboratory manager, pharmacy technician, associate governmental program analyst, office technician, office assistant, correctional food manager, records manager, supervisor of records, case record specialists, canteen manager, chaplains, librarians, teachers, and plant operations personnel.

For purposes of this report, the interview team is highlighting staff safety perceptions that were shared by staff during our interviews. Responses are grouped for custody staff and non-custody staff.

### Custody Staff – Interviews with Managers

The interview team met with associate wardens and captains. This group of managers has been assigned to this institution for a minimum of 12 months and have up to 14 years experience as a manager with CDCR. All of the managers knew what safety equipment items are issued to their staff, and they informed the interview team that all uniformed custody staff have been fitted for and issued a stab-resistant vest.

The managers agreed that DVI is a safe place for staff to work. However, they added that it is incumbent for staff to be constantly on guard because inmates housed in reception centers are known to demonstrate unpredictable behavior. They said that many of the inmates might have extensive psychological disorders requiring psychotropic medications to control their behavior. Staff safety issues identified by the managers included the following:

**Finding:** Deuel Vocational Institution was not designed as a reception center. Therefore, adequate resources (physical plant, staffing, and ancillary resources to support RC) are lacking.

**Discussion:** The managers said that DVI is receiving up to 500 inmates (new commitments, diagnostic cases, parole violators returned to custody, parole violators with a new term, and DJJ failures) per week at the reception center. They said receiving and reception can have as many as 80 inmates in the intake area at one time, and there are not a sufficient number of holding cells to separate inmates pending housing assignments. They also said there are insufficient lockup cells, and new arriving inmates are usually housed in bunk beds on the "broadway" of the lockup cells, or housed in double or triple bunks in makeshift dormitories in the gymnasium. Receiving and release custody staff are held over on a daily basis to process the expected and unexpected arrivals from county jails and parole sweeps

**Finding:** Managers said there is a need to provide additional staff training beyond the mandated IST topics.

**Discussion:** Managers believe that staff is in need of additional training. Specifically, they said that some staff members display a complacent attitude with the inmates, and they are not vigilant when working around or with the inmates. They said this demeanor becomes more common, when staff adopt an attitude of "nothing has happened in a while." They said that inexperienced staff need to develop their communication skills. They are less likely to engage inmates in conversation to develop them as sources of information, or to develop a sense that something "isn't right." They also said a training program needs to be developed for lateral transfers (e.g.; staff transferred from other institutions) to familiarize them with operational procedures at DVI.

**Finding:** Inmates held at the RC are transient, pending their transfer to a suitable institution (e.g.; right inmate, right mission, and right prison) and, consequently, exhibit destructive behavior.

**Discussion:** The managers said that RC inmates are destructive toward cell furnishings, because they know they will be transferred to another institution to complete the term of their sentences. They said that during the summer months, inmates break out their cell windows and throw trash out the windows. Inmates arc electrical outlets and will start fires in their cells or outside their broken cell windows. The institution has spent over \$40,000 of its budget to replace the broken windows. The fire chief said they have responded to over 130 fires at the institution since January of 2005. He said many of these fires are a result of inmates tossing lit material outside their broken cell windows. Managers said that offending inmates are charged with an additional crime, but this has not altered their behavior.

*(will) crew if it keeps them from breaking out the windows*

The warden's office is attempting to mitigate this liability. The warden has received budget approval for \$90,000 to install metal screens designed to prohibit the inmates from breaking out the glass windows and setting fires outside of their cell windows.

**Finding:** Post and bid prevents managers from filling posts with the best-qualified staff.

**Discussion:** The managers said that "post and bid" (a process in which lieutenant, sergeants and COs request to work a specific post based on their seniority) restricts managers' ability to ensure a high level of institutional and staff safety. Managers said that supervisor post and bid has limited their ability to place qualified supervisory staff in administrative positions identified for

prison program facilitation and operation. The best-qualified individual is not always the most senior.

**Finding:** Managers indicated that staffing shortages are contributing to an increase in sick leave use for line staff.

**Discussion:** The managers said there are over 80 staff vacancies at the institution, and as a result, overtime is necessary to staff the required posts. When staff are scheduled for vacations or call in sick, the on duty shift may be held over (work a double shift), because of operational necessity. Managers said that since excessive sick leave was eliminated from the Bargaining Unit 6 contract, the use of sick leave has increased. They believe that many of the staff feel entitled to use sick leave whenever they don't feel like reporting for work. They said they would like to see it changed back, to reduce the abuse of sick leave and to hold employees accountable. The negative effect of working excessive overtime (fatigue, morale issues, etc.) could be mitigated as well.

**Finding:** Managers expressed frustration about the inequity in pay resulting from compensation contracts negotiated by the R06 and S06 groups. In addition, the pay inequity has resulted in little incentive for qualified staff to assume managerial responsibilities.

**Discussion:** Due to recent enhancements to R06 and S06 groups, managers often make less money than those that they supervise. This not only affects managers' morale but also provides little incentive for qualified employees to seek "promotions."

The managers also expressed frustration over their increasing workload and the lack of compensatory acknowledgement for their efforts. Operational requirements, ongoing audits, compliance monitoring, and court agreements are contributing to a constant battle for internal resources to avoid future litigation. Managers also would like to be involved in determining budget priorities for their respective areas at the institution.

#### Custody/Treatment Staff - Interviews with Supervisors

The first and second line supervisors (Sergeant, Lieutenant, Senior MTA, and Correctional Counselor II - Supervisor) were interviewed at various work locations from September 26-29, 2005. Supervisor concerns mirrored those of managers regarding post and bid and sick leave abuse. Other issues are listed below.

**Finding:** Reception Center (RC) inmates are averaging more than 90 days at DVI before they are transferred to another institution.

**Discussion:** Supervisors said that inmates are routinely held for more than 90 days at the reception center due to a lack of bed space system-wide for EOP, SNY, CCCMS, and Level III and IV inmates. Adding to this delay is the current lack of medical physicians (four vacant positions) to conduct required inmate physicals, and the diversion of record analysts to assist with the Valdivia Hearings. According to the CCs who are responsible for reviewing chrono files, there is a 4 to 6 week delay before a RC inmate can be reviewed for appropriate transfer.

**Finding:** Crowding at DVI increases the pressure on staff to provide the basic services to the inmates. As a result, supervisory staff indicate that custody staff take shortcuts to complete these basic activities.

**Discussion:** Supervisors acknowledged that they were aware of COs taking shortcuts in order to accommodate the basic needs of inmates such as showering, exercise yard release, clothing and linen exchange.

GP wing

20 i/m/s

Housing units have inmates sleeping in double bunks (up to 40 inmates), in the back of the lockup wing, on the "broadway" floor (open area). When inmates housed in the lockup cells require movement for basic needs (e.g., showering, going to yard, feeding, etc.), the inmates on the Broadway floor are required to be moved and secured away from the celled inmates. In many instances, the officers do not have available space or time to isolate the inmates on the Broadway. Therefore, the floor officer will go to the back of the unit and stand between the inmates who are assigned to the Broadway and the inmates released from their cells. This action by the officers is not an attempt to shirk their responsibilities for keeping the inmates separated; they are simply trying to stay on track with their daily duties, in an honest, dedicated and professional attempt to provide each inmate with their basic services.

**Finding:** Supervisors said that custody and non-custody staff would benefit from additional mental health training.

**Discussion:** Supervisors said the current training in mental health is generic and outdated. They all agreed that custody staff as well as non-custody staff would benefit from OJT training in mental health techniques when dealing with CCCMS and EOP inmates.

Custody Staff – Interviews with Line Staff

The interview team conducted random interviews with line staff from September 26-29.

**Finding:** Staff reported that they felt comfortable and satisfied with the safety equipment that is issued to them at the institution.

**Discussion:** All line staff interviewed said they felt safe working at DVI. Line staff on all three watches described the type of safety equipment issued to them. The list included: personal alarms, radios in designated positions, handcuffs, side-handle batons, stab-resistant vests, keys and OC spray. Additionally, they reported that the equipment could be obtained at the sergeant's office, control booths, emergency response staging areas, or from the person being relieved at shift change. All uniformed peace officer personnel stated they were fitted for and issued a stab-resistant vest. They added that they wear their vests at all times while on duty.

**Finding:** MTA and CCI staff reported they have not been fitted or issued a stab-resistant vest at DVI.



**Discussion:** MTAs and CCIs do not have stab-resistant vests issued to them for duty assignments at DVI. They believe they are performing line staff peace officer functions, and they should be issued the same safety equipment as CO, Sergeant, and Lieutenants. The MTA and CCI staff indicated that said their duties require them to interview or interact with inmates face to face. Often, floor staff are too busy with other duties to escort them to see inmates, so they are left one on one with inmates. They feel especially vulnerable when they are isolated with a large number of inmates at the back of the Broadway.

The CCI group stated it is their understanding that CCI personnel at other CDCR adult operations institutions have been fitted and issued stab-resistant vests. The CCI group said that despite the low frequency of inmate assaults on staff at DVI, issuing a stab-resistant vest to CCI staff should be given consideration.

The MTA group reported the only time they wear a stab-resistant vest is when delivering medications in Ad. Seg. (K Wing). The MTA staff often have contact with inmates at their worst moments (e.g., inmates acting out because they didn't get their medication). They also said they do have emergency response involvement, as a second responder. They said because they are a peace officer classification, they should be issued stab-resistant vests.

**Finding:** Crowding is a major safety concern with line staff.

**Discussion:** CO personnel feel that the broadways should be staffed with one additional officer (2 CO vs. 1 CO). This is especially necessary during lockdown programs with the increased movement of inmates, separation requirements (ethnic/gangs), and obstructed sightlines at the back of the broadways. Staff would also like to see Broadway inmates that are on lockdown status housed in cells, and non-locked down inmates placed in the broadways.

The CC I staff indicated that inmates received at the reception center with new commitments or parole revocation inmates with new terms should not be housed in the dormitories until their chrono files are reviewed by the CC Is. They believe the Division of Adult Institutions should develop standardized criteria for SNY inmates. It has been an institutional practice to classify inmates as SNY if they request protection from the general population (e.g., an inmate admits they he is a gang dropout, and claims he needs protective housing). The increase in the number of SNYs system-wide has placed limits on where an SNY inmate can be housed, and there are a limited number of beds available for this population.

**Finding:** Line staff expressed a desire to be better informed of relevant safety issues (e.g., riot at another institution).

**Discussion:** Line staff said that in the past, safety meetings would occur periodically with the sergeants and lieutenants. The purpose of these meetings was to inform line staff of safety issues such as a new method for inmates to smuggle narcotics or weapons into the institution. They said they were not informed about the riots at Calipatria or CIM (9/22/05). They said they found out about these incidents from Internet and radio news broadcasts. Line staff would like to see communications improved for sharing information regarding incidents at other prison sites, rather than hearing the information second/third hand or from the inmates.

Interviews with Non-Custody Staff

The interview team spoke with non-custody staff from September 26 - 29 at various work locations.

**Findings:** Some short-term contract employees have not received the mandated CDCR employee orientation.

**Discussion:** The review team talked with several registry nurses, and during the interview, it was evident that they had not received the basic training requirement for orientation. One contract nurse told the interview team that she was not aware of the Department's "no hostage negotiation" policy. As noted in the Training section of this report, measures have been implemented to remedy this issue.

**Findings:** During a one-hour period each morning (3:00 a.m. to 4:00 a.m.) there is no uniformed officer assigned to supervise 25-30 inmates as they are preparing breakfast in the kitchen area.

**Discussion:** Supervising Cooks are assigned to the main kitchens, and they prepare the morning meal from 3:00 a.m. to 11:00 a.m. Twenty-five to thirty inmates are assigned to the kitchen to help in the preparation of meals. The inmates report for work at 3:00 a.m. when the Cook Supervisors arrive. Although there is a culinary officer assigned to the kitchen, this officer does not report for duty until 4:00 a.m., leaving a one-hour gap of no uniformed custody supervision of inmates in the kitchen. The cooks agreed that a full time presence (e.g., 3:00 a.m. to 11:00 a.m.) of a uniformed custody officer is vital to the security and safety of the kitchen.

**Finding:** The psychiatric staff assigned to the Reception Center stated that they would like a better line of communication between their office and custody staff.

**Discussion:** The psychiatric staff feels that it would be beneficial to the overall operation of the institution, if they had access to information provided to custody (e.g., AOD report, unit gang information, racial tension incidents, etc.). They related that they in turn could pass on vital information to custody staff relating to mental health issues.

## SUMMARY/CONCLUSION

The Deuel Vocational Institute (DVI) appears to be a well-run institution. Staff contacted during the evaluation expressed pride in their work and a high degree of confidence in the management and executive staff at DVI. Staff reported that they felt safe in their duties despite the fact that they work in an inherently dangerous setting.

It is clear from the physical plant evaluation; observations of the intake area and the intake process; as well as interviews with staff, that DVI is not well suited to be a reception center. Exacerbating the situation is the crowding that is occurring at DVI. The Broadway beds (beds installed in the open corridors of living units) and conversion of the gymnasium and other program areas to dormitories results in unsafe conditions for staff and inmates.

System crowding is also contributing to staff safety issues at DVI. Because of a lack of beds for hard to place inmates (Level IV, EOP, and SNY inmates), these type of inmates are often held at the reception center in excess of 90 days. The reception center mission is incongruent with the needs of hard to place inmates and steps should be taken to resolve this situation.

It is the opinion of the evaluation team that the staff at DVI are doing an exemplary job in spite of the many barriers they encounter.

As directed by the Corrections Standards Authority, the findings from this evaluation will be presented to the CSA at their next scheduled meeting and copies of the report will be provided to CSA members, CDCR administration and Warden Moore. It is outside the scope of this project for the CSA to receive and monitor a corrective action plan and appropriate action will be the responsibility of CDCR Division of Adult Institutions.

STATE OF CALIFORNIA — DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION

ATTACHMENT A  
ARNOLD SCHWARZENEGGER, GOVERNOR

## CORRECTIONS STANDARDS AUTHORITY

600 Barakat Drive  
Sacramento, CA 95814

September 15, 2005

Steve Moore, Warden (A)  
Deuel Vocational Institute  
P.O. Box 400  
Tracy, CA 95378-0004

Dear Warden Moore:

The California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) asked the Corrections Standards Authority (CSA) to develop a plan to evaluate staff safety issues at Adult Operations and Division of Juvenile Justice detention facilities. At their May 19, 2005 meeting, the CSA unanimously approved a proposal to assemble a panel of subject matter experts to develop criteria for conducting staff safety evaluations.

The panel met on May 24-25, 2005 and established the criteria by which the evaluations will be conducted. As a result, a team comprised of CSA, Adult Operations and Division of Juvenile Justice will be conducting the evaluations over the next 28 months. We expect to be on site at Deuel Vocational Institute for five days, September 26-30 and plan to observe operations during all shifts if possible.

We would like to begin with an entrance conference with you and/or appropriate administrative staff on September 26, 2005 at 9:00 a.m. to discuss the method by which the staff safety evaluations will be conducted and to get a general overview of facility operations and any concerns you may have.

In order to facilitate the process, please provide the following for the evaluation team's use while at Deuel Vocational Institute (The evaluation team may ask for additional resources, depending on the initial assessment.):

- A contact person with whom the team may coordinate their activities (please call or e-mail this information when the contact is identified).
- An office or conference room equipped with a table, chairs, facility map, facility telephone directory and a telephone in which a team of nine may work.
- Access to all levels of staff for short interviews. These interviews can take place at their assigned work areas and we will avoid interrupting their schedules as much as possible.
- Copies of all documentation relative to each incident of staff assault including: Incident Reports for Assaults on Staff - CDC 837 (previously provided); Use of Force Review findings (previously provided); and State Compensation Reports (SCIF) generated as a result of each incident;

- Staff Assault Committee Minutes
- Summaries of State Compensation Reports (SCIF) for all injuries on staff and/or the complete reports. Summaries are reportedly available from facility Return to Work Coordinator
- A copy of the Confidential and Restricted Department Operations Manual (Red DOM)

Supplemental Data Sources – to be accessed as needed

- Facility Health and Safety Committee Minutes\*
  - Grievances, Recommendations, Actions
- Inmate Appeals (CDC) \*
- Daily Activity Report (DAR); Notice of Unusual Incident (NOU) at certain facilities\*
- Authorized Equipment and Functionality
- Use of Force Committee Minutes and responses to recommendations\*
- Employee Training records including summary of curriculum and attendance for orientation and annual updates for selected areas\*
- Corrective Action Plans for previous audits\*
- Safety Committee Meeting Minutes and Risk Management Action Plans
- Program descriptions and locations
- Staffing summary including duty roster, allotted positions, vacancies, and leave of absence for over 120 days for all staff.
- Staffing profile summary including age, sex, years of service and ethnicity
- Facility design and current capacity
- Men's Advisory Counsel (MAC) minutes\*

Upon completion of the on site portion of the evaluation, we would like to schedule an exit conference with you and/or appropriate members of your staff (on or about October 3, 2005). The results of the evaluation will be reported to the CSA at its regularly scheduled meeting and a written report will be forwarded to CDCR with a courtesy copy sent to you.

Thank you in advance for your anticipated cooperation in this matter. If you have any questions, please feel free to contact Jerry Read, Deputy Director (A), at (916) 445-9435 or [jread@bdcorr.ca.gov](mailto:jread@bdcorr.ca.gov).

Sincerely,

Karen L. Stoll, Executive Director (A)

\*- 2004 and 2005 to date

cc: Joe McGrath, Chief Deputy Secretary  
Adult Operations

Deuel Vocational Institute  
Staff Assault Data  
January 2004 through April 2005

Attachment B

INCIDENT INFORMATION													VICTIM INFORMATION									
IR/SIR#	Date	Time	Day of Week	Site and Location	Type of Assault	Serious Injury	Intimate Weapon	Ethnicity	Classification	Rec'd CDC	Rec'd Inst	Anticipated Rel Date/FBO	Age	Housing Loc	Special Program/MH Status	Group	Work Assign	Gender	Classification (CDC/CCMS/Other)	V Age	Yrs of Svc	Race
DVI-ASU-04-01-0014	1/5/2004	1540	Mon	K-Wing	Gassing	No	No	BLA	ADSEG	10/21/2000	2/29/2003	TBD	23	K-131	CCCMS	S. Calif. Crip	N/A	M	CO	UNK	2	WHI
DVI-ASU-04-01-0014	1/5/2004	1540	Mon	K-Wing	Gassing	No	No	WHI	ADSEG	7/9/2003	7/9/2003	TBD	39	K-126	CCCMS	Sacramento	N/A	M	CO	UNK	2	WHI
DVI-ASU-04-01-0039	1/29/2004	1335	Thur	J-Wing	Gassing	No	No	HIS	ADSEG	11/24/1993	7/29/2003	7/23/2007	32	J-212	N/A	N/A	N/A	M	CO	27	4	WHI
DVI-ASU-04-01-0039	1/29/2004	1335	Thur	J-Wing	Gassing	No	No	OTH	ADSEG	7/7/2003	7/23/2003	12/7/2004	28	J-212	N/A	N/A	N/A	M	CO	27	4	WHI
DVI-ASU-04-02-0051	2/11/2004	1620	Wed	D-Wing	Battery	No	No	OTH	RC	10/16/2003	10/16/2003	7/19/2004	33	D-304	CCCMS	N/A	N/A	M	CO	28	4	WHI
DVI-ASU-04-02-0068	2/23/2004	1415	Thur	K-Wing	Gassing	No	No	HIS	RC	6/6/1991	9/26/2003	TBD	36	L-122	N/A	N/A	N/A	M	CO	31	8	OTH
DVI-ASU-04-02-0071	2/22/2004	330	Sat	L-Wing	Battery	No	No	HIS	RC	10/22/2002	1/22/2004	3/2/2004	44	L-113	N/A	N/A	N/A	F	CO	35	6	WHI
DVI-ASU-04-03-0066	3/12/2004	1610	Tue	L-2	Battery	No	No	BLA	RC	3/7/2002	3/7/2002	TBD	22	L-210	CCCMS	N/A	N/A	F	CO	32	4	WHI
DVI-ASU-04-03-0069	3/12/2004	1610	Thur	L-2	Battery	No	No	BLA	RC	3/7/2002	3/7/2002	TBD	22	L-210	CCCMS	N/A	N/A	M	CO	28	5	WHI
DVI-ASU-04-03-0115	3/31/2004	1630	Wed	B-Ward	Gassing	No	No	AMI	RC	3/6/1998	3/30/2004	TBD	40	B-236	CCCMS	N/A	N/A	M	CO	29	3	OTH
DVI-ASU-04-04-0121	4/5/2004	2000	Mon	B-Ward	Gassing	No	No	AMI	RC	3/6/1998	3/30/2004	TBD	40	B-236	CCCMS	N/A	N/A	M	CO	29	4	OTH
DVI-ASU-04-04-0152	4/28/2004	1545	Wed	J-Wing	Gassing	No	No	BLA	ADSEG	1/25/1996	4/28/2004	TBD	26	K-309	N/A	N/A	N/A	M	CO	50	2	WHI
DVI-ASU-04-05-0168	5/2/2004	1950	Sat	L-Wing	Battery	No	No	WHI	ADSEG	5/11/1999	3/8/2004	TBD	24	L-108	N/A	N/A	N/A	M	CO	42	4	WHI
DVI-ASU-04-05-0171	5/11/2004	1850	Tues	D-Wing	Battery	No	No	WHI	ADSEG	10/3/1993	1/23/2003	TBD	41	D-228	N/A	N/A	N/A	M	CO	26	3	HIS
DVI-ASU-04-05-0171	5/11/2004	1950	Tues	D-Wing	Battery	No	No	WHI	ADSEG	10/3/1993	1/23/2003	TBD	41	D-228	N/A	N/A	N/A	M	CO	28	4	WHI
DVI-ASU-04-06-0211	6/11/2004	820	Sun	K-Wing	Battery	No	No	BLA	ADSEG	8/15/2003	8/15/2003	TBD	28	K-219	CCCMS	Blond	N/A	M	CO	30	5	WHI
DVI-ASU-04-07-0242	7/8/2004	850	Thur	K-Wing	Battery	No	No	WHI	RC	10/3/1982	1/23/2003	TBD	41	K-141	N/A	N/A	N/A	M	CO	29	4	WHI
DVI-ASU-04-07-0251	7/23/2004	645	Thur	J-Wing	Battery	No	No	HIS	RC	1/19/2001	1/26/2002	TBD	24	J-134	EOP	N/A	N/A	M	CO	51	2	BLA
DVI-ASU-04-07-0263	7/23/2004	1815	Wed	K-Wing	Gassing	No	No	WHI	ADSEG	10/3/1983	1/23/2003	TBD	41	K-141	N/A	N/A	N/A	M	CO	32	4	HIS
DVI-ASU-04-07-0268	7/28/2004	1915	Wed	K-Wing	Gassing	No	No	WHI	ADSEG	5/7/2001	11/24/2003	TBD	23	K-140	N/A	N/A	N/A	M	CO	29	4	WHI
DVI-ASU-04-07-0268	7/28/2004	1815	Wed	K-Wing	Gassing	No	No	WHI	ADSEG	9/7/2001	11/24/2003	TBD	23	K-140	N/A	N/A	N/A	M	CO	29	4	WHI
DVI-ASU-04-07-0268	7/28/2004	1815	Wed	K-Wing	Gassing	No	No	WHI	ADSEG	10/3/1993	1/23/2003	TBD	41	K-141	N/A	N/A	N/A	M	CO	29	4	WHI
DVI-ASU-04-08-0310	8/1/2004	1445	Thur	J-Wing	Gassing	No	No	WHI	RC	3/8/2004	3/8/2004	TBD	24	J-127	N/A	N/A	N/A	M	CO	30	6	WHI
DVI-ASU-04-10-0340	10/14/2004	1750	Sat	K-Wing	Gassing	No	No	WHI	ADSEG	7/10/2002	7/5/2004	6/28/2005	39	K-228	CCCMS	N/A	N/A	M	CO	27	5	HIS
DVI-ASU-04-10-0349	10/31/2004	1630	Sun	K-Wing	Battery	No	No	WHI	ADSEG	9/7/2004	9/7/2004	TBD	29	K-128	N/A	N/A	N/A	M	CO	29	4	WHI
DVI-ASU-04-12-0393	12/7/2004	1400	Tues	K-Wing	Gassing	No	No	HIS	ADSEG	3/4/1998	3/16/2004	TBD	41	K-122	EOP	N/A	N/A	M	CO	30	4	WHI
DVI-ASU-05-01-0008	1/15/2005	955	Sat	B-Ward	Battery	No	No	HIS	ADSEG	1/12/2005	1/12/2005	TBD	20	B-236	CCCMS	N/A	N/A	F	Decay	UNK	1	OTH
DVI-ASU-05-01-0006	1/15/2005	955	Sat	B-Ward	Battery	No	No	HIS	ADSEG	1/12/2005	1/12/2005	TBD	20	B-236	CCCMS	N/A	N/A	M	CO	40	8	HIS
DVI-ASU-05-03-0053	3/11/2005	1840	Fri	B-Ward	Battery	No	No	BLA	RC	1/12/2005	1/14/2005	TBD	22	J-235	CCCMS	N/A	N/A	M	CO	29	5	WHI
DVI-ASU-05-03-0053	3/11/2005	1840	Fri	B-Ward	Battery	No	No	BLA	RC	1/12/2005	1/12/2005	TBD	22	J-235	CCCMS	N/A	N/A	M	CO	29	3	WHI
DVI-ASU-05-03-0063	3/20/2005	1130	Sun	K-Wing	Battery	No	No	BLA	ADSEG	9/5/2002	4/14/2004	TBD	22	K-128	N/A	Crip	N/A	M	CO	31	9	HIS

DVI-ASU-04-01-0014

Deuel Vocational Institute  
Staff Assault Data  
January 2004 through April 2005

Attachment B

INCIDENT INFORMATION																	VICTIM INFORMATION					
IRSR#	Date	Time	Day of Week	Site and Location	Type of Assault	Serious Injury	Strategic Weapon	Offense	Classification	Rec'd CDC	Rec'd Inst	Anticipated Rel Date/PBD	Age	Housing Loc	Special Program/SH Status	Gorg	Work Assign	Gender	Classification (CDC/Club/Other)	V Age	Yrs of Svs	Race
DVI-ASU-05-03-0086	3/28/2005	1215	Mon	K-Wing	Gassing	No	No	ANI	ADSEG	12/12/2000	2/1/2005	TBD	24	K-105	CCCMS	N/A	N/A	M	CO	19	14	HIS
DVI-ASU-05-03-0088	3/28/2005	1215	Mon	K-Wing	Gassing	No	No	ANI	ADSEG	12/12/2000	2/1/2005	TBD	24	K-105	CCCMS	N/A	N/A	M	CO	43	18	WAB
DVI-ASU-05-04-0093	4/23/2005	1430	Sat	K-Wing	Gassing	No	No	BLA	ADSEG	2/1/2002	2/25/2005	TBD	40	K-227	EQP	N/A	N/A	M	CO	29	6	WAB
DVI-ASU-05-04-0095	4/25/2005	1935	Mon	B-Ward	Battery	No	No	BLA	RC	8/19/2003	8/19/2003	8/20/2003	23	K-141	CCCMS	N/A	N/A	M	LT	47	16	WAB
DVI-ASU-05-04-0102	4/30/2005	1600	Sat	K-Wing	Battery	No	No	WHI	ADSEG	5/13/2004	3/18/2005	TBD	34	K-126	CCCMS	N/A	N/A	M	CO	23	2	WAB
DVI-CS-04-02-0045	2/26/2004	715	Fri	H. Corridor	Battery	No	No	BLA	RC	10/5/2000	1/27/2004	TBD	22	Acc'd D	N/A	N/A	N/A	M	CO	48	20	HIS
DVI-CS-04-02-0055	2/14/2004	1015	Sat	B-Ward	Battery	No	No	WHI	RC	1/30/2004	1/30/2004	TBD	39	B-234	N/A	N/A	N/A	F	CO	40	8	OTH
DVI-CS-04-03-0084	3/15/2004	840	Mon	Dining Hall 3	Battery	No	Trey	HIS	RC	12/23/2003	12/23/2003	TBD	52	EH-328	N/A	N/A	N/A	F	CO	37	14	WAB
DVI-CS-04-07-0253	7/23/2004	2130	Fri	B-Ward	Battery	No	No	WHI	RC	8/23/1994	12/18/2003	TBD	37	B-208	N/A	N/A	N/A	M	CO	25	2	WHI
DVI-CS-04-09-0304	9/2/2004	1100	Thur	B-Ward	Gassing	No	No	BLA	RC	8/19/2004	8/19/2004	TBD	24	B-227	CCCMS	N/A	N/A	M	CO	43	13	HIS
DVI-CS-04-09-0304	9/2/2004	1100	Thur	B-Ward	Gassing	No	No	BLA	RC	8/19/2004	8/19/2004	TBD	24	B-227	CCCMS	N/A	N/A	M	CO	40	8	WHI
DVI-CS-04-10-0343	10/29/2004	805	Tues	Dining #3	Battery	No	No	WHI	RC	5/2/2003	5/20/2003	TBD	25	E-227	N/A	N/A	N/A	M	CO	46	5	WHI
DVI-CS-04-11-0354	11/9/2004	1735	Thur	B-Ward	Battery	No	No	BLA	RC	6/3/2004	10/14/2004	TBD	57	C-109	CCCMS	N/A	N/A	M	MIA	34	3	WHI
DVI-CS-04-12-0401	12/19/2004	810	Sun	North Cor.	Battery	No	No	BLA	RC	11/30/2004	1/15/2005	TBD	50	H-143	N/A	N/A	N/A	M	CO	43	13	WHI
DVI-PG-04-05-0210	6/10/2004	1730	Thur	C-Wing	Battery	No	Door	BLA	RC	2/18/2004	2/18/2004	7/28/2004	28	C-138	N/A	N/A	N/A	M	CO	35	5	HIS
DVI-PG-04-08-0256	8/26/2004	655	Thur	NSF	Battery	No	No	BLA	Mainline	11/28/2003	1/12/2004	4/17/2005	20	OSD-G10	N/A	N/A	N/A	F	CO	45	20	HIS
DVI-PG-04-10-0327	10/1/2004	930	Fri	C-Wing	Battery	No	Gate	BLA	RC	2/20/2004	3/19/2004	5/1/2005	24	C-143	N/A	N/A	N/A	F	CO	UNK	8	HIS
DVI-RCI-04-01-0074	1/16/2004	1000	Fri	East Hall	Battery	No	No	WHI	RC	1/13/2004	1/13/2004	TBD	35	ER-341	N/A	N/A	N/A	F	CO	37	14	WHI
DVI-RCI-04-01-0079	1/21/2004	945	Wed	West Hall	Battery	No	No	HIS	RC	12/15/2003	12/16/2003	TBD	23	G-207	N/A	Harbison His	N/A	M	CO	37	7	WHI
DVI-RCI-04-01-0035	1/27/2004	1430	Tues	East Hall	Battery	No	No	WHI	RC	1/14/2003	1/14/2003	TBD	29	EH-112	N/A	N/A	N/A	M	CO	UNK	1	WHI
DVI-RCI-04-02-0261	2/20/2004	1240	Fri	RC Corridor	Battery	No	No	HIS	RC	1/21/2004	1/21/2004	TBD	25	WH-323	N/A	N/A	N/A	F	CCI	UNK	24	BLA
DVI-RCI-04-02-0061	2/23/2004	1240	Fri	RC Corridor	Battery	No	No	HIS	RC	1/23/2004	1/23/2004	TBD	19	WH-331	N/A	N/A	N/A	F	CCI	UNK	24	BLA
DVI-RCI-04-03-0081	3/27/2004	710	Sun	West Hall	Battery	No	No	HIS	RC	1/15/2004	1/15/2004	TBD	23	WH-231	N/A	N/A	N/A	F	CO	39	7	BLA
DVI-RCI-04-03-0091	3/27/2004	710	Sun	West Hall	Battery	No	No	HIS	RC	12/1/2003	12/1/2003	TBD	24	WH-204	N/A	N/A	N/A	M	CO	33	7	BLK
DVI-RCI-04-03-0098	3/10/2004	1100	Wed	G-Wing	Battery	No	No	WHI	RC	12/3/2003	12/3/2003	TBD	41	G-118	N/A	N/A	N/A	F	CO	34	11	OTH
DVI-RCI-04-03-0112	3/29/2004	1015	Mon	RC Corridor	Battery	No	No	HIS	RC	12/24/2003	12/24/2003	TBD	28	F-226	EQP	N/A	N/A	M	LT	UNK	23	WHI
DVI-RCI-04-04-0148	4/25/2004	1820	Sun	West Hall	Battery	No	No	WHI	RC	3/18/2004	3/18/2004	TBD	29	WH-244	N/A	N/A	N/A	M	CO	28	1	WHI
DVI-RCI-04-04-0153	4/26/2004	1745	Wed	West Hall	Battery	No	No	BLA	RC	4/11/2004	4/25/2004	TBD	26	WH-217	N/A	N/A	N/A	M	CO	28	4	WHI
DVI-RCI-04-03-0155	5/28/2004	740	Wed	West Hall	Battery	No	No	WHI	RC	4/10/1994	3/19/2004	2/22/2005	29	WH-249	CCCMS	N/A	N/A	M	CO	37	7	WHI
DVI-RCI-04-06-0219	6/19/2004	1610	Sat	WH Chow Hall	Battery	No	No	BLA	RC	4/8/2004	4/8/2004	TBD	52	WH-114	N/A	N/A	N/A	F	CO	31	2	HIS
DVI-RCI-04-06-0220	6/19/2004	2120	Sat	G-Wing	Battery	No	Door	WHI	RC	7/23/2003	7/23/2003	TBD	51	GD-10	OPP	N/A	N/A	M	CO	23	5	HIS

1.34  
200-207-2000  
DVI WORKER'S OFFICE  
1407

Deuel Vocational Institute  
 Staff Assault Data  
 January 2004 through April 2005

Attachment E

INCIDENT INFORMATION										VICTIM INFORMATION																	
IRS#	Date	Time	Day of Week	Site and Location	Type of Assault	Sex of Offender	Race of Offender	Offender's Age	Offender's Classification	Rec'd CDC	Rec'd Inst	Antropalea Ref	Age	Training Loc	Special Flight Status	Group	Work Status	Gender	Height	Weight	Hair	Eyes	DOB	SSN	DOB	SSN	
DVI-RC-04-03-0221	3/21/2004	0952	Tues	East Hall	Battery	M	W	44	ALI	RC	4/28/2004	4/28/2004	6/17/2005	44	EP-127	12	12A	100	M	CC	55	5	1/21/58	1234	3/21/04	5555	
DVI-RC-04-10-0241	10/19/2004	1235	Tues	RJR	Battery	M	W	21	WH	RC	10/19/2004	10/19/2004	TBD	21	A-312	10	10A	100	M	CC	54	5	1/19/83	1234	10/19/04	5555	
DVI-RC-04-12-0252	12/14/2004	1430	Tues	Garage	Battery	M	W	20	BLA	RC	8/11/2004	8/11/2004	TBD	20	G-245	10	10A	100	M	CC	50	5	1/14/84	1234	12/14/04	5555	
DVI-RC-04-12-0253	12/15/2004	1000	Wed	RJR	Battery	M	W	22	HIS	RC	12/15/2004	12/15/2004	TBD	22	TBD	10	10A	100	M	CC	51	5	1/15/84	1234	12/15/04	5555	
DVI-RC-04-12-0254	12/15/2004	1000	Wed	RJR	Battery	M	W	21	HIS	RC	12/15/2004	12/15/2004	TBD	21	TBD	10	10A	100	M	CC	50	5	1/15/84	1234	12/15/04	5555	
DVI-RC-04-12-0255	12/17/2004	1430	Fri	West Hall	Battery	M	W	35	WH	RC	8/23/2004	8/23/2004	TBD	35	WH-342	10	10A	100	M	CC	54	5	1/17/69	1234	12/17/04	5555	
DVI-RC-04-12-0256	12/20/2004	1243	Thu	RJR	Battery	M	W	27	WH	RC	8/26/2004	8/26/2004	TBD	27	TBD	10	10A	100	M	CC	57	5	1/20/77	1234	12/20/04	5555	
DVI-RC-05-01-0213	1/29/2005	1257	Sat	Garage	Battery	M	W	25	WH	RC	8/29/2004	8/29/2004	TBD	25	F-123	10	10A	100	M	CC	55	5	1/29/79	1234	1/29/05	5555	
DVI-RC-05-02-0226	2/2/2005	1235	Tues	East Hall	Battery	M	W	36	BLA	RC	12/17/1990	12/17/1990	TBD	36	A-342	CCOHS	10	10A	100	M	CC	58	5	1/17/68	1234	2/2/05	5555
DVI-RC-04-03-0210	3/2/2004	3118	Sat	Garage	Battery	M	W	29	HIS	RC	2/23/2004	2/23/2004	TBD	29	C-337	10	10A	100	M	CC	51	5	1/23/75	1234	3/2/04	5555	
DVI-RC-04-03-0215	3/21/2004	752	Wed	Garage	Battery	M	W	15	BLA	RC	3/4/2004	3/4/2004	TBD	15	C-219	10	10A	100	M	CC	25	5	1/15/89	1234	3/21/04	5555	
DVI-RC-04-03-0216	3/22/2004	2000	Sat	Garage	Battery	M	W	24	BLA	ADSEG	11/23/1980	11/23/1980	TBD	24	D-34	10	10A	100	M	CC	24	5	1/23/80	1234	3/22/04	5555	
DVI-RC-04-03-0218	3/22/2004	1300	Sat	Garage	Battery	M	W	23	BLA	ADSEG	11/23/1980	11/23/1980	TBD	23	D-334	10	10A	100	M	CC	27	5	1/23/80	1234	3/22/04	5555	
DVI-RC-04-07-0248	7/13/2004	1150	Sun	Garage	Battery	M	W	41	WH	ADSEG	7/15/2004	7/15/2004	TBD	41	D-324	10	10A	100	M	CC	53	5	1/13/63	1234	7/13/04	5555	
DVI-RC-04-10-0242	10/22/2004	800	Mon	Garage	Battery	M	W	20	BLA	RC	9/21/2004	9/21/2004	TBD	20	E-517	10	10A	100	M	CC	50	5	1/22/84	1234	10/22/04	5555	
DVI-RC-04-11-0255	11/2/2004	748	Sun	Garage	Battery	M	W	27	WH	RC	10/4/2004	10/4/2004	TBD	27	D-126	10	10A	100	M	CC	54	5	1/2/79	1234	11/2/04	5555	
DVI-RC-04-11-0270	11/23/2004	2030	Tues	Garage	Battery	M	W	27	HIS	RC	9/14/2004	9/14/2004	TBD	27	A-250	10	10A	100	M	CC	54	5	1/23/77	1234	11/23/04	5555	
DVI-RC-04-12-0294	12/16/2004	700	Tue	Garage	Gasping	M	W	23	BLA	RC	12/7/2004	12/7/2004	TBD	23	C-210	CCP	10	10A	100	M	CC	55	4	1/16/81	1234	12/16/04	5555
DVI-RC-04-12-0304	12/16/2004	720	Tue	Garage	Gasping	M	W	19	BLA	RC	12/7/2004	12/7/2004	TBD	19	C-210	CCP	10	10A	100	M	CC	55	3	1/16/81	1234	12/16/04	5555
DVI-RC-04-12-0417	12/31/2004	1415	Fri	Garage	Gasping	M	W	39	WH	RC	11/30/2004	11/30/2004	TBD	39	A-252	10	10A	100	M	CC	56	5	1/31/65	1234	12/31/04	5555	
DVI-RC-04-12-0417	12/31/2004	1415	Fri	Garage	Gasping	M	W	38	WH	RC	12/17/2004	12/17/2004	TBD	38	A-252	10	10A	100	M	CC	56	4	1/17/66	1234	12/31/04	5555	
DVI-RC-05-02-0235	2/19/2005	1510	Sat	Garage	Battery	M	W	44	BLA	RC	1/24/2005	1/24/2005	TBD	44	D-107	CCOHS	10	10A	100	M	CC	58	5	1/19/61	1234	2/19/05	5555
DVI-RC-05-03-0242	3/23/2005	1515	Fri	Garage	Battery	M	W	20	WH	RC	4/28/2005	4/28/2005	TBD	20	A-210	10	10A	100	M	CC	51	5	1/23/85	1234	3/23/05	5555	
DVI-RC-05-04-0120	4/28/2005	730	Fri	West Hall	Battery	M	W	36	BLA	RC	2/24/2005	2/24/2005	TBD	36	A-205	10	10A	100	M	CC	57	5	1/28/69	1234	4/28/05	5555	



**CORRECTIONS STANDARDS AUTHORITY - STAFF SAFETY EVALUATIONS**  
**Institutional Information**  
**LIVING AREA SPACE EVALUATION**

TYPE: Deuel Vocational Institute							TYPE: Reception Center		DATE: 9-28-05						
Building/Housing Unit							Each Building								
Bldg	Cell Type	Custody Level	# Cells	EACH CELL		Pop.	Program	Staffing							
				Beds	E Beds			F			G			S	
							1 <sup>st</sup>	2 <sup>nd</sup>	3 <sup>rd</sup>	1 <sup>st</sup>	2 <sup>nd</sup>	3 <sup>rd</sup>	1 <sup>st</sup>	2 <sup>nd</sup>	3 <sup>rd</sup>
	Holding	RC	4	0	0		Intake	5	7	7					
III	Double	RC, PC	150	300	0	280	Reception, Protective Custody	2	3	3					
III	Double	RC, PC	148	296	0	290	Reception, Protective Custody	1	3	3					
III	Double Dorm	RC, II, III	132 1	264	0 40	297	Orientation, Main Line, Reception	2	4	4					
III	Double Broadway	RC	132	264	20	262	Reception	1	3	3					
III	Double Broadway Dorm	RC	132 1	264	20 40	304	Reception	2	3	3					
III	Double Broadway Dorm	RC	132 1	264	20 24	288	Reception	2	4	4					
III	Double Broadway Dorm	RC, GP	128 1	264	20 40	306	Reception	2	4	4					
III	Double Broadway Dorm	III & IV	131 1	264	20 40	296	Reception	2	3	3					
III	Double	RC, Ag Seg	130	264	0	230	RC, Ag Seg overflow. Staffing depends on population	6	6	6					
III	Single	Ag Seg	143	143	0	143	Reception, Ag Seg.	2	1 4	1 2				1	
III	Double Dorm	RC	48 1	96	30	117	Ag Seg overflow, Reception	2	4	4					

Attachment C

Building/Housing Unit						Each Building									
Cell Type	Custody Level	# Cells	EACH CELL		Pop.	Program	Staffing								
			Beds	E Beds			F			G			S		
							1 <sup>st</sup>	2 <sup>nd</sup>	3 <sup>rd</sup>	1 <sup>st</sup>	2 <sup>nd</sup>	3 <sup>rd</sup>	1 <sup>st</sup>	2 <sup>nd</sup>	3 <sup>rd</sup>
Double Dorm	RC	48 1	96	0 40	98	Ag Seg overflow, Protective Custody, Reception	2	4	4				0	1	1
Double Dorm	II, III, RC	49 1	96	40	158	General Population (95 lifers), Reception	2	2	2						
Dorm	I, II	1		110	110	Reception, inmate workers	2	2	2						
Dorm	RC	1	0	156	156	Reception	1	3	3	1	1	1			
Dorm	I, II	1	0	300	300	General Population, Level I and II inmate workers	2	3	3						
Single	RC, I, II, III	26	26	0	12	Infirmary	0	2	1						
						These officers are posted along the corridors and provide security and escort to the cell blocks.							4	8	8
Dorm	I, II	1	20	0	18	Inmate workers, located outside of the secure perimeter.									
Dorm	I, II	1	20	0	19	Inmate workers, located outside of the secure perimeter.									
Dorm	I, II	1	20	0	20	Inmate workers, located outside of the secure perimeter.									
Dorm	I, II	1	168	0	152	Inmate workers, located outside of the secure perimeter.	2	3	4						
Dorm	I, II	1	10	0	8	Inmate workers, located outside of the secure perimeter.	1	1	1						

Deuel Vocational Institution  
September 26 - 30, 2005

Line Staff:

1. What is your current job title?
2. What is your assignment? What are your primary duties (Post Orders)?
3. When did you start working for the department as...?
4. How long have you been assigned to this facility?
5. How many inmates do you supervise? What is their general classification?
  - i. What safety equipment is issued to you? What safety equipment do you utilize at all times, otherwise have access to, or have to check out from a central location?
    - . What is the general condition of your safety equipment?
    - . Is the safety equipment issued to you adequate for your job duties?

If the answer is no, what additional safety equipment is necessary?
6. Do you have a stab vest? Have you been fitted for one? Do you wear it at all times?
  - . On a scale of 1 to 10, with 1 as the lowest score and 10 as the highest score, how safe do you feel working at this facility? Why do you feel that way?

Where do you feel the least safe? Can you describe why that is? Where and when do you feel the most safe?
  - . What staff safety issue are you most concerned about? What worries you the most as you performing your duties?

Attachment D

14. Do you have any general suggestions or comments relating to staff safety?
15. What most would you like to do or see changed to improve staff safety?
16. How often do you see and/or speak with your supervisor? Your supervisor's supervisor?  
The warden?
17. Are protocols in place for emergency responses?
18. (Policy?) What happens when a staff member is assaulted? If the staff person is injured, where do they go for first aid or for emergency treatment in more serious cases? How long might that take? Who investigates? Are criminal charges filed?

Supervisors:

1. How many years have you been a supervisor?
2. Have you worked as a supervisor at any other CDC institutions?
3. How long have you been assigned to this facility as a supervisor?
4. Describe your duties and responsibilities, and how you carry them out during a routine shift.
5. How many officers do you directly supervise?
6. How many do you indirectly supervise?
7. What is the percentage of time (shift) do you spend personally observing your subordinates?

8. What kind of complaints do you get from staff? Are there any patterns that emerge? How do you handle them?
9. How often do you see your supervisors?
10. What safety equipment is issued and carried by your staff?
11. Is there any other safety equipment, which you know of, available for staff's use? What is it, and how is it issued?
12. Does your staff have stab vests? Have they been fitted for one? Do you ensure that they wear it at all times?
13. Do you have a stab vest? Have you been fitted for one? Do you wear it at all times?
14. On a scale of 1 to 10, with 1 as the lowest score and 10 as the highest score, how safe do you feel working at this facility?
15. What is your greatest concern about staff safety for your subordinates?
16. What would you like to do or see changed to improve staff safety and reduce staff assaults?
17. What do you do to ensure a safe working environment for your staff?
18. What protocols in place for emergency responses?
19. What happens when a staff member is assaulted? If the staff person is injured, where do they go for first aid or for emergency treatment in more serious cases? How long might that take? Who investigates? Are criminal charges filed?

Managers:

1. How many years do you have as a manager?

2. Have you been a manager at any other CDC institution?
3. How long have you been assigned to this facility as a manager?
4. Describe your duties and responsibilities, and how you carry them out during a routine shift.
5. How often do you walk through the facility to talk with staff and observe general staff safety practices?
6. Can you describe the safety equipment that is issued to line staff? What is available for them to use?
7. Is there any other safety equipment, which you know of, available for staff's use? What is it, and how is it issued?
8. How many of your staff have been issued stab vests? How many have been fitted? What is the timeline for issuing vests? Who has been identified to receive them?
9. On a scale of 1 to 10, with 1 as the lowest score and 10 as the highest score, how safe do you feel working at this facility?
10. When considering staff safety, what types of concerns do you have?
11. From your perspective, what carries the greatest potential for staff injury?
12. What might mitigate or reduce staff assaults?
13. Do you have any long range plans to ensure staff safety and to reduce staff assaults?
14. What kinds of complaints do you get from staff? Are there any patterns that emerge?

## Attachment D

15. If you had sufficient resources (money and staff), what changes would you make to your operation to reduce staff assaults or the potential for assaults? Physical plant, service and supply, operational changes and/or staff changes?

16. What protocols in place for emergency responses?

17. What happens when a staff member is assaulted? If the person is injured, where do they go for first aid or for emergency treatment in more serious cases? How long might that take? Who investigates? Are criminal charges filed?

Evaluation Team Members  
Deuel Vocational Institute

Team 1

Staff Interviews:

Robert Takeshta, CSA Field Representative  
John McAuliffe, Adult Operations, Correctional Counselor II  
Jeff Plunkett, Juvenile Justice, Captain

Team 2

Physical Plant, Staffing and Population:  
Gary Wion, CSA Field Representative  
Mark Perkins, Adult Operations, Facility Captain  
Gerry Garcia, Juvenile Justice, Lieutenant

Team 3

Facility Profile, Documentation Review and Data Analysis:  
Don Allen, CSA Field Representative  
Dave Stark, Adult Operations, Lieutenant  
Bob Moore, Juvenile Justice, Major

Robert Takeshta, Field Representative  
Corrections Standards Authority  
Phone: 916-322-8345  
Fax: 916-327-3317  
E-Mail: [btakeshta@bdcorr.ca.gov](mailto:btakeshta@bdcorr.ca.gov)

Mark Perkins, Captain  
Adult Operations  
Phone: 916-358-2626  
Fax: 916-358-2499  
E-Mail: [mperkins@corr.ca.gov](mailto:mperkins@corr.ca.gov)

Gary Wion, Field Representative  
Corrections Standards Authority  
Phone: 916-324-1641  
Fax: 916-327-3317  
E-Mail: [gwion@bdcorr.ca.gov](mailto:gwion@bdcorr.ca.gov)

Jeff Plunkett, Captain  
Division of Juvenile Justice  
Phone: 916-262-0802  
Fax: 916-262-1767  
E-Mail: [jplunkett@cya.ca.gov](mailto:jplunkett@cya.ca.gov)

Don Allen, Field Representative  
Corrections Standards Authority  
Phone: 916-324-9153  
Fax: 916-327-3317  
E-Mail: [dallen@bdcorr.ca.gov](mailto:dallen@bdcorr.ca.gov)

Nicholas Andrade, Major (A)  
Division of Juvenile Justice  
Phone: 209-274-8115  
Fax: 209-274-0482  
E-Mail: [nandrade@cdcr.ca.gov](mailto:nandrade@cdcr.ca.gov)

John McAuliffe, Correctional Counselor II  
Adult Operations  
Phone: 916-358-2628  
Fax: 916-358-2636  
E-Mail: [john.mcauliffe@corr.ca.gov](mailto:john.mcauliffe@corr.ca.gov)

Buz Goncalves, Lieutenant  
Division of Juvenile Justice  
Phone: 209-944-6176  
Fax: 209-465-2968  
E-Mail: [bgoncalves@cdcr.ca.gov](mailto:bgoncalves@cdcr.ca.gov)

Dave Stark, Lieutenant  
Adult Operations  
Phone: 916-358-2473  
Fax: 916-358-2499  
E-Mail: [dave.stark@corr.ca.gov](mailto:dave.stark@corr.ca.gov)