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Sheriff Can't Release AIDS Test Results
While awaiting transfer from a county jail to an Alabama prison, a convicted prisoner was given the opportunity to voluntarily submit to an AIDS test. he did so, but only after being assured by the county health officials that the results of such test would remain confidential. The inmate was later personally informed of the test results.
A lawsuit was later brought to compel the county health officials to release the results to the sheriff, alleging that the inmate was threatening to scratch, bite, claw, or hurt any individual that came into his cell. An Alabama appeals court has held that, under state statutory law, the county health department is vested with the sole discretion as to whether to divulge confidential test results to third parties.
The court rejected the argument that the sheriff had to receive the results in order to comply with his duty to protect the health and safety of the inmates entrusted to his care. The state provides a mechanism for the sheriff to notify the health authorities of the existence of reasonable cause to believe that an inmate has been exposed to or is afflicted with any sexually transmitted diseases. "After such a communication," the court said, "it appears to become incumbent upon the health officer to act with regard to this information." State Dept of Public Health v. Wells, 562 So.2d 1315 (Ala.Civ.App. 1989), cert quashed, Alabama Supreme Court, 1990.
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Related legal case
State Dept. of Public Health v. Wells
Year | 1989 |
---|---|
Cite | 562 So. 1315 (Ala.Civ.App. 1989), cert quashed, Al |
Level | State Court of Appeals |
Aside from the provisions of the Notifiable Diseases Act discussed above, we particularly note that the legislature's most recent expression regarding the confidentiality of such test results is embodied in Alabama Act No. 88-983. It provides for exceptions to the confidentiality provisions of the Notifiable Diseases Act. It states:
"Section 1. The State Committee of Public Health is hereby authorized to establish the rules by which exceptions may be made to the confidentiality provisions of Chapter 11A of Title 22, Code of Alabama 1975, and establish rules for notification of third parties of such disease when exposure is indicated or a threat to the health and welfare of others."
1988 Ala.Acts 88-983, § 1. Although the record in the instant case is devoid of evidence of rules established by the State Committee of Public Health pursuant to this provision, the language of this section clearly reflects the intent of the legislature to vest such authority solely with the Committee. Furthermore, section 9 of the Act clearly states that "[e]xcept as provided in this Act [or the rules and regulations promulgated thereunder (see section 1) ], any information required pursuant to Chapter 11A of Title 22 of Code of Alabama 1975, shall remain confidential." 1988 Ala.Acts 88-983, § 9.
The Act further provides:
"Section 4. Physicians or the State Health Officer or his designee may notify a third party of the presence of a contagious disease in an individual where there is a foreseeable, real or probable risk of transmission of the disease."
1988 Ala.Acts 88-983, § 4. It is clear from the language of this section that discretion *1318 is vested in "[p]hysicians or the State Health Officer or his designee" to determine whether the results of tests conducted pursuant to the Notifiable Diseases Act are to be divulged to third parties. Accordingly, we find that it was error for the trial court to determine otherwise. Additionally, we find, in view of the evidence, that the trial court erred in substituting its judgment for that of the county health officer when it found that there existed a likelihood of present danger so as to require release of the inmate's test results.
Finally, we recognize and understand the sheriff's legal charge and his sense of duty to protect the jail and keep the prisoners safe until he is legally relieved of their custody. Ala.Code (1975), § 14-6-1. Accordingly, we find no conflict with that charge in our opinion, nor do we intend to disturb any explicit or implicit authority a sheriff may possess.
As to the sheriff's legal charge in this case, we find no statute that imposes a duty or obligation upon him to act with a heightened degree of care to protect individuals such as those here. However, it appears that the legislature may have empowered the health department to establish a mechanism to deal with this through the granting of statutory power to adopt rules and regulations. 1988 Ala.Acts 88-893. Pending the adoption of such rules and regulations, if such are to be forthcoming, we find that § 22-11A-37 appears to already provide the sheriff with the tools to discharge any special duty or obligation as he may perceive he has in such a case as that before us. The Act states:
"When there is reasonable cause to believe that an inmate of any state correctional facility or any municipal or county jail has been exposed to or is afflicted with any of the diseases designated by this chapter, the state or county health officer may petition the superintendent of the facility to isolate the inmate for compulsory testing, treatment and quarantine."
Ala.Code (1975), § 22-11A-37.
Additionally, it appears to us that by communicating to the state or county health officer the existence of reasonable cause to believe that an inmate has been exposed to or is afflicted with any of the diseases set forth in the Notifiable Diseases Act, the sheriff may satisfy any duty or obligation he might have to protect the health and safety of inmates entrusted to his care. After such a communication, it appears to become incumbent upon the health officer to act with regard to this information.
In light of the above discussion, this court must yield to the infinite wisdom of the legislature with regard to such important matters as public health.
Accordingly, this case is due to be reversed and remanded with instructions to enter an order consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.
INGRAM, P.J., concurs.
ROBERTSON, J., dissents.
ROBERTSON, Judge (dissenting).
I respectfully dissent.
The sheriff and his jailer is charged under Alabama law with the care of inmates in his custody. In carrying out this duty, he must exercise a high degree of care to preserve the inmates' safety until legally relieved of their custody. State ex rel. Attorney General v. Martin, 180 Ala. 458, 61 So. 491 (1913).
In the instant case, the anonymous inmate had been sentenced to life without parole in a state penitentiary and was merely awaiting transfer in the county jail to begin serving such term. Clearly, under the statute (§ 22-11A-17), testing for AIDS will occur and the results will be known to the State Department of Corrections once the inmate is received into that system. However, while awaiting transfer, the care of the inmate was the responsibility of the county sheriff.
The interpretation of this statute requires not only a careful reading of the words but a balancing of the interests of *1319 the parties involved. Clearly, the word "shall" in the first sentence indicates that all persons sentenced may be tested even if merely awaiting transfer if such is in the best interest of preserving the safety of the inmates in the sheriff's care. In order to carry out the statutory duties with which he is charged the sheriff must have access to certain information.
Clearly, here, where an inmate is claiming to have been exposed to AIDS and testimony indicates the inmate was threatening to scratch, bite, claw, or hurt any individual that came into his cell, certain security risks are involved in his care and safety as well as in the care and safety of the other inmates in the facility and the sheriff's security staff. Without the information requested, the sheriff is at the mercy of the inmate, who is already posing security hazards to others. To refuse to allow the sheriff access to information necessary in the care of those inmates in his custody, is to disallow the sheriff the controls necessary to perform the duties with which he is legally charged. While this case involves the very sensitive issue of confidentiality of medical records, it also involves, and cannot be considered without, considerations of security. It is not about compulsory testing, but rather, the necessity of certain information required for the sheriff to carry out statutory charges.
562 So.2d 1315
END OF DOCUMENT
"Section 1. The State Committee of Public Health is hereby authorized to establish the rules by which exceptions may be made to the confidentiality provisions of Chapter 11A of Title 22, Code of Alabama 1975, and establish rules for notification of third parties of such disease when exposure is indicated or a threat to the health and welfare of others."
1988 Ala.Acts 88-983, § 1. Although the record in the instant case is devoid of evidence of rules established by the State Committee of Public Health pursuant to this provision, the language of this section clearly reflects the intent of the legislature to vest such authority solely with the Committee. Furthermore, section 9 of the Act clearly states that "[e]xcept as provided in this Act [or the rules and regulations promulgated thereunder (see section 1) ], any information required pursuant to Chapter 11A of Title 22 of Code of Alabama 1975, shall remain confidential." 1988 Ala.Acts 88-983, § 9.
The Act further provides:
"Section 4. Physicians or the State Health Officer or his designee may notify a third party of the presence of a contagious disease in an individual where there is a foreseeable, real or probable risk of transmission of the disease."
1988 Ala.Acts 88-983, § 4. It is clear from the language of this section that discretion *1318 is vested in "[p]hysicians or the State Health Officer or his designee" to determine whether the results of tests conducted pursuant to the Notifiable Diseases Act are to be divulged to third parties. Accordingly, we find that it was error for the trial court to determine otherwise. Additionally, we find, in view of the evidence, that the trial court erred in substituting its judgment for that of the county health officer when it found that there existed a likelihood of present danger so as to require release of the inmate's test results.
Finally, we recognize and understand the sheriff's legal charge and his sense of duty to protect the jail and keep the prisoners safe until he is legally relieved of their custody. Ala.Code (1975), § 14-6-1. Accordingly, we find no conflict with that charge in our opinion, nor do we intend to disturb any explicit or implicit authority a sheriff may possess.
As to the sheriff's legal charge in this case, we find no statute that imposes a duty or obligation upon him to act with a heightened degree of care to protect individuals such as those here. However, it appears that the legislature may have empowered the health department to establish a mechanism to deal with this through the granting of statutory power to adopt rules and regulations. 1988 Ala.Acts 88-893. Pending the adoption of such rules and regulations, if such are to be forthcoming, we find that § 22-11A-37 appears to already provide the sheriff with the tools to discharge any special duty or obligation as he may perceive he has in such a case as that before us. The Act states:
"When there is reasonable cause to believe that an inmate of any state correctional facility or any municipal or county jail has been exposed to or is afflicted with any of the diseases designated by this chapter, the state or county health officer may petition the superintendent of the facility to isolate the inmate for compulsory testing, treatment and quarantine."
Ala.Code (1975), § 22-11A-37.
Additionally, it appears to us that by communicating to the state or county health officer the existence of reasonable cause to believe that an inmate has been exposed to or is afflicted with any of the diseases set forth in the Notifiable Diseases Act, the sheriff may satisfy any duty or obligation he might have to protect the health and safety of inmates entrusted to his care. After such a communication, it appears to become incumbent upon the health officer to act with regard to this information.
In light of the above discussion, this court must yield to the infinite wisdom of the legislature with regard to such important matters as public health.
Accordingly, this case is due to be reversed and remanded with instructions to enter an order consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.
INGRAM, P.J., concurs.
ROBERTSON, J., dissents.
ROBERTSON, Judge (dissenting).
I respectfully dissent.
The sheriff and his jailer is charged under Alabama law with the care of inmates in his custody. In carrying out this duty, he must exercise a high degree of care to preserve the inmates' safety until legally relieved of their custody. State ex rel. Attorney General v. Martin, 180 Ala. 458, 61 So. 491 (1913).
In the instant case, the anonymous inmate had been sentenced to life without parole in a state penitentiary and was merely awaiting transfer in the county jail to begin serving such term. Clearly, under the statute (§ 22-11A-17), testing for AIDS will occur and the results will be known to the State Department of Corrections once the inmate is received into that system. However, while awaiting transfer, the care of the inmate was the responsibility of the county sheriff.
The interpretation of this statute requires not only a careful reading of the words but a balancing of the interests of *1319 the parties involved. Clearly, the word "shall" in the first sentence indicates that all persons sentenced may be tested even if merely awaiting transfer if such is in the best interest of preserving the safety of the inmates in the sheriff's care. In order to carry out the statutory duties with which he is charged the sheriff must have access to certain information.
Clearly, here, where an inmate is claiming to have been exposed to AIDS and testimony indicates the inmate was threatening to scratch, bite, claw, or hurt any individual that came into his cell, certain security risks are involved in his care and safety as well as in the care and safety of the other inmates in the facility and the sheriff's security staff. Without the information requested, the sheriff is at the mercy of the inmate, who is already posing security hazards to others. To refuse to allow the sheriff access to information necessary in the care of those inmates in his custody, is to disallow the sheriff the controls necessary to perform the duties with which he is legally charged. While this case involves the very sensitive issue of confidentiality of medical records, it also involves, and cannot be considered without, considerations of security. It is not about compulsory testing, but rather, the necessity of certain information required for the sheriff to carry out statutory charges.
562 So.2d 1315
END OF DOCUMENT