×
You have 2 more free articles available this month. Subscribe today.
Prisoner Litigants May Be Shackled in Court
Winston Holloway is an Arkansas prisoner who filed suit under § 1983 claiming that living conditions in the state prison's segregation unit violated the eighth amendment. At trial the jury ruled in favor of prison officials on all claims.
On appeal Holloway claimed that he had been denied a fair trial on his eighth amendment claim because the jury saw his prisoner witnesses and him in shackles. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit disagreed and affirmed the jury's verdict.
The Court of Appeals held that the shackles added nothing to the case that was not known to the jury because Holloway and his witnesses appeared in prison clothes before the jury, the nature of the case and claims made it apparent that Holloway was a prisoner. The plaintiff's status as a prisoner had no bearing on his civil rights case and the judge issued a cautionary instruction to the jury that they disregard the shackles in considering the case. Thus, Holloway was not deprived of this right to a fair trial by being seen in shackles by the jury.
The court went on to add that this case does not mean that the use of shackles in a prisoner civil rights case may never rise to reversible error. It states: "This court does not endorse a general policy of parading inmate civil plaintiffs or their witnesses before the jury in shackles. In these cases, the district court has responsibility to ensure reasonable efforts are made to permit the inmate and the inmate's witnesses to appear without shackles during proceedings before the jury. When this is not feasible, the district court should take appropriate action to minimiz e the use of shackles, to cover shackles from the jury's view, and to mitigate any potential prejudice through cautionary instructions." See, Holloway v. Alexander, 957 F.2d 529 (8 Cir.,1992).
On appeal Holloway claimed that he had been denied a fair trial on his eighth amendment claim because the jury saw his prisoner witnesses and him in shackles. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit disagreed and affirmed the jury's verdict.
The Court of Appeals held that the shackles added nothing to the case that was not known to the jury because Holloway and his witnesses appeared in prison clothes before the jury, the nature of the case and claims made it apparent that Holloway was a prisoner. The plaintiff's status as a prisoner had no bearing on his civil rights case and the judge issued a cautionary instruction to the jury that they disregard the shackles in considering the case. Thus, Holloway was not deprived of this right to a fair trial by being seen in shackles by the jury.
The court went on to add that this case does not mean that the use of shackles in a prisoner civil rights case may never rise to reversible error. It states: "This court does not endorse a general policy of parading inmate civil plaintiffs or their witnesses before the jury in shackles. In these cases, the district court has responsibility to ensure reasonable efforts are made to permit the inmate and the inmate's witnesses to appear without shackles during proceedings before the jury. When this is not feasible, the district court should take appropriate action to minimiz e the use of shackles, to cover shackles from the jury's view, and to mitigate any potential prejudice through cautionary instructions." See, Holloway v. Alexander, 957 F.2d 529 (8 Cir.,1992).
As a digital subscriber to Prison Legal News, you can access full text and downloads for this and other premium content.
Already a subscriber? Login
Related legal case
Holloway v. Alexander
| Year | 1992 |
|---|---|
| Cite | 957 F.2d 529 (8th Cir. 1992) |
| Level | Court of Appeals |
Holloway v. Alexander, 957 F.2d 529 (8th Cir. 02/20/1992)
[1] UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
[2] No. 91-2178EA
[4] filed: February 20, 1992.
[5] WINSTON HOLLOWAY, APPELLANT,
v.
COI LARRY ALEXANDER; RICKY ANTHONY; BERNARD GARDNER; ROY HOBBS; MARK ANTHONY JIMMERSON; KARL E. JOHNSON; WESLEY W. MITCHELL; RANDLE MORGAN; LARRY NORRIS; UNKNOWN AGENTS (25); RODNEY V. WATSON, APPELLEES.
[6] Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas. Honorable H. David Young, U.S. Magistrate.
[7] COUNSEL
[8] Counsel who represented the appellant was Mark L. Pryor of Little Rock, AR.
[9] Counsel who represented the appellee was Brad Newman, AAG, of Little Rock, AR.
[10] Before Fagg, Bowman, and Wollman, Circuit Judges.
[11] Author: Fagg
[12] FAGG, Circuit Judge.
[13] Winston Holloway, an Arkansas prisoner, brought this civil rights action against various employees of the Arkansas Department of Correction (the appellees), asserting the living conditions in the punitive isolation area of the state's maximum security prison violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. A jury found in favor of the appellees. Holloway appeals and we affirm.
[14] Holloway contends he was denied a fair trial on his Eighth Amendment claim because the district court permitted the jury to see him and his witnesses in shackles. We disagree. The shackles added nothing to the trial that was not already apparent from the nature of the case: Holloway and his witnesses wore prison garb throughout the trial; the jury knew Holloway and his witnesses were maximum security prisoners; and Holloway's own testimony about his criminal history and sentences made it clear he was a dangerous felon and a likely flight risk. In these circumstances, "'no prejudice can result from [the jury] seeing that which is already known.'" Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 507, 48 L. Ed. 2d 126, 96 S. Ct. 1691 (1976) (quoted case omitted); see also Scott v. James, 902 F.2d 672, 674 (8th Cir.) (defendant's own testimony showing he was a prisoner "rendered harmless any possible prejudice resulting from his momentary appearance in handcuffs"), cert. denied, 112 L. Ed. 2d 160, 111 S. Ct. 198 (1990). Any general prejudice caused by the presence of the shackles was cured when the district court admonished the jury to disregard the shackles in their consideration of Holloway's case. See Davis v. Eide, 439 F.2d 1077, 1078-79 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 843, 30 L. Ed. 2d 78, 92 S. Ct. 139 (1971).
[15] In a prisoner civil rights case involving living conditions, the plaintiff's status as a dangerous felon has no bearing on the issue the jury must decide. The shackles may have reinforced in the jurors' minds that Holloway and his witnesses were maximum security prisoners. The jury, however, was called on to decide only whether Holloway's living conditions inside the prison were cruel and inhumane. The fact that Holloway and his witnesses were security risks inside the courtroom was simply not a factor relevant to that decision. We thus conclude Holloway was not deprived of a fair trial by the jurors seeing him and his witnesses in shackles.
[16] Although we hold the use of shackles did not rise to the level of reversible error in Holloway's case, we do not hold the use of shackles could never amount to reversible error in a prisoner civil rights action. This court does not endorse a general policy of parading inmate civil plaintiffs or their witnesses before the jury in shackles. In these cases, the district court has a responsibility to ensure reasonable efforts are made to permit the inmate and the inmate's witnesses to appear without shackles during proceedings before the jury. When this is not feasible, the district court should take appropriate action to minimize the use of shackles, to cover shackles from the jury's view, and to mitigate any potential prejudice through cautionary instructions.
[17] Holloway also contends he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on his Eighth Amendment claim. Holloway and the appellees, however, presented conflicting testimony on the material issues in this action. Thus, the district court properly submitted Holloway's claim to the jury, and sufficient evidence supports the jury's verdict. See Van Praag v. Columbia Classics Corp., 849 F.2d 1106, 1110-11 (8th Cir. 1988).
[18] Finally, Holloway contends the district court committed error in failing to instruct the jury on nominal damages. Because the jury returned a verdict for the appellees, the jury did not consider damages, and any error in failing to instruct the jury on nominal damages was harmless. See Green v. American Airlines, Inc., 804 F.2d 453, 456 (8th Cir. 1986). Furthermore, having failed to object to the district court's denial of his requested instruction, Holloway did not preserve his jury-instruction claim for review. See Barton v. Columbia Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 930 F.2d 1337, 1340-41 (8th Cir. 1991).
[19] Accordingly, we affirm.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[1] UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
[2] No. 91-2178EA
[4] filed: February 20, 1992.
[5] WINSTON HOLLOWAY, APPELLANT,
v.
COI LARRY ALEXANDER; RICKY ANTHONY; BERNARD GARDNER; ROY HOBBS; MARK ANTHONY JIMMERSON; KARL E. JOHNSON; WESLEY W. MITCHELL; RANDLE MORGAN; LARRY NORRIS; UNKNOWN AGENTS (25); RODNEY V. WATSON, APPELLEES.
[6] Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas. Honorable H. David Young, U.S. Magistrate.
[7] COUNSEL
[8] Counsel who represented the appellant was Mark L. Pryor of Little Rock, AR.
[9] Counsel who represented the appellee was Brad Newman, AAG, of Little Rock, AR.
[10] Before Fagg, Bowman, and Wollman, Circuit Judges.
[11] Author: Fagg
[12] FAGG, Circuit Judge.
[13] Winston Holloway, an Arkansas prisoner, brought this civil rights action against various employees of the Arkansas Department of Correction (the appellees), asserting the living conditions in the punitive isolation area of the state's maximum security prison violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. A jury found in favor of the appellees. Holloway appeals and we affirm.
[14] Holloway contends he was denied a fair trial on his Eighth Amendment claim because the district court permitted the jury to see him and his witnesses in shackles. We disagree. The shackles added nothing to the trial that was not already apparent from the nature of the case: Holloway and his witnesses wore prison garb throughout the trial; the jury knew Holloway and his witnesses were maximum security prisoners; and Holloway's own testimony about his criminal history and sentences made it clear he was a dangerous felon and a likely flight risk. In these circumstances, "'no prejudice can result from [the jury] seeing that which is already known.'" Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 507, 48 L. Ed. 2d 126, 96 S. Ct. 1691 (1976) (quoted case omitted); see also Scott v. James, 902 F.2d 672, 674 (8th Cir.) (defendant's own testimony showing he was a prisoner "rendered harmless any possible prejudice resulting from his momentary appearance in handcuffs"), cert. denied, 112 L. Ed. 2d 160, 111 S. Ct. 198 (1990). Any general prejudice caused by the presence of the shackles was cured when the district court admonished the jury to disregard the shackles in their consideration of Holloway's case. See Davis v. Eide, 439 F.2d 1077, 1078-79 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 843, 30 L. Ed. 2d 78, 92 S. Ct. 139 (1971).
[15] In a prisoner civil rights case involving living conditions, the plaintiff's status as a dangerous felon has no bearing on the issue the jury must decide. The shackles may have reinforced in the jurors' minds that Holloway and his witnesses were maximum security prisoners. The jury, however, was called on to decide only whether Holloway's living conditions inside the prison were cruel and inhumane. The fact that Holloway and his witnesses were security risks inside the courtroom was simply not a factor relevant to that decision. We thus conclude Holloway was not deprived of a fair trial by the jurors seeing him and his witnesses in shackles.
[16] Although we hold the use of shackles did not rise to the level of reversible error in Holloway's case, we do not hold the use of shackles could never amount to reversible error in a prisoner civil rights action. This court does not endorse a general policy of parading inmate civil plaintiffs or their witnesses before the jury in shackles. In these cases, the district court has a responsibility to ensure reasonable efforts are made to permit the inmate and the inmate's witnesses to appear without shackles during proceedings before the jury. When this is not feasible, the district court should take appropriate action to minimize the use of shackles, to cover shackles from the jury's view, and to mitigate any potential prejudice through cautionary instructions.
[17] Holloway also contends he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on his Eighth Amendment claim. Holloway and the appellees, however, presented conflicting testimony on the material issues in this action. Thus, the district court properly submitted Holloway's claim to the jury, and sufficient evidence supports the jury's verdict. See Van Praag v. Columbia Classics Corp., 849 F.2d 1106, 1110-11 (8th Cir. 1988).
[18] Finally, Holloway contends the district court committed error in failing to instruct the jury on nominal damages. Because the jury returned a verdict for the appellees, the jury did not consider damages, and any error in failing to instruct the jury on nominal damages was harmless. See Green v. American Airlines, Inc., 804 F.2d 453, 456 (8th Cir. 1986). Furthermore, having failed to object to the district court's denial of his requested instruction, Holloway did not preserve his jury-instruction claim for review. See Barton v. Columbia Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 930 F.2d 1337, 1340-41 (8th Cir. 1991).
[19] Accordingly, we affirm.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------