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Segregation of HIV+ Prisoners Upheld, Again
James Camarillo was an HIV positive California state prisoner. He has since been released on parole. While in custody of the California DOC he was transferred to a housing unit of HIV+ prisoners. Camarillo filed suit under § 1983 claiming that the transfer violated his right to equal protection, privacy, due process, freedom from cruel and unusual punishment and freedom of association. On the defendant prison officials' motion for summary judgement the district court dismissed the first four claims holding that they were entitled to qualified immunity for their actions. The court did not address the issue of qualified immunity on the freedom of association issue and ordered the case to proceed to trial.
The defendants filed an interlocutory appeal claiming that they were entitled to qualified immunity on this issue as well. The court of appeals for the ninth circuit agreed and reversed and remanded the case.
The defendants did not raise qualified immunity as an affirmative defense in their answer to the complaint. The appeals court notes that qualified immunity is an affirmative defense that should be plead by the defendant in his or her answer to the complaint. However, in the absence of a showing of prejudice, an affirmative defense can be raised for the first time on summary judgement. Because Camarillo did not claim any prejudice the court ruled that the defendants had not waived their qualified immunity defense.
The court gave a brief description of the doctrine of qualified immunity and notes that the plaintiff in a § 1983 action bears the burden of proving a right was clearly established at the time of a government officials allegedly unconstitutional conduct. In this case, the court held that the district court should have entered summary judgement for the defendants as soon as it determined no clearly established right had been violated.
The court noted that every court that has considered the question of segregating HIV+ prisoners has upheld the practice. The cases are cited in the opinion. In this case the constitutionality of segregating HIV+ prisoners was not before the court. Without reaching that question the court dismissed the suit on the matter of granting qualified immunity to the defendants. See: Camarillo v. McCarthy, 998 F.2d 638 (9th Cir. 1993).
The defendants filed an interlocutory appeal claiming that they were entitled to qualified immunity on this issue as well. The court of appeals for the ninth circuit agreed and reversed and remanded the case.
The defendants did not raise qualified immunity as an affirmative defense in their answer to the complaint. The appeals court notes that qualified immunity is an affirmative defense that should be plead by the defendant in his or her answer to the complaint. However, in the absence of a showing of prejudice, an affirmative defense can be raised for the first time on summary judgement. Because Camarillo did not claim any prejudice the court ruled that the defendants had not waived their qualified immunity defense.
The court gave a brief description of the doctrine of qualified immunity and notes that the plaintiff in a § 1983 action bears the burden of proving a right was clearly established at the time of a government officials allegedly unconstitutional conduct. In this case, the court held that the district court should have entered summary judgement for the defendants as soon as it determined no clearly established right had been violated.
The court noted that every court that has considered the question of segregating HIV+ prisoners has upheld the practice. The cases are cited in the opinion. In this case the constitutionality of segregating HIV+ prisoners was not before the court. Without reaching that question the court dismissed the suit on the matter of granting qualified immunity to the defendants. See: Camarillo v. McCarthy, 998 F.2d 638 (9th Cir. 1993).
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Related legal case
Camarillo v. McCarthy
| Year | 1993 |
|---|---|
| Cite | 998 F.2d 638 (9th Cir. 1993) |
| Level | Court of Appeals |
Camarillo v. McCarthy, 998 F.2d 638 (9th Cir. 02/03/1993)
[1] UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
[2] No. 92-15991
[4] *fn* submitted san francisco california: February 3, 1993.
[5] JAMES HAYNES CAMARILLO, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
v.
DANIEL J. MCCARTHY, DIRECTOR, ET AL., DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS
[6] Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California. D.C. No. CV-88-00568-LKK. Lawrence K. Karlton, District Judge, Presiding
[7] Before: Farris, Poole, and Wiggins, Circuit Judges.
[8] MEMORANDUM
[9] Defendants, California state prison officials, appeal the denial of their motion for summary judgment in an action brought by former state prisoner James Haynes Camarillo pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. While incarcerated, Camarillo, who is HIV-positive, was transferred to a housing unit for HIV-positive inmates. Camarillo's suit alleged that his transfer violated his constitutional rights of: (1) equal protection; (2) privacy; (3) due process; (4) freedom from cruel and unusual punishment; and (5) freedom of association. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court held that qualified immunity barred suit against the officials for the first four of the alleged constitutional violations. On the claim of freedom of association, the court did not address qualified immunity. Instead, it denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment and ordered the matter to proceed to trial because a material issue of fact remained as to whether Camarillo's freedom to associate was curtailed by his transfer.
[10] We have jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal pursuant to the collateral order doctrine. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530, 86 L. Ed. 2d 411, 105 S. Ct. 2806 (1985); Romero v. Kitsap County, 931 F.2d 624, 626 (9th Cir. 1991).
[11] I.
[12] Camarillo argues that the prison officials waived the defense of qualified immunity by failing to raise it as an affirmative defense in their answer to the complaint. In the absence of a showing of prejudice, an affirmative defense may be raised for the first time at summary judgment. See Rivera v. Anaya, 726 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1984). Camarillo has not claimed prejudice; nor is any suggested by the record. The defense of qualified immunity was not waived. See id.
[13] II.
[14] Qualified immunity protects government officials performing discretionary functions from liability for civil damages, unless the official's conduct violates clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 73 L. Ed. 2d 396, 102 S. Ct. 2727 (1982); Romero, 931 F.2d at 627. The plaintiff in a § 1983 action bears the burden of proving that the right allegedly violated was clearly established at the time of the official's allegedly impermissible conduct. Elder v. Holloway, 975 F.2d 1388, 1390 (9th Cir. 1992); Romero, 931 F.2d at 627.
[15] A law is "clearly established" when "the contours of the right [are] sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right." Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 97 L. Ed. 2d 523, 107 S. Ct. 3034 (1987). The magistrate Judge, whose findings were adopted by the district court, canvassed relevant decisional law, see Wood v. Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583, 591 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 938, 111 S. Ct. 341, 112 L. Ed. 2d 305 (1990), and concluded that "it was not clearly established by statute or case law that such segregation violated statutory or constitutional rights." Excerpts of Record at 6-7. Nevertheless, the court denied in part the defendants' motion for summary judgment because a factual dispute remained as to whether Camarillo's freedom to associate was curtailed.
[16] The district court should have ordered summary judgment for the defendants. Once it was determined that no clearly established constitutional rights were violated, the factual dispute became immaterial. See Romero, 931 F.2d at 628.
[17] III.
[18] Camarillo argues that it was clearly established at the time he was segregated in the HIV unit that prison inmates have First Amendment rights, including freedom of association. Camarillo misconstrues the level of generality at which a law must be "clearly established." See Anderson, 483 U.S. at 639. The operation of the "clearly established" standard,
[19] depends substantially upon the level of generality at which the relevant "legal rule" is to be identified. For example, the right to due process of law is quite clearly established by the Due Process Clause, and thus there is a sense in which any action that violates the Clause (no matter how unclear it may be that the particular action is a violation) violates a clearly established right. Much the same could be said of any other constitutional or statutory violation. But if the test of "clearly established law" were to be applied at this level of generality, it would bear no relationship to the "objective legal reasonableness" that is the touchstone of Harlow.
[20] Id.
[21] The relevant, properly particularized question, see id. at 640, is whether it was clearly established that inmates are entitled to be free of prison regulations that restrict their association with members of the general prison population.
[22] A prison regulation that impinges on an inmate's constitutional rights is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89, 96 L. Ed. 2d 64, 107 S. Ct. 2254 (1987). It was not clearly established at the relevant time -- nor is it now*fn1 -- that a prison policy that segregates HIV-positive inmates from the general prison population is unconstitutional. Camarillo failed to cite a single case, either to the district court or on appeal, indicating otherwise.*fn2
[23] REVERSED and REMANDED for entry of summary judgment for defendants.
[24] Disposition
[25] REVERSED and REMANDED for entry of summary judgment for defendants.
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General Footnotes
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[26] *fn* The panel unanimously found this case suitable for decision without oral argument. Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 9th Cir. R. 34-4.
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Opinion Footnotes
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[27] *fn1 Several recent cases hold that prison policies mandating segregation of HIV-positive inmates are not unconstitutional. See, e.g.,Moore v. Mabus, 976 F.2d 268, 271 (5th Cir. 1992); Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1521 (11th Cir. 1991); Muhammad v. Carlson, 845 F.2d 175, 177 (8th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1068, 103 L. Ed. 2d 814, 109 S. Ct. 1346 (1989).
[28] *fn2 Although it is Camarillo's responsibility to "identify the universe of statutory or decisional law from which the court can determine whether the right allegedly violated was clearly established," see Elder, 975 F.2d at 1392, we may undertake our own inquiry. See id. at 1396. Our research convinces us that the right Camarillo asserts was not clearly established in June 1987.
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[1] UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
[2] No. 92-15991
[4] *fn* submitted san francisco california: February 3, 1993.
[5] JAMES HAYNES CAMARILLO, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
v.
DANIEL J. MCCARTHY, DIRECTOR, ET AL., DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS
[6] Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California. D.C. No. CV-88-00568-LKK. Lawrence K. Karlton, District Judge, Presiding
[7] Before: Farris, Poole, and Wiggins, Circuit Judges.
[8] MEMORANDUM
[9] Defendants, California state prison officials, appeal the denial of their motion for summary judgment in an action brought by former state prisoner James Haynes Camarillo pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. While incarcerated, Camarillo, who is HIV-positive, was transferred to a housing unit for HIV-positive inmates. Camarillo's suit alleged that his transfer violated his constitutional rights of: (1) equal protection; (2) privacy; (3) due process; (4) freedom from cruel and unusual punishment; and (5) freedom of association. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court held that qualified immunity barred suit against the officials for the first four of the alleged constitutional violations. On the claim of freedom of association, the court did not address qualified immunity. Instead, it denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment and ordered the matter to proceed to trial because a material issue of fact remained as to whether Camarillo's freedom to associate was curtailed by his transfer.
[10] We have jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal pursuant to the collateral order doctrine. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530, 86 L. Ed. 2d 411, 105 S. Ct. 2806 (1985); Romero v. Kitsap County, 931 F.2d 624, 626 (9th Cir. 1991).
[11] I.
[12] Camarillo argues that the prison officials waived the defense of qualified immunity by failing to raise it as an affirmative defense in their answer to the complaint. In the absence of a showing of prejudice, an affirmative defense may be raised for the first time at summary judgment. See Rivera v. Anaya, 726 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1984). Camarillo has not claimed prejudice; nor is any suggested by the record. The defense of qualified immunity was not waived. See id.
[13] II.
[14] Qualified immunity protects government officials performing discretionary functions from liability for civil damages, unless the official's conduct violates clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 73 L. Ed. 2d 396, 102 S. Ct. 2727 (1982); Romero, 931 F.2d at 627. The plaintiff in a § 1983 action bears the burden of proving that the right allegedly violated was clearly established at the time of the official's allegedly impermissible conduct. Elder v. Holloway, 975 F.2d 1388, 1390 (9th Cir. 1992); Romero, 931 F.2d at 627.
[15] A law is "clearly established" when "the contours of the right [are] sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right." Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 97 L. Ed. 2d 523, 107 S. Ct. 3034 (1987). The magistrate Judge, whose findings were adopted by the district court, canvassed relevant decisional law, see Wood v. Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583, 591 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 938, 111 S. Ct. 341, 112 L. Ed. 2d 305 (1990), and concluded that "it was not clearly established by statute or case law that such segregation violated statutory or constitutional rights." Excerpts of Record at 6-7. Nevertheless, the court denied in part the defendants' motion for summary judgment because a factual dispute remained as to whether Camarillo's freedom to associate was curtailed.
[16] The district court should have ordered summary judgment for the defendants. Once it was determined that no clearly established constitutional rights were violated, the factual dispute became immaterial. See Romero, 931 F.2d at 628.
[17] III.
[18] Camarillo argues that it was clearly established at the time he was segregated in the HIV unit that prison inmates have First Amendment rights, including freedom of association. Camarillo misconstrues the level of generality at which a law must be "clearly established." See Anderson, 483 U.S. at 639. The operation of the "clearly established" standard,
[19] depends substantially upon the level of generality at which the relevant "legal rule" is to be identified. For example, the right to due process of law is quite clearly established by the Due Process Clause, and thus there is a sense in which any action that violates the Clause (no matter how unclear it may be that the particular action is a violation) violates a clearly established right. Much the same could be said of any other constitutional or statutory violation. But if the test of "clearly established law" were to be applied at this level of generality, it would bear no relationship to the "objective legal reasonableness" that is the touchstone of Harlow.
[20] Id.
[21] The relevant, properly particularized question, see id. at 640, is whether it was clearly established that inmates are entitled to be free of prison regulations that restrict their association with members of the general prison population.
[22] A prison regulation that impinges on an inmate's constitutional rights is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89, 96 L. Ed. 2d 64, 107 S. Ct. 2254 (1987). It was not clearly established at the relevant time -- nor is it now*fn1 -- that a prison policy that segregates HIV-positive inmates from the general prison population is unconstitutional. Camarillo failed to cite a single case, either to the district court or on appeal, indicating otherwise.*fn2
[23] REVERSED and REMANDED for entry of summary judgment for defendants.
[24] Disposition
[25] REVERSED and REMANDED for entry of summary judgment for defendants.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
General Footnotes
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[26] *fn* The panel unanimously found this case suitable for decision without oral argument. Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 9th Cir. R. 34-4.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Opinion Footnotes
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[27] *fn1 Several recent cases hold that prison policies mandating segregation of HIV-positive inmates are not unconstitutional. See, e.g.,Moore v. Mabus, 976 F.2d 268, 271 (5th Cir. 1992); Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1521 (11th Cir. 1991); Muhammad v. Carlson, 845 F.2d 175, 177 (8th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1068, 103 L. Ed. 2d 814, 109 S. Ct. 1346 (1989).
[28] *fn2 Although it is Camarillo's responsibility to "identify the universe of statutory or decisional law from which the court can determine whether the right allegedly violated was clearly established," see Elder, 975 F.2d at 1392, we may undertake our own inquiry. See id. at 1396. Our research convinces us that the right Camarillo asserts was not clearly established in June 1987.
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