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Detainees Can't Be Forced to Work
Dickie Cokeley is an Arkansas state prisoner. While confined in the Arkansas DOC his criminal conviction was reversed by a federal court. Upon reversal of his conviction Cokeley asked prison officials to place him on an unassigned work status. They refused to do so and ordered him to work, when he refused to work he was infracted and punished. Cokeley filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claiming that forcing him to work while his status was that of a pretrial detainee violated his right to due process and forced him into involuntary servitude, i.e. slavery. He also claimed his right of access to the courts was violated when prison officials denied his request to call his attorney. The district court dismissed the suit as being frivolous under 28 U. S.C. § 1915(d). The court of appeals for the eighth circuit reversed and remanded.
The appeals court held that Cokeley had stated a valid legal claim in his complaint. A successful habeas petitioner, like a pretrial detainee, has not been convicted of a crime and is being held in custody pending trial to determine guilt. "Pursuant to the due process provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, a pretrial detainee may not be punished prior to a determination of guilt in accordance with due process." Bell v. Wolfish, 441 US 520, 99 S. Ct. 1861 (1979). In Martinez v. Turner, 977 F.2d 421 (8th Cir. 1992) the appeals court held that ".. requiring a pretrial detainee to work or be placed in administrative segregation is punishment."
"Cokeley alleges that, after his habeas petition was granted but while he was still imprisoned, he was punished when he refused an order to work. Cokeley thus has raised a novel claim with an arguable legal basis that the due process clause protects a successful habeas petitioner from punishment as it does a pretrial detainee. The district court abused its discretion in dismissing this claim." The appeals court remanded the claim back to the lower court and also instructed the district court to consider the court access claim as well. See: Cokeley v. Endell, 27 F.3d 331 (8th Cir. 1994).
The appeals court held that Cokeley had stated a valid legal claim in his complaint. A successful habeas petitioner, like a pretrial detainee, has not been convicted of a crime and is being held in custody pending trial to determine guilt. "Pursuant to the due process provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, a pretrial detainee may not be punished prior to a determination of guilt in accordance with due process." Bell v. Wolfish, 441 US 520, 99 S. Ct. 1861 (1979). In Martinez v. Turner, 977 F.2d 421 (8th Cir. 1992) the appeals court held that ".. requiring a pretrial detainee to work or be placed in administrative segregation is punishment."
"Cokeley alleges that, after his habeas petition was granted but while he was still imprisoned, he was punished when he refused an order to work. Cokeley thus has raised a novel claim with an arguable legal basis that the due process clause protects a successful habeas petitioner from punishment as it does a pretrial detainee. The district court abused its discretion in dismissing this claim." The appeals court remanded the claim back to the lower court and also instructed the district court to consider the court access claim as well. See: Cokeley v. Endell, 27 F.3d 331 (8th Cir. 1994).
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Related legal case
Cokeley v. Endell
| Year | 1994 |
|---|---|
| Cite | 27 F.3d 331 (8th Cir. 1994) |
| Level | Court of Appeals |
Cokeley v. Endell, 27 F.3d 331 (8th Cir. 06/16/1994)
[1] UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
[2] No. 93-2821
[3] 1994, 27 F.3d 331
[4] filed: June 16, 1994.
[5] DICKIE COKELEY, APPELLANT,
v.
ROGER ENDELL, DIRECTOR, ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION; LARRY NORRIS, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION; LARRY FIEDOROWICZ, DISCIPLINARY HEARING ADMINISTRATOR, ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION; M.D. REED, WARDEN, VARNER UNIT, ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION; JAMES BYERS, DISCIPLINARY HEARING OFFICER, ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION; C.A. COLLINS, BUILDING MAJOR, CHIEF OF SECURITY, ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION; JOHN H. CARTWRIGHT, SUPERVISOR, VARNER UNIT, ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION; I. GREEN, CAPTAIN, VARNER UNIT, ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION, APPELLEES.
[6] Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas. District No. 93-CV-252. Honorable Susan Webber Wright, District Judge.
[7] COUNSEL
[8] The appellant appeared in this case pro se.
[9] Before McMILLIAN, Magill, and Beam, Circuit Judges.
[10] Author: Magill
[11] MAGILL, Circuit Judge.
[12] Dickie Cokeley appeals the district court's dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action. We reverse and remand.
[13] Cokeley filed a pro se section 1983 complaint alleging that various Arkansas Department of Correction officials violated his rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. Specifically, Cokeley claimed he became a pretrial detainee when his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition was granted on December 20, 1991. See Cokeley v. Lockhart, 951 F.2d 916, 917 (8th Cir. 1991) (writ granted subject to state's right to retry within a reasonable time), cert. denied, 121 L. Ed. 2d 220, 113 S. Ct. 296 (1992). As a pretrial detainee, Cokeley claimed that he should have been placed in an unassigned status but was "forced into slavery or involuntary servitude and punished by disciplinary action on November 23, 1992 when he refused an order by his immediate supervisor to work[] which resulted in loss of class and hobby craft privileges as punishment." Cokeley further claimed that Security Captain I. Green violated his right of access to the courts because Green denied Cokeley's request to telephone his attorney. The district court dismissed the complaint sua sponte as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d).
[14] A complaint which contains both factual allegations and legal Conclusions "is frivolous where it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact." Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325, 104 L. Ed. 2d 338, 109 S. Ct. 1827 (1989). This court reviews a district court's section 1915(d) dismissal for abuse of discretion. See Denton v. Hernandez, 118 L. Ed. 2d 340, 112 S. Ct. 1728, 1734 (1992).
[15] We find that Cokeley's claim has an arguable legal basis. Although a successful habeas petitioner differs from a pretrial detainee because he "has been adJudged guilty beyond a reasonable doubt by a Judge or jury, and this adjudication of guilt has been upheld by the appellate courts of the State," Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 779, 95 L. Ed. 2d 724, 107 S. Ct. 2113 (1987) (court may consider dangerousness of habeas petitioner in deciding whether to release him pending appeal of his successful habeas petition), a successful habeas petitioner also differs from a prisoner because a federal court of appeals has found his state conviction invalid and has set aside the conviction. Like a pretrial detainee, Cokeley, as a successful habeas petitioner, was being detained by the state pending a trial to determine guilt.
[16] Pursuant to the due process provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, a pretrial detainee may not be punished prior to a determination of guilt in accordance with due process. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535, 60 L. Ed. 2d 447, 99 S. Ct. 1861 (1979); Jones v. Mabry, 723 F.2d 590, 594 (8th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1228, 81 L. Ed. 2d 878, 104 S. Ct. 2683 (1984). In Martinez v. Turner, 977 F.2d 421, 423 (8th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 123 L. Ed. 2d 277, 113 S. Ct. 1658 (1993), this court held that "requiring a pretrial detainee to work or be placed in administrative segregation is punishment." Cokeley alleges that, after his habeas petition was granted but while he was still imprisoned, he was punished when he refused an order to work. Cokeley thus has raised a novel claim with an arguable legal basis that the due process clause protects a successful habeas petitioner from punishment as it does a pretrial detainee. The district court abused its discretion in dismissing this claim. Further, the district court did not address Cokeley's claim of denial of access to the courts.
[17] We reverse and remand the district court's section 1915(d) dismissal, and we remand his denial of access claim for consideration by the district court.
[18] Disposition
[19] Reversed and Remanded
[20] BEAM, Circuit Judge, Dissenting.
[21] I Dissent.
[1] UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
[2] No. 93-2821
[3] 1994, 27 F.3d 331
[4] filed: June 16, 1994.
[5] DICKIE COKELEY, APPELLANT,
v.
ROGER ENDELL, DIRECTOR, ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION; LARRY NORRIS, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION; LARRY FIEDOROWICZ, DISCIPLINARY HEARING ADMINISTRATOR, ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION; M.D. REED, WARDEN, VARNER UNIT, ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION; JAMES BYERS, DISCIPLINARY HEARING OFFICER, ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION; C.A. COLLINS, BUILDING MAJOR, CHIEF OF SECURITY, ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION; JOHN H. CARTWRIGHT, SUPERVISOR, VARNER UNIT, ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION; I. GREEN, CAPTAIN, VARNER UNIT, ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION, APPELLEES.
[6] Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas. District No. 93-CV-252. Honorable Susan Webber Wright, District Judge.
[7] COUNSEL
[8] The appellant appeared in this case pro se.
[9] Before McMILLIAN, Magill, and Beam, Circuit Judges.
[10] Author: Magill
[11] MAGILL, Circuit Judge.
[12] Dickie Cokeley appeals the district court's dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action. We reverse and remand.
[13] Cokeley filed a pro se section 1983 complaint alleging that various Arkansas Department of Correction officials violated his rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. Specifically, Cokeley claimed he became a pretrial detainee when his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition was granted on December 20, 1991. See Cokeley v. Lockhart, 951 F.2d 916, 917 (8th Cir. 1991) (writ granted subject to state's right to retry within a reasonable time), cert. denied, 121 L. Ed. 2d 220, 113 S. Ct. 296 (1992). As a pretrial detainee, Cokeley claimed that he should have been placed in an unassigned status but was "forced into slavery or involuntary servitude and punished by disciplinary action on November 23, 1992 when he refused an order by his immediate supervisor to work[] which resulted in loss of class and hobby craft privileges as punishment." Cokeley further claimed that Security Captain I. Green violated his right of access to the courts because Green denied Cokeley's request to telephone his attorney. The district court dismissed the complaint sua sponte as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d).
[14] A complaint which contains both factual allegations and legal Conclusions "is frivolous where it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact." Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325, 104 L. Ed. 2d 338, 109 S. Ct. 1827 (1989). This court reviews a district court's section 1915(d) dismissal for abuse of discretion. See Denton v. Hernandez, 118 L. Ed. 2d 340, 112 S. Ct. 1728, 1734 (1992).
[15] We find that Cokeley's claim has an arguable legal basis. Although a successful habeas petitioner differs from a pretrial detainee because he "has been adJudged guilty beyond a reasonable doubt by a Judge or jury, and this adjudication of guilt has been upheld by the appellate courts of the State," Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 779, 95 L. Ed. 2d 724, 107 S. Ct. 2113 (1987) (court may consider dangerousness of habeas petitioner in deciding whether to release him pending appeal of his successful habeas petition), a successful habeas petitioner also differs from a prisoner because a federal court of appeals has found his state conviction invalid and has set aside the conviction. Like a pretrial detainee, Cokeley, as a successful habeas petitioner, was being detained by the state pending a trial to determine guilt.
[16] Pursuant to the due process provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, a pretrial detainee may not be punished prior to a determination of guilt in accordance with due process. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535, 60 L. Ed. 2d 447, 99 S. Ct. 1861 (1979); Jones v. Mabry, 723 F.2d 590, 594 (8th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1228, 81 L. Ed. 2d 878, 104 S. Ct. 2683 (1984). In Martinez v. Turner, 977 F.2d 421, 423 (8th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 123 L. Ed. 2d 277, 113 S. Ct. 1658 (1993), this court held that "requiring a pretrial detainee to work or be placed in administrative segregation is punishment." Cokeley alleges that, after his habeas petition was granted but while he was still imprisoned, he was punished when he refused an order to work. Cokeley thus has raised a novel claim with an arguable legal basis that the due process clause protects a successful habeas petitioner from punishment as it does a pretrial detainee. The district court abused its discretion in dismissing this claim. Further, the district court did not address Cokeley's claim of denial of access to the courts.
[17] We reverse and remand the district court's section 1915(d) dismissal, and we remand his denial of access claim for consideration by the district court.
[18] Disposition
[19] Reversed and Remanded
[20] BEAM, Circuit Judge, Dissenting.
[21] I Dissent.