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Retaliatory Infraction Illegal
Donald Dixon is a Missouri state prisoner. He filed suit under 42 U.S. C. § 1983 after a prison guard filed a retaliatory disciplinary charge against him after he filed a grievance. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the guard because the disciplinary hearings committee dismissed the infraction and Dixon was not punished. The court held that Dixon could not establish his retaliation claim without showing independent injury. The court of appeals for the eighth circuit reversed and remanded in a brief opinion.
"In Sprouse v. Babcock 870 F.2d 450 (8th Cir. 1989), we recognized the First Amendment right to petition for redress of grievances includes redress under established prison grievance procedures .... Although the filing of a false disciplinary charge is not itself actionable under § 1983, the filing of a disciplinary charge becomes actionable if done in retaliation for the in mate's filing of a grievance&, see: Franco v Kelly, 854 F. 2d 584, 589-90 (2nd Cir. 1988). Having presented evidence that Brown's disciplinary charge was false and made in retaliation for Dixon's grievance against Brown, Dixon need not show a separate, independent injury as an element of his case. Because the retaliatory filing of a disciplinary charge strikes at the heart of an inmate's constitutional right to seek redress of grievances, the injury to this right inheres in the retaliatory conduct itself ... In short, when retaliatory conduct is involved, there is no independent injury requirement." See Dixon v. Brown, 38 F.3d 379 (8th Cir. 1994).
"In Sprouse v. Babcock 870 F.2d 450 (8th Cir. 1989), we recognized the First Amendment right to petition for redress of grievances includes redress under established prison grievance procedures .... Although the filing of a false disciplinary charge is not itself actionable under § 1983, the filing of a disciplinary charge becomes actionable if done in retaliation for the in mate's filing of a grievance&, see: Franco v Kelly, 854 F. 2d 584, 589-90 (2nd Cir. 1988). Having presented evidence that Brown's disciplinary charge was false and made in retaliation for Dixon's grievance against Brown, Dixon need not show a separate, independent injury as an element of his case. Because the retaliatory filing of a disciplinary charge strikes at the heart of an inmate's constitutional right to seek redress of grievances, the injury to this right inheres in the retaliatory conduct itself ... In short, when retaliatory conduct is involved, there is no independent injury requirement." See Dixon v. Brown, 38 F.3d 379 (8th Cir. 1994).
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Related legal case
Dixon v. Brown
| Year | 1994 |
|---|---|
| Cite | 38 F.3d 379 (8th Cir. 1994) |
| Level | Court of Appeals |
Dixon v. Brown, 38 F.3d 379 (8th Cir. 10/20/1994)
[1] UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
[2] No. 93-3771WM
[3] 1994. 38 F.3d 379
[4] filed: October 20, 1994.
[5] DONALD L. DIXON, APPELLANT,
v.
LARRY BROWN, CO I, APPELLEE.
[6] Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri. District No. 92-CV-4455. Honorable Scott Wright, District Judge.
[7] COUNSEL
[8] The appellant appeared pro se in this appeal.
[9] Counsel who presented argument on behalf of the appellee was Alana M. Barragan-Scott of Jefferson City, Missouri. The names of Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon, John R. Minich and Alana M. Barragan-Scott of Jefferson City, Missouri, appear on the brief of the appellee.
[10] Before Fagg, Wollman, and Morris Sheppard Arnold, Circuit Judges.
[11] Author: Fagg
[12] FAGG, Circuit Judge.
[13] In this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, Missouri inmate Donald L. Dixon asserts correctional officer Larry Brown violated Dixon's First Amendment right of petition by bringing a false disciplinary charge against Dixon in retaliation for Dixon's use of prison grievance procedures. The district court granted Brown summary judgment because the prison disciplinary committee dismissed the charge and Dixon was not punished. The district court believed Dixon could not establish his retaliation claim without showing an independent injury. We disagree and reverse.
[14] In Sprouse v. Babcock, 870 F.2d 450 (8th Cir. 1989), we recognized the First Amendment right to petition for redress of grievances includes redress under established prison grievance procedures. Id. at 452. Although the filing of a false disciplinary charge is not itself actionable under § 1983, the filing of a disciplinary charge becomes actionable if done in retaliation for the inmate's filing of a grievance. Id. ; see Franco v. Kelly, 854 F.2d 584, 589-90 (2d Cir. 1988). Having presented evidence that Brown's disciplinary charge was false and made in retaliation for Dixon's grievance against Brown, Dixon need not show a separate, independent injury as an element of his case. Because the retaliatory filing of a disciplinary charge strikes at the heart of an inmate's constitutional right to seek redress of grievances, the injury to this right inheres in the retaliatory conduct itself. See Sprouse, 870 F.2d at 452; cf. Hershberger v. Scaletta, No. 93-3783, 1994 WL 460818, at * 1 (8th Cir. Aug. 26, 1994) (systemic denial of inmates' constitutional right of access to courts is "such a fundamental deprivation that it is an injury in itself"). In short, when retaliatory conduct is involved, there is no independent injury requirement.
[15] We thus reverse and remand to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
[1] UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
[2] No. 93-3771WM
[3] 1994. 38 F.3d 379
[4] filed: October 20, 1994.
[5] DONALD L. DIXON, APPELLANT,
v.
LARRY BROWN, CO I, APPELLEE.
[6] Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri. District No. 92-CV-4455. Honorable Scott Wright, District Judge.
[7] COUNSEL
[8] The appellant appeared pro se in this appeal.
[9] Counsel who presented argument on behalf of the appellee was Alana M. Barragan-Scott of Jefferson City, Missouri. The names of Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon, John R. Minich and Alana M. Barragan-Scott of Jefferson City, Missouri, appear on the brief of the appellee.
[10] Before Fagg, Wollman, and Morris Sheppard Arnold, Circuit Judges.
[11] Author: Fagg
[12] FAGG, Circuit Judge.
[13] In this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, Missouri inmate Donald L. Dixon asserts correctional officer Larry Brown violated Dixon's First Amendment right of petition by bringing a false disciplinary charge against Dixon in retaliation for Dixon's use of prison grievance procedures. The district court granted Brown summary judgment because the prison disciplinary committee dismissed the charge and Dixon was not punished. The district court believed Dixon could not establish his retaliation claim without showing an independent injury. We disagree and reverse.
[14] In Sprouse v. Babcock, 870 F.2d 450 (8th Cir. 1989), we recognized the First Amendment right to petition for redress of grievances includes redress under established prison grievance procedures. Id. at 452. Although the filing of a false disciplinary charge is not itself actionable under § 1983, the filing of a disciplinary charge becomes actionable if done in retaliation for the inmate's filing of a grievance. Id. ; see Franco v. Kelly, 854 F.2d 584, 589-90 (2d Cir. 1988). Having presented evidence that Brown's disciplinary charge was false and made in retaliation for Dixon's grievance against Brown, Dixon need not show a separate, independent injury as an element of his case. Because the retaliatory filing of a disciplinary charge strikes at the heart of an inmate's constitutional right to seek redress of grievances, the injury to this right inheres in the retaliatory conduct itself. See Sprouse, 870 F.2d at 452; cf. Hershberger v. Scaletta, No. 93-3783, 1994 WL 460818, at * 1 (8th Cir. Aug. 26, 1994) (systemic denial of inmates' constitutional right of access to courts is "such a fundamental deprivation that it is an injury in itself"). In short, when retaliatory conduct is involved, there is no independent injury requirement.
[15] We thus reverse and remand to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.