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Florida Prisoners Have Property Interest Under DOC Rules
A Florida appellate court held that Title 33 of the Florida Administrative Code, the rules of the Florida Department of Corrections (DOC), affords Florida state prisoners a vested right to possess property insofar as the property was authorized and the prisoner has storage space available to contain it. A circuit court order summarily dismissing a prisoner's petition for a writ of mandamus, seeking to compel the return of his property, was reversed with directions to issue an order to show cause why the writ should not be issued.
In 1994 Rex Tweed was transferred from Baker Correctional Institution to Marion Correctional Institution. Upon his arrival at Marion the prison property officer seized Tweed's General Electric Super II radio. Although Tweed received the radio through an approved DOC package permit, and he had possessed it within the prison system for several years, the DOC refused to order Tweed's radio returned.
After exhausting his administrative remedies through the DOC grievance farce, Tweed petitioned the circuit court in Marion County for mandamus relief, compelling the return of his property. However, the trial judge, Carven D. Angel, dismissed Tweed's petition out of hand, without even eliciting a response from the DOC. This is a fairly typical example of Florida trial court treatment of prisoner petitions.
On appeal the Attorney General argued that prisoners have no right to their property and the DOC may seize prisoner property at will. However, the court disagreed, finding that the DOC's own rules (Fla. Admin. Code r. 33-3.0025) accorded prisoners a property interest in their possession, so long as the property was previously authorized and the prisoner had ample space to store it. The lower tribunal was directed to issue an alternative writ of mandamus requiring the DOC to respond on the issue.
Ironically, the three year delay caused by the Florida courts' routine practice of placing prisoner litigation on the slow track, has rendered Tweed's victory hollow. As of January 1, 1998, the DOC's new property rule takes effect, reducing the size of authorized radios to Walkman type, effectively banning all Super II's. See: Tweed v. Sistrunk , 697 So.2d 888 (Fla. App. 5 Dist. 1997).
In 1994 Rex Tweed was transferred from Baker Correctional Institution to Marion Correctional Institution. Upon his arrival at Marion the prison property officer seized Tweed's General Electric Super II radio. Although Tweed received the radio through an approved DOC package permit, and he had possessed it within the prison system for several years, the DOC refused to order Tweed's radio returned.
After exhausting his administrative remedies through the DOC grievance farce, Tweed petitioned the circuit court in Marion County for mandamus relief, compelling the return of his property. However, the trial judge, Carven D. Angel, dismissed Tweed's petition out of hand, without even eliciting a response from the DOC. This is a fairly typical example of Florida trial court treatment of prisoner petitions.
On appeal the Attorney General argued that prisoners have no right to their property and the DOC may seize prisoner property at will. However, the court disagreed, finding that the DOC's own rules (Fla. Admin. Code r. 33-3.0025) accorded prisoners a property interest in their possession, so long as the property was previously authorized and the prisoner had ample space to store it. The lower tribunal was directed to issue an alternative writ of mandamus requiring the DOC to respond on the issue.
Ironically, the three year delay caused by the Florida courts' routine practice of placing prisoner litigation on the slow track, has rendered Tweed's victory hollow. As of January 1, 1998, the DOC's new property rule takes effect, reducing the size of authorized radios to Walkman type, effectively banning all Super II's. See: Tweed v. Sistrunk , 697 So.2d 888 (Fla. App. 5 Dist. 1997).
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Related legal case
Tweed v. Sistrunk
| Year | 1997 |
|---|---|
| Cite | 697 So.2d 888 (Fla. App. 5 Dist. 1997) |
| Level | State Court of Appeals |
697 SO.2D 888
REXFORD TWEED, Appellant, v. D. RODNEY SISTRUNK, SUPERINTENDENT, Appellee.
CASE NO. 96-577
COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA, FIFTH DISTRICT
697 So. 2d 888; 1997 Fla. App. ; 22 Fla. L. Weekly D 1545
June 27, 1997, Opinion filed
SUBSEQUENT HISTORY: [**1] Rehearing Denied August 11, 1997. Released for Publication August 28, 1997.
PRIOR HISTORY: Appeal from the Circuit Court for Marion County, Carven D. Angel, Judge.
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part; and REMANDED.
COUNSEL: Rexford Tweed, Madison, pro se.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Barbara A. Ard, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.
JUDGES: PETERSON, C.J., GRIFFIN and ANTOON, JJ., concur.
OPINION: [*889] PER CURIAM.
Appellant sought a writ of mandamus from the circuit court for the return of property he claims was improperly withheld from him after he transferred between prison institutions. The circuit court denied the petition without issuing an alternative writ. We find appellant's attempts to rely on his constitutional rights to due process and access to the courts to be misplaced. We disagree with the appellee, however, that Title 33 of the Florida Administrative Code does not afford appellant a right to his property insofar as it is authorized and he has storage space available. Accordingly, the appealed order is reversed in part, and we remand for further proceedings. The lower court is directed to issue an alternative writ with respect to [**2] the second issue of appellant's petition consistent with this opinion.
AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part; and REMANDED.
PETERSON, C.J., GRIFFIN and ANTOON, JJ., concur.
REXFORD TWEED, Appellant, v. D. RODNEY SISTRUNK, SUPERINTENDENT, Appellee.
CASE NO. 96-577
COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA, FIFTH DISTRICT
697 So. 2d 888; 1997 Fla. App. ; 22 Fla. L. Weekly D 1545
June 27, 1997, Opinion filed
SUBSEQUENT HISTORY: [**1] Rehearing Denied August 11, 1997. Released for Publication August 28, 1997.
PRIOR HISTORY: Appeal from the Circuit Court for Marion County, Carven D. Angel, Judge.
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part; and REMANDED.
COUNSEL: Rexford Tweed, Madison, pro se.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Barbara A. Ard, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.
JUDGES: PETERSON, C.J., GRIFFIN and ANTOON, JJ., concur.
OPINION: [*889] PER CURIAM.
Appellant sought a writ of mandamus from the circuit court for the return of property he claims was improperly withheld from him after he transferred between prison institutions. The circuit court denied the petition without issuing an alternative writ. We find appellant's attempts to rely on his constitutional rights to due process and access to the courts to be misplaced. We disagree with the appellee, however, that Title 33 of the Florida Administrative Code does not afford appellant a right to his property insofar as it is authorized and he has storage space available. Accordingly, the appealed order is reversed in part, and we remand for further proceedings. The lower court is directed to issue an alternative writ with respect to [**2] the second issue of appellant's petition consistent with this opinion.
AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part; and REMANDED.
PETERSON, C.J., GRIFFIN and ANTOON, JJ., concur.