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Florida Finally Learns the Meaning of Ex Post Facto
In a one paragraph memorandum opinion the Supreme Court of Florida held that the retroactive cancellation of provisional credits, previously awarded pursuant to statute, violates the ex post facto restrictions of the state and federal constitutions.
As a result of a population cap imposed on the Florida DOC by a federal court, the state enacted a law that authorized the across-the-board award of up to 60 days gain-time to all state prisoners earning regular "incentive" gain-time, whenever the prison system population reached 97.5% of its lawful rated capacity. Effective January 1, 1990, the statute was amended to exclude prisoners convicted of murder from eligibility. A 1992 attorney general's opinion authorized the retroactive revocation of all previously awarded provisional credits to the affected class.
In 1994 a prisoner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus with the Florida Supreme Court seeking credit for 420 days of canceled provisional credits. Two months later the petition was denied without opinion. In a memorandum opinion the U.S. Supreme Court vacated the decision and remanded the case back to Florida for reconsideration in light of California Dept. of Corrections v. Morales , 514 U.S. 499 (1995). See: Calamia v. Singletary , 115 S.Ct. 1995 (1995).
Ignoring the intent of the remand, a 4-3 majority of the Florida Supreme Court analyzed the claim under four of its previous holdings involving similar claims, finding solace in the fact that the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari in one. Relying on the same rationale, and "a number of other cases" in which Florida federal courts reasoned likewise, the court concluded that the cancellation of provisional credits does not run afoul of ex post facto proscriptions. In a telling comment the court cautioned a holding to the contrary "would provide an unwarranted windfall to thousands of prisoners." See, Calamia v. Singletary , 686 So.2d 1337 (Fla. S.Ct. 1996).
Two months to the day after the court reaffirmed the retroactive cancellation of provisional credits, the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously ruled otherwise. In Lynce v. Mathis , 117 S.Ct. 981 (1997) the Court concluded that the 1992 action canceling Florida's provisional release credits violates the ex post facto clause of the federal constitution. Shortly thereafter, the Court once again vacated Calamia and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of Lynce. See: Calamia v. Singletary, 117 S.Ct 1309 (1997). Finally, it appears Florida has learned the meaning of ex post facto. Calamia's provisional credits were restored. See: Calamia v Singletary 694 So.2d 733 (Fla. S.Ct. 1997).
As a result of a population cap imposed on the Florida DOC by a federal court, the state enacted a law that authorized the across-the-board award of up to 60 days gain-time to all state prisoners earning regular "incentive" gain-time, whenever the prison system population reached 97.5% of its lawful rated capacity. Effective January 1, 1990, the statute was amended to exclude prisoners convicted of murder from eligibility. A 1992 attorney general's opinion authorized the retroactive revocation of all previously awarded provisional credits to the affected class.
In 1994 a prisoner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus with the Florida Supreme Court seeking credit for 420 days of canceled provisional credits. Two months later the petition was denied without opinion. In a memorandum opinion the U.S. Supreme Court vacated the decision and remanded the case back to Florida for reconsideration in light of California Dept. of Corrections v. Morales , 514 U.S. 499 (1995). See: Calamia v. Singletary , 115 S.Ct. 1995 (1995).
Ignoring the intent of the remand, a 4-3 majority of the Florida Supreme Court analyzed the claim under four of its previous holdings involving similar claims, finding solace in the fact that the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari in one. Relying on the same rationale, and "a number of other cases" in which Florida federal courts reasoned likewise, the court concluded that the cancellation of provisional credits does not run afoul of ex post facto proscriptions. In a telling comment the court cautioned a holding to the contrary "would provide an unwarranted windfall to thousands of prisoners." See, Calamia v. Singletary , 686 So.2d 1337 (Fla. S.Ct. 1996).
Two months to the day after the court reaffirmed the retroactive cancellation of provisional credits, the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously ruled otherwise. In Lynce v. Mathis , 117 S.Ct. 981 (1997) the Court concluded that the 1992 action canceling Florida's provisional release credits violates the ex post facto clause of the federal constitution. Shortly thereafter, the Court once again vacated Calamia and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of Lynce. See: Calamia v. Singletary, 117 S.Ct 1309 (1997). Finally, it appears Florida has learned the meaning of ex post facto. Calamia's provisional credits were restored. See: Calamia v Singletary 694 So.2d 733 (Fla. S.Ct. 1997).
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Related legal case
Calamia v. Singletary
| Year | 1997 |
|---|---|
| Cite | 694 So.2d 733 (Fla. S.Ct. 1997) |
| Level | State Supreme Court |
694 SO.2D 733
RUSSELL CALAMIA, Petitioner, vs. HARRY K. SINGLETARY, JR., Respondent. JEFFREY LYNN HOCK, Petitioner, vs. HARRY K. SINGLETARY, JR., Respondent.
Nos. 84,088 and 86,182
SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA
694 So. 2d 733; 1997 Fla. ; 22 Fla. L. Weekly S 294
May 22, 1997, Decided
PRIOR HISTORY: [**1] Two Consolidated Original Proceedings Habeas Corpus and Mandamus.
DISPOSITION: Petition for writ of habeas corpus of Russell Calamia and petition for writ of mandamus of Jeffrey Lynn Hock granted. Respondent directed to reinstate the petitioners' administrative and provisional gain time.
COUNSEL: Wendy M. Edmonds and R. Mitchell Prugh of Middleton, Prugh & Anderson, P.A., Melrose, Florida, on behalf of Russell Calamia; and John C. Schaible, Florida Institutional Legal Services, Inc., Gainesville, Florida, on behalf of Jeffrey Lynn Hock, for Petitioner.
Susan A. Maher, Deputy General, Department of Corrections, Tallahassee, Florida, for Respondent.
JUDGES: KOGAN, C.J., and OVERTON, SHAW, GRIMES, HARDING, WELLS and ANSTEAD, JJ., concur.
OPINION: [*734] ON REMAND FROM THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
PER CURIAM.
On petition for writ of certiorari, the United States Supreme Court vacated our previous decision in this cause n1 and remanded the case for further consideration in light of its decision in Lynce v. Mathis, 137 L. Ed. 2d 63, 117 S. Ct. 891 (1997). Calamia v. Singletary, 137 L. Ed. 2d 473, 117 S. Ct. 1309 (1997). In view of the holding [**2] of Lynce, we grant the petition for writ of habeas corpus of Russell Calamia and the petition for writ of mandamus of Jeffrey Lynn Hock. We direct respondent to reinstate the petitioners' administrative and provisional gain time in accordance with the opinion in Lynce v. Mathis.
n1 Calamia v. Singletary, 686 So. 2d 1337 (Fla. 1996).
It is so ordered.
KOGAN, C.J., and OVERTON, SHAW, GRIMES, HARDING, WELLS and ANSTEAD, JJ., concur.
RUSSELL CALAMIA, Petitioner, vs. HARRY K. SINGLETARY, JR., Respondent. JEFFREY LYNN HOCK, Petitioner, vs. HARRY K. SINGLETARY, JR., Respondent.
Nos. 84,088 and 86,182
SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA
694 So. 2d 733; 1997 Fla. ; 22 Fla. L. Weekly S 294
May 22, 1997, Decided
PRIOR HISTORY: [**1] Two Consolidated Original Proceedings Habeas Corpus and Mandamus.
DISPOSITION: Petition for writ of habeas corpus of Russell Calamia and petition for writ of mandamus of Jeffrey Lynn Hock granted. Respondent directed to reinstate the petitioners' administrative and provisional gain time.
COUNSEL: Wendy M. Edmonds and R. Mitchell Prugh of Middleton, Prugh & Anderson, P.A., Melrose, Florida, on behalf of Russell Calamia; and John C. Schaible, Florida Institutional Legal Services, Inc., Gainesville, Florida, on behalf of Jeffrey Lynn Hock, for Petitioner.
Susan A. Maher, Deputy General, Department of Corrections, Tallahassee, Florida, for Respondent.
JUDGES: KOGAN, C.J., and OVERTON, SHAW, GRIMES, HARDING, WELLS and ANSTEAD, JJ., concur.
OPINION: [*734] ON REMAND FROM THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
PER CURIAM.
On petition for writ of certiorari, the United States Supreme Court vacated our previous decision in this cause n1 and remanded the case for further consideration in light of its decision in Lynce v. Mathis, 137 L. Ed. 2d 63, 117 S. Ct. 891 (1997). Calamia v. Singletary, 137 L. Ed. 2d 473, 117 S. Ct. 1309 (1997). In view of the holding [**2] of Lynce, we grant the petition for writ of habeas corpus of Russell Calamia and the petition for writ of mandamus of Jeffrey Lynn Hock. We direct respondent to reinstate the petitioners' administrative and provisional gain time in accordance with the opinion in Lynce v. Mathis.
n1 Calamia v. Singletary, 686 So. 2d 1337 (Fla. 1996).
It is so ordered.
KOGAN, C.J., and OVERTON, SHAW, GRIMES, HARDING, WELLS and ANSTEAD, JJ., concur.