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Texas Cannot Use Enhancement to Deny Mandatory Supervision
The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas has held that the fact that a felony has been enhanced to a higher degree felony cannot be used to deny a prisoner mandatory supervision release (MSR).
Nathaniel Elbert Coleman, a Texas state prisoner, was convicted of drug possession and retaliation, enhanced by a prior felony conviction for second degree aggravated assault, and sentenced to ten years in prison. Coleman filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under Article 11.07, Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, after prison officials informed him that he was not eligible for MSR. The district court entered findings showing that Coleman's 1987 conviction for second-degree aggravated assault was actually a third degree felony because the victim was not a peace officer or jailer. The Court of Criminal Appeals held that "the punishment range of that conviction had been enhanced to that for a second degree felony, but the enhancement did not change the classification of the offense itself from that of a third degree felony." Because, when the primary offenses were committed, in 1998, only first and second degree felony aggravated assaults were classified as ineligible for MSR, the Court granted relief and ordered the Texas Department of Criminal Justice to classify Coleman as eligible for MSR. See: Ex parte Coleman , 59 S.W.3d 676 (Tex.Crim.App. 2002).
Nathaniel Elbert Coleman, a Texas state prisoner, was convicted of drug possession and retaliation, enhanced by a prior felony conviction for second degree aggravated assault, and sentenced to ten years in prison. Coleman filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under Article 11.07, Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, after prison officials informed him that he was not eligible for MSR. The district court entered findings showing that Coleman's 1987 conviction for second-degree aggravated assault was actually a third degree felony because the victim was not a peace officer or jailer. The Court of Criminal Appeals held that "the punishment range of that conviction had been enhanced to that for a second degree felony, but the enhancement did not change the classification of the offense itself from that of a third degree felony." Because, when the primary offenses were committed, in 1998, only first and second degree felony aggravated assaults were classified as ineligible for MSR, the Court granted relief and ordered the Texas Department of Criminal Justice to classify Coleman as eligible for MSR. See: Ex parte Coleman , 59 S.W.3d 676 (Tex.Crim.App. 2002).
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Related legal case
Ex Parte Coleman
| Year | 2001 |
|---|---|
| Cite | 59 S.W.3d 676 (Tex.Crim.App. 2002) |
| Level | State Court of Appeals |
Ex parte Coleman, 59 S.W.3d 676 (Tex.Crim.App. 11/07/2001)
[1] Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
[2] NOS. 74, 208, 74,209, 74 ,210
[3] 59 S.W.3d 676, 2001.TX
[4] November 07, 2001
[5] EX PARTE NATHANIEL ELBERT COLEMAN, APPLICANT
[6] The opinion of the court was delivered by: Per Curiam
[7] ON APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS FROM HARRIS COUNTY
[8] OPINION
[9] This is a post-conviction application for a writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to Article 11.07, V.A.C.C.P. Applicant was convicted of possession of more than four grams of phencyclidine and two counts of retaliation. His punishment, enhanced by a prior conviction, was assessed at ten years confinement. Appeals from these convictions were dismissed, Coleman v. State, Nos. 01-98-112-CR, 01-98-113-CR, 01-98-114-CR (Tex.App. - Houston [1st], delivered December 16, 1999, no pet.).
[10] Applicant contends, inter alia, that he has been denied eligibility for release on mandatory supervision without being provided written reasons for such a denial. The trial court has entered findings that Applicant is ineligible for mandatory supervision because he has a prior conviction for a second degree felony aggravated assault. However, those findings show that Applicant's conviction for an aggravated assault committed in 1987 was actually a third degree felony because the complainant was not alleged to be a peace officer or jailer. V.T.C.A. Penal Code, § 22.02(c). The punishment range for that aggravated assault conviction was enhanced to that for a second degree felony, but the enhancement did not change the classification of the offense itself from that of a third degree felony. See Webb v. State, 12 S.W.3d 808 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). When these primary offenses were committed in 1998, only first and second degree felony aggravated assaults were classified as ineligible for mandatory supervision. Hall v. State, 995 S.W.2d 151 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). Applicant is entitled to relief.
[11] Relief is granted. The Texas Department of Criminal Justice, institutional division, shall classify Applicant as eligible for discretionary mandatory supervision in cause numbers 773242, 777076, and 777055 from the 228th Judicial District Court of Harris County. All other requested relief is denied.
[12] Copies of this opinion shall be sent to the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, institutional and pardons and paroles divisions.
[13] PUBLISH
[1] Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
[2] NOS. 74, 208, 74,209, 74 ,210
[3] 59 S.W.3d 676, 2001.TX
[4] November 07, 2001
[5] EX PARTE NATHANIEL ELBERT COLEMAN, APPLICANT
[6] The opinion of the court was delivered by: Per Curiam
[7] ON APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS FROM HARRIS COUNTY
[8] OPINION
[9] This is a post-conviction application for a writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to Article 11.07, V.A.C.C.P. Applicant was convicted of possession of more than four grams of phencyclidine and two counts of retaliation. His punishment, enhanced by a prior conviction, was assessed at ten years confinement. Appeals from these convictions were dismissed, Coleman v. State, Nos. 01-98-112-CR, 01-98-113-CR, 01-98-114-CR (Tex.App. - Houston [1st], delivered December 16, 1999, no pet.).
[10] Applicant contends, inter alia, that he has been denied eligibility for release on mandatory supervision without being provided written reasons for such a denial. The trial court has entered findings that Applicant is ineligible for mandatory supervision because he has a prior conviction for a second degree felony aggravated assault. However, those findings show that Applicant's conviction for an aggravated assault committed in 1987 was actually a third degree felony because the complainant was not alleged to be a peace officer or jailer. V.T.C.A. Penal Code, § 22.02(c). The punishment range for that aggravated assault conviction was enhanced to that for a second degree felony, but the enhancement did not change the classification of the offense itself from that of a third degree felony. See Webb v. State, 12 S.W.3d 808 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). When these primary offenses were committed in 1998, only first and second degree felony aggravated assaults were classified as ineligible for mandatory supervision. Hall v. State, 995 S.W.2d 151 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). Applicant is entitled to relief.
[11] Relief is granted. The Texas Department of Criminal Justice, institutional division, shall classify Applicant as eligible for discretionary mandatory supervision in cause numbers 773242, 777076, and 777055 from the 228th Judicial District Court of Harris County. All other requested relief is denied.
[12] Copies of this opinion shall be sent to the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, institutional and pardons and paroles divisions.
[13] PUBLISH