Sanders v. Palunsky, 36 S.W.3d 222, 36 S.W.3d 222 (Tex.App. 01/11/2001)

[1] Texas Court of Appeals (Civil)


[2] No. 14-00-00150-CV


[3] 36 S.W.3d 222, 36 S.W.3d 222, 2001


[4] January 11, 2001


[5] LONNIE JAMES SANDERS, APPELLANT
v.
ALLAN PALUNSKY, CHAIRMAN OF THE TEXAS BOARD OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, WAYNE SCOTT, DIRECTOR OF THE TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, AND GARY JOHNSON, DIRECTOR OF THE TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE-INSTITUTIONAL DIVISION, APPELLEES


[6] On Appeal from the 278th District Court Walker County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 20,663C


[7] Panel consists of Justices Yates, Wittig, and Frost.


[8] The opinion of the court was delivered by: Kem Thompson Frost Justice


[9] AFFIRMED AND OPINION FILED JANUARY 11, 2001.


[10] OPINION


[11] In this case we address whether chapter 14 of the Texas Civil Practices and Remedies Code, governing inmate litigation, violates the equal protection clause of our state and federal constitutions and whether section 14.005(b) of that statute violates the open courts provision of the Texas Constitution. Appellant, Lonnie James Sanders, appeals from an order dismissing his pro se, in forma pauperis suit under chapter 14 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. We affirm.


[12] I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND


[13] Appellant is aninmateat the Wynne Unit of the Texas Department ofCriminalJustice--Institutional Division("TDCJ-ID"). He filed a suit against appellees, Alan Palunsky, Wayne Scott, and Gary Johnson, alleging his constitutional rights had been violated by certain policies and action taken with regard to appellant's good conduct time. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court dismissed appellant's suit because he had failed to comply with the requirements of section 14.005 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, governing exhaustion of administrative remedies. From our review of the clerk's record, it appears that appellant failed to file his claim before the 31st day after the date he received the written decision from the grievance system. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 14.005(b) (Vernon Supp. 2000). Under section 14.005(b), a trial court may dismiss an inmate's suit if he fails to timely file it. See id.


[14] II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL


[15] On appeal, appellant raises two points of error, asserting: (1) chapter 14 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code is unconstitutional because it violates the equal protection clauses of the United States and Texas Constitutions; and (2) section 14.005(b) is unconstitutional because it violates the open courts provision found in Article 1, Section 13 of the Texas Constitution, to the extent that it conflicts with the two-year limitations period in section 16.003 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code.


[16] A. Constitutionality of Chapter 14 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code


[17] In his first point of error, appellant contends chapter 14 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, which governs inmate litigation, violates the equal protection clauses of the federal and state constitutions because it applies only to indigent inmates. He appears to argue that the statute violates the equal protection clauses because it treats indigent inmates differently from non-indigent inmates.


[18] When analyzing an equal protection claim, we must begin with the presumption that a statute is constitutional. Enron Corp. v. Spring Indep. Sch. Dist., 922 S.W.2d 931, 934 (Tex. 1999). The party challenging the constitutionality of a statute bears the burden of demonstrating that the enactment fails to meet constitutional requirements. Id. The same requirements are applied under the Texas Constitution as under the United States Constitution. Reid v. Rolling Fork Pub. Util. Dist., 979 S.W.2d 1085, 1089 (5th Cir. 1992); Rose v. Doctors Hosp., 801 S.W.2d 841, 846 (Tex. 1990). The principle of equalprotection guarantees that "all persons similarly situated should be treated alike." City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 3253-54, 87 L.Ed.2d 313, 320 (1985) (citing Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216, 102 S.Ct. 2382, 2394, 72 L.Ed.2d 786 (1982)); see Mayhew v. Town of Sunnyvale, 964 S.W.2d 922, 939 (Tex. 1998); In re M.A.C., 999 S.W.2d 442, 445 (Tex. App.--El Paso 1999, no pet.). Thus, to assert an equal protection claim, the deprived party must establish two elements: (1) that he was treated differently than other similarly-situated parties; and (2) he was treated differently without a reasonable basis. Executive 100, Inc. v. Martin County, 922 F.2d 1536, 1541 (11th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 810, 112 S.Ct. 55, 116 L.Ed.2d 32 (1991); City of Lubbock v. Corbin, 942 S.W.2d 14, 22 (Tex. App.--Amarillo 1996, writ denied). Appellant's claim cannot survive even under the first requirement.


[19] The provisions of chapter 14 apply to all inmate suits in which an affidavit or unsworn declaration of inabilityto pay costs is filed. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 14.002(a) (Vernon Supp. 2000) (emphasis added).*fn1 Appellant does not claim he is being treated differently from other indigent inmates; rather, he complains that he is being treated differently from non-indigent inmates. Under chapter 14, all indigent inmates are treated equally. See id. All indigent inmates must comply with the special filing and time limit requirements of chapter 14. Thus, appellant has been treated no differently from other similarly situated parties (indigent inmates). In Smith v. State, 898 S.W.2d 838, 846 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995), the appellant complained that the Texas Legislature's decision to keep parole information from capital juries, yet inform non-capital juries of the same informationviolated the equal protection clause. In rejecting this complaint, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held there was no violation because the appellant was treated the same as all other capital defendants. Id. at 847. In other words, because the appellant's complaint was amongsimilarlysituated individuals,the equal protection clause was not violated. Id.; see also Butler v. State, 872 S.W.2d 227, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994 (holding that sentencing scheme that permits jury consideration of unadjudicated offenses, which differs from punishment scheme in non-capital cases, does not violate equal protection clause).


[20] In this case, procedural requirements of chapter 14 apply equally to all suits brought by Texas inmates where an affidavit or unsworn declaration of inability to pay is filed. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 14.002(a) (Vernon Supp. 2000). Appellant was treated no differently than any other indigent Texas inmate. Accordingly, we hold that because appellant's claim in this case is not among similarly situated individuals, his contention that chapter 14 violates the equal protection clause is without merit.


[21] Moreover, neither the United States Supreme Court, nor either of Texas' high courts has recognized inmates as a suspect class or recognized the right to file successive civil suits as a fundamental right. See Hicks v. Brysch, 989 F. Supp. 797, 822, 823 (W.D. Tex. 1997) (holding that neither prisoners nor indigents constitute suspect class and restriction on ability of indigent prisoners to proceed in forma pauperis does not implicate any constitutionally protected right per se); Ex parte Dinkins, 894 S.W.2d 330, 342 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (holding that criminaldefendants are not suspect class and right to file successive writs is not fundamental right); Ex parte Davis, 947 S.W.2d 216, 228 n.11 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (J. Clinton, dissenting). If the challenged statute neither singles out members of a suspect class nor implicates a fundamental right, then it need only be rationally related to a legitimate state interest to survive an equal protection challenge. See City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440; G.D. Searle & Co. v. Cohn, 455 U.S. 404, 408, 102 S.Ct. 1137, 1141, 71 L.Ed.2d 250 (1982); Mayhew, 964 S.W.2d 922, 939 (Tex. 1998); Penick v. Christensen, 912 S.W.2d 276, 286 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, writ denied). Thus, to survive a challenge based on the equal protection clause, chapter 14's restrictions on inmate litigation need only be rationally related to a legitimate state interest. We find they are.


[22] The procedural requirements placed on suits filed by indigent inmates under chapter 14 are designed to control the flood of frivolous lawsuits filed in the courts of this state by prison inmates. McCollum v. Mount Ararat Baptist Church, Inc., 980 S.W.2d 535, 537 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, no pet.); Hickson v. Moya, 926 S.W.2d 397, 399 (Tex. App.--Waco 1996, no pet.). These suits, which are constant and often duplicative, consume valuable judicial resources with little offsetting benefit. Hickson, 926 S.W.2d at 399. Requiring indigent inmates to file affidavits related to their previous filings, to exhaust their administrative remedies, to file suit within 31 days after the decision on their grievance, and to dismiss their suits if they do not comply, furthers the legitimate, even compelling, state interest in protecting scarce judicial resources from the continued onslaught of prisoners who abuse the judicial system by filing frivolous civil lawsuits. Hicks, 989 F. Supp. at 823. Prohibiting prisoners with a history of instituting frivolous and malicious litigationfrom proceeding in forma pauperis clearly serves to deter such abuses of our judicial system. McCollum, 980 S.W.2d at 537; Hickson, 926 S.W.2d at 399; Hicks, 989 F. Supp. at 823. Accordingly, we find appellant's equal protection challenge without merit. We overrule appellant's first point of error.


[23] B. Challenge to Section 14.005(b) as Violative of the Open Courts Provision of the Texas Constitution


[24] In point of error two, appellant contends section 14.005(b) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code violates the open courts provision. Article I, section 13 of the Texas constitution provides that "[a]ll courts shall be open, and every person for an injury done him, in his lands, goods, person or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law." TEX. CONST. art. I, § 13. Appellant claims that Section 14.005(b) abridges his rights under this constitutional provision in that it requires an inmate to file suit, where the suit is based on claims that are subject to the prison grievance system, within 31 days after a decision is received from the grievance system. Appellant complains that while indigent inmates must file within 31 days of the decision from the grievance system, other plaintiffs claiming injury to person or property are governed by the less restrictive two-year statute of limitations in section 16.003 of the Texas CivilPractice and Remedies Code. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.003 (VernonSupp. 2000). Again, we reject appellant's contention.


[25] In scrutinizing an open courts challenge, courts apply a two-prong test, asking (1) if the litigant has a "cognizable common law cause of action that is being restricted" and (2) if so, is the restriction "unreasonable or arbitrary when balanced against the purpose and basis of the statute." Sax v. Votteler, 648 S.W.2d 661, 666 (Tex. 1983); Thomas v. Bush, 23 S.W.3d 215, 218 (Tex. App.--Beaumont 2000, no pet.). Here, appellant brought suit alleging appellees had violated certain policies and taken other actions adversely affecting his good conduct time, thereby violating his constitutional rights.


[26] Assuming appellant has a "cognizable common law cause of action that is being restricted," we consider whether the particular restrictions in section 14.005(b) are unreasonable or arbitrary when balanced against the underling purposes of the statute. Section 14.005(b) provides a deadline by which inmates must file lawsuits involving complaints that have been the subject of internal administrative review. A state may require inmates to comply with rules that make the trial process possible or that facilitate the functioning of our system of justice. See Randle v. Wilson, 26 S.W. 3d 513, 516 (Tex. App.--Amarillo 2000, no pet.) (citing Hodge v. Prince, 730 F. Supp. 747, 751 (N.D. Tex. 1990), aff'd, 923 F.2d 853 (5th Cir. 1991)). A limitation period, such as the 31 day period in the case before us, is just such a rule. Randle, 26 S.W. 3d at 516. The limitation exists to compel litigants to take action and to provide our judicial system an opportunity to timely and efficiently address legitimate claims. Thus, it serves a reasonable purpose. Moreover, it is not unreasonable to expect inmates to comply with the limitation. For a prisoner who already has pursued a grievance through the administrative channels and exhausted those potential remedies, 31 days to convert that grievance into a lawsuit is ample time to act. This is not a circumstance, such as with the statute of limitationprovision in section 16.003, in which the inmate merely has 31 days to discover the claim and then initiate suit upon it; he already knows about the claim and already has pursued the administrative steps to act upon it.


[27] We hold that reasonable restrictions on the abilityof pro se litigants, including inmates, to proceed in forma pauperis do not constitute a denial of the constitutional right of access to the courts. See Hicks, 989 F. Supp. at 823. The time requirement of section 14.005(b) is a reasonable restriction and does not deny indigent inmates access to the courts or otherwise abridge their rights under the open courts provision of the Texas Constitution. Accordingly, we overrule appellant's second point of error.


[28] We affirm the trial court's judgment.


[29] Publish -- TEX. R. APP. P. 47.3(b).



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Opinion Footnotes

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[30] *fn1 The only exception is actions brought under the Texas Family Code. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 14.002(b) (Vernon Supp. 2000).

Wallace v. Texas Department of Criminal Justice, 36 S.W.3d 607, 36 S.W.3d 607 (Tex.App. 11/30/2000)

[1] Texas Court of Appeals (Civil)


[2] No. 01-98-01364-CV


[3] 36 S.W.3d 607, 36 S.W.3d 607, 2000.TX


[4] November 30, 2000


[5] Petition for review denied February 22, 2001.


[6] ROSCOE WALLACE, APPELLANT
v.
TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE-INSTITUTIONAL DIVISION AND GREGG IRVING, APPELLEES


[7] On Appeal from the 278th District Walker County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 20,187-C


[8] Ant Roscoe Wallace Huntsville, TX 77349 Ape Kevin Robert Lashus Austin, TX 78711 Phone 512/463-2080 Fax 512/495-9139


[9] Panel consists of Justices O'Connor, Hedges, and Price.


[10] The opinion of the court was delivered by: Frank C. Price *fn5 Justice


[11] OPINION


[12] Roscoe Wallace, the appellant, appeals from the dismissal of a suit brought under the Texas Tort Claims Act against appellees, the Texas Department of Criminal Justice-Institutional Division (TDCJ) and Gregg Irving. We affirm.


[13] FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND


[14] This lawsuit arises out of an incident that allegedly occurred on April 19, 1996, when Wallace, an inmate of the TDCJ, injured his hand while operating a printer/slotter machine in the box factory at the prison. Irving was the plant manager of the box factory. According to Wallace, he was forced to operate this machine, which he believed to be unsafe. After the incident, Wallace was examined and treated for a fracture of his left hand.


[15] On July 22, 1996, Wallace filed a step-one grievance alleging he was not getting proper medical care for the injury that had occurred at the box factory. The warden denied the grievance because Wallace's medical record indicated Wallace's health care needs had been addressed. On August 8, 1996, Wallace filed a step-two grievance, appealing denial of the step-one grievance. The regional director denied the step-two grievance on August 19, 1996.


[16] On April 7, 1998, Wallace filed his original petition in the district court, alleging the defendants were negligent in relation to the operation of machinery at the box factory and in relation to medical procedures. He attached a declaration of inability to pay costs and a notarized statement of his prison account. He did not attach a statement indicating the nature and dates of any grievances he pursued, and he did not attach a statement regarding any other lawsuits he may have filed. *fn1


[17] On July 7, 1998, the trial court held a chapter 14 hearing during which the State questioned whether Wallace had exhausted his administrative remedies regarding the allegedly faulty machinery. The court, however, allowed the suit to proceed.


[18] On August 21, 1998, Wallace filed copies of the grievance forms showing denial of his previous step-one grievance and his step-two appeal. On September 21, 1998, Wallace submitted a new step-one grievance claiming "intentional acts or omissions and gross negligence" in relation to the printer/slotter. The warden treated the 1998 grievance as encompassing the same subject matter as the 1996 grievances and denied the 1998 grievance. By sworn statement attached to the motion to dismiss, a TDCJ grievance investigator explained:


[19] [A]t the time of the alleged injury there was a three step process in place. In order to appeal the Step 2 Grievance, Mr. Wallace would have had to file a Step 3 Grievance within five (5) days. He never filed a Step 3 Grievance. Therefore, after the deadline, the Step 1 and Step 2 decisions became final and his remedies were exhausted. On September 21, 1998 Mr. Wallace again filed a Grievance relating to the alleged injuries he received back in 1996. . . . This grievance concerned the same subject matter as the earlier grievance and was filed over two years later, clearly filed outside the deadline for filing a grievance. Therefore, the most recent grievance was denied. *fn2


[20] Finally, Wallace filed a first amended original petition. He alleged negligence only in relation to the machinery. The defendants filed a response and motion to dismiss. They argued dismissal was appropriate because (1) the Tort Claims Act suit against Irving was frivolous because the Act does not govern suits brought directly against an employee of the State, (2) Wallace's suit was untimely filed, and (3) Wallace failed to file the statutorily required affidavits. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the action with prejudice.


[21] DISCUSSION


[22] In three issues, Wallace contends the trial court erred in dismissing the case. In issue one, he contends the trial court erroneously dismissed his case as frivolous. In issue two, he contends the trial court erroneously dismissed his case as untimely. In issue three, he contends the trial court erroneously dismissed his case because he did not attach the required affidavits.


[23] Wallace's suit is subject to the requirements of chapter 14 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code. Thompson v. Henderson, 927 S.W.2d 323, 232 & n.1 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, no writ). In reviewing the trial court's decision to dismiss a case subject to chapter 14, an appellate court applies an abuse-of-discretion standard of review. Hickson v. Moya, 926 S.W.2d 397, 398 (Tex. App.-Waco 1996, no writ); see Clark v. J.W. Estelle Unit, 23 S.W.3d 420, 421 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet. filed) (applying abuse-of-discretion standard to dismissal for not complying with requirements of Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 14.004); Samuels v. Strain, 11 S.W.3d 404, 406 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, no pet.) (applying abuse-of-discretion standard to dismissal on grounds of frivolousness under chapter 14). A court abuses its discretion if it acts without reference to guiding rules or principles. Samuels, 11 S.W.3d at 406.


[24] When a dismissal order does not state the specific grounds on which it was granted, a party appealing from the judgment rendered pursuant to that order must show that each of the independent arguments alleged in the motion to dismiss is insufficient to support the order. See Morris v. Collins, 916 S.W.2d 527, 530 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, no writ) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating rule as applying to both summary judgments and dismissal orders and citing Gannon v. Baker, 830 S.W.2d 706, 709 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, writ denied)), disagreed with on other grounds in Texas Dep't of Transp. v. Jones, 8 S.W. 3d 636, 638 n.2 (Tex. 1999) (per curiam). Although Wallace addresses all three grounds raised in the motion, his inability to show his petition was timely is dispositive.


[25] An inmate must prove he exhausted all administrative remedies within the penal grievance system before initiating a lawsuit. See Pedraza v. Tibbs, 826 S.W.2d 695, 699 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, writ dism'd w.o.j.) (stating rule in context of chapter 13 case). The written decision denying Wallace's step-two grievance was signed August 19, 1996. As explained by the grievance investigator, Wallace exhausted his administrative remedies, and his 1996 grievance became final on August 24, 1996, i.e., five days after his step-two grievance was denied.


[26] Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 14.005 provides in relevant part:


[27] (a) An inmate who files a claim that is subject to the grievance system established under Section 501.008, Government Code, shall file with the court:


[28] (1) an affidavit or unsworn declaration stating the date that the grievance was filed and the date the written decision described by Section 501.008(d), Government Code, was received by the inmate; and


[29] (2) a copy of the written decision from the grievance system.


[30] (b) A court shall dismiss a claim if the inmate fails to file the claim before the 31st day after the date the inmate receives the written decision from the grievance system. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 14.005 (Vernon Supp. 2000).


[31] Wallace filed his lawsuit more than 19 months after he received notice of the written decision on his grievance. His suit was untimely. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 14.005(b) (Vernon Supp. 2000). The trial court did not err in dismissing Wallace's lawsuit. *fn3


[32] Wallace, however, questions how the trial court could allow his suit to go forth at the initial hearing and then dismiss it on procedural grounds at trial. At the initial hearing, the trial court did not have before it complete information regarding the nature of the 1996 grievances or the dates of their denials because Wallace had not yet complied with section 14.005(a). At the subsequent hearing, however, the trial court did have that information.


[33] Wallace also directs this Court's attention to the two-year limitation period for tort claims. See Act of May 27, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 739 § 2, 1995 Tex. Gen. Laws 3850, 3850 (since amended) (current version at TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.003(a) (Vernon Supp. 2000)); Srite v. Owens-Illinois, Inc. 870 S.W.2d 556, 563 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993), rev'd in part on other grounds, Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Burt, 897 S.W.2d 765, 769 (Tex. 1995). The legislature, however, has set forth specific provisions for claims that are subject to the grievance system established under Texas Government Code section 501.008. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 14.005 (Vernon Supp. 2000). Wallace's claim was such a claim. See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 501.008 (a) (Vernon 1998) (stating that remedy provided by grievance system is exclusive administrative remedy available to inmate for claim for relief against department of corrections that arises while inmate housed in facility operated by department). Under the provisions applicable to claims subject to the grievance system, the trial court "shall dismiss a claim" if the inmate does not file it before the 31st day after he receives the decision from the grievance system. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 14.005 (b) (Vernon Supp. 2000). Even were we to consider this specific provision as conflicting with the general two-year limitations period for personal injury, the more specific provision applicable to inmates' claims governed by the grievance system controls. See Graff v. Harris County, 877 S.W.2d 82, 84 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, writ denied). *fn4


[34] We overrule Wallace's issue two. Because of our disposition of this issue, we need not address Wallace's issues one and three.


[35] We affirm the judgment.


[36] Publish. Tex. R. App. P. 47.



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Opinion Footnotes

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[37] *fn1 On September 29, 1998, Wallace executed an affidavit stating he had never previously filed a civil action.


[38] *fn2 The warden, however, stated he was denying the 1998 petition on the ground that Wallace had not exhausted his administrative remedies in 1996.


[39] *fn3 Even were we to view the 1998 grievance as encompassing a different matter than the 1996 grievances, the 1998 grievance would appear to be untimely under the administrative directives in effect at the time Wallace filed the 1998 grievance. Those directives required an inmate to submit a step-one grievance within 15 days of the incident at issue.


[40] *fn4 Government Code section 501.008 (e) provides: The limitations period applicable to a claim arising out of the same operative facts as a claim for which the grievance system provides the exclusive remedy: (1) is suspended on the filing of the grievance; and (2) remains suspended until the earlier of the following dates: (A) the 180th day after the date the grievance is filed; or (B) the date the inmate receives the written decision described by Subsection (d)(1). Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 501.008(e) (Vernon 1998). When an inmate must initiate a grievance within 15 days of an incident, and when the department decides the grievance within a few weeks thereafter, the general limitations period will not have run by the time the inmate must file suit in district court under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 14.005(b). The 31-day period for filing suit in section 14.005(b) serves a reasonable purpose by allowing the judicial system an opportunity to address legitimate claims and injuries in a timely and efficient manner. See Randle v. Wilson, 26 S.W.3d 513, 516 (Tex. App.-Amarillo, 2000, no pet.).


[41] *fn5 The Honorable Frank C. Price, former Justice, Court of Appeals, First District of Texas at Houston, participating by assignment.