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Catalyst Theory Guts Fee Award in Texas Parole Case
The court of appeals for the Fifth circuit vacated an award of $471,946 in attorney fees in a Texas parole suit finding that a recent supreme court ruling precluded attorney fee awards under the catalyst theory.
Texas prisoners filed a class action suit challenging various parole board practices. The prisoners won at trial, see Johnson v. Texas Dept. of Criminal Justice , 910 F. Supp. 1208 (WD TX 1995) [ PLN , Oct. 1996], but were reversed on the merits on appeal, see: Johnson v. Rodriguez , 110 F.3d 299 (5th Cir. 1997) [ PLN , Nov. 1997]. On remand, the lower court ordered the defendants to pay the plaintiffs $471,946.05 in attorney fees and costs, holding that while the plaintiffs had lost on the merits, the lawsuit had served as a "catalyst" because the parole board defendants "voluntarily" changed their policies and practices to accommodate the plaintiffs' demands. The defendants appealed.
In Buckhannon Board and Care Home Inc. v. West Virginia Dept. of Health and Human Resources , 121 S.Ct. 1835 (2001) the supreme court overruled nine circuit courts of appeal and rejected the catalyst theory of who is a prevailing party for attorney fee award purposes.
Relying on Buckhannon , the Fifth circuit held that the prisoner plaintiffs were not the prevailing party because they had lost on the merits and the Texas Board of Pardons and paroles had "voluntarily" adopted rules implementing the changes sought by the plaintiffs. The case was vacated and remanded with instructions for the lower court to dismiss the case and the fee award. See: Johnson v. Rodriguez , 260 F.3d 493 (5th Cir. 2001).
Texas prisoners filed a class action suit challenging various parole board practices. The prisoners won at trial, see Johnson v. Texas Dept. of Criminal Justice , 910 F. Supp. 1208 (WD TX 1995) [ PLN , Oct. 1996], but were reversed on the merits on appeal, see: Johnson v. Rodriguez , 110 F.3d 299 (5th Cir. 1997) [ PLN , Nov. 1997]. On remand, the lower court ordered the defendants to pay the plaintiffs $471,946.05 in attorney fees and costs, holding that while the plaintiffs had lost on the merits, the lawsuit had served as a "catalyst" because the parole board defendants "voluntarily" changed their policies and practices to accommodate the plaintiffs' demands. The defendants appealed.
In Buckhannon Board and Care Home Inc. v. West Virginia Dept. of Health and Human Resources , 121 S.Ct. 1835 (2001) the supreme court overruled nine circuit courts of appeal and rejected the catalyst theory of who is a prevailing party for attorney fee award purposes.
Relying on Buckhannon , the Fifth circuit held that the prisoner plaintiffs were not the prevailing party because they had lost on the merits and the Texas Board of Pardons and paroles had "voluntarily" adopted rules implementing the changes sought by the plaintiffs. The case was vacated and remanded with instructions for the lower court to dismiss the case and the fee award. See: Johnson v. Rodriguez , 260 F.3d 493 (5th Cir. 2001).
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Related legal case
Johnson v. Rodriguez
| Year | 2001 |
|---|---|
| Cite | 260 F.3d 493 (5th Cir. 2001) |
| Level | Court of Appeals |
Johnson v. Rodriguez, 260 F.3d 493 (5th Cir. 08/10/2001)
[1] U.S. Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit
[2] No. 00-50443,, No. 00-50570
[3] 260 F.3d 493, 2001
[4] August 10, 2001
[5] DANIEL JOHNSON, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF ALL PRESENT AND FUTURE INMATES OF THE TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE - INSTITUTIONAL DIVISION, PLAINTIFF - APPELLEE - CROSS-APPELLANT,
v.
VICTOR RODRIGUEZ, ETC; ET AL, DEFENDANTS, RISSIE OWENS; CYNTHIA TAUSS, MEMBER OF TEXAS BOARD OF PARDONS & PAROLES; LYNN F BROWN, MEMBER OF TEXAS BOARD OF PARDONS & PAROLES; LAFAYETTE COLLINS; FILIBERTO REYNA; JUANITA GONZALEZ; PADDY LANN BURWELL, MEMBER OF TEXAS BOARD OF PARDONS & PAROLES; ALVIN SHAW; GERALD GARRETT, CHAIRMAN, TEXAS BOARD OF PARDONS & PAROLES; JAMES PAUL KIEL, JR., MEMBER OF TEXAS BOARD OF PARDONS & PAROLES; LINDA GARCIA, MEMBER OF TEXAS BOARD OF PARDONS & PAROLES; BRENDOLYN ROGERS-JOHNSON, MEMBER OF TEXAS BOARD OF PARDONS & PAROLES; THOMAS W MOSS; SANDIE WALKER, MEMBER OF TEXAS BOARD OF PARDONS & PAROLES; DANIEL LANG; LUCINDA SIMONS, MEMBER OF TEXAS BOARD OF PARDONS & PAROLES; JOHN DAVID FRANZ, MEMBER OF TEXAS BOARD OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE; TEXAS BOARD OF PARDONS & PAROLES; JAMES E. BUSH, MEMBER OF THE TEXAS BOARD OF PARDONS AND PAROLES, DEFENDANTS - APPELLANTS - CROSS-APPELLEES.
DANIEL JOHNSON, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF ALL PRESENT AND FUTURE INMATES OF THE TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE - INSTITUTIONAL DIVISION, PLAINTIFF - APPELLEE,
v.
VICTOR RODRIGUEZ, ETC; ET AL DEFENDANTS, RISSIE OWENS; CYNTHIA TAUSS, MEMBER OF TEXAS BOARD OF PARDONS & PAROLES; LYNN F BROWN, MEMBER OF TEXAS BOARD OF PARDONS & PAROLES; LAFAYETTE COLLINS; FILIBERTO REYNA; JUANITA GONZALEZ; PADDY LANN BURWELL, MEMBER OF TEXAS BOARD OF PARDONS & PAROLES; ALVIN SHAW; GERALD GARRETT, CHAIRMAN, TEXAS BOARD OF PARDONS & PAROLES; JAMES PAUL KIEL, JR., MEMBER OF TEXAS BOARD OF PARDONS & PAROLES; LINDA GARCIA, MEMBER OF TEXAS BOARD OF PARDONS & PAROLES; BRENDOLYN ROGERS-JOHNSON, MEMBER OF TEXAS BOARD OF PARDONS & PAROLES; THOMAS W MOSS; SANDIE WALKER, MEMBER OF TEXAS BOARD OF PARDONS & PAROLES; DANIEL LANG; LUCINDA SIMONS, MEMBER OF TEXAS BOARD OF PARDONS & PAROLES; JOHN DAVID FRANZ, MEMBER OF TEXAS BOARD OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE; TEXAS BOARD OF PARDONS & PAROLES; JAMES E. BUSH, MEMBER OF THE TEXAS BOARD OF PARDONS AND PAROLES, DEFENDANTS - APPELLANTS.
[6] Before Higginbotham, Emilio M. Garza, Circuit Judges, and DOWD*fn1, District Judge.
[7] The opinion of the court was delivered by: Per Curiam
[8] As amended August 28, 2001.
[9] Appeal from the United States District Court For the Western District of Texas
[10] The chairmen and members of the Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles and of the Texas Board of Criminal Justice, in their official capacities, appeal from the judgment below awarding attorneys' fees to plaintiffs' counsel in this class action by Texas prisoners. Following our reversal on the merits of the prisoners' constitutional claims, see Johnson v. Rodriguez, 110 F.3d 299 (5th Cir. 1997), the magistrate judge ordered the defendants to pay $471, 946.05 in attorneys' fees and expenses, finding that the prisoners were a prevailing party pursuant to the "catalyst theory" of legal relief. The Supreme Court has since rejected reliance on the "catalyst theory" as a basis for awarding attorney's fees under fee-shifting statutes authorizing awards to the "prevailing party." See Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dept. of Health & Human Res., -- U.S. --, 121 S.Ct. 1835 (2001). Accordingly, we reverse the magistrate judge's determination that the prisoner class is a "prevailing party" under 28 U.S.C. § 1988. Finding no other basis on which attorneys' fees might be awarded, we vacate the magistrate judge's order.
[11] The remaining issues in this appeal are whether it was appropriate for the magistrate judge to retain Daniel Johnson as class representative and whether the magistrate judge was required to dismiss the remaining prisoners' claims as moot. At oral argument, counsel for both parties agreed that resolution of these issues is of no consequence if we vacate the award of attorneys' fees. Both parties recognize that the class members' claims are moot in light of the Board's voluntary adoption and retention of an administrative rule prohibiting the complained of conduct. Because there is no judicial relief left for the prisoner class to pursue, we need not address the question of whether Daniel Johnson is a proper class representative.
[12] We therefore VACATE the award of attorneys' fees and REMAND the case to the magistrate judge with instructions to dismiss the case as moot. We DISMISS as moot Johnson's cross-appeal for increased attorneys' fees.
[13] VACATED and REMANDED with instructions; cross-appeal DISMISSED.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Opinion Footnotes
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[14] *fn1 District Judge of the Northern District of Ohio, sitting by designation.
[1] U.S. Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit
[2] No. 00-50443,, No. 00-50570
[3] 260 F.3d 493, 2001
[4] August 10, 2001
[5] DANIEL JOHNSON, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF ALL PRESENT AND FUTURE INMATES OF THE TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE - INSTITUTIONAL DIVISION, PLAINTIFF - APPELLEE - CROSS-APPELLANT,
v.
VICTOR RODRIGUEZ, ETC; ET AL, DEFENDANTS, RISSIE OWENS; CYNTHIA TAUSS, MEMBER OF TEXAS BOARD OF PARDONS & PAROLES; LYNN F BROWN, MEMBER OF TEXAS BOARD OF PARDONS & PAROLES; LAFAYETTE COLLINS; FILIBERTO REYNA; JUANITA GONZALEZ; PADDY LANN BURWELL, MEMBER OF TEXAS BOARD OF PARDONS & PAROLES; ALVIN SHAW; GERALD GARRETT, CHAIRMAN, TEXAS BOARD OF PARDONS & PAROLES; JAMES PAUL KIEL, JR., MEMBER OF TEXAS BOARD OF PARDONS & PAROLES; LINDA GARCIA, MEMBER OF TEXAS BOARD OF PARDONS & PAROLES; BRENDOLYN ROGERS-JOHNSON, MEMBER OF TEXAS BOARD OF PARDONS & PAROLES; THOMAS W MOSS; SANDIE WALKER, MEMBER OF TEXAS BOARD OF PARDONS & PAROLES; DANIEL LANG; LUCINDA SIMONS, MEMBER OF TEXAS BOARD OF PARDONS & PAROLES; JOHN DAVID FRANZ, MEMBER OF TEXAS BOARD OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE; TEXAS BOARD OF PARDONS & PAROLES; JAMES E. BUSH, MEMBER OF THE TEXAS BOARD OF PARDONS AND PAROLES, DEFENDANTS - APPELLANTS - CROSS-APPELLEES.
DANIEL JOHNSON, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF ALL PRESENT AND FUTURE INMATES OF THE TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE - INSTITUTIONAL DIVISION, PLAINTIFF - APPELLEE,
v.
VICTOR RODRIGUEZ, ETC; ET AL DEFENDANTS, RISSIE OWENS; CYNTHIA TAUSS, MEMBER OF TEXAS BOARD OF PARDONS & PAROLES; LYNN F BROWN, MEMBER OF TEXAS BOARD OF PARDONS & PAROLES; LAFAYETTE COLLINS; FILIBERTO REYNA; JUANITA GONZALEZ; PADDY LANN BURWELL, MEMBER OF TEXAS BOARD OF PARDONS & PAROLES; ALVIN SHAW; GERALD GARRETT, CHAIRMAN, TEXAS BOARD OF PARDONS & PAROLES; JAMES PAUL KIEL, JR., MEMBER OF TEXAS BOARD OF PARDONS & PAROLES; LINDA GARCIA, MEMBER OF TEXAS BOARD OF PARDONS & PAROLES; BRENDOLYN ROGERS-JOHNSON, MEMBER OF TEXAS BOARD OF PARDONS & PAROLES; THOMAS W MOSS; SANDIE WALKER, MEMBER OF TEXAS BOARD OF PARDONS & PAROLES; DANIEL LANG; LUCINDA SIMONS, MEMBER OF TEXAS BOARD OF PARDONS & PAROLES; JOHN DAVID FRANZ, MEMBER OF TEXAS BOARD OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE; TEXAS BOARD OF PARDONS & PAROLES; JAMES E. BUSH, MEMBER OF THE TEXAS BOARD OF PARDONS AND PAROLES, DEFENDANTS - APPELLANTS.
[6] Before Higginbotham, Emilio M. Garza, Circuit Judges, and DOWD*fn1, District Judge.
[7] The opinion of the court was delivered by: Per Curiam
[8] As amended August 28, 2001.
[9] Appeal from the United States District Court For the Western District of Texas
[10] The chairmen and members of the Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles and of the Texas Board of Criminal Justice, in their official capacities, appeal from the judgment below awarding attorneys' fees to plaintiffs' counsel in this class action by Texas prisoners. Following our reversal on the merits of the prisoners' constitutional claims, see Johnson v. Rodriguez, 110 F.3d 299 (5th Cir. 1997), the magistrate judge ordered the defendants to pay $471, 946.05 in attorneys' fees and expenses, finding that the prisoners were a prevailing party pursuant to the "catalyst theory" of legal relief. The Supreme Court has since rejected reliance on the "catalyst theory" as a basis for awarding attorney's fees under fee-shifting statutes authorizing awards to the "prevailing party." See Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dept. of Health & Human Res., -- U.S. --, 121 S.Ct. 1835 (2001). Accordingly, we reverse the magistrate judge's determination that the prisoner class is a "prevailing party" under 28 U.S.C. § 1988. Finding no other basis on which attorneys' fees might be awarded, we vacate the magistrate judge's order.
[11] The remaining issues in this appeal are whether it was appropriate for the magistrate judge to retain Daniel Johnson as class representative and whether the magistrate judge was required to dismiss the remaining prisoners' claims as moot. At oral argument, counsel for both parties agreed that resolution of these issues is of no consequence if we vacate the award of attorneys' fees. Both parties recognize that the class members' claims are moot in light of the Board's voluntary adoption and retention of an administrative rule prohibiting the complained of conduct. Because there is no judicial relief left for the prisoner class to pursue, we need not address the question of whether Daniel Johnson is a proper class representative.
[12] We therefore VACATE the award of attorneys' fees and REMAND the case to the magistrate judge with instructions to dismiss the case as moot. We DISMISS as moot Johnson's cross-appeal for increased attorneys' fees.
[13] VACATED and REMANDED with instructions; cross-appeal DISMISSED.
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Opinion Footnotes
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[14] *fn1 District Judge of the Northern District of Ohio, sitting by designation.