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Interview by One Montana Parole Board Member Violates Due Process
The Montana Supreme Court held that prisoners in that state have a due process and statutory right to personally appear before all Parole Board members who will decide the merits of the prisoner's parole application.
Montana prisoner Rodney West petitioned the Court for a Writ of Habeas Corpus alleging that his continued incarceration was illegal because only one member of the Board was present at his parole hearing. The state conceded that West had a liberty interest in parole and that due process and Montana statutory provisions required the Board to personally interview him prior to making a determination about his parole, as the Court previously held in Sage v. Gamble , 279 Mont. 459, 929 P.2d 822 (1996).
Respondent argued, however, that not all members of the Board were required to be present for the personal interview, pursuant to the Court's later holding in Radford v. Mahoney , 290 Mont. 530, 977 P.2d 342 (1998).
The Court rejected the state's argument, stating: "We held in Sage v. Gamble that because of the subjective nature of the Parole Board's decision, to deny an inmate the opportunity to appear before those who will personally decide the merits of his or her parole application implicates his or her right to due process. Those rights are no less implicated because an inmate has the right to appear before one Board member when a vote by a majority of the Board members is required for a decision."
Accordingly, the Court granted West's petition, concluding that "it was not adequate for the Board to provide an interview by fewer members than were required to decide his application for parole." See: West v. Mahoney , 22 P.3d 201 (Mont. 2001).
The Court reiterated this ruling in a subsequent case brought by another Montana prisoner, also granting habeas relief. See: Haney v. Mahoney, 32 P.3d 1254 (Mont. 2001).
Montana prisoner Rodney West petitioned the Court for a Writ of Habeas Corpus alleging that his continued incarceration was illegal because only one member of the Board was present at his parole hearing. The state conceded that West had a liberty interest in parole and that due process and Montana statutory provisions required the Board to personally interview him prior to making a determination about his parole, as the Court previously held in Sage v. Gamble , 279 Mont. 459, 929 P.2d 822 (1996).
Respondent argued, however, that not all members of the Board were required to be present for the personal interview, pursuant to the Court's later holding in Radford v. Mahoney , 290 Mont. 530, 977 P.2d 342 (1998).
The Court rejected the state's argument, stating: "We held in Sage v. Gamble that because of the subjective nature of the Parole Board's decision, to deny an inmate the opportunity to appear before those who will personally decide the merits of his or her parole application implicates his or her right to due process. Those rights are no less implicated because an inmate has the right to appear before one Board member when a vote by a majority of the Board members is required for a decision."
Accordingly, the Court granted West's petition, concluding that "it was not adequate for the Board to provide an interview by fewer members than were required to decide his application for parole." See: West v. Mahoney , 22 P.3d 201 (Mont. 2001).
The Court reiterated this ruling in a subsequent case brought by another Montana prisoner, also granting habeas relief. See: Haney v. Mahoney, 32 P.3d 1254 (Mont. 2001).
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Related legal cases
West v. Mahoney
| Year | 2001 |
|---|---|
| Cite | 22 P.3d 201 (Mont. 2001) |
| Level | State Supreme Court |
In re West, 305 Mont. 117, 22 P.3d 201, 2001 MT 82 (Mont. 05/03/2001)
[1] Montana Supreme Court
[2] No. 01-130
[3] 305 Mont. 117, 22 P.3d 201, 2001 MT 82, 2001.MT
[4] May 03, 2001
[5] RODNEY ALLEN WEST, PETITIONER, MIKE MAHONEY, WARDEN; MONTANA STATE PRISON, RESPONDENTS.
[6] OPINION AND ORDER
[7] ¶1 The Petitioner, Rodney Allen West, has petitioned this Court for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to §§ 46-22-101 through 307, MCA.
[8] ¶2 In support of his petition, West alleges that he was found guilty in 1988 of theft and sentenced in 1989 to ten (10) years for theft with an additional thirty (30) year sentence because of the determination that he was a persistent offender. He was also designated a dangerous offender for purposes of parole eligibility. He alleges that his continued incarceration is illegal because at his parole hearing on December 27, 2000, only one member of the Board was present. He contends that pursuant to §§ 46-23-201 and 202(2), MCA (1981), he had a right to appear in front of the full Parole Board. He also contends that the Board's decisions are required by § 46-23-107 to be made by majority vote and are required by rule to be signed by two Board members. Finally, he contends that he had a liberty interest in parole which he was denied because he met the criteria for parole and because he was denied due process.
[9] ¶3 In response, the Respondent, Mike Mahoney, concedes that because West was convicted prior to March 20, 1989, he had a "liberty interest" in parole and that due process and the provisions of § 46-23-201 require that the Board of Pardons personally interview him prior to making a determination about his parole. We so held in Sage v. Gamble (1996), 279 Mont. 459, 929 P.2d 822. However, the respondent contends that pursuant to our later order in Radford v. Mahoney, Montana Supreme Court No. 98-150 (decided July 14, 1998), not all members of the Board are required to be present for the personal interview with the inmate. Furthermore, respondent contends that § 46-23-104(4)(a), MCA, specifically provides that the Board may delegate the responsibility for parole eligibility interviews to one of its members.
[10] ¶4 Finally, the respondent contends that the bases for denial of West's parole as documented by his case disposition form are consistent with those factors the Board was required to consider pursuant to § 46-23-202, MCA, and that, therefore, its disposition of his case was not illegal.
[11] ¶5 In Sage v. Gamble we were asked to decide whether a prisoner's right to due process was denied when his parole eligibility interview was conducted by a staff member employed by the Board of Pardons and he was denied the opportunity to personally appear before the Board at his parole hearing. Relying on language from Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex (1979), 442 U.S. 1, 12, 99 S.Ct. 2100, 2106, 68 L.Ed.2d 668, we concluded that:
[12] It is reasonable, therefore, to infer from the Greenholtz opinion that the opportunity of a parole applicant to appear before those entrusted with the subjective responsibility of passing judgment on his or her application is an important element of the due process to which the applicant is entitled. 279 Mont. at 466.
[13] ¶6 We pointed out that § 46-23-202(2), MCA (1981), which is also applicable to West, required that before ordering parole the Board is required to interview the prisoner and that Rule 2.25.401, ARM, adopted by the Board to implement the preceding statutory obligation required that the prisoner be brought before the Board and that the hearing be conducted at the direction of the chairman. We stated:
[14] Based on the plain language of both § 46-23-202, MCA (1981), and Rule 20.25.401, ARM, an inmate who is eligible for parole is clearly provided the right to personally appear at an interview before the Parole Board prior to the Board's decision to grant or deny the application for parole.
[15] 279 Mont. at 466.
[16] ¶7 We acknowledged that § 46-23-104(4), MCA, which is again relied on by the respondents in this case, provided for interviews by staff members but concluded that:
[17] [A]n interpretation which relieves the Board of its duty to personally interview an inmate would unconstitutionally deny the inmate his right to due process guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the U. S. Constitution, and independently by Article II, Section 17, of the Montana Constitution, by denying him an opportunity to be heard by those who will decide the merits of his application. See, e.g., Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 16, 99 S.Ct. at 2108. It is our duty to construe statutes, where possible, in a manner that withstands constitutional scrutiny. State v. Martel (1995), 273 Mont. 143, 148, 902 P.2d 14, 17. 279 Mont. at 467.
[18] ¶8 In language particularly applicable to the facts before us we held that:
[19] Therefore, we interpret § 46-23-104(4), MCA (1981), to permit the Board to designate one of its members, one of its staff members, or any other adult correctional releasing authority to conduct a prehearing interview of an inmate relative to parole eligibility for the purpose of assisting the Board and expediting the hearing process. However, the prehearing interview does not, and cannot substitute for the applicant's constitutional right to personally appear before the Board.
[20] To ignore the importance of an inmate's opportunity to appear before those who will personally decide the merits of his or her parole application is to ignore the subjective nature of the decision and the statutory requirement that those vested with such responsibility possess specific qualifications. . . . 279 Mont. at 467.
[21] We hold that due process requirements of both the federal and state constitutions, and the clear mandate of § 46-23-202, MCA (1981), compel the Board of Pardons to personally interview a parole-eligible inmate, who has a liberty interest in parole, at the time fixed by law. 279 Mont. at 468.
[22] ¶9 Respondent contends that its action in this case was permissible because the full Board ultimately participated in the decision to deny West parole and because in Radford v. Mahoney, Montana Supreme Court No. 98-150 (July 14, 1998), we held that not all members of the Board are required to be present for the personal interview of the inmate. However, we note an inconsistency between the copy of the "case disposition" attached to West's petition for habeas corpus and the copy of the same "case disposition" attached to the respondent's response to West's petition. The copy attached to West's petition is signed by only one Board member and was presumably presented to him in that form. The copy attached to the respondent's response is signed by two Board members, however, it is undisputed that only the first signator interviewed West.
[23] ¶10 We conclude that the respondent's arguments are unpersuasive and that to the extent that our Order in Radford is inconsistent with our reported decision in Sage v. Gamble, it is unpersuasive. Section 46-23-107, MCA (1981), requires that "decisions of the Board shall be by majority vote. . . ." We held in Sage v. Gamble that because of the subjective nature of the Parole Board's decision, to deny an inmate the opportunity to appear before those who will personally decide the merits of his or her parole application implicates his or her right to due process. Those rights are no less implicated because an inmate has the right to appear before one Board member when a vote by a majority of the Board members is required for a decision.
[24] ¶11 Therefore, West's petition for a writ of habeas corpus is granted to the limited extent that we conclude it was not adequate for the Board to provide an interview by fewer members than were required to decide his application for parole. For this reason,
[25] ¶12 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that this case is remanded to the Board of Pardons for further proceedings to be conducted as expeditiously as possible at which the petitioner, Rodney Allen West, is to be provided with an opportunity to appear before a sufficient number of members of the Board of Pardons so that those who decide his case will have done so based on a personal interview.
[26] ¶13 The Clerk of Court is directed to mail a copy of this Order to Rodney Allen West, AO 15264, Dawson County Correctional Center, 440 Colorado Blvd., Glendive, Montana 59330, and to Colleen Graham White, Department of Corrections, P.O. Box 201301, Helena, Montana 59620, on behalf of the respondents.
[27] DATED this 3rd day of May, 2001.
[28] TERRY N. TRIEWEILER
[29] JIM REGNIER
[30] JAMES C. NELSON
[31] W. WILLIAM LEAPHART
[32] PATRICIA COTTER
[33] Justice Jim Rice dissenting.
[34] ¶14 I respectfully dissent from the Court's opinion herein.
[35] ¶15 In October 2000, Petitioner West personally appeared for his interview before Board member Wilson, providing him an opportunity to review his record and to be heard in regard to his parole. At that time, he requested that the Board not render its decision until he could present witness testimony. The full Board then reviewed the matter and, responding to the Petitioner's request, issued a continuance and granted Petitioner a second opportunity to appear before Board member Wilson in December 2000, at which time Petitioner presented video tape testimony. A final case disposition was then issued by Board members Wilson and Fleming, recommending Petitioner's placement in a community-based prerelease program.
[36] ¶16 In Greenholtz, the United States Supreme Court held that state parole procedures must provide prisoners with an effective opportunity to, first, insure that the records before a parole board are, in fact, related to the prisoner's case, and, second, to present any special considerations why the prisoner is an appropriate candidate for parole. Relying on Greenholtz, this Court, in Sage, held that the Board of Parole violated Sage's due process rights when it delegated the prisoner's pre-parole interview, required under § 46-23-202, MCA (1981), to the Board's executive secretary. In so doing, the Court in Sage interpreted §46-23-104(4), MCA (1981), which specifically authorizes the Board to delegate a parole interview to its staff or, as applicable here, to one of the members of the Board, as applying only to a "pre-hearing interview" that does not satisfy the parole interview requirement of §46-23-202, MCA.
[37] ¶17 The physical realities of Montana inmates located in various facilities inside and outside of the state, and a Parole Board comprised of citizen members, illustrates the practical need met by the Legislature when it enacted § 46-23-104(4), MCA, specifically authorizing the Board to delegate a parole interview to one of its members. The Court in Sage, and again herein, by interpreting § 46-23-104(4), MCA, as applying to a "pre-hearing interview" that is different than the statutory parole interview, has eliminated the purpose for which the provision was enacted by the Legislature.
[38] ¶18 Further, as the Court observes, the practice of delegating the parole interview to a single member of the Board was upheld by this Court in Radford v. Mahoney. While I am uncomfortable in referencing the unpublished Radford decision, the Court has done so in its opinion, and a response is appropriate. In Radford, the Court noted that the Sage holding required the Board to conduct its own personal interview of a parole-eligible inmate, but that it did not hold that all members of the Board needed to be present for the personal interview. The Court in Radford concluded that Montana law did not require the pre-parole interview to be conducted before the entire Board.
[39] ¶19 The actions taken in this matter by the Board provided an effective opportunity for the Petitioner to review the file, to be personally heard and to present evidence regarding his parole. The Board thus fulfilled the due process requirements established in Greenholtz. "Due process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands." Greenholz, 442 U.S. 1, 12, 99 S.Ct. 2100, 2106, 60 Led.2d 668. I would hold that Petitioner's due process rights were not violated herein by the Board of Pardons, that §46-23-104(4), MCA, properly authorizes delegation of the pre-parole interview to a single Board member, and would deny the petition.
[40] JIM RICE
[41] I join in the foregoing dissent of Justice Rice.
[42] KARLA M. GRAY
[1] Montana Supreme Court
[2] No. 01-130
[3] 305 Mont. 117, 22 P.3d 201, 2001 MT 82, 2001.MT
[4] May 03, 2001
[5] RODNEY ALLEN WEST, PETITIONER, MIKE MAHONEY, WARDEN; MONTANA STATE PRISON, RESPONDENTS.
[6] OPINION AND ORDER
[7] ¶1 The Petitioner, Rodney Allen West, has petitioned this Court for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to §§ 46-22-101 through 307, MCA.
[8] ¶2 In support of his petition, West alleges that he was found guilty in 1988 of theft and sentenced in 1989 to ten (10) years for theft with an additional thirty (30) year sentence because of the determination that he was a persistent offender. He was also designated a dangerous offender for purposes of parole eligibility. He alleges that his continued incarceration is illegal because at his parole hearing on December 27, 2000, only one member of the Board was present. He contends that pursuant to §§ 46-23-201 and 202(2), MCA (1981), he had a right to appear in front of the full Parole Board. He also contends that the Board's decisions are required by § 46-23-107 to be made by majority vote and are required by rule to be signed by two Board members. Finally, he contends that he had a liberty interest in parole which he was denied because he met the criteria for parole and because he was denied due process.
[9] ¶3 In response, the Respondent, Mike Mahoney, concedes that because West was convicted prior to March 20, 1989, he had a "liberty interest" in parole and that due process and the provisions of § 46-23-201 require that the Board of Pardons personally interview him prior to making a determination about his parole. We so held in Sage v. Gamble (1996), 279 Mont. 459, 929 P.2d 822. However, the respondent contends that pursuant to our later order in Radford v. Mahoney, Montana Supreme Court No. 98-150 (decided July 14, 1998), not all members of the Board are required to be present for the personal interview with the inmate. Furthermore, respondent contends that § 46-23-104(4)(a), MCA, specifically provides that the Board may delegate the responsibility for parole eligibility interviews to one of its members.
[10] ¶4 Finally, the respondent contends that the bases for denial of West's parole as documented by his case disposition form are consistent with those factors the Board was required to consider pursuant to § 46-23-202, MCA, and that, therefore, its disposition of his case was not illegal.
[11] ¶5 In Sage v. Gamble we were asked to decide whether a prisoner's right to due process was denied when his parole eligibility interview was conducted by a staff member employed by the Board of Pardons and he was denied the opportunity to personally appear before the Board at his parole hearing. Relying on language from Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex (1979), 442 U.S. 1, 12, 99 S.Ct. 2100, 2106, 68 L.Ed.2d 668, we concluded that:
[12] It is reasonable, therefore, to infer from the Greenholtz opinion that the opportunity of a parole applicant to appear before those entrusted with the subjective responsibility of passing judgment on his or her application is an important element of the due process to which the applicant is entitled. 279 Mont. at 466.
[13] ¶6 We pointed out that § 46-23-202(2), MCA (1981), which is also applicable to West, required that before ordering parole the Board is required to interview the prisoner and that Rule 2.25.401, ARM, adopted by the Board to implement the preceding statutory obligation required that the prisoner be brought before the Board and that the hearing be conducted at the direction of the chairman. We stated:
[14] Based on the plain language of both § 46-23-202, MCA (1981), and Rule 20.25.401, ARM, an inmate who is eligible for parole is clearly provided the right to personally appear at an interview before the Parole Board prior to the Board's decision to grant or deny the application for parole.
[15] 279 Mont. at 466.
[16] ¶7 We acknowledged that § 46-23-104(4), MCA, which is again relied on by the respondents in this case, provided for interviews by staff members but concluded that:
[17] [A]n interpretation which relieves the Board of its duty to personally interview an inmate would unconstitutionally deny the inmate his right to due process guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the U. S. Constitution, and independently by Article II, Section 17, of the Montana Constitution, by denying him an opportunity to be heard by those who will decide the merits of his application. See, e.g., Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 16, 99 S.Ct. at 2108. It is our duty to construe statutes, where possible, in a manner that withstands constitutional scrutiny. State v. Martel (1995), 273 Mont. 143, 148, 902 P.2d 14, 17. 279 Mont. at 467.
[18] ¶8 In language particularly applicable to the facts before us we held that:
[19] Therefore, we interpret § 46-23-104(4), MCA (1981), to permit the Board to designate one of its members, one of its staff members, or any other adult correctional releasing authority to conduct a prehearing interview of an inmate relative to parole eligibility for the purpose of assisting the Board and expediting the hearing process. However, the prehearing interview does not, and cannot substitute for the applicant's constitutional right to personally appear before the Board.
[20] To ignore the importance of an inmate's opportunity to appear before those who will personally decide the merits of his or her parole application is to ignore the subjective nature of the decision and the statutory requirement that those vested with such responsibility possess specific qualifications. . . . 279 Mont. at 467.
[21] We hold that due process requirements of both the federal and state constitutions, and the clear mandate of § 46-23-202, MCA (1981), compel the Board of Pardons to personally interview a parole-eligible inmate, who has a liberty interest in parole, at the time fixed by law. 279 Mont. at 468.
[22] ¶9 Respondent contends that its action in this case was permissible because the full Board ultimately participated in the decision to deny West parole and because in Radford v. Mahoney, Montana Supreme Court No. 98-150 (July 14, 1998), we held that not all members of the Board are required to be present for the personal interview of the inmate. However, we note an inconsistency between the copy of the "case disposition" attached to West's petition for habeas corpus and the copy of the same "case disposition" attached to the respondent's response to West's petition. The copy attached to West's petition is signed by only one Board member and was presumably presented to him in that form. The copy attached to the respondent's response is signed by two Board members, however, it is undisputed that only the first signator interviewed West.
[23] ¶10 We conclude that the respondent's arguments are unpersuasive and that to the extent that our Order in Radford is inconsistent with our reported decision in Sage v. Gamble, it is unpersuasive. Section 46-23-107, MCA (1981), requires that "decisions of the Board shall be by majority vote. . . ." We held in Sage v. Gamble that because of the subjective nature of the Parole Board's decision, to deny an inmate the opportunity to appear before those who will personally decide the merits of his or her parole application implicates his or her right to due process. Those rights are no less implicated because an inmate has the right to appear before one Board member when a vote by a majority of the Board members is required for a decision.
[24] ¶11 Therefore, West's petition for a writ of habeas corpus is granted to the limited extent that we conclude it was not adequate for the Board to provide an interview by fewer members than were required to decide his application for parole. For this reason,
[25] ¶12 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that this case is remanded to the Board of Pardons for further proceedings to be conducted as expeditiously as possible at which the petitioner, Rodney Allen West, is to be provided with an opportunity to appear before a sufficient number of members of the Board of Pardons so that those who decide his case will have done so based on a personal interview.
[26] ¶13 The Clerk of Court is directed to mail a copy of this Order to Rodney Allen West, AO 15264, Dawson County Correctional Center, 440 Colorado Blvd., Glendive, Montana 59330, and to Colleen Graham White, Department of Corrections, P.O. Box 201301, Helena, Montana 59620, on behalf of the respondents.
[27] DATED this 3rd day of May, 2001.
[28] TERRY N. TRIEWEILER
[29] JIM REGNIER
[30] JAMES C. NELSON
[31] W. WILLIAM LEAPHART
[32] PATRICIA COTTER
[33] Justice Jim Rice dissenting.
[34] ¶14 I respectfully dissent from the Court's opinion herein.
[35] ¶15 In October 2000, Petitioner West personally appeared for his interview before Board member Wilson, providing him an opportunity to review his record and to be heard in regard to his parole. At that time, he requested that the Board not render its decision until he could present witness testimony. The full Board then reviewed the matter and, responding to the Petitioner's request, issued a continuance and granted Petitioner a second opportunity to appear before Board member Wilson in December 2000, at which time Petitioner presented video tape testimony. A final case disposition was then issued by Board members Wilson and Fleming, recommending Petitioner's placement in a community-based prerelease program.
[36] ¶16 In Greenholtz, the United States Supreme Court held that state parole procedures must provide prisoners with an effective opportunity to, first, insure that the records before a parole board are, in fact, related to the prisoner's case, and, second, to present any special considerations why the prisoner is an appropriate candidate for parole. Relying on Greenholtz, this Court, in Sage, held that the Board of Parole violated Sage's due process rights when it delegated the prisoner's pre-parole interview, required under § 46-23-202, MCA (1981), to the Board's executive secretary. In so doing, the Court in Sage interpreted §46-23-104(4), MCA (1981), which specifically authorizes the Board to delegate a parole interview to its staff or, as applicable here, to one of the members of the Board, as applying only to a "pre-hearing interview" that does not satisfy the parole interview requirement of §46-23-202, MCA.
[37] ¶17 The physical realities of Montana inmates located in various facilities inside and outside of the state, and a Parole Board comprised of citizen members, illustrates the practical need met by the Legislature when it enacted § 46-23-104(4), MCA, specifically authorizing the Board to delegate a parole interview to one of its members. The Court in Sage, and again herein, by interpreting § 46-23-104(4), MCA, as applying to a "pre-hearing interview" that is different than the statutory parole interview, has eliminated the purpose for which the provision was enacted by the Legislature.
[38] ¶18 Further, as the Court observes, the practice of delegating the parole interview to a single member of the Board was upheld by this Court in Radford v. Mahoney. While I am uncomfortable in referencing the unpublished Radford decision, the Court has done so in its opinion, and a response is appropriate. In Radford, the Court noted that the Sage holding required the Board to conduct its own personal interview of a parole-eligible inmate, but that it did not hold that all members of the Board needed to be present for the personal interview. The Court in Radford concluded that Montana law did not require the pre-parole interview to be conducted before the entire Board.
[39] ¶19 The actions taken in this matter by the Board provided an effective opportunity for the Petitioner to review the file, to be personally heard and to present evidence regarding his parole. The Board thus fulfilled the due process requirements established in Greenholtz. "Due process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands." Greenholz, 442 U.S. 1, 12, 99 S.Ct. 2100, 2106, 60 Led.2d 668. I would hold that Petitioner's due process rights were not violated herein by the Board of Pardons, that §46-23-104(4), MCA, properly authorizes delegation of the pre-parole interview to a single Board member, and would deny the petition.
[40] JIM RICE
[41] I join in the foregoing dissent of Justice Rice.
[42] KARLA M. GRAY
Haney v. Mahoney
| Year | 2001 |
|---|---|
| Cite | 32 P.3d 1254 (Mont. 2001) |
| Level | State Supreme Court |
Haney v. Mahoney, 306 Mont. 288, 32 P.3d 1254, 2001 MT 201 (Mont. 10/04/2001)
[1] Montana Supreme Court
[2] No. 01-313
[3] 306 Mont. 288, 32 P.3d 1254, 2001 MT 201, 2001.MT
[4] October 04, 2001
[5] LAWRENCE HANEY, PETITIONER,
v.
MIKE MAHONEY, WARDEN OF MONTANA STATE PRISON, ET AL., MONTANA BOARD OF PARDONS AND PAROLE, RESPONDENTS.
[6] OPINION AND ORDER
[7] ¶1 The Petitioner, Lawrence Haney, has petitioned this Court for writ of habeas corpus directing the Respondent, Montana Board of Pardons and Parole, to grant him immediate parole and the Respondent Mike Mahoney to authorize his immediate release from the Montana State Prison.
[8] ¶2 In support of his petition, Haney alleges that at the time scheduled for his appearance before the Board on February 21, 2001, he was actually only permitted a brief appearance before Craig Thomas, a hearings officer for the Board. Following that appearance, he was denied parole by the Board. He alleges that he was entitled to appear before the "full board" and that the denial of that opportunity violated his constitutional right to due process and § 46-22-101, MCA. He also contends that ARM 20.25.401 requires an informal interview "before the parole board" which must be conducted under the direction of the chairman of the Board. Haney finally contends that reasons for denial of parole such as "prior criminal record" and "the nature and circumstances of the crime" are insufficient reasons and are simply repetitious of factors already taken into consideration by the court in which he was sentence
[9] ¶3 For their original response, Mahoney and the Board conceded that Haney was denied parole on February 28, 2001, without the benefit of a personal appearance before the Board but contended that since he had no liberty interest in parole, he was not entitled to corresponding procedural protections which would give rise to a claim that his right to due process was denied. The respondents pointed out that § 46-23-201, which formerly served as the statutory basis for a liberty interest in parole, was amended in 1989 to make the award of parole permissive and that it is the amended statute which applied to Haney. Respondents contend that they have satisfied their only obligation which was to provide Haney with an opportunity to be heard and a written statement of the reasons for denying parole. They contend that our recent decision in West v. Mahoney, 2001 MT 82, 305 Mont.117, 22 P.3d 201, is inapplicable because the petitioner in that case had a "liberty interest" which was the basis for greater procedural protection. Finally, respondents contended that pursuant to § 46-23-104(4), the Board was authorized to delegate Haney's interview to a hearings officer and that it satisfied its statutory obligation imposed pursuant to § 46-23-107 when the final decision was made by a majority of the Board members.
[10] ¶4 On July 24, 2001, we issued an order in which we agreed that because Haney was sentenced after 1 989, he did not have a constitutionally-protected liberty interest in parole. However, we noted that § 46-23-202, MCA (1997), was in effect at the time that Haney was sentenced and required in subparagraph (2)(a) that "before ordering the parole of any prisoner, the board shall conduct a hearing and interview the prisoner." We noted that the respondents had failed to address the merits of Haney's claims based on this statutory authority and ordered the respondents to respond to claims based on the applicable statutes. They have now done so.
[11] ¶5 Respondents contend that if Haney had requested the opportunity to do so, he would have been allowed to call witnesses on his behalf, that they considered the required statutory factors prior to rendering their decision, and that a quorum of the Board met and reviewed the information gathered by its hearings officer, Craig Thomas. The respondents contend, however, that there is no statutory requirement that petitioner personally appear before a majority of the Board and that his procedural rights were satisfied by the interview conducted by a designated hearings officer. Respondents contend they are authorized by § 46-23-104(4), MCA (1997), to delegate the "hearing and interview" to one of the Board's staff members. Respondents further contend that pursuant to the Board's rule making authority and ARM 20.25.401(3), "all interviews and hearings before the board shall be conducted informally under the direction of the chair, designated chair or designated hearings officer." The Board contends that it fulfilled its requirement to "conduct a hearing and interview the prisoner" when it delegated this function to Craig Thomas, Executive Director of the Board. It relies on legislative history in support of the Board's need to delegate the hearing and interview function.
[12] ¶6 While we are mindful of the Board's rule making authority, we are also mindful that state agencies may not enact administrative rules inconsistent with statutory law.
[13] [R]ules adopted by administrative agencies which conflict with statutory requirements or exceed authority provided by statute, are invalid. Taylor v. Taylor (1995), 272 Mont. 30, 36, 899 P.2d 523, 526; See § 2-4-305(6), MCA.
[14] ¶7 Furthermore, while legislative history may be helpful to interpret ambiguous terms of statutory law, we will not rely on legislative history to contradict the plain language of statutory law when it is clear on its face.
[15] In analyzing a statute, courts determine legislative intent by first looking to the statute, and if the legislature's intent is clear from the language of the statute, courts look no further. Luciano v. Northwest Pipe and Casing Co. (1994), 264 Mont. 148, 151, 870 P.2d 99, 101.
[16] ¶8 Therefore, we must first consider the applicable statutory law. Section 46-23-202, MCA (1997), provides in relevant part that:
[17] (2) Before ordering the parole of any prisoner, the Board shall:
[18] (a) Conduct a hearing and interview the prisoner. At the time of the hearing, the board shall receive relevant statements from interested persons and any person may be represented by a counsel, provided that the board has the power to regulate procedures at all hearings.
[19] ¶9 Section 46-23-202, MCA (1997), clearly requires that before consideration of a prisoner's application for parole, the Board shall conduct a hearing at which statements from interested persons shall be considered. The Board, however, contends that it had authority to delegate the responsibility pursuant to § 46-23-104, MCA (1997), which provides in relevant part that:
[20] (4) The board may designate one of its members, one of its staff members, or any other adult correctional releasing authority to conduct interviews relative to:
[21] (a) parole eligibility;
[22] (b) plans for release on parole; or
[23] (c) revocation hearings.
[24] ¶10 We conclude that the plain language of § 46-23-104, MCA (1997), does not permit the Board to designate a staff member to conduct the hearing required by § 46-23-202, MCA (1997). That statute clearly requires both a hearing and an interview of the prisoner. The statute relied on by the Board authorizes only delegation of "interviews." The fact that the interviews may relate to parole eligibility does not eliminate the separate statutory requirement for a hearing conducted by the Board.
[25] ¶11 For these reasons, we conclude that the Petitioner, Lawrence Haney, was denied his statutory right to a hearing before the Board when the Board denied his parole without giving him an opportunity to personally appear before the Board and when it delegated its hearing responsibility to a hearings officer. Therefore,
[26] ¶12 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the decision of the Montana Board of Pardons and Parole denying the petitioner's parole application is vacated and this matter is remanded to the Board for reconsideration of Haney's application after providing him with an opportunity to appear before and present witnesses on his behalf to the Board.
[27] ¶13 The Clerk of Court is directed to notify the parties of this Order by mailing a copy to Colleen Graham White, Special Assistant Attorney General, P.O. Box 201301, Helena, Montana 59602-1301; and to Lawrence Haney, AO #28169, Montana State Prison, 700 Conley Lake Road, Deer Lodge, Montana 59722.
[28] DATED this 4th day of October, 2001.
[29] TERRY N. TRIEWEILER
[30] We Concur:
[31] KARLA M. GRAY
[32] JIM REGNIER
[33] JIM RICE
[34] JAMES C. NELSON
[35] PATRICIA COTTER
[36] W. WILLIAM LEAPHART
[1] Montana Supreme Court
[2] No. 01-313
[3] 306 Mont. 288, 32 P.3d 1254, 2001 MT 201, 2001.MT
[4] October 04, 2001
[5] LAWRENCE HANEY, PETITIONER,
v.
MIKE MAHONEY, WARDEN OF MONTANA STATE PRISON, ET AL., MONTANA BOARD OF PARDONS AND PAROLE, RESPONDENTS.
[6] OPINION AND ORDER
[7] ¶1 The Petitioner, Lawrence Haney, has petitioned this Court for writ of habeas corpus directing the Respondent, Montana Board of Pardons and Parole, to grant him immediate parole and the Respondent Mike Mahoney to authorize his immediate release from the Montana State Prison.
[8] ¶2 In support of his petition, Haney alleges that at the time scheduled for his appearance before the Board on February 21, 2001, he was actually only permitted a brief appearance before Craig Thomas, a hearings officer for the Board. Following that appearance, he was denied parole by the Board. He alleges that he was entitled to appear before the "full board" and that the denial of that opportunity violated his constitutional right to due process and § 46-22-101, MCA. He also contends that ARM 20.25.401 requires an informal interview "before the parole board" which must be conducted under the direction of the chairman of the Board. Haney finally contends that reasons for denial of parole such as "prior criminal record" and "the nature and circumstances of the crime" are insufficient reasons and are simply repetitious of factors already taken into consideration by the court in which he was sentence
[9] ¶3 For their original response, Mahoney and the Board conceded that Haney was denied parole on February 28, 2001, without the benefit of a personal appearance before the Board but contended that since he had no liberty interest in parole, he was not entitled to corresponding procedural protections which would give rise to a claim that his right to due process was denied. The respondents pointed out that § 46-23-201, which formerly served as the statutory basis for a liberty interest in parole, was amended in 1989 to make the award of parole permissive and that it is the amended statute which applied to Haney. Respondents contend that they have satisfied their only obligation which was to provide Haney with an opportunity to be heard and a written statement of the reasons for denying parole. They contend that our recent decision in West v. Mahoney, 2001 MT 82, 305 Mont.117, 22 P.3d 201, is inapplicable because the petitioner in that case had a "liberty interest" which was the basis for greater procedural protection. Finally, respondents contended that pursuant to § 46-23-104(4), the Board was authorized to delegate Haney's interview to a hearings officer and that it satisfied its statutory obligation imposed pursuant to § 46-23-107 when the final decision was made by a majority of the Board members.
[10] ¶4 On July 24, 2001, we issued an order in which we agreed that because Haney was sentenced after 1 989, he did not have a constitutionally-protected liberty interest in parole. However, we noted that § 46-23-202, MCA (1997), was in effect at the time that Haney was sentenced and required in subparagraph (2)(a) that "before ordering the parole of any prisoner, the board shall conduct a hearing and interview the prisoner." We noted that the respondents had failed to address the merits of Haney's claims based on this statutory authority and ordered the respondents to respond to claims based on the applicable statutes. They have now done so.
[11] ¶5 Respondents contend that if Haney had requested the opportunity to do so, he would have been allowed to call witnesses on his behalf, that they considered the required statutory factors prior to rendering their decision, and that a quorum of the Board met and reviewed the information gathered by its hearings officer, Craig Thomas. The respondents contend, however, that there is no statutory requirement that petitioner personally appear before a majority of the Board and that his procedural rights were satisfied by the interview conducted by a designated hearings officer. Respondents contend they are authorized by § 46-23-104(4), MCA (1997), to delegate the "hearing and interview" to one of the Board's staff members. Respondents further contend that pursuant to the Board's rule making authority and ARM 20.25.401(3), "all interviews and hearings before the board shall be conducted informally under the direction of the chair, designated chair or designated hearings officer." The Board contends that it fulfilled its requirement to "conduct a hearing and interview the prisoner" when it delegated this function to Craig Thomas, Executive Director of the Board. It relies on legislative history in support of the Board's need to delegate the hearing and interview function.
[12] ¶6 While we are mindful of the Board's rule making authority, we are also mindful that state agencies may not enact administrative rules inconsistent with statutory law.
[13] [R]ules adopted by administrative agencies which conflict with statutory requirements or exceed authority provided by statute, are invalid. Taylor v. Taylor (1995), 272 Mont. 30, 36, 899 P.2d 523, 526; See § 2-4-305(6), MCA.
[14] ¶7 Furthermore, while legislative history may be helpful to interpret ambiguous terms of statutory law, we will not rely on legislative history to contradict the plain language of statutory law when it is clear on its face.
[15] In analyzing a statute, courts determine legislative intent by first looking to the statute, and if the legislature's intent is clear from the language of the statute, courts look no further. Luciano v. Northwest Pipe and Casing Co. (1994), 264 Mont. 148, 151, 870 P.2d 99, 101.
[16] ¶8 Therefore, we must first consider the applicable statutory law. Section 46-23-202, MCA (1997), provides in relevant part that:
[17] (2) Before ordering the parole of any prisoner, the Board shall:
[18] (a) Conduct a hearing and interview the prisoner. At the time of the hearing, the board shall receive relevant statements from interested persons and any person may be represented by a counsel, provided that the board has the power to regulate procedures at all hearings.
[19] ¶9 Section 46-23-202, MCA (1997), clearly requires that before consideration of a prisoner's application for parole, the Board shall conduct a hearing at which statements from interested persons shall be considered. The Board, however, contends that it had authority to delegate the responsibility pursuant to § 46-23-104, MCA (1997), which provides in relevant part that:
[20] (4) The board may designate one of its members, one of its staff members, or any other adult correctional releasing authority to conduct interviews relative to:
[21] (a) parole eligibility;
[22] (b) plans for release on parole; or
[23] (c) revocation hearings.
[24] ¶10 We conclude that the plain language of § 46-23-104, MCA (1997), does not permit the Board to designate a staff member to conduct the hearing required by § 46-23-202, MCA (1997). That statute clearly requires both a hearing and an interview of the prisoner. The statute relied on by the Board authorizes only delegation of "interviews." The fact that the interviews may relate to parole eligibility does not eliminate the separate statutory requirement for a hearing conducted by the Board.
[25] ¶11 For these reasons, we conclude that the Petitioner, Lawrence Haney, was denied his statutory right to a hearing before the Board when the Board denied his parole without giving him an opportunity to personally appear before the Board and when it delegated its hearing responsibility to a hearings officer. Therefore,
[26] ¶12 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the decision of the Montana Board of Pardons and Parole denying the petitioner's parole application is vacated and this matter is remanded to the Board for reconsideration of Haney's application after providing him with an opportunity to appear before and present witnesses on his behalf to the Board.
[27] ¶13 The Clerk of Court is directed to notify the parties of this Order by mailing a copy to Colleen Graham White, Special Assistant Attorney General, P.O. Box 201301, Helena, Montana 59602-1301; and to Lawrence Haney, AO #28169, Montana State Prison, 700 Conley Lake Road, Deer Lodge, Montana 59722.
[28] DATED this 4th day of October, 2001.
[29] TERRY N. TRIEWEILER
[30] We Concur:
[31] KARLA M. GRAY
[32] JIM REGNIER
[33] JIM RICE
[34] JAMES C. NELSON
[35] PATRICIA COTTER
[36] W. WILLIAM LEAPHART