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No Jurisdiction for Interlocutory Appeal Over Medical Treatment
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has held that it lacks jurisdiction to hear an interlocutory appeal filed by a prison doctor.
Maurice Moore, an Iowa state prisoner, filed suit, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against a prison doctor Moore alleged was deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. The doctor filed a motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. "Qualified immunity shields government officials for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person should have know." The doctor admitted he knew Moore had serious medical needsAIDS and Hepatitis Cbut he was not deliberately indifferent to those needs. The district court denied the motion, concluding that there was a material fact issue regarding deliberate indifference and that qualified immunity was unavailable because, viewing the evidence favorably to Moore, the doctor's conduct was not objectively reasonable under clearly established law. The doctor filed an interlocutory appeal.
An interlocutory appeal is an appeal of an order that does not finally decide a case. This is an exception to the general rule that only final orders are appealable. To qualify for interlocutory appeal, the order must decide an issue collateral to and independent of the issues in the case and it must not be possible to vindicate the appealing party's rights by waiting until the case is final.
Qualified immunity conveys on government officials more that the right to be free of damage awards for liabilityit gives them the right not to go to trial. Obviously, this right could not be vindicated if the official had to wait until after a trial when a final order is issued to appeal the court's decision on the issue of qualified immunity. Therefore, interlocutory appeals of the court's denial of a government official's motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity are allowed.
The Eighth Circuit noted that, in this type of interlocutory appeal, the question to be decided is almost always whether the alleged federal right was clearly established. In this case, the district court denied qualified immunity based on evidentiary sufficiency. Unlike the denial of summary judgment based on an abstract issue of law relating to qualified immunity, the court of appeals has no jurisdiction to hear an appeal from the denial of a motion for summary judgment based on evidentiary sufficiency. Therefore, the court of appeals dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. See: Moore v. Duffy , 255 F.3d 543 (8th Cir. 2001).
Maurice Moore, an Iowa state prisoner, filed suit, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against a prison doctor Moore alleged was deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. The doctor filed a motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. "Qualified immunity shields government officials for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person should have know." The doctor admitted he knew Moore had serious medical needsAIDS and Hepatitis Cbut he was not deliberately indifferent to those needs. The district court denied the motion, concluding that there was a material fact issue regarding deliberate indifference and that qualified immunity was unavailable because, viewing the evidence favorably to Moore, the doctor's conduct was not objectively reasonable under clearly established law. The doctor filed an interlocutory appeal.
An interlocutory appeal is an appeal of an order that does not finally decide a case. This is an exception to the general rule that only final orders are appealable. To qualify for interlocutory appeal, the order must decide an issue collateral to and independent of the issues in the case and it must not be possible to vindicate the appealing party's rights by waiting until the case is final.
Qualified immunity conveys on government officials more that the right to be free of damage awards for liabilityit gives them the right not to go to trial. Obviously, this right could not be vindicated if the official had to wait until after a trial when a final order is issued to appeal the court's decision on the issue of qualified immunity. Therefore, interlocutory appeals of the court's denial of a government official's motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity are allowed.
The Eighth Circuit noted that, in this type of interlocutory appeal, the question to be decided is almost always whether the alleged federal right was clearly established. In this case, the district court denied qualified immunity based on evidentiary sufficiency. Unlike the denial of summary judgment based on an abstract issue of law relating to qualified immunity, the court of appeals has no jurisdiction to hear an appeal from the denial of a motion for summary judgment based on evidentiary sufficiency. Therefore, the court of appeals dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. See: Moore v. Duffy , 255 F.3d 543 (8th Cir. 2001).
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Related legal case
Moore v. Duffy
| Year | 2001 |
|---|---|
| Cite | 255 F.3d 543 (8th Cir. 2001) |
| Level | Court of Appeals |
Moore v. Duffy, 255 F.3d 543 (8th Cir. 07/06/2001)
[1] U.S. Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit
[2] No. 00-2222
[3] 255 F.3d 543, 2001
[4] July 06, 2001
[5] MAURICE MOORE, APPELLEE,
v.
DR. JOHN DUFFY, APPELLANT.
[6] Before Morris Sheppard Arnold and Heaney, Circuit Judges, and Battey, District Judge. *fn1
[7] The opinion of the court was delivered by: Morris Sheppard Arnold, Circuit Judge
[8] Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa.
[9] Submitted: March 14, 2001
[10] Dr. John Duffy brings this interlocutory appeal from the district court's *fn2 denial of his motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
[11] Inmate Maurice Moore filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Dr. Duffy was deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs in violation of the eighth amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). Dr. Duffy moved for summary judgment based, in part, on qualified immunity. The district court denied the motion, concluding that there was a material fact issue regarding deliberate indifference and that qualified immunity was unavailable because, viewing the evidence favorably to Mr. Moore, Dr. Duffy's conduct was not objectively reasonable under clearly established law. Dr. Duffy contends on appeal that he is entitled to qualified immunity.
[12] Qualified immunity shields government officials "from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known," Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). To establish his eighth amendment claim, Mr. Moore had to prove that he had "objectively serious medical needs" and that Dr. Duffy "actually knew of but deliberately disregarded those needs," Roberson v. Bradshaw, 198 F.3d 645, 647 (8th Cir. 1999). " '[D]eliberate indifference includes something more than negligence but less than actual intent to harm'; it requires proof of a reckless disregard of the known risk," Jackson v. Everett, 140 F.3d 1149, 1152 (8th Cir. 1998), quoting Newman v. Holmes, 122 F.2d 650, 653 (8th Cir. 1997). Dr. Duffy acknowledges that he knew of the serious medical needs of Mr. Moore, who suffered from AIDS and hepatitis C, but argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity because he was not deliberately indifferent to those needs.
[13] Mr. Moore contends that we lack jurisdiction over this appeal. Although there is ordinarily no appeal from the denial of summary judgment, "summary judgment determinations are appealable when they resolve a dispute concerning an 'abstract issu[e] of law' relating to qualified immunity ... typically, the issue whether the federal right allegedly infringed was 'clearly established' " (emphasis in original), Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 313 (1996), quoting Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 317 (1995). A district court's determination of evidentiary sufficiency is not subject to an interlocutory appeal, however, simply because the determination occurs in a qualified immunity case. See Behrens, 516 U.S. at 313; see also Johnson, 515 U.S. at 319-20.
[14] Although medical negligence does not violate the eighth amendment, see Roberson, 198 F.3d at 647, Dr. Duffy does not dispute that it was "clearly established" when he treated Mr. Moore that medical treatment may so deviate from the applicable standard of care as to evidence a physician's deliberate indifference, see Smith v. Jenkins, 919 F.2d 90, 93 (8th Cir. 1990). Often whether such a significant departure from professional standards occurred is a factual question requiring expert opinion to resolve, see id.; see also Greason v. Kemp, 891 F.2d 829, 835 (11th Cir. 1990). Here the district court concluded that the parties' conflicting expert opinions regarding the treatment rendered by Dr. Duffy created a material question of fact with respect to whether Dr. Duffy acted with deliberate indifference to Mr. Moore's medical needs. Because Dr. Duffy seeks to challenge only the district court's determination that the "the pretrial record sets forth a 'genuine' issue of fact for trial," Johnson, 515 U.S. at 320, we lack jurisdiction over the appeal.
[15] Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
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Opinion Footnotes
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[16] *fn1 The Honorable Richard H. Battey, United States District Judge for the District of South Dakota, sitting by designation.
[17] *fn2 The Honorable Robert W. Pratt, United States District Judge for the Southern District of Iowa.
[1] U.S. Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit
[2] No. 00-2222
[3] 255 F.3d 543, 2001
[4] July 06, 2001
[5] MAURICE MOORE, APPELLEE,
v.
DR. JOHN DUFFY, APPELLANT.
[6] Before Morris Sheppard Arnold and Heaney, Circuit Judges, and Battey, District Judge. *fn1
[7] The opinion of the court was delivered by: Morris Sheppard Arnold, Circuit Judge
[8] Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa.
[9] Submitted: March 14, 2001
[10] Dr. John Duffy brings this interlocutory appeal from the district court's *fn2 denial of his motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
[11] Inmate Maurice Moore filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Dr. Duffy was deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs in violation of the eighth amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). Dr. Duffy moved for summary judgment based, in part, on qualified immunity. The district court denied the motion, concluding that there was a material fact issue regarding deliberate indifference and that qualified immunity was unavailable because, viewing the evidence favorably to Mr. Moore, Dr. Duffy's conduct was not objectively reasonable under clearly established law. Dr. Duffy contends on appeal that he is entitled to qualified immunity.
[12] Qualified immunity shields government officials "from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known," Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). To establish his eighth amendment claim, Mr. Moore had to prove that he had "objectively serious medical needs" and that Dr. Duffy "actually knew of but deliberately disregarded those needs," Roberson v. Bradshaw, 198 F.3d 645, 647 (8th Cir. 1999). " '[D]eliberate indifference includes something more than negligence but less than actual intent to harm'; it requires proof of a reckless disregard of the known risk," Jackson v. Everett, 140 F.3d 1149, 1152 (8th Cir. 1998), quoting Newman v. Holmes, 122 F.2d 650, 653 (8th Cir. 1997). Dr. Duffy acknowledges that he knew of the serious medical needs of Mr. Moore, who suffered from AIDS and hepatitis C, but argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity because he was not deliberately indifferent to those needs.
[13] Mr. Moore contends that we lack jurisdiction over this appeal. Although there is ordinarily no appeal from the denial of summary judgment, "summary judgment determinations are appealable when they resolve a dispute concerning an 'abstract issu[e] of law' relating to qualified immunity ... typically, the issue whether the federal right allegedly infringed was 'clearly established' " (emphasis in original), Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 313 (1996), quoting Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 317 (1995). A district court's determination of evidentiary sufficiency is not subject to an interlocutory appeal, however, simply because the determination occurs in a qualified immunity case. See Behrens, 516 U.S. at 313; see also Johnson, 515 U.S. at 319-20.
[14] Although medical negligence does not violate the eighth amendment, see Roberson, 198 F.3d at 647, Dr. Duffy does not dispute that it was "clearly established" when he treated Mr. Moore that medical treatment may so deviate from the applicable standard of care as to evidence a physician's deliberate indifference, see Smith v. Jenkins, 919 F.2d 90, 93 (8th Cir. 1990). Often whether such a significant departure from professional standards occurred is a factual question requiring expert opinion to resolve, see id.; see also Greason v. Kemp, 891 F.2d 829, 835 (11th Cir. 1990). Here the district court concluded that the parties' conflicting expert opinions regarding the treatment rendered by Dr. Duffy created a material question of fact with respect to whether Dr. Duffy acted with deliberate indifference to Mr. Moore's medical needs. Because Dr. Duffy seeks to challenge only the district court's determination that the "the pretrial record sets forth a 'genuine' issue of fact for trial," Johnson, 515 U.S. at 320, we lack jurisdiction over the appeal.
[15] Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
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Opinion Footnotes
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[16] *fn1 The Honorable Richard H. Battey, United States District Judge for the District of South Dakota, sitting by designation.
[17] *fn2 The Honorable Robert W. Pratt, United States District Judge for the Southern District of Iowa.