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Texas Slavery Upheld Again
The court of appeals for the Fifth circuit held that the Thirteenth amendment does not forbid the forcible enslavement of prisoners and a statutory gap in Texas law was inconsequential when a prisoner claimed statutory authority was required for prison slavery.
Ahmad Ali, a Texas state prisoner, was sentenced to 13 years imprisonment for robbery. Between 1989 and 1995, Texas statutes did not authorize sentencing prisoners to hard labor as part of their punishments. Statutes before and after did. See: Tex.Rev.Civ. Stat. Art. 6166X (repealed 1989); Tex. Gov't Code § 497.090 (1995, repealed in 1999 and replaced by Tex. Gov't Code § 497.099(a)).
Ali filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit claiming violation of his 13th amendment right to be free from involuntary servitude. The district court dismissed the suit and the court of appeals affirmed.
The appeals court stated: "This appeal leads us to reiterate that inmates sentenced to incarceration cannot state a viable 13th amendment claim if the prison system requires them to work." The court cites numerous precedents that hold that "When a person is duly tried, convicted and sentenced in accordance with the law, no issue of peonage or involuntary servitude arises" because by its very terms the 13th amendment enshrines penal slavery as part of the constitution. In a footnote, the court observed that, for 13th amendment purposes, "the precise terms of state law are irrelevant. The constitution does not forbid an inmate's being required to work. Whether that requirement violates state law is a separate, non constitutional issue not here raised by Ali." The implication being that perhaps Ali should raise this statutory authority claim in state court.
The court noted that no other court has held otherwise and dismissed as dicta language in Watson v. Graves , 909 F.2d 1549, 1552 (5th Cir. 1990) that said that prisoners not sentenced to hard labor retain their 13th amendment rights.
Since the 13th amendment was enacted, courts have referred to prisoners as "slaves of the state." Texas, like a few other states, pays prisoners in its custody absolutely nothing for their labor, making Texas prisoners state slaves in the most literal sense of the term. See: Ali v. Johnson , 259 F.3d 317 (5th Cir. 2001).
Ahmad Ali, a Texas state prisoner, was sentenced to 13 years imprisonment for robbery. Between 1989 and 1995, Texas statutes did not authorize sentencing prisoners to hard labor as part of their punishments. Statutes before and after did. See: Tex.Rev.Civ. Stat. Art. 6166X (repealed 1989); Tex. Gov't Code § 497.090 (1995, repealed in 1999 and replaced by Tex. Gov't Code § 497.099(a)).
Ali filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit claiming violation of his 13th amendment right to be free from involuntary servitude. The district court dismissed the suit and the court of appeals affirmed.
The appeals court stated: "This appeal leads us to reiterate that inmates sentenced to incarceration cannot state a viable 13th amendment claim if the prison system requires them to work." The court cites numerous precedents that hold that "When a person is duly tried, convicted and sentenced in accordance with the law, no issue of peonage or involuntary servitude arises" because by its very terms the 13th amendment enshrines penal slavery as part of the constitution. In a footnote, the court observed that, for 13th amendment purposes, "the precise terms of state law are irrelevant. The constitution does not forbid an inmate's being required to work. Whether that requirement violates state law is a separate, non constitutional issue not here raised by Ali." The implication being that perhaps Ali should raise this statutory authority claim in state court.
The court noted that no other court has held otherwise and dismissed as dicta language in Watson v. Graves , 909 F.2d 1549, 1552 (5th Cir. 1990) that said that prisoners not sentenced to hard labor retain their 13th amendment rights.
Since the 13th amendment was enacted, courts have referred to prisoners as "slaves of the state." Texas, like a few other states, pays prisoners in its custody absolutely nothing for their labor, making Texas prisoners state slaves in the most literal sense of the term. See: Ali v. Johnson , 259 F.3d 317 (5th Cir. 2001).
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Related legal case
Ali v. Johnson
| Year | 2001 |
|---|---|
| Cite | 259 F.3d 317 (5th Cir. 2001) |
| Level | Court of Appeals |
Ali v. Johnson, 259 F.3d 317 (5th Cir. 07/11/2001)
[1] U.S. Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit
[2] No. 00-10777
[3] 259 F.3d 317, 2001
[4] July 11, 2001
[5] AHMAD YUSUF ALI, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT,
v.
GARY L. JOHNSON, DIRECTOR, TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, INSTITUTIONAL DIVISION, DEFENDANT-APPELLEE.
[6] Civil Docket # 3:00-CV-555
[7] Before Davis, Jones, and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges.
[8] The opinion of the court was delivered by: Edith H. Jones, Circuit Judge
[9] Summary Calendar
[10] Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas
[11] This appeal leads us to reiterate that inmates sentenced to incarceration cannot state a viable Thirteenth Amendment claim if the prison system requires them to work. The district court's decision denying relief to appellant Ali is thus affirmed.
[12] Ali's § 1983 claim arises from a hiatus in Texas law, whose statutes did not specifically require inmates to work between 1989 and 1995,*fn1 and from some inartful language in one of this court's opinions. Ali began serving a 13-year sentence after his 1994 conviction for robbery. He alleges that because of the statutory gap, he was not sentenced to "hard labor." He then cites the following statement from this court: "We agree that a prisoner who is not sentenced to hard labor retains his Thirteenth Amendment rights . . ." Watson v. Graves, 909 F.2d 1549, 1552 (5th Cir. 1990).
[13] Even if Watson correctly implied that a prisoner not sentenced to hard labor may make a Thirteenth Amendment claim, Ali conveniently overlooks the fact that this statement was dicta, because the court found that in any event the inmates' factual allegations did not comport with an involuntary servitude claim. Id. at 1552-1553.
[14] Watson's statement about involuntary servitude is an anomaly in federal jurisprudence. Two years before Watson, this court rejected a Thirteenth Amendment claim made by a Texas prisoner, citing a half dozen previous federal decisions and the text of the Thirteenth Amendment:
[15] Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction. U.S. Constitution, Thirteenth Amendment, § 1 (emphasis added). Wendt v. Lynaugh, 841 F.2d 619, 620-21 (5th Cir. 1988).
[16] Wendt quoted a Ninth Circuit case articulating the literal intent of the Thirteenth Amendment: "When a person is duly tried, convicted and sentenced in accordance with the law, no issue of peonage or involuntary servitude arises." Draper v. Rhay, 315 F.2d 193, 197 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 915 (1963). In the same year in which Watson was decided, this court held in two separate cases that forcing inmates to work without pay, and compelling them to work on private property without pay, do not violate the Thirteenth Amendment. See Mikeska v. Collins, 900 F.2d 833, 837 (5th Cir. 1990); Murray v. Mississippi Department of Corrections, 911 F.2d 1167 (5th Cir. 1990). Other decisions of this court have rejected similar claims. Craine v. Alexander, 756 F.2d 1070, 1075 (5th Cir. 1985); Plaisance v. Phelps, 845 F.2d 107, 108 (5th Cir. 1988). This court is always bound by earlier controlling precedents, if two of our decisions conflict. To the extent Watson conflicts with these earlier decisions, it lacks authority.*fn2
[17] Ali's final contention, that he was denied equal protection under a state law provision that grants release credit for days of work performed, is meritless. Tex. Crim. Proc. Code Ann. art. 43.10, rule 6 (Vernon Supp. 2001) (a person convicted of a misdemeanor, or confined in jail for a felony, is entitled to one day of sentence credit for each day he works). The rule does not apply to Ali, as he is serving a felony sentence in a TDCJ unit.
[18] For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Opinion Footnotes
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[19] *fn1 Both before 1989 and after 1995, the statutes have clearly authorized that inmates may be ordered to labor as part of their punishment. See Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 6166x (repealed 1989); Tex. Gov't. Code § 497.090 (1995, repealed in 1999 and replaced by Tex. Gov't. Code § 497.099(a) (Vernon Supp. 2001)).
[20] *fn2 Ali would distinguish Wendt from his case on the grounds that at the time of Wendt's conviction, Texas law clearly required inmates to work as part of their punishment. Watson also appears to classify Wendt as applicable when inmates have been sentenced to hard labor. For Thirteenth Amendment purposes, however, the precise terms of state law are irrelevant. The Constitution does not forbid an inmate's being required to work. Whether that requirement violates state law is a separate, non-constitutional issue not here raised by Ali.
[1] U.S. Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit
[2] No. 00-10777
[3] 259 F.3d 317, 2001
[4] July 11, 2001
[5] AHMAD YUSUF ALI, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT,
v.
GARY L. JOHNSON, DIRECTOR, TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, INSTITUTIONAL DIVISION, DEFENDANT-APPELLEE.
[6] Civil Docket # 3:00-CV-555
[7] Before Davis, Jones, and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges.
[8] The opinion of the court was delivered by: Edith H. Jones, Circuit Judge
[9] Summary Calendar
[10] Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas
[11] This appeal leads us to reiterate that inmates sentenced to incarceration cannot state a viable Thirteenth Amendment claim if the prison system requires them to work. The district court's decision denying relief to appellant Ali is thus affirmed.
[12] Ali's § 1983 claim arises from a hiatus in Texas law, whose statutes did not specifically require inmates to work between 1989 and 1995,*fn1 and from some inartful language in one of this court's opinions. Ali began serving a 13-year sentence after his 1994 conviction for robbery. He alleges that because of the statutory gap, he was not sentenced to "hard labor." He then cites the following statement from this court: "We agree that a prisoner who is not sentenced to hard labor retains his Thirteenth Amendment rights . . ." Watson v. Graves, 909 F.2d 1549, 1552 (5th Cir. 1990).
[13] Even if Watson correctly implied that a prisoner not sentenced to hard labor may make a Thirteenth Amendment claim, Ali conveniently overlooks the fact that this statement was dicta, because the court found that in any event the inmates' factual allegations did not comport with an involuntary servitude claim. Id. at 1552-1553.
[14] Watson's statement about involuntary servitude is an anomaly in federal jurisprudence. Two years before Watson, this court rejected a Thirteenth Amendment claim made by a Texas prisoner, citing a half dozen previous federal decisions and the text of the Thirteenth Amendment:
[15] Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction. U.S. Constitution, Thirteenth Amendment, § 1 (emphasis added). Wendt v. Lynaugh, 841 F.2d 619, 620-21 (5th Cir. 1988).
[16] Wendt quoted a Ninth Circuit case articulating the literal intent of the Thirteenth Amendment: "When a person is duly tried, convicted and sentenced in accordance with the law, no issue of peonage or involuntary servitude arises." Draper v. Rhay, 315 F.2d 193, 197 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 915 (1963). In the same year in which Watson was decided, this court held in two separate cases that forcing inmates to work without pay, and compelling them to work on private property without pay, do not violate the Thirteenth Amendment. See Mikeska v. Collins, 900 F.2d 833, 837 (5th Cir. 1990); Murray v. Mississippi Department of Corrections, 911 F.2d 1167 (5th Cir. 1990). Other decisions of this court have rejected similar claims. Craine v. Alexander, 756 F.2d 1070, 1075 (5th Cir. 1985); Plaisance v. Phelps, 845 F.2d 107, 108 (5th Cir. 1988). This court is always bound by earlier controlling precedents, if two of our decisions conflict. To the extent Watson conflicts with these earlier decisions, it lacks authority.*fn2
[17] Ali's final contention, that he was denied equal protection under a state law provision that grants release credit for days of work performed, is meritless. Tex. Crim. Proc. Code Ann. art. 43.10, rule 6 (Vernon Supp. 2001) (a person convicted of a misdemeanor, or confined in jail for a felony, is entitled to one day of sentence credit for each day he works). The rule does not apply to Ali, as he is serving a felony sentence in a TDCJ unit.
[18] For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
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Opinion Footnotes
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[19] *fn1 Both before 1989 and after 1995, the statutes have clearly authorized that inmates may be ordered to labor as part of their punishment. See Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 6166x (repealed 1989); Tex. Gov't. Code § 497.090 (1995, repealed in 1999 and replaced by Tex. Gov't. Code § 497.099(a) (Vernon Supp. 2001)).
[20] *fn2 Ali would distinguish Wendt from his case on the grounds that at the time of Wendt's conviction, Texas law clearly required inmates to work as part of their punishment. Watson also appears to classify Wendt as applicable when inmates have been sentenced to hard labor. For Thirteenth Amendment purposes, however, the precise terms of state law are irrelevant. The Constitution does not forbid an inmate's being required to work. Whether that requirement violates state law is a separate, non-constitutional issue not here raised by Ali.