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Failure to Assert Hearing Officer Bias Administratively Waives Claim on Habeas
The court of appeals for the Seventh circuit held that a prisoner's failure to present his claim of hearing officer bias in an administrative appeal waived the claim on habeas review. Steven Eads, an Indiana state prisoner, was infracted for disorderly conduct and found guilty at a disciplinary hearing and sentenced to a loss of 90 days of good time credits.
Eads filed a federal habeas corpus petition (Indiana does not provide for judicial review of prison disciplinary hearings, therefore Indiana prisoners can file challenges to such hearings directly in federal court as habeas corpus petitions) claiming that a member of the hearing committee that found him guilty was the "live in boyfriend" of a female guard who was an important witness against him. Eads did not make this claim when he administratively appealed the infraction. The district court denied relief and the court of appeals affirmed.
The appeals court noted, "if the relationship were as intimate as alleged here and if the witness were crucial to the prosecution, the proceeding would indeed violate due process." The court, however, upheld the infraction because Eads failed to raise the claim in his administrative appeal, "Thus forfeiting his right to urge it as a ground for obtaining relief in a federal habeas corpus proceeding."
The court held that there "is a danger prisoners will fabricate such claims or base them on groundless rumors. The later the claim is made, the likelier it is to be a last minute invention." The habeas petition was denied. This case illustrates the importance of understanding one's rights at a prison disciplinary hearing and asserting them both at the hearing and on administrative appeal and in state court proceedings as well. See: Eads v. Hanks, 280 F.3d 728 (7th Cir. 2002).
Eads filed a federal habeas corpus petition (Indiana does not provide for judicial review of prison disciplinary hearings, therefore Indiana prisoners can file challenges to such hearings directly in federal court as habeas corpus petitions) claiming that a member of the hearing committee that found him guilty was the "live in boyfriend" of a female guard who was an important witness against him. Eads did not make this claim when he administratively appealed the infraction. The district court denied relief and the court of appeals affirmed.
The appeals court noted, "if the relationship were as intimate as alleged here and if the witness were crucial to the prosecution, the proceeding would indeed violate due process." The court, however, upheld the infraction because Eads failed to raise the claim in his administrative appeal, "Thus forfeiting his right to urge it as a ground for obtaining relief in a federal habeas corpus proceeding."
The court held that there "is a danger prisoners will fabricate such claims or base them on groundless rumors. The later the claim is made, the likelier it is to be a last minute invention." The habeas petition was denied. This case illustrates the importance of understanding one's rights at a prison disciplinary hearing and asserting them both at the hearing and on administrative appeal and in state court proceedings as well. See: Eads v. Hanks, 280 F.3d 728 (7th Cir. 2002).
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Related legal case
Eads v. Hanks
| Year | 2002 |
|---|---|
| Cite | 280 F.3d 728 (7th Cir. 2002) |
| Level | Court of Appeals |
Eads v. Hanks, 280 F.3d 728 (7th Cir. 01/18/2002)
[1] U.S. Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit
[2] No. 01-1720
[3] 280 F.3d 728, 2002
[4] January 18, 2002
[5] STEVEN L. EADS, PETITIONER-APPELLANT,
v.
CRAIG A. HANKS, RESPONDENT-APPELLEE.
[6] Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, Terre Haute Division. No. 00 C 285--Richard L. Young, Judge.
[7] Before Posner, Manion, and Rovner, Circuit Judges.
[8] The opinion of the court was delivered by: Posner, Circuit Judge
[9] Submitted November 21, 2001
[10] A state prisoner appeals from the denial of habeas corpus relief. A disciplinary committee at the prison had found him guilty of disorderly conduct and revoked 90 days of good-time credit, and he claims that the proceeding denied him due process of law because (he alleges) a member of the committee is the "live-in boyfriend" of one of the witnesses, a female guard. In a judicial proceeding, such a relationship between a judge and a key witness would be disqualifying, Hodge v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, No. 1999-SC-0050-R, 2001 WL 1143135, at *6 (Ky. 2001); Williams v. Reed, 6 S.W.3d 916, 921 (Mo. App. 1999); see In re Faulkner, 856 F.2d 716, 721 (5th Cir. 1988) (per curiam); United States v. Kelly, 888 F.2d 732, 745 (11th Cir. 1989); Wesley v. State, 916 P.2d 793, 798 (Nev. 1996); Hadler v. Union Bank & Trust Co., 765 F. Supp. 976, 978 (S.D. Ind. 1991), and if the judge were not recused, the proceeding might well be deemed inconsistent with due process. See Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 904-05 (1997). Oddly, we cannot find an appellate case dealing with the cognate issue of bias in prison disciplinary committees. The requirements of due process are considerably relaxed in the setting of prison discipline, White v. Indiana Parole Board, 266 F.3d 759, 766-68 (7th Cir. 2001); Francis v. Coughlin, 891 F.2d 43, 46 (2d Cir. 1989); Adams v. Gunnell, 729 F.2d 362, 370 (5th Cir. 1984), even though the consequences are frequently and here a prolongation of the prisoner's confinement. But it is well settled that the prisoner is entitled to an impartial tribunal, e.g., Whitford v. Boglino, 63 F.3d 527, 534 (7th Cir. 1995) (per curiam); Ramirez v. Turner, 991 F.2d 351, 355 (7th Cir. 1993); Merritt v. De Los Santos, 721 F.2d 598, 600 (7th Cir. 1983) (per curiam); Malek v. Camp, 822 F.2d 812, 816-17 (8th Cir. 1987), and he is denied that right if a member of the tribunal was a witness to the incident at issue. Whitford v. Boglino, supra, 63 F.3d at 534. It would not be a giant step to deem the right denied if the witness were the spouse or "significant other" of a member of the tribunal. And so we shall assume that if the relationship were as intimate as alleged here and if the witness were crucial to the prosecution, the proceeding would indeed violate due process.
[11] We need not pursue the question, however, because the prisoner had the information about the alleged relationship between the committee member and the witness before he filed his administrative appeal, yet failed to advise the appellate tribunal, thus forfeiting his right to urge it as a ground for obtaining relief in a federal habeas corpus proceeding. 28 U.S.C. sec. 2254(b)(1)(A); O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842 (1999); Rodriguez v. Scillia, 193 F.3d 913, 916-17 (7th Cir. 1999); Wenger v. Frank, 266 F.3d 218, 223-24 (3d Cir. 2001). Insistence on a timely complaint of a potentially disqualifying personal relationship is imperative, United States v. Johnpoll, 748 F. Supp. 86, 88-89 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), since there is a danger that prisoners will fabricate such claims or base them on groundless rumors. The later the claim is made, the likelier it is to be a last-minute invention.
[12] Affirmed.
[1] U.S. Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit
[2] No. 01-1720
[3] 280 F.3d 728, 2002
[4] January 18, 2002
[5] STEVEN L. EADS, PETITIONER-APPELLANT,
v.
CRAIG A. HANKS, RESPONDENT-APPELLEE.
[6] Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, Terre Haute Division. No. 00 C 285--Richard L. Young, Judge.
[7] Before Posner, Manion, and Rovner, Circuit Judges.
[8] The opinion of the court was delivered by: Posner, Circuit Judge
[9] Submitted November 21, 2001
[10] A state prisoner appeals from the denial of habeas corpus relief. A disciplinary committee at the prison had found him guilty of disorderly conduct and revoked 90 days of good-time credit, and he claims that the proceeding denied him due process of law because (he alleges) a member of the committee is the "live-in boyfriend" of one of the witnesses, a female guard. In a judicial proceeding, such a relationship between a judge and a key witness would be disqualifying, Hodge v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, No. 1999-SC-0050-R, 2001 WL 1143135, at *6 (Ky. 2001); Williams v. Reed, 6 S.W.3d 916, 921 (Mo. App. 1999); see In re Faulkner, 856 F.2d 716, 721 (5th Cir. 1988) (per curiam); United States v. Kelly, 888 F.2d 732, 745 (11th Cir. 1989); Wesley v. State, 916 P.2d 793, 798 (Nev. 1996); Hadler v. Union Bank & Trust Co., 765 F. Supp. 976, 978 (S.D. Ind. 1991), and if the judge were not recused, the proceeding might well be deemed inconsistent with due process. See Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 904-05 (1997). Oddly, we cannot find an appellate case dealing with the cognate issue of bias in prison disciplinary committees. The requirements of due process are considerably relaxed in the setting of prison discipline, White v. Indiana Parole Board, 266 F.3d 759, 766-68 (7th Cir. 2001); Francis v. Coughlin, 891 F.2d 43, 46 (2d Cir. 1989); Adams v. Gunnell, 729 F.2d 362, 370 (5th Cir. 1984), even though the consequences are frequently and here a prolongation of the prisoner's confinement. But it is well settled that the prisoner is entitled to an impartial tribunal, e.g., Whitford v. Boglino, 63 F.3d 527, 534 (7th Cir. 1995) (per curiam); Ramirez v. Turner, 991 F.2d 351, 355 (7th Cir. 1993); Merritt v. De Los Santos, 721 F.2d 598, 600 (7th Cir. 1983) (per curiam); Malek v. Camp, 822 F.2d 812, 816-17 (8th Cir. 1987), and he is denied that right if a member of the tribunal was a witness to the incident at issue. Whitford v. Boglino, supra, 63 F.3d at 534. It would not be a giant step to deem the right denied if the witness were the spouse or "significant other" of a member of the tribunal. And so we shall assume that if the relationship were as intimate as alleged here and if the witness were crucial to the prosecution, the proceeding would indeed violate due process.
[11] We need not pursue the question, however, because the prisoner had the information about the alleged relationship between the committee member and the witness before he filed his administrative appeal, yet failed to advise the appellate tribunal, thus forfeiting his right to urge it as a ground for obtaining relief in a federal habeas corpus proceeding. 28 U.S.C. sec. 2254(b)(1)(A); O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842 (1999); Rodriguez v. Scillia, 193 F.3d 913, 916-17 (7th Cir. 1999); Wenger v. Frank, 266 F.3d 218, 223-24 (3d Cir. 2001). Insistence on a timely complaint of a potentially disqualifying personal relationship is imperative, United States v. Johnpoll, 748 F. Supp. 86, 88-89 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), since there is a danger that prisoners will fabricate such claims or base them on groundless rumors. The later the claim is made, the likelier it is to be a last-minute invention.
[12] Affirmed.