Having found that the statute created a "significantly difficult" impediment to access, the court next addressed the test to be applied to determine whether the state's justification for the statute was sufficient to pass constitutional muster. Id. at 527-28. After noting that "[t]he right to access ... specifically mentioned in Florida's constitution ... deserves more protection than those rights found only by implication" (id. at 527) (citing Lloyd v. Farkash, 476 So.2d 305, 307 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985)), the court concluded that a strict-scrutiny, rather than a rational-basis, analysis was appropriate because a "fundamental interest" was being taken. Id. at 527-28. Applying strict scrutiny, the court concluded that the state's justification was not sufficiently narrowly tailored to remedy only the compelling interest identified and, accordingly, held that the statute was unconstitutional. Id. at 528.

It seems to us relatively clear from a careful reading of Mitchell that the court was of the opinion that the Florida access-to-courts provision applies to all types of claims that might be filed by inmates in Florida's courts, not just to claims challenging their convictions or sentences or the conditions of their confinement, or seeking to vindicate a fundamental constitutional right. We glean such an intent *854 principally from the court's statement that "the right which ha[d] been infringed [wa]s the right [of the petitioning inmate] to seek redress for any type of injury or complaint of any kind in any civil case...." Id. at 527. Such a conclusion finds further support in our prior decision in Lloyd v. Farkash, 476 So.2d 305 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985) (cited in Mitchell, with apparent approval, 786 So.2d at 528). In Lloyd, a Florida inmate sought to bring a malpractice action against his former lawyer. 476 So.2d at 306. The trial court dismissed the action on the authority of section 944.292, Florida Statutes (1983), which suspended all civil rights of anyone convicted of a felony until those rights were restored by pardon or other affirmative action. Id. On appeal, we reversed, holding that section 944.292 was an unconstitutional violation of the access-to-courts provision to the extent that "it purport[ed] to deprive convicted felons of their right to bring civil actions in state courts...." Id. at 308.

C.
Clearly, the pertinent facts in Mitchell are different in several respects from those here. In the first place, we do not have a situation where the legislature has sought to limit access to the courts. Moreover, properly viewed, we are not faced with an attempt to restrict access at all. Rather, we must determine to what extent the Florida access-to-courts provision requires the Department to provide more affirmative assistance to inmates than does the federal constitution. Despite these differences, however, we are relatively confident that our supreme court would apply the two-step test announced in Mitchell to this case.

Because it appears that the trial court applied the narrower federal test, rather than the broader article I, section 21, test announced in Mitchell, we conclude that the trial court erred. The parties agree that the sole issue is whether, as a matter of law, the Department's actions violated the Florida provision. Accordingly, to determine whether the error was harmful, thereby requiring reversal, we must analyze the actions complained of by appellants according to the Mitchell test. See, e.g., Brookridge Cmty. Prop. Owners, Inc. v. Brookridge, Inc., 573 So.2d 972, 975 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991) (applying the "tipsy coachman" rule to affirm a summary judgment where, although the trial court's reasoning was erroneous, it reached the correct result because no material facts were in dispute and appellees were entitled to judgment as a matter of law). As we read the court's opinion, we need not determine whether the justifications put forward by appellees in support of the Department's actions stand up to strict scrutiny unless we first conclude that those actions (either individually or collectively) create a "significantly difficult" impediment to appellants' right of access.

IV.
The first question we must resolve in attempting to apply the two-step Mitchell test is what, precisely, the court meant when it said that the right of access must be "significantly obstructed." 786 So.2d at 527. In its opinion, the court did not explain what magnitude an impediment would have to attain to be found to be "significant." (Perhaps it felt it was unnecessary to do so because it had apparently concluded that, in some instances at least, the hurdle imposed by the statute amounted to an insurmountable obstacle.) However, the most commonly understood meanings of the adjective "significant" would appear to be "important" and "of consequence." See, e.g., The Random House Dictionary of the English Language *855 1779 (2d ed. unabridged 1987). Absent any indication from the opinion that a different meaning was intended, we presume that the court intended the adverb "significantly" to be so read.

A.
Appellants first complain that the Department's removal of reference books and inmate-created form pleadings from prison law libraries, and its decision to limit access to legal materials through inter-library loans, violated the access-to-courts provision. They argue that the access-to-courts provision must be read as intended to ensure access to all state and federal courts. Because the prison law library collections do not include materials directly relevant to the law of other states, or to a number of federal legal matters including immigration, racial discrimination, disabilities and veterans' benefits, they contend that the libraries are constitutionally inadequate. Appellees, on the other hand, maintain that the provision is intended to ensure access only to Florida courts. We agree with appellees. We find it inconceivable that the access-to-courts provision was included in our state constitution with the intent that it would ensure for Florida residents access to all courts in this country, state and federal. While we have concluded in part III.B. of this opinion that the provision must be read as requiring the state to assist inmates to file any type of action cognizable in Florida courts, we do not believe that it may be read as requiring the state to assist inmates to file any type of action they might desire in federal courts or the courts of other states, as well. See generally Kinney Sys., Inc. v. Continental Ins. Co., 674 So.2d 86, 92 (Fla.1996) (Article I, section 21 "guarantees every person access to our courts for redress of injuries"); Traylor v. State, 596 So.2d 957, 985 (Fla.1992) (Kogan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (Under article I, section 21, "all persons are guaranteed meaningful access to the courts of this state for the administration of justice"); Hoffman v. Ouellette, 798 So.2d 42, 45 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) ("Florida courts shall be open to every person for redress of any injury. Art. 1, § 21, Fla. Const."); U.S.B. Acquisition Co. v. U.S. Block Corp., 564 So.2d 221, 222 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990) ("[T]he right of access to our courts is constitutionally protected and should be denied only under extreme circumstances. Art. I, § 21, Fla. Const.").

Major collection prison law libraries currently maintain some 45 titles, including the Federal Reporters, Federal Practice Digest, Florida Cases, Florida Law Weekly, Florida Digest, Florida Jurisprudence, Florida Statutes (official and West's annotated), Florida Court Rules, Shepard's Federal and Florida Citations, Florida Session Laws, and numerous secondary sources on civil and criminal practice and procedure, evidence, corrections and prisoners' rights, legal forms, and legal research. As we have said, the state does have an obligation to maintain libraries sufficient to permit inmates to perform research and prepare legal papers so that they might file any type of claim cognizable in Florida courts. However, the only specific complaint made by appellants regarding the availability of Florida materials is that some secondary materials relating to family law have been removed. Given the materials available in the major collections, we cannot conceive of any claim cognizable in a Florida court (including those based on federal law) that could not be researched and adequately addressed. The fact that other titles have been removed certainly does not significantly obstruct inmates' ability to prepare and file meaningful legal papers. Accordingly, we conclude that the law library *856 collections do not violate the Florida access-to-courts provision.

Appellants also complain about the Department's decision to remove from the libraries inmate-created forms and sample pleadings. They concede that the libraries do include forms prepared or approved by the courts and other legal bodies (such as The Florida Bar), as well as reference form-books (such as Matthew Bender). We fail to see how the removal of inmate-created forms and pleadings constitutes a significant impediment to inmates' access to courts.

The Department limits access to legal materials by means of inter-library loans with libraries outside the prison system, and requires inmates to provide the reason for the materials requested and other information. In almost all cases, such requests involve either federal or out-of-state materials, or secondary treatises. Because we have concluded that the materials available in the major collections appear to be adequate to permit research for, and preparation of, any claim cognizable in a Florida court (including those based on federal law), we conclude, further, that the decision to limit access to materials by means of inter-library loans with libraries outside the prison system does not constitute a significant impediment to inmates' access to courts.

B.
Appellants next complain about the fact that many prison libraries are not open 25 hours each week, as required by departmental rules; rules that prescribe which inmates may use the library, and when; the reduction in the number of inmate research aides; and rules that restrict inmates' ability to avail themselves of the assistance of other inmates, known as "writ writers." According to the parties' stipulation, all law libraries were open at least 21 hours each week. We have reviewed the rules complained of, and find them all to be reasonably related to institutional security. Appellants' arguments fail to convince us that these actions (either individually or collectively) create a significant obstacle to their access to courts. See generally Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 490, 89 S.Ct. 747, 21 L.Ed.2d 718 (1969) (holding that a state may impose reasonable restrictions on assistance by inmates, such as limitations on the time and location of such activities); Walker v. Mintzes, 771 F.2d 920, 932 (6th Cir.1985) (holding that restricted library access does not necessarily amount to a denial of access to courts, and that prison regulations reasonably limiting the times, places and manner in which inmates may engage in legal research and preparation of legal papers are permissible as long as the regulations do not frustrate access to the courts); Shango v. Jurich, 965 F.2d 289, 292 (7th Cir.1992) (holding that "[l]ibrary access may be restricted by time, place and manner regulations that are 'justified in light of legitimate security considerations' ").

C.
Appellants further claim that the Department deprived inmates of access to the courts by eliminating access to computers, word processors, and typewriters for preparation of legal pleadings or legal mail and removing word processing equipment from all prisons that had such equipment. Appellees concede that it takes longer to prepare handwritten pleadings, and that the removal of such equipment has lengthened the backlog of inmate research aides. However, appellants have failed to identify a single inmate whose right of access to the courts was significantly impeded by these actions (and we note, anecdotally, that we have experienced no perceptible decline in the number *857 of inmate filings since such equipment was removed). We cannot conceive that the access-to-courts provision was intended to require the state to provide inmates with mechanical equipment to facilitate their research and preparation of legal papers. See generally Twyman v. Crisp, 584 F.2d 352, 358 (10th Cir.1978) ("Access to the courts does not include a federally protected right to use a typewriter or to have one's pleadings typed ... [because] pro se prisoners' causes are not prejudiced by the filing of handwritten briefs"). While removing such equipment may make the courts' work more difficult (to the extent that handwritten papers are sometimes more difficult to read), we conclude that removing such equipment did not significantly impede inmates' access to the courts.

Appellants also complain on appeal about a lack of adequate paper, pens and envelopes. Clearly, a consistent failure to provide adequate paper, pens and envelopes would run afoul of both the Florida and the federal right of access, and appellees have conceded as much. However, the stipulation identifies only sporadic shortages of relatively brief duration, which were soon remedied. On the state of this record, we are not prepared to say that such shortages are sufficient to demonstrate a deficiency of constitutional magnitude. See generally Sowell v. Vose, 941 F.2d 32, 34 (1st Cir.1991) ( "[I]n cases involving ... the availability of supplies (such as paper, pens and pencils), the deprivation 'may affect merely comfort or convenience without depriving a prisoner of access to the courts. A court cannot make the assumption that any alleged administrative deficiency or less than optimal clerical arrangement actually impedes a prisoner's ability to file meaningful legal papers.' ").

D.
Finally, appellants complain that the Department deprived them of access to the courts by subjecting all legal mail to visual inspection for contraband in the inmate's presence; refusing to grant "legal mail" status to "legal materials" sent to, and received from, nonlawyers, thereby permitting departmental personnel to read pleadings and legal correspondence sent to nonlawyers for typing; and precluding inmates from receiving more than five typed pages in a single envelope without obtaining prior written permission from the warden. A departmental rule provides that only the signature and letterhead of legal mail may be read, to ensure it is not contraband. This rule is clearly reasonably related to institutional security. Moreover, it does not, in our opinion, constitute a significant obstacle to inmate access to courts.

As for the rules relating to "legal materials" sent to, or received from, nonlawyers for typing, we have already concluded (in part IV.C.) that inmates have no protected right to typed legal papers. Moreover, it is clear that no right of confidentiality exists as to documents or communications voluntarily provided to third parties. These rules, as well, are reasonably related to institutional security, and do not create a significant impediment to inmates' access to the courts.

E.
We conclude, further, that the challenged actions do not collectively violate the Florida access-to-courts provision. Certainly, their combined effect will make it somewhat more difficult and time-consuming for inmates to prepare and file legal papers. However, we do not believe that the record carries appellants' burden of demonstrating that, together, those actions will pose a significant obstacle preventing *858 access to the courts. Accepting appellants' arguments would be to "guarantee [to] inmates the wherewithal to transform themselves into litigating engines...." Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. at 355, 116 S.Ct. 2174. We do not believe the Florida access-to-courts provision includes any such guarantee.

V.
In summary, we conclude that article I, section 21, of the Florida Constitution (the "access-to-courts" provision) does require the Department to provide more affirmative assistance to inmates in the preparation and filing of litigation papers than does the federal constitution. It requires that the Department provide affirmative assistance as to all types of claims that might be filed in Florida's courts (including those based on federal law), rather than merely as to claims challenging convictions, sentences or conditions of confinement, or seeking to vindicate a fundamental constitutional right; and that the Department's justification for its action or inaction satisfy the strict-scrutiny test when such action or inaction results in a significant impediment to inmates' access to the courts. We also conclude that the trial court applied the wrong test to determine that appellants were not entitled to relief. Nevertheless, we affirm because we conclude, further, that, as a matter of law, either individually or collectively, the actions complained of by appellants do not constitute significant impediments to their right of access to Florida courts.

AFFIRMED.

BOOTH and DAVIS, JJ., concur.

883 So.2d 847, 29 Fla. L. Weekly D1937

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