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Dental Treatment Denial Claim Cannot Be Subdivided By Court
The court of appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that a prisoner's allegation of denial of dental treatment cannot be split into three separate sub-claims then dismissed for failure to exhaust state remedies on the sub-claims.
James McAlphin, an Arkansas state prisoner, filed suit against prison officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging defendants' refusal to provide dental treatment caused him to lose five teeth, two more than would have been extracted had he received prompt treatment, and that two more teeth still needed to be extracted due to the lack of treatment. McAlphin is incarcerated at the Varner SuperMax which is attached to the Varner Unit. His complaint alleges that Warden Rick Toney and Dr. Stanley Ware ignored his requests and had not allowed him to be escorted down the hall to receive treatment at the Varner Unit Infirmary." He also alleged that Toney and Grievance Officer Terri Brown refused to treat his situation as an emergency and had shown deliberate indifference" to his dental treatment needs when McAlphin's gums became infected.
The district court dismissed the suit without serving the defendants because McAlphin was subject to the three-strikes provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) for having filed three previous frivolous lawsuits. McAlphin appealed.
The Eighth Circuit held that the allegation that McAlphin still needs two additional tooth extractions because of a spreading gum infection fell within the imminent danger of serious physical injury" exception to § 1915(g). McAlphin v. Toney, 281 F.3d 709 (8th Cir. 2002).
On remand the defendants moved to dismiss the suit for failure to exhaust state remedies. McAlphin opposed the motion and sought leave to amend the complaint with additional claims and defendants. The district court granted the motion to dismiss and denied McAlphin's motion for leave to amend the complaint. The district court reasoned that McAlphin had raised three claims: (1) denial of dental treatment; (2) failure to treat the grievances as an emergency; and. (3) refusal to escort him to the Varner Unit infirmary for treatment. Because McAlphin had not exhausted all three claims, dismissal was in order. McAlphin appealed.
The Eighth Circuit disagreed with the district court's reasoning. It held that McAlphin had raised a single claim of denial of emergency dental treatment and the failure to treat it as an emergency and failure to escort him to Varner Unit's infirmary were a part of that single claim which had been fully exhausted. Therefore, the dismissal of McAlphin's suit was in error.
The Eighth Circuit also noted that the district court was correct in denying McAlphin leave to amend the complaint because some of the claims he sought to add fell outside the imminent danger" exception to § 1915(g). In dicta, the Eighth Circuit stated that, should a prisoner who is subject to the three-strikes rule initially join an exhausted imminent danger claim with other unexhausted claims, it may be both necessary and appropriate to sever the unexhausted claims so that the imminent danger may proceed" as a pauper to a prompt separate disposition.
The denial of leave to file an amended complaint was affirmed. The dismissal was reversed and the suit returned to the district court for further proceedings. See: McAlphin v. Toney, 375 F.3d 753(8th Cir. 2004).
James McAlphin, an Arkansas state prisoner, filed suit against prison officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging defendants' refusal to provide dental treatment caused him to lose five teeth, two more than would have been extracted had he received prompt treatment, and that two more teeth still needed to be extracted due to the lack of treatment. McAlphin is incarcerated at the Varner SuperMax which is attached to the Varner Unit. His complaint alleges that Warden Rick Toney and Dr. Stanley Ware ignored his requests and had not allowed him to be escorted down the hall to receive treatment at the Varner Unit Infirmary." He also alleged that Toney and Grievance Officer Terri Brown refused to treat his situation as an emergency and had shown deliberate indifference" to his dental treatment needs when McAlphin's gums became infected.
The district court dismissed the suit without serving the defendants because McAlphin was subject to the three-strikes provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) for having filed three previous frivolous lawsuits. McAlphin appealed.
The Eighth Circuit held that the allegation that McAlphin still needs two additional tooth extractions because of a spreading gum infection fell within the imminent danger of serious physical injury" exception to § 1915(g). McAlphin v. Toney, 281 F.3d 709 (8th Cir. 2002).
On remand the defendants moved to dismiss the suit for failure to exhaust state remedies. McAlphin opposed the motion and sought leave to amend the complaint with additional claims and defendants. The district court granted the motion to dismiss and denied McAlphin's motion for leave to amend the complaint. The district court reasoned that McAlphin had raised three claims: (1) denial of dental treatment; (2) failure to treat the grievances as an emergency; and. (3) refusal to escort him to the Varner Unit infirmary for treatment. Because McAlphin had not exhausted all three claims, dismissal was in order. McAlphin appealed.
The Eighth Circuit disagreed with the district court's reasoning. It held that McAlphin had raised a single claim of denial of emergency dental treatment and the failure to treat it as an emergency and failure to escort him to Varner Unit's infirmary were a part of that single claim which had been fully exhausted. Therefore, the dismissal of McAlphin's suit was in error.
The Eighth Circuit also noted that the district court was correct in denying McAlphin leave to amend the complaint because some of the claims he sought to add fell outside the imminent danger" exception to § 1915(g). In dicta, the Eighth Circuit stated that, should a prisoner who is subject to the three-strikes rule initially join an exhausted imminent danger claim with other unexhausted claims, it may be both necessary and appropriate to sever the unexhausted claims so that the imminent danger may proceed" as a pauper to a prompt separate disposition.
The denial of leave to file an amended complaint was affirmed. The dismissal was reversed and the suit returned to the district court for further proceedings. See: McAlphin v. Toney, 375 F.3d 753(8th Cir. 2004).
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Related legal case
McAlphin v. Toney
| Year | 2004 |
|---|---|
| Cite | 375 F.3d 753(8th Cir. 2004). |
| Level | Court of Appeals |
| Attorney Fees | 0 |
| Damages | 0 |
| Injunction Status | N/A |
375 F.3d 753
United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
James McALPHIN, Appellant,
v.
R. TONEY, Warden, Varner Super Max, ADC; T. Brown, Grievance Officer, Varner
Super Max, ADC; Dr. Ware, Varner Super Max, ADC, Appellees,
Erwin, Nurse, Varner Super Max; Nettles, Nurse, Varner Super Max, ADC,
Defendants.
No. 03-1532EA.
Submitted: May 18, 2004.
Filed: July 19, 2004.
Background: Pro se inmate filed action against corrections officials, alleging inadequate dental care. The Court of Appeals reversed initial dismissal of complaint under "three strikes" provision applying to forma pauperis civil actions or appeals on basis of imminent danger exception, 281 F.3d 709. On remand, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas, Stephen M. Reasoner, J., denied inmate's motion to amend and dismissed the complaint for failure to exhaust prison grievance procedures. Inmate appealed.
Holdings: The Court of Appeals held that:
(1) inmate exhausted prison grievance procedure on what was essentially one claim, and
(2) inmate was not entitled to amend complaint to state additional claims that had not been exhausted.
Reversed and remanded.
*754 Max M. Horner, Jr., argued, Jacksonville, AR, for appellant.
Michelle Banks Odem, Asst. Atty. General, argued, Little Rock, AR, for appellee.
Before LOKEN, Chief Judge, RICHARD S. ARNOLD and BYE, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
James McAlphin, an Arkansas prisoner, appeals the District Court's dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action for failure to exhaust his administrative remedies as required by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (inmate cannot bring § 1983 action challenging prison conditions until available administrative remedies are exhausted). After reviewing the District Court's factual findings for clear error and its conclusions of law de novo, see Kozohorsky v. Harmon, 332 F.3d 1141, 1143 (8th Cir.2003), we reverse.
McAlphin filed an in forma pauperis complaint against Varner SuperMax Warden Rick Toney, Grievance Officer Terri Brown, and Dr. Stanley Ware. He alleged that defendants denied him immediate dental extractions because there was no *755 dental lab at Varner SuperMax; that Toney and Dr. Ware had "ignored his request[s]" and had not allowed him to be escorted down the hall to receive treatment at the Varner Unit infirmary (the Varner Unit was attached to Varner SuperMax); and that Toney and Brown had refused to view his situation as an emergency and had shown deliberate indifference to "problems." McAlphin's gums became so infected that five teeth--two more than originally needed--had to be extracted and two additional extractions were required. To his complaint, McAlphin attached three grievances, each fully exhausted, about his dental treatment. The District Court dismissed the complaint before service of process on the ground that McAlphin was not entitled to proceed i.f.p. because he had brought three or more prior actions that were dismissed as frivolous. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). McAlphin appealed the dismissal. We remanded, concluding that, by alleging he needs two more tooth extractions and an infection is spreading in his mouth, McAlphin's complaint fell within the "imminent danger of serious physical injury" exception to § 1915(g). McAlphin v. Toney, 281 F.3d 709 (8th Cir.2002).
On remand, defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to exhaust prison remedies, as 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) requires. McAlphin opposed that motion and moved to amend his complaint to add additional claims and defendants. The District Court agreed with defendants that McAlphin's original complaint alleged three separate claims: a claim that dental treatment had been denied, a claim that Toney and Brown failed to treat McAlphin's grievances as emergency matters, and a claim that Toney and Dr. Ware refused to escort McAlphin to the Varner Unit infirmary for treatment. Concluding that McAlphin's grievances did not put Toney and Brown on notice of claims about the grievance procedure, the District Court denied McAlphin's motion to amend and dismissed the complaint without prejudice because he had not exhausted all three claims.
We agree with the District Court that a claim falling within the imminent danger exception to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) must nonetheless meet the mandatory exhaustion requirements of 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). See Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524, 122 S.Ct. 983, 152 L.Ed.2d 12 (2002). But we disagree with the Court's construction of McAlphin's complaint. We read the complaint as alleging one claim for the denial of emergency dental treatment. The allegations that Toney and Brown did not treat McAlphin's grievances as emergency matters, and that Toney and Dr. Ware refused to escort McAlphin to the nearby infirmary for emergency treatment, were part of that claim. As defendants conceded that McAlphin's denial-of-treatment claim was fully exhausted, the Court erred in dismissing the complaint for failure to exhaust.
We affirm the District Court's denial of McAlphin's motion to amend. When an inmate's right to file i.f.p. claims is subject to the "three-strikes" restriction in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), and the inmate is granted leave to proceed i.f.p. under the "imminent danger" exception, the i.f.p. action must be limited to imminent danger claims that have been properly exhausted. Thus, McAlphin's motion to amend to add other claims and defendants was properly denied as an abuse of the imminent danger exception. Indeed, if the inmate initially joins an exhausted imminent danger claim with other unexhausted claims, it may be both necessary and appropriate to sever the unexhausted claims so that the imminent danger claim may proceed i.f.p. to a *756 prompt, separate disposition. See Kozohorsky, 332 F.3d at 1143-44.
The judgment is reversed, and this case is remanded for further proceedings looking to disposition on the merits.
375 F.3d 753
END OF DOCUMENT
United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
James McALPHIN, Appellant,
v.
R. TONEY, Warden, Varner Super Max, ADC; T. Brown, Grievance Officer, Varner
Super Max, ADC; Dr. Ware, Varner Super Max, ADC, Appellees,
Erwin, Nurse, Varner Super Max; Nettles, Nurse, Varner Super Max, ADC,
Defendants.
No. 03-1532EA.
Submitted: May 18, 2004.
Filed: July 19, 2004.
Background: Pro se inmate filed action against corrections officials, alleging inadequate dental care. The Court of Appeals reversed initial dismissal of complaint under "three strikes" provision applying to forma pauperis civil actions or appeals on basis of imminent danger exception, 281 F.3d 709. On remand, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas, Stephen M. Reasoner, J., denied inmate's motion to amend and dismissed the complaint for failure to exhaust prison grievance procedures. Inmate appealed.
Holdings: The Court of Appeals held that:
(1) inmate exhausted prison grievance procedure on what was essentially one claim, and
(2) inmate was not entitled to amend complaint to state additional claims that had not been exhausted.
Reversed and remanded.
*754 Max M. Horner, Jr., argued, Jacksonville, AR, for appellant.
Michelle Banks Odem, Asst. Atty. General, argued, Little Rock, AR, for appellee.
Before LOKEN, Chief Judge, RICHARD S. ARNOLD and BYE, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
James McAlphin, an Arkansas prisoner, appeals the District Court's dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action for failure to exhaust his administrative remedies as required by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (inmate cannot bring § 1983 action challenging prison conditions until available administrative remedies are exhausted). After reviewing the District Court's factual findings for clear error and its conclusions of law de novo, see Kozohorsky v. Harmon, 332 F.3d 1141, 1143 (8th Cir.2003), we reverse.
McAlphin filed an in forma pauperis complaint against Varner SuperMax Warden Rick Toney, Grievance Officer Terri Brown, and Dr. Stanley Ware. He alleged that defendants denied him immediate dental extractions because there was no *755 dental lab at Varner SuperMax; that Toney and Dr. Ware had "ignored his request[s]" and had not allowed him to be escorted down the hall to receive treatment at the Varner Unit infirmary (the Varner Unit was attached to Varner SuperMax); and that Toney and Brown had refused to view his situation as an emergency and had shown deliberate indifference to "problems." McAlphin's gums became so infected that five teeth--two more than originally needed--had to be extracted and two additional extractions were required. To his complaint, McAlphin attached three grievances, each fully exhausted, about his dental treatment. The District Court dismissed the complaint before service of process on the ground that McAlphin was not entitled to proceed i.f.p. because he had brought three or more prior actions that were dismissed as frivolous. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). McAlphin appealed the dismissal. We remanded, concluding that, by alleging he needs two more tooth extractions and an infection is spreading in his mouth, McAlphin's complaint fell within the "imminent danger of serious physical injury" exception to § 1915(g). McAlphin v. Toney, 281 F.3d 709 (8th Cir.2002).
On remand, defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to exhaust prison remedies, as 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) requires. McAlphin opposed that motion and moved to amend his complaint to add additional claims and defendants. The District Court agreed with defendants that McAlphin's original complaint alleged three separate claims: a claim that dental treatment had been denied, a claim that Toney and Brown failed to treat McAlphin's grievances as emergency matters, and a claim that Toney and Dr. Ware refused to escort McAlphin to the Varner Unit infirmary for treatment. Concluding that McAlphin's grievances did not put Toney and Brown on notice of claims about the grievance procedure, the District Court denied McAlphin's motion to amend and dismissed the complaint without prejudice because he had not exhausted all three claims.
We agree with the District Court that a claim falling within the imminent danger exception to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) must nonetheless meet the mandatory exhaustion requirements of 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). See Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524, 122 S.Ct. 983, 152 L.Ed.2d 12 (2002). But we disagree with the Court's construction of McAlphin's complaint. We read the complaint as alleging one claim for the denial of emergency dental treatment. The allegations that Toney and Brown did not treat McAlphin's grievances as emergency matters, and that Toney and Dr. Ware refused to escort McAlphin to the nearby infirmary for emergency treatment, were part of that claim. As defendants conceded that McAlphin's denial-of-treatment claim was fully exhausted, the Court erred in dismissing the complaint for failure to exhaust.
We affirm the District Court's denial of McAlphin's motion to amend. When an inmate's right to file i.f.p. claims is subject to the "three-strikes" restriction in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), and the inmate is granted leave to proceed i.f.p. under the "imminent danger" exception, the i.f.p. action must be limited to imminent danger claims that have been properly exhausted. Thus, McAlphin's motion to amend to add other claims and defendants was properly denied as an abuse of the imminent danger exception. Indeed, if the inmate initially joins an exhausted imminent danger claim with other unexhausted claims, it may be both necessary and appropriate to sever the unexhausted claims so that the imminent danger claim may proceed i.f.p. to a *756 prompt, separate disposition. See Kozohorsky, 332 F.3d at 1143-44.
The judgment is reversed, and this case is remanded for further proceedings looking to disposition on the merits.
375 F.3d 753
END OF DOCUMENT