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Fifth Circuit Reinstates Texas Prisoner's Property Confiscation/Retaliation Suit
by Matthew T. Clarke
The Fifth Circuit court of appeals issued an opinion vacating the district court's dismissal of a prisoner's suit alleging prison officials confiscated his property in retaliation for his criticism of the prison.
Billy Fredrick Allen, a Texas state prisoner, filed a civil rights suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging major Johnny M. Thomas, and guards Ronnie Major and Robert Dickey confiscated his radio and word processor in retaliation for his having given to the prison's mail room for mailing typed letters to state newspaper editors critical of the prison for holding prisoners beyond their release dates. According to Allen, shortly after the letters were tendered to the mail room, Thomas ordered Major to confiscate his radio and word processor, using the false allegation that they were altered" and therefore violated prison Administrative Directive 03.72. Allen claims they were not altered and the confiscation was in retaliation for the letters.
The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment based upon qualified immunity which District Judge Nancy Atlas granted. Bizarrely, Atlas said Allen's free speech rights had not been violated because only the method by which he may communicate his speech was affected." Allen appealed.
The Fifth Circuit noted several errors of reasoning and law in Atlas's dismissal order. First, Atlas stated that Allen did not have a due process claim under § 1983 because there were adequate state post-deprivation remedies, citing the U.S. Supreme Court's Parratt/Hudson doctrine. However, Parratt/Hudson only applies when the action complained of is random and unauthorized. In this case, the action was allegedly taken pursuant to an administrative directive, not in a random and unauthorized manner. Therefore, Parratt/Hudson could not apply and dismissal of those grounds was vacated.
A second error was Atlas's contention that the only evidence that the property confiscation was retaliatory was Allen's unsupported allegations.
The Fifth Circuit noted that Allen did allege a chronology of events from which retaliation may plausibly be inferred" as is required by Woods v. Smith, 60 F.3d 1161 (5th Cir. 1995) for retaliation cases. Furthermore, Atlas had refused to allow Allen to depose two mail room employees on the ground that their testimony could not raise an issue of material fact when Allen alleged they could help prove the retaliatory motive. This refusal to allow depositions was premature and was vacated as was the dismissal on the grounds of unproven retaliatory conduct.
The Fifth Circuit held that Atlas committed a third error when she denied Allen's motion for appointment of counsel without analysis on the grounds that the case had no exceptional circumstances requiring appointment of counsel. See: Ulmer v. Chancellor, 691 F.3d 209 (5th Cir. 1982) requires such an analysis and explains which factors must be considered. Because it was not clear from the record whether such exceptional circumstances did exist, this ruling was also vacated and the district court instructed to present specific findings explaining why counsel was denied" should it deny the motion again.
The orders of the district court discussed above were vacated, the remainder of the district court's orders were affirmed and the case was returned to the district court for further proceedings. See: Allen v. Thomas, 388 F.3d 147 (5th Cir. 2004).
Additional sources: Houston Chronicle, interview with Billy Fredrick Allen.
The Fifth Circuit court of appeals issued an opinion vacating the district court's dismissal of a prisoner's suit alleging prison officials confiscated his property in retaliation for his criticism of the prison.
Billy Fredrick Allen, a Texas state prisoner, filed a civil rights suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging major Johnny M. Thomas, and guards Ronnie Major and Robert Dickey confiscated his radio and word processor in retaliation for his having given to the prison's mail room for mailing typed letters to state newspaper editors critical of the prison for holding prisoners beyond their release dates. According to Allen, shortly after the letters were tendered to the mail room, Thomas ordered Major to confiscate his radio and word processor, using the false allegation that they were altered" and therefore violated prison Administrative Directive 03.72. Allen claims they were not altered and the confiscation was in retaliation for the letters.
The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment based upon qualified immunity which District Judge Nancy Atlas granted. Bizarrely, Atlas said Allen's free speech rights had not been violated because only the method by which he may communicate his speech was affected." Allen appealed.
The Fifth Circuit noted several errors of reasoning and law in Atlas's dismissal order. First, Atlas stated that Allen did not have a due process claim under § 1983 because there were adequate state post-deprivation remedies, citing the U.S. Supreme Court's Parratt/Hudson doctrine. However, Parratt/Hudson only applies when the action complained of is random and unauthorized. In this case, the action was allegedly taken pursuant to an administrative directive, not in a random and unauthorized manner. Therefore, Parratt/Hudson could not apply and dismissal of those grounds was vacated.
A second error was Atlas's contention that the only evidence that the property confiscation was retaliatory was Allen's unsupported allegations.
The Fifth Circuit noted that Allen did allege a chronology of events from which retaliation may plausibly be inferred" as is required by Woods v. Smith, 60 F.3d 1161 (5th Cir. 1995) for retaliation cases. Furthermore, Atlas had refused to allow Allen to depose two mail room employees on the ground that their testimony could not raise an issue of material fact when Allen alleged they could help prove the retaliatory motive. This refusal to allow depositions was premature and was vacated as was the dismissal on the grounds of unproven retaliatory conduct.
The Fifth Circuit held that Atlas committed a third error when she denied Allen's motion for appointment of counsel without analysis on the grounds that the case had no exceptional circumstances requiring appointment of counsel. See: Ulmer v. Chancellor, 691 F.3d 209 (5th Cir. 1982) requires such an analysis and explains which factors must be considered. Because it was not clear from the record whether such exceptional circumstances did exist, this ruling was also vacated and the district court instructed to present specific findings explaining why counsel was denied" should it deny the motion again.
The orders of the district court discussed above were vacated, the remainder of the district court's orders were affirmed and the case was returned to the district court for further proceedings. See: Allen v. Thomas, 388 F.3d 147 (5th Cir. 2004).
Additional sources: Houston Chronicle, interview with Billy Fredrick Allen.
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Related legal case
Allen v. Thomas
| Year | 2004 |
|---|---|
| Cite | 388 F.3d 147 (5th Cir. 2004). |
| Level | Court of Appeals |
| Attorney Fees | 0 |
| Damages | 0 |
| Injunction Status | N/A |
388 F.3d 147
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
Billy Frederick ALLEN, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Johnny M. THOMAS; Ronnie Major; Robert Dickey; John Doe, # 4; Doe, # 5,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 03-21208.
Oct. 7, 2004.
Background: State prisoner whose property was confiscated brought § 1983 action against correctional officers. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, Nancy F. Atlas, J., dismissed complaint, and prisoner appealed.
Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Edith Brown Clement, Circuit Judge, held that:
(1) existence of adequate state post-deprivation remedy did not bar due process claim, and
(2) complaint adequately alleged retaliation claim.
Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded.
*148 Billy Frederick Allen, Rosharon, TX, pro se.
Jacqueline Lee Haney, Asst. Atty. Gen., Amber Lea Adams, Austin, TX, for Johnny M. Thomas, Ronnie Major and Robert Dickey.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas.
Before BENAVIDES, DENNIS and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.
EDITH BROWN CLEMENT, Circuit Judge:
Billy Frederick Allen, Texas prisoner # 366613, appeals the district court's dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint against three correctional officers: Major Johnny M. Thomas, Ronnie Major, and Robert Dickey. The district court held that the defendants were entitled to summary judgment on the issue of qualified immunity, holding that Allen had not met his threshold burden of demonstrating a violation of a constitutional right. See Kipps v. Caillier, 205 F.3d 203, 204 (5th Cir.2000).
Allen argues that the district court erred in granting the defendants' motion to dismiss and for summary judgment on his claim that his due process rights were violated during the confiscation of his word processor and radio under the authority of prison Administrative Directive 03.72. He contends that the district court erred in dismissing and/or granting summary judgment on his claims that 1) Dickey violated *149 his constitutional right to due process; 2) Administrative Directive 03.72 is unconstitutionally vague; 3) the confiscation violated his right to freedom of speech; and 4) the confiscation was retaliatory. Allen also argues that 1) the district court deprived him of the opportunity to amend his complaint; 2) the district court should not have considered the defendants' Exhibit A as competent summary judgment evidence; 3) the district court abused its discretion in denying him appointed counsel; 4) the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion for sanctions; and 5) the district court abused its discretion in denying him leave to file a supplemental complaint. Except as discussed below, all aspects of the district court's judgment are affirmed.
In granting the defendants' motion to dismiss and for summary judgment on Allen's due process claim, the district court reasoned that Allen did not have a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim for wrongful confiscation of property because Texas had an adequate post-deprivation remedy for negligent or intentional deprivations of property. Under the Parratt/Hudson [FN1] doctrine, "a deprivation of a constitutionally protected property interest caused by a state employee's random, unauthorized conduct does not give rise to a § 1983 procedural due process claim, unless the State fails to provide an adequate postdeprivation remedy." Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 115, 110 S.Ct. 975, 108 L.Ed.2d 100 (1990). Conduct is not "random and unauthorized" for purposes of the Parratt/Hudson doctrine if the state "delegated to [the defendants] the power and authority to effect the very deprivation complained of." Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 138, 110 S.Ct. 975.
FN1. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 82 L.Ed.2d 393 (1984); Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 101 S.Ct. 1908, 68 L.Ed.2d 420 (1981), overruled in part by, Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330-31, 106 S.Ct. 662, 88 L.Ed.2d 662 (1986).
Because the undisputed facts reveal that Allen's word processor and radio were confiscated under the authority of a prison administrative directive, the confiscation was not a random, unauthorized act by a state employee. See Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 138-39, 110 S.Ct. 975; Brooks v. George County, Mississippi, 84 F.3d 157, 165-66 (5th Cir.1996). The district court erred in applying the Parratt/Hudson doctrine. Therefore, we VACATE that portion of the district court's order granting the defendants' motion to dismiss and for summary judgment on Allen's claim that the property confiscation violated his procedural due process rights and REMAND the case for further proceedings on that claim. In doing so, we express no view on the ultimate merits of the claim. Because the district court's grant of summary judgment on Allen's claim against Dickey on grounds of lack of personal involvement was premature, we VACATE the district court's grant of summary judgment on Allen's due process claim against Dickey and REMAND for further proceedings.
In granting summary judgment for the defendants on Allen's claim that the property confiscation was in retaliation for his exercise of his First Amendment rights, the district court concluded that Allen presented no more than his own personal belief that "but for" a retaliatory motive, his property would not have been seized. To state a valid claim for retaliation, an inmate must either produce direct evidence of motivation or " 'allege a chronology of events from which retaliation may plausibly be inferred.' " Woods v. Smith, 60 F.3d 1161, 1166 (5th Cir.1995) (quoting Cain v. Lane, 857 F.2d 1139, 1143 n. 6 (7th Cir.1988)).
*150 Allen's verified complaint alleges such a chronology of events. Allen asserts that shortly after he submitted letters critical of the prison to the mail room for mailing, Thomas ordered Major to seize from his living quarters his word processor and radio, property which Allen had possessed for years and which he had registered with the prison. The district court's refusal to allow Allen to depose two mail room employees, reasoning that their testimony would not raise a genuine issue of material fact for trial, was premature. We VACATE the district court's grant of summary judgment for the defendants on this claim and REMAND for further proceedings.
In denying Allen's motion for the appointment of counsel, the district court concluded that no exceptional circumstances existed to require appointment of counsel. The district court provided no analysis of the relevant factors this Circuit uses to decide whether to appoint counsel for an indigent party. See Ulmer v. Chancellor, 691 F.2d 209, 213 (5th Cir.1982). Because the record does not clearly show that exceptional circumstances do not exist, the district court must present specific findings explaining why counsel was denied. See Jackson v. Dallas Police Dep't, 811 F.2d 260, 262 (5th Cir.1986). Thus, we VACATE the district court's denial of Allen's motion and REMAND for further proceedings.
For the reasons stated, we AFFIRM IN PART, VACATE IN PART, and REMAND to the district court for further proceedings consistent herewith.
388 F.3d 147
END OF DOCUMENT
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
Billy Frederick ALLEN, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Johnny M. THOMAS; Ronnie Major; Robert Dickey; John Doe, # 4; Doe, # 5,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 03-21208.
Oct. 7, 2004.
Background: State prisoner whose property was confiscated brought § 1983 action against correctional officers. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, Nancy F. Atlas, J., dismissed complaint, and prisoner appealed.
Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Edith Brown Clement, Circuit Judge, held that:
(1) existence of adequate state post-deprivation remedy did not bar due process claim, and
(2) complaint adequately alleged retaliation claim.
Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded.
*148 Billy Frederick Allen, Rosharon, TX, pro se.
Jacqueline Lee Haney, Asst. Atty. Gen., Amber Lea Adams, Austin, TX, for Johnny M. Thomas, Ronnie Major and Robert Dickey.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas.
Before BENAVIDES, DENNIS and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.
EDITH BROWN CLEMENT, Circuit Judge:
Billy Frederick Allen, Texas prisoner # 366613, appeals the district court's dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint against three correctional officers: Major Johnny M. Thomas, Ronnie Major, and Robert Dickey. The district court held that the defendants were entitled to summary judgment on the issue of qualified immunity, holding that Allen had not met his threshold burden of demonstrating a violation of a constitutional right. See Kipps v. Caillier, 205 F.3d 203, 204 (5th Cir.2000).
Allen argues that the district court erred in granting the defendants' motion to dismiss and for summary judgment on his claim that his due process rights were violated during the confiscation of his word processor and radio under the authority of prison Administrative Directive 03.72. He contends that the district court erred in dismissing and/or granting summary judgment on his claims that 1) Dickey violated *149 his constitutional right to due process; 2) Administrative Directive 03.72 is unconstitutionally vague; 3) the confiscation violated his right to freedom of speech; and 4) the confiscation was retaliatory. Allen also argues that 1) the district court deprived him of the opportunity to amend his complaint; 2) the district court should not have considered the defendants' Exhibit A as competent summary judgment evidence; 3) the district court abused its discretion in denying him appointed counsel; 4) the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion for sanctions; and 5) the district court abused its discretion in denying him leave to file a supplemental complaint. Except as discussed below, all aspects of the district court's judgment are affirmed.
In granting the defendants' motion to dismiss and for summary judgment on Allen's due process claim, the district court reasoned that Allen did not have a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim for wrongful confiscation of property because Texas had an adequate post-deprivation remedy for negligent or intentional deprivations of property. Under the Parratt/Hudson [FN1] doctrine, "a deprivation of a constitutionally protected property interest caused by a state employee's random, unauthorized conduct does not give rise to a § 1983 procedural due process claim, unless the State fails to provide an adequate postdeprivation remedy." Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 115, 110 S.Ct. 975, 108 L.Ed.2d 100 (1990). Conduct is not "random and unauthorized" for purposes of the Parratt/Hudson doctrine if the state "delegated to [the defendants] the power and authority to effect the very deprivation complained of." Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 138, 110 S.Ct. 975.
FN1. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 82 L.Ed.2d 393 (1984); Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 101 S.Ct. 1908, 68 L.Ed.2d 420 (1981), overruled in part by, Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330-31, 106 S.Ct. 662, 88 L.Ed.2d 662 (1986).
Because the undisputed facts reveal that Allen's word processor and radio were confiscated under the authority of a prison administrative directive, the confiscation was not a random, unauthorized act by a state employee. See Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 138-39, 110 S.Ct. 975; Brooks v. George County, Mississippi, 84 F.3d 157, 165-66 (5th Cir.1996). The district court erred in applying the Parratt/Hudson doctrine. Therefore, we VACATE that portion of the district court's order granting the defendants' motion to dismiss and for summary judgment on Allen's claim that the property confiscation violated his procedural due process rights and REMAND the case for further proceedings on that claim. In doing so, we express no view on the ultimate merits of the claim. Because the district court's grant of summary judgment on Allen's claim against Dickey on grounds of lack of personal involvement was premature, we VACATE the district court's grant of summary judgment on Allen's due process claim against Dickey and REMAND for further proceedings.
In granting summary judgment for the defendants on Allen's claim that the property confiscation was in retaliation for his exercise of his First Amendment rights, the district court concluded that Allen presented no more than his own personal belief that "but for" a retaliatory motive, his property would not have been seized. To state a valid claim for retaliation, an inmate must either produce direct evidence of motivation or " 'allege a chronology of events from which retaliation may plausibly be inferred.' " Woods v. Smith, 60 F.3d 1161, 1166 (5th Cir.1995) (quoting Cain v. Lane, 857 F.2d 1139, 1143 n. 6 (7th Cir.1988)).
*150 Allen's verified complaint alleges such a chronology of events. Allen asserts that shortly after he submitted letters critical of the prison to the mail room for mailing, Thomas ordered Major to seize from his living quarters his word processor and radio, property which Allen had possessed for years and which he had registered with the prison. The district court's refusal to allow Allen to depose two mail room employees, reasoning that their testimony would not raise a genuine issue of material fact for trial, was premature. We VACATE the district court's grant of summary judgment for the defendants on this claim and REMAND for further proceedings.
In denying Allen's motion for the appointment of counsel, the district court concluded that no exceptional circumstances existed to require appointment of counsel. The district court provided no analysis of the relevant factors this Circuit uses to decide whether to appoint counsel for an indigent party. See Ulmer v. Chancellor, 691 F.2d 209, 213 (5th Cir.1982). Because the record does not clearly show that exceptional circumstances do not exist, the district court must present specific findings explaining why counsel was denied. See Jackson v. Dallas Police Dep't, 811 F.2d 260, 262 (5th Cir.1986). Thus, we VACATE the district court's denial of Allen's motion and REMAND for further proceedings.
For the reasons stated, we AFFIRM IN PART, VACATE IN PART, and REMAND to the district court for further proceedings consistent herewith.
388 F.3d 147
END OF DOCUMENT