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Delaware Prisoner's $100,000 Damage Award For Retaliation Upheld
by Michael Rigby
A disabled Delaware prisoner's $100,000 damage award for retaliation will stand, a federal district court in Delaware has held.
On August 20, 1999, Roger Atkinson, a blind prisoner with a host of medical problems, sued Delaware prison officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after he was moved from a non-smoking section of the Multi-Purpose Criminal Justice Facility to a smoking section. After the suit was filed, Atkinson alleged that prison guard Fred Way and others retaliated against him.
In particular, Atkinson alleged that Way prevented him from calling his lawyer, withheld documents he requested from the law library, repeatedly read his personal mail over the prison's intercom, placed him in segregation during recreation periods, cursed him, made derogatory statements about his blindness, and stated that he would not have been placed in segregation if he had not filed a lawsuit. Atkinson further contended that Way and others physically assaulted him, threatened him, tampered with his food, and prevented him from receiving his medication. Atkinson amended his complaint to allege retaliation by Way and other prison officials.
Defendants asserted a qualified immunity defense and moved for summary judgment. The U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware denied the motion and defendants filed an interlocutory appeal. The Third Circuit affirmed holding that the defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity. Atkinson v. Taylor, 316 F.3d 257 (3rd Cir. 2003). [See PLN, August 2004, p. 26.] On remand, defendants moved for dismissal based on the Fugitive Disenfranchisement Doctrine claiming that Atkinson, who had been released on parole, was a fugitive from justice. The district court denied that motion as well. Atkinson v. Taylor, 277 F.Supp.2d 382 (USDC D DE 2003).
A trial ensued in which a jury found for Atkinson on his retaliation claim. The jury concluded Way had caused Atkinson injury by violating his constitutional rights and awarded Atkinson $85,000 in compensatory damages and $15,000 in punitive damages.
After the verdict, Way moved for judgement as a matter of law, a set-aside of the compensatory damages award, or a new trial on damages." Specifically, Way contended that he was entitled to judgment as a matter of law because no reasonable jury could have found, based on the evidence, that his harassment was in retaliation for Atkinson's lawsuit. As for the compensatory damages, Way contended they were barred by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e because Atkinson sustained no actual physical injury.
On July 19, 2004, the district court denied Way's motion. First, the court held that the jury heard ample evidence" from which to conclude that Way's harassment of Atkinson stemmed from his lawsuit. Therefore, the evidence the jury used in reaching its decision was legally sufficient.
The court then held that the jury's award of compensatory damages should stand. Pursuant to the PLRA, a prisoner's claim for compensatory damages related to mental or emotional injury must also show an accompanying physical injury. The Third, Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have interpreted the statute as requiring less than significant but more than de minimis physical injury." In the instant case, the jury was instructed that it could award compensatory damages only if they found Way's retaliatory actions caused Atkinson physical harm and, [i]t is presumed the jury followed this instruction.
Moreover, the jury had sufficient evidence from which to conclude that Atkinson's physical injury was more than de minimis, the court held. Evidence included testimony involving numerous instances of Way causing Atkinson physical pain by denying him medication and a medical expert's testimony that a denial of medication would cause [Atkinson] to become severely sick' because his pituitary gland had been removed." The verdict was affirmed.
Atkinson was represented by Richard H. Morse of the Wilmington, Delaware, law firm Young, Conaway, Stargatt, & Taylor. See: Atkinson v. Way, USDC D DE, Case No. 99-562 JJF.
A disabled Delaware prisoner's $100,000 damage award for retaliation will stand, a federal district court in Delaware has held.
On August 20, 1999, Roger Atkinson, a blind prisoner with a host of medical problems, sued Delaware prison officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after he was moved from a non-smoking section of the Multi-Purpose Criminal Justice Facility to a smoking section. After the suit was filed, Atkinson alleged that prison guard Fred Way and others retaliated against him.
In particular, Atkinson alleged that Way prevented him from calling his lawyer, withheld documents he requested from the law library, repeatedly read his personal mail over the prison's intercom, placed him in segregation during recreation periods, cursed him, made derogatory statements about his blindness, and stated that he would not have been placed in segregation if he had not filed a lawsuit. Atkinson further contended that Way and others physically assaulted him, threatened him, tampered with his food, and prevented him from receiving his medication. Atkinson amended his complaint to allege retaliation by Way and other prison officials.
Defendants asserted a qualified immunity defense and moved for summary judgment. The U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware denied the motion and defendants filed an interlocutory appeal. The Third Circuit affirmed holding that the defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity. Atkinson v. Taylor, 316 F.3d 257 (3rd Cir. 2003). [See PLN, August 2004, p. 26.] On remand, defendants moved for dismissal based on the Fugitive Disenfranchisement Doctrine claiming that Atkinson, who had been released on parole, was a fugitive from justice. The district court denied that motion as well. Atkinson v. Taylor, 277 F.Supp.2d 382 (USDC D DE 2003).
A trial ensued in which a jury found for Atkinson on his retaliation claim. The jury concluded Way had caused Atkinson injury by violating his constitutional rights and awarded Atkinson $85,000 in compensatory damages and $15,000 in punitive damages.
After the verdict, Way moved for judgement as a matter of law, a set-aside of the compensatory damages award, or a new trial on damages." Specifically, Way contended that he was entitled to judgment as a matter of law because no reasonable jury could have found, based on the evidence, that his harassment was in retaliation for Atkinson's lawsuit. As for the compensatory damages, Way contended they were barred by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e because Atkinson sustained no actual physical injury.
On July 19, 2004, the district court denied Way's motion. First, the court held that the jury heard ample evidence" from which to conclude that Way's harassment of Atkinson stemmed from his lawsuit. Therefore, the evidence the jury used in reaching its decision was legally sufficient.
The court then held that the jury's award of compensatory damages should stand. Pursuant to the PLRA, a prisoner's claim for compensatory damages related to mental or emotional injury must also show an accompanying physical injury. The Third, Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have interpreted the statute as requiring less than significant but more than de minimis physical injury." In the instant case, the jury was instructed that it could award compensatory damages only if they found Way's retaliatory actions caused Atkinson physical harm and, [i]t is presumed the jury followed this instruction.
Moreover, the jury had sufficient evidence from which to conclude that Atkinson's physical injury was more than de minimis, the court held. Evidence included testimony involving numerous instances of Way causing Atkinson physical pain by denying him medication and a medical expert's testimony that a denial of medication would cause [Atkinson] to become severely sick' because his pituitary gland had been removed." The verdict was affirmed.
Atkinson was represented by Richard H. Morse of the Wilmington, Delaware, law firm Young, Conaway, Stargatt, & Taylor. See: Atkinson v. Way, USDC D DE, Case No. 99-562 JJF.
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Related legal cases
Atkinson v. Way
| Year | 2004 |
|---|---|
| Cite | USDC D DE, Case No. 99-562 JJF |
| Level | District Court |
| Conclusion | Jury Verdict |
| Attorney Fees | 0 |
| Damages | 100000 |
| Injunction Status | N/A |
Atkinson v. Taylor
| Year | 2003 |
|---|---|
| Cite | 277 F.Supp.2d 382 (USDC D DE 2003). |
| Level | District Court |
| Attorney Fees | 0 |
| Damages | 0 |
| Injunction Status | N/A |
ROGER ATKINSON, Plaintiff, v. STANLEY TAYLOR ET AL., Defendants.
Civil Action No. 99-562-JJF
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
277 F. Supp. 2d 382; 2003 U.S. Dist.
August 7, 2003, Decided
SUBSEQUENT HISTORY: Motion for new trial denied by Atkinson v. Way, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13702 (D. Del., July 19, 2004)
PRIOR HISTORY: Atkinson v. Taylor, 316 F.3d 257, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 1237 (3d Cir. Del., 2003)
DISPOSITION: [**1] Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Fugitive Disentitlement Doctrine was denied. Mr. Foster's application to stay discovery with regard to Commissioner Taylor was denied.
COUNSEL: Richard H. Morse, Esquire of YOUNG, CONAWAY, STARGATT & TAYLOR, Wilmington, Delaware. Attorney for Plaintiff.
Michael F. Foster, Esquire of the DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE FOR THE STATE OF DELAWARE, Wilmington, Delaware. Attorney for Defendant, Commissioner, Stanley Taylor.
Marc P. Niedzielski, Esquire of the DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE FOR THE STATE OF DELAWARE, Wilmington, Delaware. Attorney for Defendant, Warden, Raphael Williams.
Stuart B. Drowos, Esquire of the DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE FOR THE STATE OF DELAWARE, Wilmington, Delaware. Attorney for Defendants Major Perry Phelps and the State of Delaware Department of Corrections.
Laura L. Gerard, Esquire of the DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE FOR THE STATE OF DELAWARE, Wilmington, Delaware. Attorney for Defendant, Sergeant Parker. [**2]
Gregory E. Smith, Esquire of the DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE FOR THE STATE OF DELAWARE, Wilmington, Delaware. Attorney for Defendants Fred Way and Andre Green.
JUDGES: JOSEPH J. FARNAN, JR., UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
OPINIONBY: JOSEPH J. FARNAN, JR.
OPINION:
[*383] MEMORANDUM OPINION
Wilmington, Delaware.
FARNAN, District Judge,
Currently pending before the Court is Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to the Fugitive Disentitlement Doctrine (D.I. 122). For the reasons discussed, the motion will be denied.
I. Nature and Stage of Proceedings
Plaintiff, Roger Atkinson filed this civil action when he was an inmate incarcerated within the State of Delaware by the Department of Corrections ("DOC"). Plaintiff completed his Level V custodial incarceration but continues to be in the custody of the DOC as a probationer. During his term of incarceration, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants exposed him to unreasonably high levels of environmental smoke and that Defendants Way and Green used excessive force against him. Trial was scheduled to commence in June 2001. Shortly before the start of the trial, the Court denied Defendants' motions to dismiss and motions for summary judgment. Defendants then filed an appeal which was denied by the Third Circuit on January 21, 2003. On March 27, 2003, the Third Circuit denied Defendants' request for an en [*384] banc hearing. Trial is now scheduled to commence [**3] on September 22, 2003. On June 22, 2003, the Defendants filed the instant Motion to Dismiss citing the Fugitive Disentitlement Doctrine (D.I. 122). The Court heard argument on the motion by a teleconference on August 5, 2003.
II. The Parties' Contentions
Defendants contend that this action should be dismissed pursuant to the Fugitive Disentitlement Doctrine. Defendants contend that the three requirements for application of the doctrine are met in this case. Specifically, Defendants contend that (1) the Plaintiff is a fugitive; 2) his fugitive status has a connection to this civil action; and 3) the sanction of dismissal is necessary to effectuate the policy underlying the Fugitive Disentitlement Doctrine.
In support of their contention that Mr. Atkinson is a fugitive, Defendants submit: 1) a capias for the arrest of Mr. Atkinson from the New Castle County Superior Court for a violation of probation in the State of Delaware (D.I. 131); 2) an affidavit of Kimberly C. Taylor, Mr. Atkinson's Probation Officer, which states that Mr. Atkinson has contacted her and she informed him that he is wanted in Delaware for violation of his probation. Ms. Taylor further avers that [**4] Mr. Atkinson has not returned to Delaware and has failed to provide her with his current location (D.I. 142); 3) an active arrest warrant for Mr. Atkinson from the State of Illinois (D.I. 140); and 4) an Order for the arrest of Mr. Atkinson from the State of North Carolina. (D.I. 140).
With regard to the second prong of the doctrine, Defendants contend that Mr. Atkinson's fugitive status is the result of a violation of probation involving the same sentence that is at issue in this action in which Mr. Atkinson alleges unreasonable conditions of confinement.
Finally, Defendants contend that they are prejudiced by Plaintiff's absence because of the time and cost of trial preparation. Specifically, Defendants contend that in addition to the time taken away from their official duties to prepare for a jury trial in federal court, a significant witness, Dr. Keith Ivens, has relocated to Mississippi, and as a result, the Defendants must expend financial resources to transport him back to Delaware to testify. Defendants argue that there is no guarantee that Mr. Atkinson will appear for trial given that if he does appear he is aware that he will be arrested for a probation violation, and therefore, [**5] their preparation for trial may be meaningless.
In response, Plaintiff contends that there is no evidence in the record demonstrating that Mr. Atkinson is a fugitive and no evidence that Mr. Atkinson has any reason to know that the State of Delaware is looking for him, or has issued a capias. n1 Further, Plaintiff contends that his alleged fugitive status is not connected to the issues of his civil action. In his civil action Mr. Atkinson seeks to recover for being exposed to unreasonably high levels of environmental tobacco smoke during his incarceration, alleged verbal and physical abuse by two prison guards during his incarceration, and alleged retaliation during his incarceration for his having named one of the Defendants in his environmental tobacco smoke claim.
n1 At the teleconference on August 5, 2003, counsel for Mr. Atkinson indicated that he had not received a copy of the affidavit of Kimberly Taylor, Mr. Atkinson's Probation Officer, in which Ms. Taylor details her efforts to contact Mr. Atkinson and his status as a fugitive.
[**6]
As to the third requirement, Plaintiff argues that the Defendants have made no showing that dismissal of this action is necessary to effectuate the purposes of the [*385] Fugitive Disentitlement Doctrine. Plaintiff argues that the United States Supreme Court has made clear that the concern underlying the Fugitive Disentitlement Doctrine relates to protecting the Government from prejudice that would be caused by a fugitive plaintiff's absence. Plaintiff's counsel argues that Defendants do not explain how they would be prejudiced in this case by Mr. Atkinson's absence, and therefore, the motion to dismiss should be denied.
III. Discussion
The Fugitive Disentitlement Doctrine limits a fugitive's access to the judicial system when he or she has fled criminal conviction in a court of the United States. Magluta v. Samples, 162 F.3d 662, 664 (11th Cir. 1998). Although the doctrine has historically been utilized by courts of appeal to dismiss appeals of fugitives, district courts may sanction or enter judgment against parties based on their fugitive status. Id. (citing Prevot v. Prevot, 59 F.3d 556, 564-65 (6th Cir.1995)).
The rationale for the [**7] doctrine includes difficulty of enforcement against one not willing to subject himself to the court's authority; the inequity of allowing a fugitive to use court resources only if the outcome is an aid to him; and the need to avoid prejudice to the non fugitive party. Id. (citing Degen .v. United States, 517 U.S. 820, 824-25, 828, 116 S. Ct. 1777, 135 L. Ed. 2d 102 (1996); United States v. Barnette, 129 F.3d 1179, 1183 (11th Cir. 1997)). Dismissal of a civil action based on the Fugitive Disentitlement Doctrine requires that (1) the plaintiff is a fugitive; (2) his fugitive status has a connection to his civil action; and (3) the sanction employed by the district court, dismissal, is necessary to effectuate the concerns underlying the fugitive Disentitlement doctrine. See Degen, 517 U.S. at 829; Ortega Rodriguez v. United States, 507 U.S. 234, 242-49, 113 S. Ct. 1199, 122 L. Ed. 2d 581 (1993); Magluta, 162 F.3d at 664.
In the instant case, the Defendants contend that Mr. Atkinson is a fugitive based on the capias issued by the New Castle County Superior Court for a violation of probation and [**8] Ms. Taylor's affidavit which states that Mr. Atkinson is aware that he is wanted in the State of Delaware for a probation violation. Accepting these representations as true, the Court concludes that Mr. Atkinson is a fugitive because there is a capias for his arrest and he is aware of it.
On the factual record established, the Court finds that the the second requirement for the application of the doctrine has not been met because there is not a sufficient nexus between Mr. Atkinson's fugitive status and his civil action. In his civil action Mr. Atkinson alleges that he was subjected to unreasonably high levels of environmental tobacco smoke and subjected to physical and verbal abuse by two prison guards while incarcerated. However, Mr. Atkinson's fugitive status is allegedly due to a failure to report and to inform the Probation Office in Delaware of his new address which the Court finds is unrelated to any of the facts underlying his civil suit. Although Mr. Atkinson was on probation for the same charge he was incarcerated for, the Court finds that this is not a sufficient nexus because the underlying facts of the instant litigation are unrelated to his alleged probation violation [**9] and failure to report.
The Defendants rely on Ali v. Sims, 788 F.2d 954 (3d Cir. 1986) to support their position as to this prong of the analysis. In Ali, the plaintiff hijacked a plane in order to flee custody while being transported to court for his civil trial. The Court finds that the Ali case is easily distinguishable from the instant situation because in Ali there was a close connection [*386] between the plaintiff's fugitive status and his civil action, since transportation of the plaintiff for his civil trial led to his fugitive status. In contrast, the Court finds that there is no such relationship between Mr. Atkinson's civil action and his fugitive status.
Further, the Court concludes that dismissal is not necessary to effectuate the concerns underlying the Fugitive Disentitlement Doctrine. As to this prong, the Court finds that the Defendants have failed to show that they would be prejudiced in this case by Mr. Atkinson's absence. See Degen, 517 U.S. at 827. The Defendants do contend that they will have to expend resources to defend the action and transport a key witness a long distance in order to testify. However, the Court [**10] finds that these events did not occur as a result of Mr. Atkinson's fugitive status or absence. Rather, the Court concludes that the Defendants would have to defend the action regardless of Mr. Atkinson's fugitive status and such preparation includes transporting key witnesses and expending time and resources.
The Defendants also rely on Sarlund v. Anderson, 205 F.3d 973 (7th Cir. 2000), to support their position as to the third requirement. The Court finds that this case is also readily distinguishable from the instant situation. In Sarlund, Plaintiff's whereabouts were unknown and he could not be deposed or be made to pay costs or attorneys' fees if he lost and his suit was determined to be frivolous. By contrast, Mr. Atkinson has already been deposed and the case has survived a summary judgment motion, and therefore, cannot be considered frivolous. Further, the Court recognizes that Mr. Atkinson has been in regular contact with his attorney, Richard H. Morse, Esq. Accordingly, the Court will deny the motion to dismiss.
In sum, the Court concludes that the application of the Fugitive Disentitlement Doctrine would be particularly harsh in this case because Mr. [**11] Atkinson has been in regular contact with his attorney and Defendants have not demonstrated that there is a sufficient nexus between Mr. Atkinson's alleged fugitive status and his civil action or that dismissal is necessary to effectuate the concerns underlying the Fugitive Disentitlement Doctrine.
Additionally, at the August 5, 2003 teleconference on the instant motion, Deputy Attorney General, Michael Foster requested that discovery as to Commissioner Taylor be stayed. Because the Court has declined to dismiss the action pursuant to the Fugitive Disentitlement Doctrine, discovery will go forward as to Commissioner Taylor but is closed in all other respects.
An appropriate Order will be entered.
ORDER
NOW THEREFORE, for the reasons stated set forth in the Memorandum Opinion issued this date, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED this 7th day of August 2003, that:
1) Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to the Fugitive Disentitlement Doctrine (D.I. 122) is DENIED.
2) Mr. Foster's application to stay discovery with regard to Commissioner Taylor is DENIED. Discovery shall go forward as to Commissioner Taylor but is closed in all other respects.
JOSEPH J. FARNAN, [**12] JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Civil Action No. 99-562-JJF
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
277 F. Supp. 2d 382; 2003 U.S. Dist.
August 7, 2003, Decided
SUBSEQUENT HISTORY: Motion for new trial denied by Atkinson v. Way, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13702 (D. Del., July 19, 2004)
PRIOR HISTORY: Atkinson v. Taylor, 316 F.3d 257, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 1237 (3d Cir. Del., 2003)
DISPOSITION: [**1] Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Fugitive Disentitlement Doctrine was denied. Mr. Foster's application to stay discovery with regard to Commissioner Taylor was denied.
COUNSEL: Richard H. Morse, Esquire of YOUNG, CONAWAY, STARGATT & TAYLOR, Wilmington, Delaware. Attorney for Plaintiff.
Michael F. Foster, Esquire of the DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE FOR THE STATE OF DELAWARE, Wilmington, Delaware. Attorney for Defendant, Commissioner, Stanley Taylor.
Marc P. Niedzielski, Esquire of the DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE FOR THE STATE OF DELAWARE, Wilmington, Delaware. Attorney for Defendant, Warden, Raphael Williams.
Stuart B. Drowos, Esquire of the DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE FOR THE STATE OF DELAWARE, Wilmington, Delaware. Attorney for Defendants Major Perry Phelps and the State of Delaware Department of Corrections.
Laura L. Gerard, Esquire of the DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE FOR THE STATE OF DELAWARE, Wilmington, Delaware. Attorney for Defendant, Sergeant Parker. [**2]
Gregory E. Smith, Esquire of the DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE FOR THE STATE OF DELAWARE, Wilmington, Delaware. Attorney for Defendants Fred Way and Andre Green.
JUDGES: JOSEPH J. FARNAN, JR., UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
OPINIONBY: JOSEPH J. FARNAN, JR.
OPINION:
[*383] MEMORANDUM OPINION
Wilmington, Delaware.
FARNAN, District Judge,
Currently pending before the Court is Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to the Fugitive Disentitlement Doctrine (D.I. 122). For the reasons discussed, the motion will be denied.
I. Nature and Stage of Proceedings
Plaintiff, Roger Atkinson filed this civil action when he was an inmate incarcerated within the State of Delaware by the Department of Corrections ("DOC"). Plaintiff completed his Level V custodial incarceration but continues to be in the custody of the DOC as a probationer. During his term of incarceration, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants exposed him to unreasonably high levels of environmental smoke and that Defendants Way and Green used excessive force against him. Trial was scheduled to commence in June 2001. Shortly before the start of the trial, the Court denied Defendants' motions to dismiss and motions for summary judgment. Defendants then filed an appeal which was denied by the Third Circuit on January 21, 2003. On March 27, 2003, the Third Circuit denied Defendants' request for an en [*384] banc hearing. Trial is now scheduled to commence [**3] on September 22, 2003. On June 22, 2003, the Defendants filed the instant Motion to Dismiss citing the Fugitive Disentitlement Doctrine (D.I. 122). The Court heard argument on the motion by a teleconference on August 5, 2003.
II. The Parties' Contentions
Defendants contend that this action should be dismissed pursuant to the Fugitive Disentitlement Doctrine. Defendants contend that the three requirements for application of the doctrine are met in this case. Specifically, Defendants contend that (1) the Plaintiff is a fugitive; 2) his fugitive status has a connection to this civil action; and 3) the sanction of dismissal is necessary to effectuate the policy underlying the Fugitive Disentitlement Doctrine.
In support of their contention that Mr. Atkinson is a fugitive, Defendants submit: 1) a capias for the arrest of Mr. Atkinson from the New Castle County Superior Court for a violation of probation in the State of Delaware (D.I. 131); 2) an affidavit of Kimberly C. Taylor, Mr. Atkinson's Probation Officer, which states that Mr. Atkinson has contacted her and she informed him that he is wanted in Delaware for violation of his probation. Ms. Taylor further avers that [**4] Mr. Atkinson has not returned to Delaware and has failed to provide her with his current location (D.I. 142); 3) an active arrest warrant for Mr. Atkinson from the State of Illinois (D.I. 140); and 4) an Order for the arrest of Mr. Atkinson from the State of North Carolina. (D.I. 140).
With regard to the second prong of the doctrine, Defendants contend that Mr. Atkinson's fugitive status is the result of a violation of probation involving the same sentence that is at issue in this action in which Mr. Atkinson alleges unreasonable conditions of confinement.
Finally, Defendants contend that they are prejudiced by Plaintiff's absence because of the time and cost of trial preparation. Specifically, Defendants contend that in addition to the time taken away from their official duties to prepare for a jury trial in federal court, a significant witness, Dr. Keith Ivens, has relocated to Mississippi, and as a result, the Defendants must expend financial resources to transport him back to Delaware to testify. Defendants argue that there is no guarantee that Mr. Atkinson will appear for trial given that if he does appear he is aware that he will be arrested for a probation violation, and therefore, [**5] their preparation for trial may be meaningless.
In response, Plaintiff contends that there is no evidence in the record demonstrating that Mr. Atkinson is a fugitive and no evidence that Mr. Atkinson has any reason to know that the State of Delaware is looking for him, or has issued a capias. n1 Further, Plaintiff contends that his alleged fugitive status is not connected to the issues of his civil action. In his civil action Mr. Atkinson seeks to recover for being exposed to unreasonably high levels of environmental tobacco smoke during his incarceration, alleged verbal and physical abuse by two prison guards during his incarceration, and alleged retaliation during his incarceration for his having named one of the Defendants in his environmental tobacco smoke claim.
n1 At the teleconference on August 5, 2003, counsel for Mr. Atkinson indicated that he had not received a copy of the affidavit of Kimberly Taylor, Mr. Atkinson's Probation Officer, in which Ms. Taylor details her efforts to contact Mr. Atkinson and his status as a fugitive.
[**6]
As to the third requirement, Plaintiff argues that the Defendants have made no showing that dismissal of this action is necessary to effectuate the purposes of the [*385] Fugitive Disentitlement Doctrine. Plaintiff argues that the United States Supreme Court has made clear that the concern underlying the Fugitive Disentitlement Doctrine relates to protecting the Government from prejudice that would be caused by a fugitive plaintiff's absence. Plaintiff's counsel argues that Defendants do not explain how they would be prejudiced in this case by Mr. Atkinson's absence, and therefore, the motion to dismiss should be denied.
III. Discussion
The Fugitive Disentitlement Doctrine limits a fugitive's access to the judicial system when he or she has fled criminal conviction in a court of the United States. Magluta v. Samples, 162 F.3d 662, 664 (11th Cir. 1998). Although the doctrine has historically been utilized by courts of appeal to dismiss appeals of fugitives, district courts may sanction or enter judgment against parties based on their fugitive status. Id. (citing Prevot v. Prevot, 59 F.3d 556, 564-65 (6th Cir.1995)).
The rationale for the [**7] doctrine includes difficulty of enforcement against one not willing to subject himself to the court's authority; the inequity of allowing a fugitive to use court resources only if the outcome is an aid to him; and the need to avoid prejudice to the non fugitive party. Id. (citing Degen .v. United States, 517 U.S. 820, 824-25, 828, 116 S. Ct. 1777, 135 L. Ed. 2d 102 (1996); United States v. Barnette, 129 F.3d 1179, 1183 (11th Cir. 1997)). Dismissal of a civil action based on the Fugitive Disentitlement Doctrine requires that (1) the plaintiff is a fugitive; (2) his fugitive status has a connection to his civil action; and (3) the sanction employed by the district court, dismissal, is necessary to effectuate the concerns underlying the fugitive Disentitlement doctrine. See Degen, 517 U.S. at 829; Ortega Rodriguez v. United States, 507 U.S. 234, 242-49, 113 S. Ct. 1199, 122 L. Ed. 2d 581 (1993); Magluta, 162 F.3d at 664.
In the instant case, the Defendants contend that Mr. Atkinson is a fugitive based on the capias issued by the New Castle County Superior Court for a violation of probation and [**8] Ms. Taylor's affidavit which states that Mr. Atkinson is aware that he is wanted in the State of Delaware for a probation violation. Accepting these representations as true, the Court concludes that Mr. Atkinson is a fugitive because there is a capias for his arrest and he is aware of it.
On the factual record established, the Court finds that the the second requirement for the application of the doctrine has not been met because there is not a sufficient nexus between Mr. Atkinson's fugitive status and his civil action. In his civil action Mr. Atkinson alleges that he was subjected to unreasonably high levels of environmental tobacco smoke and subjected to physical and verbal abuse by two prison guards while incarcerated. However, Mr. Atkinson's fugitive status is allegedly due to a failure to report and to inform the Probation Office in Delaware of his new address which the Court finds is unrelated to any of the facts underlying his civil suit. Although Mr. Atkinson was on probation for the same charge he was incarcerated for, the Court finds that this is not a sufficient nexus because the underlying facts of the instant litigation are unrelated to his alleged probation violation [**9] and failure to report.
The Defendants rely on Ali v. Sims, 788 F.2d 954 (3d Cir. 1986) to support their position as to this prong of the analysis. In Ali, the plaintiff hijacked a plane in order to flee custody while being transported to court for his civil trial. The Court finds that the Ali case is easily distinguishable from the instant situation because in Ali there was a close connection [*386] between the plaintiff's fugitive status and his civil action, since transportation of the plaintiff for his civil trial led to his fugitive status. In contrast, the Court finds that there is no such relationship between Mr. Atkinson's civil action and his fugitive status.
Further, the Court concludes that dismissal is not necessary to effectuate the concerns underlying the Fugitive Disentitlement Doctrine. As to this prong, the Court finds that the Defendants have failed to show that they would be prejudiced in this case by Mr. Atkinson's absence. See Degen, 517 U.S. at 827. The Defendants do contend that they will have to expend resources to defend the action and transport a key witness a long distance in order to testify. However, the Court [**10] finds that these events did not occur as a result of Mr. Atkinson's fugitive status or absence. Rather, the Court concludes that the Defendants would have to defend the action regardless of Mr. Atkinson's fugitive status and such preparation includes transporting key witnesses and expending time and resources.
The Defendants also rely on Sarlund v. Anderson, 205 F.3d 973 (7th Cir. 2000), to support their position as to the third requirement. The Court finds that this case is also readily distinguishable from the instant situation. In Sarlund, Plaintiff's whereabouts were unknown and he could not be deposed or be made to pay costs or attorneys' fees if he lost and his suit was determined to be frivolous. By contrast, Mr. Atkinson has already been deposed and the case has survived a summary judgment motion, and therefore, cannot be considered frivolous. Further, the Court recognizes that Mr. Atkinson has been in regular contact with his attorney, Richard H. Morse, Esq. Accordingly, the Court will deny the motion to dismiss.
In sum, the Court concludes that the application of the Fugitive Disentitlement Doctrine would be particularly harsh in this case because Mr. [**11] Atkinson has been in regular contact with his attorney and Defendants have not demonstrated that there is a sufficient nexus between Mr. Atkinson's alleged fugitive status and his civil action or that dismissal is necessary to effectuate the concerns underlying the Fugitive Disentitlement Doctrine.
Additionally, at the August 5, 2003 teleconference on the instant motion, Deputy Attorney General, Michael Foster requested that discovery as to Commissioner Taylor be stayed. Because the Court has declined to dismiss the action pursuant to the Fugitive Disentitlement Doctrine, discovery will go forward as to Commissioner Taylor but is closed in all other respects.
An appropriate Order will be entered.
ORDER
NOW THEREFORE, for the reasons stated set forth in the Memorandum Opinion issued this date, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED this 7th day of August 2003, that:
1) Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to the Fugitive Disentitlement Doctrine (D.I. 122) is DENIED.
2) Mr. Foster's application to stay discovery with regard to Commissioner Taylor is DENIED. Discovery shall go forward as to Commissioner Taylor but is closed in all other respects.
JOSEPH J. FARNAN, [**12] JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE