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Exhaustion of Administrative Remedy Requirement May be Excused
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals has held that the failure to exhaust administrative remedies may be excused in limited circumstances and should be excused in this case. This civil rights action arose from events that occurred while Ivan Rodriguez was incarcerated in New York's Westchester County Jail (WCJ) from July 1997 to November 1998. Rodriguez's complaint alleged he was beat by jail personnel and that EMSA Correctional Care denied him proper medical treatment for his injuries.
The defendants moved for summary judgment based on Rodriguez's failure to exhaust administrative remedies as required by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2000). Rodriguez admitted he did not exhaust administrative remedies, but sought to excuse his omission primarily for two reasons. First, he contended that he did not think exhaustion was required for a single episode of prisoner mistreatment, as distinguished from continuing prison conditions. Second, he contended that by time the Supreme Court ruled in Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516 (2002) [PLN June 2002, pg. 17], that all prisoner complaints required exhaustion, he had been transferred from WCJ, and administrative remedies were no longer available to him.
The district court granted the defendant's judgment, and Rodriguez appealed. The Second Circuit said it had previously held in Berry v. Kerik, 366 F.3d 85, 88 (2nd Cir. 2004)that a prisoner's complaint should be dismissed with prejudice where administrative remedies were available for a reasonable length of time and were not exhausted in the absence of any justification." The Court held Rodriguez had shown justification for not exhausting remedies.
That justification was the prisoner's belief that exhaustion was not required for a single episode of mistreatment, as a panel of the Court had deemed reasonable because it was so held in Nussle v. Willette, 224 F.3d 95 (2nd cir. 2000).
The Court said that exhaustion would be required after the ruling in Porter, but as Rodriguez had been transferred from the jurisdiction of WCJ officials, dismissal of the complaint was precluded because administrative remedies were no longer available" to Rodriguez, a condition for exhaustion under §1997 e(a).
The matter was remanded for disposition of the merits of the complaint. See: Rodriguez v. Westchester County Jail Correctional Department, 372 F.3d 485 (2nd Cir. 2004).
The defendants moved for summary judgment based on Rodriguez's failure to exhaust administrative remedies as required by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2000). Rodriguez admitted he did not exhaust administrative remedies, but sought to excuse his omission primarily for two reasons. First, he contended that he did not think exhaustion was required for a single episode of prisoner mistreatment, as distinguished from continuing prison conditions. Second, he contended that by time the Supreme Court ruled in Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516 (2002) [PLN June 2002, pg. 17], that all prisoner complaints required exhaustion, he had been transferred from WCJ, and administrative remedies were no longer available to him.
The district court granted the defendant's judgment, and Rodriguez appealed. The Second Circuit said it had previously held in Berry v. Kerik, 366 F.3d 85, 88 (2nd Cir. 2004)that a prisoner's complaint should be dismissed with prejudice where administrative remedies were available for a reasonable length of time and were not exhausted in the absence of any justification." The Court held Rodriguez had shown justification for not exhausting remedies.
That justification was the prisoner's belief that exhaustion was not required for a single episode of mistreatment, as a panel of the Court had deemed reasonable because it was so held in Nussle v. Willette, 224 F.3d 95 (2nd cir. 2000).
The Court said that exhaustion would be required after the ruling in Porter, but as Rodriguez had been transferred from the jurisdiction of WCJ officials, dismissal of the complaint was precluded because administrative remedies were no longer available" to Rodriguez, a condition for exhaustion under §1997 e(a).
The matter was remanded for disposition of the merits of the complaint. See: Rodriguez v. Westchester County Jail Correctional Department, 372 F.3d 485 (2nd Cir. 2004).
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Related legal case
Rodriguez v. Westchester County Jail Correctional
| Year | 2004 |
|---|---|
| Cite | 372 F.3d 485 (2nd Cir. 2004) |
| Level | Court of Appeals |
| Attorney Fees | 0 |
| Damages | 0 |
| Injunction Status | N/A |
Rodriguez v. Westchester County Jail Correctional Dep't, 372 F.3d 485 ( 06/24/2004)
[1] UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT August Term 2003
[2] Docket No. 02-0325
[3] 372 F.3d 485, 2004
[4] June 24, 2004
[5] IVAN RODRIGUEZ, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT,
v.
WESTCHESTER COUNTY JAIL CORRECTIONAL DEPARTMENT, ASSOC. WARDEN MIRANDA, EMERGENCY RESPONSE TEAM (ERT), WESTCHESTER COUNTY JAIL, SGT. GARY JOHNSON, SUPERVISOR, (ERT), OFFICER ROSENDORN, JOHN DOE-1, JOHN DOE-2, EMSA CORRECTIONAL CARE, DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES.
[6] SYLLABUS BY THE COURT
[7] Petition for rehearing of April 16, 2004, order denying Defendants-Appellees' motion to dismiss appeal, and remanding to District Court for consideration of the merits.
[8] Petition denied.
[9] Ivan Rodriguez, pro se, Green Haven Correctional Facility, Stormville, N.Y., submitted papers for Plaintiff-Appellant.
[10] Thomas G. Gardiner, County Attorney's Office, White Plains, N.Y., submitted papers for Defendants-Appellees.
[11] Before: Newman, Kearse, and Katzmann, Circuit Judges.
[12] The opinion of the court was delivered by: Jon O. Newman, Circuit Judge.
[13] Submitted: April 14, 2004
[14] This petition for rehearing of an order denying a motion to dismiss an appeal merits a brief explication of a narrow issue concerning exhaustion of prison administrative remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2000). The issue is whether justifiable circumstances may sometimes excuse a prisoner's failure to exhaust administrative remedies when challenging conditions of confinement. We conclude that exhaustion may sometimes be excused and should be excused in this case. We therefore deny the petition for rehearing.*fn1
[15] Ivan Rodriguez was incarcerated in the Westchester County Jail from July 1997 to November 1998, when he was transferred beyond the authority of Westchester County officials. In April 1998 he filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the District Court for the Southern District of New York against county entities and jail officials ("County Defendants") and EMSA Correctional Care ("EMSA"), alleging constitutional torts arising from an episode in October 1997. Rodriguez claimed that jail personnel beat him and that EMSA denied him proper medical treatment for his injuries.
[16] The County Defendants and EMSA filed separate motions for summary judgment, contending, among other things, that Rodriguez had failed to exhaust administrative remedies. Rodriguez acknowledged that he had not exhausted administrative remedies, but sought to excuse his omission primarily for two reasons. First, he contended that he did not think exhaustion was required for a single episode of prisoner mistreatment, as distinguished from continuing prison conditions. Second, he contended that by the time the Supreme Court ruled in Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516 (2002), that all prisoner complaints required exhaustion, he had been transferred from the Westchester County Jail, and administrative remedies were no longer available to him.
[17] The District Court (Robert P. Patterson, Jr., District Judge) granted the Defendants' motions, entering judgment for the County Defendants on August 23, 2002, and for EMSA on June 23, 2003. The Court acknowledged that in 2000, prior to the Supreme Court's 2002 decision in Porter, our Court had ruled that exhaustion was not required for single episode grievances, see Nussle v. Willette, 224 F.3d 95, 100 (2d Cir. 2000), rev'd, Porter, 534 U.S. at 523. Nevertheless, Judge Patterson concluded that Rodriguez had been required to exhaust because he had had more than a year before his transfer during which he could have exhausted then-available administrative remedies and, that during that interval, he could not have relied on Nussle, which had not then been decided.
[18] Rodriguez appealed the dismissal of his claims against the County Defendants in No. 02-0325,*fn2 and later appealed the dismissal of his claims against EMSA in No. 03-0240. The Defendants moved to dismiss both appeals because of Rodriguez's failure to exhaust administrative remedies. On April 16, 2004, we entered a brief summary order in No. 02-0325, which denied the County Defendants' motion to dismiss Rodriguez's appeal and remanded to the District Court for consideration of the merits.*fn3 Somewhat cryptically, we noted only that Rodriguez's administrative remedies became unavailable prior to the Supreme Court's ruling in Porter. The County Defendants petitioned for rehearing. On May 6, 2004, we denied the petition for rehearing in a summary order that amplified the reasons for our April 16 order. Rodriguez v. Westchester County Jail Correctional Department, No. 02-0325 (2d Cir. May 6, 2004).
[19] Our May 6 order pointed out that because a panel of this Court had interpreted the PLRA not to require exhaustion for claims of excessive force, "Rodriguez's own prior understanding of the statute, even though ultimately determined to be incorrect, see Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516 (2002), was a 'justification for not pursuing available remedies.'" Rodriguez v. Westchester County Jail Correctional Department, No. 02-0325 (2d Cir. May 6, 2004) (quoting Berry v. Kerik, 366 F.3d 85, 88 (2d Cir. 2004)). That sentence comprehended two points that we now further elaborate.
[20] First, in Berry we had stated that a prisoner's complaint should be dismissed with prejudice where administrative remedies were available for a reasonable length of time and were not exhausted "in the absence of any justification." Berry, 366 F.3d at 88. Berry thus implied that circumstances might arise that would justify and thereby excuse a failure to exhaust remedies, although such circumstances were not present in Berry's case.
[21] Second, our May 6 order applied the implication of Berry by ruling that Rodriguez had shown justification for not exhausting remedies. That justification was the prisoner's belief that exhaustion was not required, a belief deemed reasonable because it was thereafter entertained by a panel of this Court (until later rejected by the Supreme Court).
[22] The May 6 order also implicitly ruled that although exhaustion would have been required after the Supreme Court's decision in Porter, Rodriguez's transfer from the jurisdiction of Westchester County officials precluded dismissal of his complaint because the transfer rendered administrative remedies no longer "available," a condition of the exhaustion requirement of section 1997e(a).
[23] For all of these reasons, we denied the County Defendants' petition for rehearing and reconfirm that ruling today.*fn4
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Opinion Footnotes
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[24] *fn1 We originally denied the petition in a summary order filed May 6, 2004, and now deem a published opinion to be warranted.
[25] *fn2 The notice of appeal in No. 02-0325 was premature because the claims against EMSA were still pending in the District Court, and a partial judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) had not been ordered. However, the notice of appeal became effective upon the District Court's subsequent dismissal of the claims against EMSA, thereby permitting entry of a final judgment disposing of all claims. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(2).
[26] *fn3 Also on April 16, 2004, we entered a summary order granting EMSA's motion to dismiss the appeal in No. 03-0240 "because it lacks an arguable basis in fact or law. See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)."
[27] *fn4 Our May 6 ruling also rejected the County Defendants' claim that Rodriguez's appellate brief had not pursued his claim of excessive force. As we pointed out, his brief, filed October 15, 2003, explicitly stated that he was challenging the District Court's June 19, 2003, ruling, and that ruling denied Rodriguez's motion to file an amended complaint, which included an excessive force claim. The brief also identified as one of the issues presented: "Should the case be remanded for a determination as to whether the plaintiff was authorized to file an amended complaint without exhaustion[?]"
[1] UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT August Term 2003
[2] Docket No. 02-0325
[3] 372 F.3d 485, 2004
[4] June 24, 2004
[5] IVAN RODRIGUEZ, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT,
v.
WESTCHESTER COUNTY JAIL CORRECTIONAL DEPARTMENT, ASSOC. WARDEN MIRANDA, EMERGENCY RESPONSE TEAM (ERT), WESTCHESTER COUNTY JAIL, SGT. GARY JOHNSON, SUPERVISOR, (ERT), OFFICER ROSENDORN, JOHN DOE-1, JOHN DOE-2, EMSA CORRECTIONAL CARE, DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES.
[6] SYLLABUS BY THE COURT
[7] Petition for rehearing of April 16, 2004, order denying Defendants-Appellees' motion to dismiss appeal, and remanding to District Court for consideration of the merits.
[8] Petition denied.
[9] Ivan Rodriguez, pro se, Green Haven Correctional Facility, Stormville, N.Y., submitted papers for Plaintiff-Appellant.
[10] Thomas G. Gardiner, County Attorney's Office, White Plains, N.Y., submitted papers for Defendants-Appellees.
[11] Before: Newman, Kearse, and Katzmann, Circuit Judges.
[12] The opinion of the court was delivered by: Jon O. Newman, Circuit Judge.
[13] Submitted: April 14, 2004
[14] This petition for rehearing of an order denying a motion to dismiss an appeal merits a brief explication of a narrow issue concerning exhaustion of prison administrative remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2000). The issue is whether justifiable circumstances may sometimes excuse a prisoner's failure to exhaust administrative remedies when challenging conditions of confinement. We conclude that exhaustion may sometimes be excused and should be excused in this case. We therefore deny the petition for rehearing.*fn1
[15] Ivan Rodriguez was incarcerated in the Westchester County Jail from July 1997 to November 1998, when he was transferred beyond the authority of Westchester County officials. In April 1998 he filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the District Court for the Southern District of New York against county entities and jail officials ("County Defendants") and EMSA Correctional Care ("EMSA"), alleging constitutional torts arising from an episode in October 1997. Rodriguez claimed that jail personnel beat him and that EMSA denied him proper medical treatment for his injuries.
[16] The County Defendants and EMSA filed separate motions for summary judgment, contending, among other things, that Rodriguez had failed to exhaust administrative remedies. Rodriguez acknowledged that he had not exhausted administrative remedies, but sought to excuse his omission primarily for two reasons. First, he contended that he did not think exhaustion was required for a single episode of prisoner mistreatment, as distinguished from continuing prison conditions. Second, he contended that by the time the Supreme Court ruled in Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516 (2002), that all prisoner complaints required exhaustion, he had been transferred from the Westchester County Jail, and administrative remedies were no longer available to him.
[17] The District Court (Robert P. Patterson, Jr., District Judge) granted the Defendants' motions, entering judgment for the County Defendants on August 23, 2002, and for EMSA on June 23, 2003. The Court acknowledged that in 2000, prior to the Supreme Court's 2002 decision in Porter, our Court had ruled that exhaustion was not required for single episode grievances, see Nussle v. Willette, 224 F.3d 95, 100 (2d Cir. 2000), rev'd, Porter, 534 U.S. at 523. Nevertheless, Judge Patterson concluded that Rodriguez had been required to exhaust because he had had more than a year before his transfer during which he could have exhausted then-available administrative remedies and, that during that interval, he could not have relied on Nussle, which had not then been decided.
[18] Rodriguez appealed the dismissal of his claims against the County Defendants in No. 02-0325,*fn2 and later appealed the dismissal of his claims against EMSA in No. 03-0240. The Defendants moved to dismiss both appeals because of Rodriguez's failure to exhaust administrative remedies. On April 16, 2004, we entered a brief summary order in No. 02-0325, which denied the County Defendants' motion to dismiss Rodriguez's appeal and remanded to the District Court for consideration of the merits.*fn3 Somewhat cryptically, we noted only that Rodriguez's administrative remedies became unavailable prior to the Supreme Court's ruling in Porter. The County Defendants petitioned for rehearing. On May 6, 2004, we denied the petition for rehearing in a summary order that amplified the reasons for our April 16 order. Rodriguez v. Westchester County Jail Correctional Department, No. 02-0325 (2d Cir. May 6, 2004).
[19] Our May 6 order pointed out that because a panel of this Court had interpreted the PLRA not to require exhaustion for claims of excessive force, "Rodriguez's own prior understanding of the statute, even though ultimately determined to be incorrect, see Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516 (2002), was a 'justification for not pursuing available remedies.'" Rodriguez v. Westchester County Jail Correctional Department, No. 02-0325 (2d Cir. May 6, 2004) (quoting Berry v. Kerik, 366 F.3d 85, 88 (2d Cir. 2004)). That sentence comprehended two points that we now further elaborate.
[20] First, in Berry we had stated that a prisoner's complaint should be dismissed with prejudice where administrative remedies were available for a reasonable length of time and were not exhausted "in the absence of any justification." Berry, 366 F.3d at 88. Berry thus implied that circumstances might arise that would justify and thereby excuse a failure to exhaust remedies, although such circumstances were not present in Berry's case.
[21] Second, our May 6 order applied the implication of Berry by ruling that Rodriguez had shown justification for not exhausting remedies. That justification was the prisoner's belief that exhaustion was not required, a belief deemed reasonable because it was thereafter entertained by a panel of this Court (until later rejected by the Supreme Court).
[22] The May 6 order also implicitly ruled that although exhaustion would have been required after the Supreme Court's decision in Porter, Rodriguez's transfer from the jurisdiction of Westchester County officials precluded dismissal of his complaint because the transfer rendered administrative remedies no longer "available," a condition of the exhaustion requirement of section 1997e(a).
[23] For all of these reasons, we denied the County Defendants' petition for rehearing and reconfirm that ruling today.*fn4
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Opinion Footnotes
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[24] *fn1 We originally denied the petition in a summary order filed May 6, 2004, and now deem a published opinion to be warranted.
[25] *fn2 The notice of appeal in No. 02-0325 was premature because the claims against EMSA were still pending in the District Court, and a partial judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) had not been ordered. However, the notice of appeal became effective upon the District Court's subsequent dismissal of the claims against EMSA, thereby permitting entry of a final judgment disposing of all claims. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(2).
[26] *fn3 Also on April 16, 2004, we entered a summary order granting EMSA's motion to dismiss the appeal in No. 03-0240 "because it lacks an arguable basis in fact or law. See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)."
[27] *fn4 Our May 6 ruling also rejected the County Defendants' claim that Rodriguez's appellate brief had not pursued his claim of excessive force. As we pointed out, his brief, filed October 15, 2003, explicitly stated that he was challenging the District Court's June 19, 2003, ruling, and that ruling denied Rodriguez's motion to file an amended complaint, which included an excessive force claim. The brief also identified as one of the issues presented: "Should the case be remanded for a determination as to whether the plaintiff was authorized to file an amended complaint without exhaustion[?]"