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Prior Sex Offense Plea Qualifies For California Sexually Violent Predator Civil Commitment
The San Joaquin County California District Attorney requested review by the
State Supreme Court of an appellate decision that State prisoner Norman
Yartz's first sex offense conviction in 1978 could not be used to support
his civil commitment as a Sexually Violent Predator (SVP). The issue before
the Court was whether a statutory SVP Act proceeding is a "civil suit"
which would prohibit the State from declaring Yartz an SVP.
In 1985, Yartz was convicted on a second sex offense. In 1997 while he was
still incarcerated, the San Jouquin County District Attorney petitioned to
civilly commit him as an SVP. Yartz moved to exclude his 1978 sex offense
conviction based upon California statutory law in effect at the time of
that crime which prohibited no contest pleas as the basis for an SVP Act
commitment proceeding. Yartz had pled no contest in his 1978 conviction.
The Court held that the 1982 amendment controlled in this case since
proceedings under the SVP Act are not a civil action. The critical
distinction between a civil action and a special proceeding of a civil
nature (the SVP Act) is that such Act is neither an action at law or a suit
in equity but a "civil commitment proceeding commenced by petition
independently of a pending action". The Court cited People v. Superior
Court (Cheek). 94 Cal. App.4th 980, 988 (2001) as controlling authority. A
dissenting opinion from the majority held that Cartwright v. Board of
Chiropractic Examiners, 16 Cal.3d 762 (1976) permitted those who entered a
no contest plea to a sex offense to not have such pleas used in sex
offender civil commitment proceedings. See: People v. Yartz, 37 Cal.4th
529, 123 P.3d 604 (Cal. 2005).
State Supreme Court of an appellate decision that State prisoner Norman
Yartz's first sex offense conviction in 1978 could not be used to support
his civil commitment as a Sexually Violent Predator (SVP). The issue before
the Court was whether a statutory SVP Act proceeding is a "civil suit"
which would prohibit the State from declaring Yartz an SVP.
In 1985, Yartz was convicted on a second sex offense. In 1997 while he was
still incarcerated, the San Jouquin County District Attorney petitioned to
civilly commit him as an SVP. Yartz moved to exclude his 1978 sex offense
conviction based upon California statutory law in effect at the time of
that crime which prohibited no contest pleas as the basis for an SVP Act
commitment proceeding. Yartz had pled no contest in his 1978 conviction.
The Court held that the 1982 amendment controlled in this case since
proceedings under the SVP Act are not a civil action. The critical
distinction between a civil action and a special proceeding of a civil
nature (the SVP Act) is that such Act is neither an action at law or a suit
in equity but a "civil commitment proceeding commenced by petition
independently of a pending action". The Court cited People v. Superior
Court (Cheek). 94 Cal. App.4th 980, 988 (2001) as controlling authority. A
dissenting opinion from the majority held that Cartwright v. Board of
Chiropractic Examiners, 16 Cal.3d 762 (1976) permitted those who entered a
no contest plea to a sex offense to not have such pleas used in sex
offender civil commitment proceedings. See: People v. Yartz, 37 Cal.4th
529, 123 P.3d 604 (Cal. 2005).
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