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$7,500 of Personal Injury Award Exempt From Attachment By Illinois DOC
Lonnie Booth was an Illinois state prisoner in May 2001 when he received a $41,715.57 settlement in a personal injury suit after attorney fees and costs were deducted. In January 2003, the DOC filed suit seeking to recover $40,656.89 plus court costs as reimbursement for the costs of Booth's incarceration. Booth failed to appear at a hearing and the judge entered an order awarding the DOC $40,656.89. Booth then moved for declaratory judgment, claiming the settlement award was exempt under section 12-1001(h)(4), Code of Civil Procedure [735 ILCS 5/12-1001(h)(4)].
Section 4-101(11) of the Code of Civil Procedure [735 ILCS 5/4-101(11)] states that the Attorney General may attach the property of prisoners' in cases brought under Section 3-7-6 of the unified Code of Corrections. However, 735 ILCS 5/12-1001(h)(4) provides for a $7,500 exemption for payments in personal injury cases. 730 ILCS 5/3-7-6(e)(3) allows the DOC to seek reimbursement of costs of incarceration from any asset in the possession of a prisoner or former prisoner. However, the attachment of the assets must conform with state and federal limitations on the collection of money judgments. [Readers should note that states cannot seize section 1983 judgements or settlements under the supremacy clause of the U.S. constitution.]
The DOC moved for summary judgment alleging no material facts were in dispute. The trial court granted the motion, but exempted $7,500 of the settlement award from attachment. The DOC appealed, claiming that section 3-7-6 did not provide any exemptions from attachment in suits for recovery of incarceration costs brought by the DOC.
Booth failed to file an appeal brief. Normally, this would be fatal to his position on appeal. However, in this case, the appeals court held that the record was so simple and the issues were so clear cut that it could decide the case on the merits without Booth's brief.
The last sentence in Section 7-3-6(e)(3) states: No provision of this Section shall be construed in violation of any state or federal limitation on the collection of money damages." The court of appeals held that the attachment sought by the DOC was therefore subject to all limitations on it provided by state and federal law. Because state statute, 735 ILCS 5/12-100l(h)(4), clearly exempted $7,500 of the personal injury settlement award from attachment, the DOC could not attach the $7,500. The court did not need to use the construction aides the state suggested because the language of the statute was plain, clear, and unambiguous, requiring no further construction. The judgment of the trial court was affirmed. See: Illinois v. Booth, 815 N.E.2d 1206 (Ill.App.3d Cir. 2004).
The Illinois supreme court granted review and on May 19, 2005, issued a brief ruling affirming the appeals court ruling that the DOC could not attach $7,500.00 of Booth's damage award in this case. See: People ex rel. Dir. of Corr. v. Booth, 215 Ill. 2d 416 (Ill. 2005).
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People ex rel. Dir. of Corr. v. Booth
Year | 2005 |
---|---|
Cite | 215 Ill. 2d 416 (Ill. 2005). |
Level | State Supreme Court |
Conclusion | Bench Verdict |
Attorney Fees | 0 |
Damages | 0 |
Injunction Status | Granted |
[23] We note, moreover, that the record in this case is brief, the facts are straightforward, and the claimed error can easily be resolved without the aid of an appellee's brief. Where such circumstances have been present in previous cases, our court has held that we should decide the appeal on the merits. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Rogers, 213 Ill. 2d 129, 135 (2004); People v. Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d 220, 223 (2003). There is no reason to depart from that approach here. The state does not argue otherwise. Accordingly, we shall proceed to the merits of the appeal.
[24] We begin by pointing out what is not in dispute. No one questions that the state had the right to seek reimbursement from Booth under section 3-7-6 of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/3-7-6 (West 2002)) for the expenses it incurred in keeping him incarcerated. The state's compliance with the relevant requirements for initiating a claim for reimbursement under the statute is not challenged. The amount Booth owed was calculated in accordance with statutory requirements, and the accuracy of the state's calculations is conceded. No procedural irregularities have been raised with respect to the circuit court's handling of the case. The judgment awarded by the circuit court has ample support in the record.
[25] Under the statute, Booth clearly owes the state the sum of $40,656.89, as the circuit court found. Booth does not dispute that he owes the state this amount. The issue is simply whether the full amount of the $41,715.57 payment made to Booth in settlement of his personal injury action can be reached by the state to satisfy the judgment.
[26] Resolution of that issue turns on a single question: Does the $7,500 statutory exemption for personal injury payments set forth in section 12-1001(h)(4) of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/12-1001(h)(4) (West 2002)) apply to actions brought under section 3-7-6 of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/3-7-6 (West 2002)), as this one was? Our answer to that question involves no disputed issues of fact. It is purely a matter of statutory construction. How statutes should be construed presents a question of law, which we review de novo. Department of Transportation ex rel. People v. 151 Interstate Road Corp., 209 Ill. 2d 471, 485 (2004). De novo review is also appropriate because the appeal arises from an order granting summary judgment. People ex rel. Birkett v. City of Chicago, 202 Ill. 2d 36, 54 (2002).
[27] The cardinal rule of statutory construction, to which all other rules and canons are subordinate, is to ascertain and give effect to the true intent of the legislature. The best evidence of legislative intent is the language used in the statute itself, which must be given its plain, ordinary and popularly understood meaning. The statute should be evaluated as a whole, with each provision construed in connection with every other relevant section. Carver v. Sheriff of La Salle County, 203 Ill. 2d 497, 507-08 (2003). If the language of the statute is clear, it must be given effect without resort to other interpretive aids. In re Marriage of Rogers, 213 Ill. 2d at 136.
[28] The $41,715.57 payment made to Booth in settlement of his personal injury action falls squarely within the terms of section 12-1001 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which, as we have previously discussed, exempts from judgment, attachment or distress for rent various types of personal property, including payments of up to $7,500 made "on account of personal bodily injury of the debtor" (735 ILCS 5/12-1001(h)(4) (West 2002)). Because the settlement is subject to this statutory exemption, and because the judgment obtained by the state would consume nearly all of the settlement proceeds, allowing the state to collect the judgment out of the settlement proceeds, which are the only funds Booth had, would necessarily violate the express provisions of section 12-1001(h)(4). Such a result would, in turn, contravene the express provisions of section 3-7-6 of the Unified Code of Corrections, which specifies that "[n]o provision of this Section shall be construed in violation of any State or federal limitation on the collection of money judgments." 730 ILCS 5/3-7-6(e)(3) (West 2002). Accordingly, the circuit and appellate courts were correct to hold that $7,500 of Booth's personal injury settlement was exempt from collection by the state in this case.
[29] The state argues that because section 3-7-6 of the Unified Code of Corrections deals specifically with actions for reimbursement of incarceration expenses while section 12-1001 of the Code of Civil Procedure applies generally to judgments and attachments in civil cases, section 3-7-6 of the Unified Code of Corrections trumps section 12-1001 and renders it inapplicable. This argument is untenable. It is true, generally speaking, that specific statutory provisions control over general provisions on the same subject. That principle only applies, however, if the two statutes cannot be construed harmoniously. Williams v. Illinois State Scholarship Comm'n, 139 Ill. 2d 24, 57 (1990). Such a situation is not present here. There is no conflict between section 3-7-6 of the Unified Code of Corrections and section 12-1001 of the Code of Civil Procedure. To the contrary, section 3-7-6(e)(3)'s admonition that "[n]o provision of this Section shall be construed in violation of any State or federal limitation on the collection of money judgments" (730 ILCS 5/3-7-6(e)(3) (West 2002)) mandates that section 3-7-6 be read in harmony with provisions such as section 12-1001 of the Code of Civil Procedure governing normal civil proceedings to enforce money judgments. Any construction of the law that would place it in conflict with those provisions is expressly prohibited.
[30] The language employed by the General Assembly in section 3-7-6(e)(3) leaves no doubt as to the legislature's intent. Actions by the state to obtain reimbursement of incarceration expenses do not override the normal legal restrictions that otherwise govern civil damage claims. In an effort to avoid that conclusion, the state argues that we should look beyond the particular text of the statute. Although the legislature wrote that no provision of section 3-7-6 shall be construed in violation of state or federal limitations on the collection of money judgments, the state argues that what the legislature actually meant was that no provision of the statute should be construed as a violation of any state or federal limitations on collection of money judgments.
[31] Under the state's view of the law, action that would otherwise be contrary to state or federal law if done in conventional proceedings to collect money judgments would be considered wholly permissible so long as it was done in furtherance of proceedings to recover the expenses of incarceration. Taken to its natural conclusion, the state's interpretation would mean that whenever recovery of incarceration costs is involved, the proceedings would be beyond the reach of any other law, state or federal, pertaining to the collection of money judgments.
[32] We reject this construction of the law for two reasons. First, it would require us to conclude that the Illinois General Assembly and the courts of our state have the authority to validate action that would otherwise be impermissible under federal law. We have no such authority. Under the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., art. VI, cl. 2), federal law preempts a conflicting state law and the state law is nullified to the extent that it actually conflicts with federal law. See In re Marriage of Hulstrom, 342 Ill. App. 3d 262, 266 (2003).
[33] Second, and most importantly, the state's construction of the law is not supported by the language actually used by the General Assembly. The law clearly states that no provision of section 3-7-6 shall be construed in violation of state or federal limitations. It does not say that no provision of the statute should be construed as a violation of any state or federal limitations, as the state urges. Had the legislature intended the latter terminology, it would have utilized that language in drafting the law. It did not, and our authority to interpret statutes does not give us the power to rewrite the law or depart from its plain language. In re Michelle J., 209 Ill. 2d 428, 437 (2004). Where, as here, a statute is clear and unambiguous, it must be enforced as written. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Aldridge, 179 Ill. 2d 141, 154 (1997).
[34] For the foregoing reasons, we agree with the appellate court that the circuit court did not err in applying the $7,500 exemption set forth in section 12-1001(h)(4) of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/12-1001(h)(4) (West 2002)) to the action brought against Booth under section 3-7-6 of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/3-7-6 (West 2002)) to recoup the costs of his incarceration. The judgment of the appellate court is therefore affirmed.
[35] Affirmed.
[24] We begin by pointing out what is not in dispute. No one questions that the state had the right to seek reimbursement from Booth under section 3-7-6 of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/3-7-6 (West 2002)) for the expenses it incurred in keeping him incarcerated. The state's compliance with the relevant requirements for initiating a claim for reimbursement under the statute is not challenged. The amount Booth owed was calculated in accordance with statutory requirements, and the accuracy of the state's calculations is conceded. No procedural irregularities have been raised with respect to the circuit court's handling of the case. The judgment awarded by the circuit court has ample support in the record.
[25] Under the statute, Booth clearly owes the state the sum of $40,656.89, as the circuit court found. Booth does not dispute that he owes the state this amount. The issue is simply whether the full amount of the $41,715.57 payment made to Booth in settlement of his personal injury action can be reached by the state to satisfy the judgment.
[26] Resolution of that issue turns on a single question: Does the $7,500 statutory exemption for personal injury payments set forth in section 12-1001(h)(4) of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/12-1001(h)(4) (West 2002)) apply to actions brought under section 3-7-6 of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/3-7-6 (West 2002)), as this one was? Our answer to that question involves no disputed issues of fact. It is purely a matter of statutory construction. How statutes should be construed presents a question of law, which we review de novo. Department of Transportation ex rel. People v. 151 Interstate Road Corp., 209 Ill. 2d 471, 485 (2004). De novo review is also appropriate because the appeal arises from an order granting summary judgment. People ex rel. Birkett v. City of Chicago, 202 Ill. 2d 36, 54 (2002).
[27] The cardinal rule of statutory construction, to which all other rules and canons are subordinate, is to ascertain and give effect to the true intent of the legislature. The best evidence of legislative intent is the language used in the statute itself, which must be given its plain, ordinary and popularly understood meaning. The statute should be evaluated as a whole, with each provision construed in connection with every other relevant section. Carver v. Sheriff of La Salle County, 203 Ill. 2d 497, 507-08 (2003). If the language of the statute is clear, it must be given effect without resort to other interpretive aids. In re Marriage of Rogers, 213 Ill. 2d at 136.
[28] The $41,715.57 payment made to Booth in settlement of his personal injury action falls squarely within the terms of section 12-1001 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which, as we have previously discussed, exempts from judgment, attachment or distress for rent various types of personal property, including payments of up to $7,500 made "on account of personal bodily injury of the debtor" (735 ILCS 5/12-1001(h)(4) (West 2002)). Because the settlement is subject to this statutory exemption, and because the judgment obtained by the state would consume nearly all of the settlement proceeds, allowing the state to collect the judgment out of the settlement proceeds, which are the only funds Booth had, would necessarily violate the express provisions of section 12-1001(h)(4). Such a result would, in turn, contravene the express provisions of section 3-7-6 of the Unified Code of Corrections, which specifies that "[n]o provision of this Section shall be construed in violation of any State or federal limitation on the collection of money judgments." 730 ILCS 5/3-7-6(e)(3) (West 2002). Accordingly, the circuit and appellate courts were correct to hold that $7,500 of Booth's personal injury settlement was exempt from collection by the state in this case.
[29] The state argues that because section 3-7-6 of the Unified Code of Corrections deals specifically with actions for reimbursement of incarceration expenses while section 12-1001 of the Code of Civil Procedure applies generally to judgments and attachments in civil cases, section 3-7-6 of the Unified Code of Corrections trumps section 12-1001 and renders it inapplicable. This argument is untenable. It is true, generally speaking, that specific statutory provisions control over general provisions on the same subject. That principle only applies, however, if the two statutes cannot be construed harmoniously. Williams v. Illinois State Scholarship Comm'n, 139 Ill. 2d 24, 57 (1990). Such a situation is not present here. There is no conflict between section 3-7-6 of the Unified Code of Corrections and section 12-1001 of the Code of Civil Procedure. To the contrary, section 3-7-6(e)(3)'s admonition that "[n]o provision of this Section shall be construed in violation of any State or federal limitation on the collection of money judgments" (730 ILCS 5/3-7-6(e)(3) (West 2002)) mandates that section 3-7-6 be read in harmony with provisions such as section 12-1001 of the Code of Civil Procedure governing normal civil proceedings to enforce money judgments. Any construction of the law that would place it in conflict with those provisions is expressly prohibited.
[30] The language employed by the General Assembly in section 3-7-6(e)(3) leaves no doubt as to the legislature's intent. Actions by the state to obtain reimbursement of incarceration expenses do not override the normal legal restrictions that otherwise govern civil damage claims. In an effort to avoid that conclusion, the state argues that we should look beyond the particular text of the statute. Although the legislature wrote that no provision of section 3-7-6 shall be construed in violation of state or federal limitations on the collection of money judgments, the state argues that what the legislature actually meant was that no provision of the statute should be construed as a violation of any state or federal limitations on collection of money judgments.
[31] Under the state's view of the law, action that would otherwise be contrary to state or federal law if done in conventional proceedings to collect money judgments would be considered wholly permissible so long as it was done in furtherance of proceedings to recover the expenses of incarceration. Taken to its natural conclusion, the state's interpretation would mean that whenever recovery of incarceration costs is involved, the proceedings would be beyond the reach of any other law, state or federal, pertaining to the collection of money judgments.
[32] We reject this construction of the law for two reasons. First, it would require us to conclude that the Illinois General Assembly and the courts of our state have the authority to validate action that would otherwise be impermissible under federal law. We have no such authority. Under the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., art. VI, cl. 2), federal law preempts a conflicting state law and the state law is nullified to the extent that it actually conflicts with federal law. See In re Marriage of Hulstrom, 342 Ill. App. 3d 262, 266 (2003).
[33] Second, and most importantly, the state's construction of the law is not supported by the language actually used by the General Assembly. The law clearly states that no provision of section 3-7-6 shall be construed in violation of state or federal limitations. It does not say that no provision of the statute should be construed as a violation of any state or federal limitations, as the state urges. Had the legislature intended the latter terminology, it would have utilized that language in drafting the law. It did not, and our authority to interpret statutes does not give us the power to rewrite the law or depart from its plain language. In re Michelle J., 209 Ill. 2d 428, 437 (2004). Where, as here, a statute is clear and unambiguous, it must be enforced as written. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Aldridge, 179 Ill. 2d 141, 154 (1997).
[34] For the foregoing reasons, we agree with the appellate court that the circuit court did not err in applying the $7,500 exemption set forth in section 12-1001(h)(4) of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/12-1001(h)(4) (West 2002)) to the action brought against Booth under section 3-7-6 of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/3-7-6 (West 2002)) to recoup the costs of his incarceration. The judgment of the appellate court is therefore affirmed.
[35] Affirmed.
People ex rel. Director of Dept. of Corrections v.
Year | 2004 |
---|---|
Cite | 815 N.E.2d 1206 (Ill. App.3d Cir. 2004). |
Level | State Court of Appeals |
Conclusion | Bench Verdict |
Attorney Fees | 0 |
Damages | 0 |
Injunction Status | Granted |
352 Ill.App.3d 297, 815 N.E.2d 1206, 287 Ill.Dec. 403
Appellate Court of Illinois, Third District.
The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois ex rel. The DIRECTOR OF the DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Lonnie BOOTH, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 3-03-0821.
Sept. 2, 2004.
**1206 *298 ***403 Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, Gary S. Feinerman, Solicitor General, Jan E. Hughes, Assistant Attorney General, Chicago, for the People.
Lonnie Booth, Danville, for Lonnie Booth.
Justice McDADE delivered the opinion of the court:
The plaintiff, the Director of the Department of Corrections (DOC), sued the defendant,**1207 ***404 Lonnie Booth, an inmate in the DOC, to recover the costs of the defendant's incarceration. The circuit court judge entered an order for summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff for $40,656.89 plus costs, but held that section 12-1001(h)(4) of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/12-1001(h)(4) (West 2002)) exempted $7,500 from the award. The plaintiff appeals, contending that the exemption should not apply in this case. We affirm.
The defendant was incarcerated in April 2001. In May 2001, he received a settlement from personal injury litigation in the amount of $41,715.57 after attorney fees and costs.
In January 2003, the plaintiff filed suit against the defendant, seeking to recover $40,656.89 as reimbursement for the cost of the defendant's incarceration. After the defendant failed to appear at a hearing on a motion for attachment, the circuit court entered an order in favor of the plaintiff for $40,656.89. In response, the defendant moved for declaratory judgment, contending that his settlement money was exempt under section 12-1001(h)(4) of the Code of Civil Procedure. The plaintiff moved for summary judgment, contending that no material facts were in dispute and that the plaintiff had a statutory right to reimbursement pursuant to section 3-7-6 of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/3-7-6 (West 2002)).
The circuit court granted the plaintiff's motion and entered judgment for $40,656.89, but held that section 12-1001(h)(4) exempted $7,500 from the award. The plaintiff appeals, contending that section 3-7-6 does not provide for any exemptions to DOC suits for recovery of incarceration costs.
*299 This case presents an issue of statutory construction. When construing a statute, we are to determine and give effect to the legislature's intent. People v. Robinson, 172 Ill.2d 452, 217 Ill.Dec. 729, 667 N.E.2d 1305 (1996). In doing so, we look to the plain language of the statute; if the statute's plain meaning is clear and unambiguous, we are to apply the statute without using further tools of statutory construction. Robinson, 172 Ill.2d 452, 217 Ill.Dec. 729, 667 N.E.2d 1305. Because statutory construction is a question of law, we review the circuit court's order de novo. Robinson, 172 Ill.2d 452, 217 Ill.Dec. 729, 667 N.E.2d 1305.
Initially, we note that the defendant did not file an appellee's brief with this court. Generally, we will not act as an advocate for an appellee who fails to file a brief. See First Capitol Mortgage Corp. v. Talandis Construction Corp., 63 Ill.2d 128, 345 N.E.2d 493 (1976). However, when a record is simple and the claimed error can easily be decided without the aid of an appellee's brief, we should decide the appeal's merits. First Capitol Mortgage Corp., 63 Ill.2d 128, 345 N.E.2d 493. We believe we can decide the merits of this appeal without the aid of an appellee's brief.
Section 3-7-6(a) of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/3-7-6(a) (West 2002)) provides that inmates shall be responsible to the DOC for the cost of their incarceration. Section 3-7-6(d) of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/3-7-6(d) (West 2002)) provides that, upon authorization from the Director of the DOC, the Attorney General can institute proceedings to reach an inmate's assets in order to cover the cost of incarceration. Assets are defined as:
"[A]ny property, tangible or intangible, real or personal, belonging to or due to a committed or formerly committed person including income or payments to the person from social security, worker's compensation, veteran's compensation, pension benefits, or from any other **1208 ***405 source whatsoever and any and all assets and property of whatever character held in the name of the person, held for the benefit of the person, or payable or otherwise deliverable to the person. Any trust, or portion of a trust, of which a convicted person is a beneficiary, shall be construed as an asset of the person, to the extent that benefits thereunder are required to be paid to the person, or shall in fact be paid to the person. At the time of a legal proceeding by the Attorney General under this Section, if it appears that the committed person has any assets which ought to be subjected to the claim of the Department under this Section, the court may issue an order requiring any person, corporation, or other legal entity possessed or having custody of those assets to appropriate any of the assets or a portion thereof toward reimbursing the Department as provided for under this Section. No provision of *300 this Section shall be construed in violation of any State or federal limitation on the collection of money judgments." (Emphasis added.) (730 ILCS 5/3-7-6(e)(3) (West 2002)).
Furthermore, section 4-101(11) of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/4-101(11) (West 2002)) provides that the Attorney General may attach the property of an inmate in cases brought under section 3-7-6 of the Unified Code of Corrections. An exemption exists, however, for an amount no greater than $7,500 from a payment received by the debtor due to personal bodily injury. 735 ILCS 5/12-1001(h)(4) (West 2002).
The plaintiff contends that the last sentence in section 3-7-6(e)(3) means that denying an exemption, such as the one in section 12-1001(h)(4), in cases involving the attachment of prisoner assets does not violate any state or federal statute. The plaintiff essentially argues that section 3-7-6(e)(3) authorizes the Director of the DOC and the Attorney General to reach as far as possible into prisoners' assets because the normal restrictions on attachments do not apply to prisoners. We do not believe the legislature intended this reading of section 3-7-6(e)(3).
The plain language of section 3-7-6(e)(3) does indeed authorize the Director of the DOC and the Attorney General to reach far into prisoners' assets; however, the last sentence forbids the Director of the DOC and the Attorney General from violating any state or federal law limiting a creditor's ability to collect in the process. Because the exemption in section 12-1001(h)(4) clearly applies to the defendant's personal injury settlement award, and because section 3-7-6(e)(3) clearly requires that the Attorney General honor such exemptions, we decline to construe section 3-7-6(e)(3) as denying prisoners the protections afforded to debtors in section 12-1001(h)(4). We therefore hold that the circuit court properly construed section 3-7-6(e)(3) when it applied the section 12-1001(h)(4) exemption in the case below.
The plaintiff also argues that a tool of statutory construction-when two statutes deal with a similar legal issue, the more specific statute controls-mandates that we vacate the portion of the circuit court's order exempting $7,500 from the award. Because the plain language of section 3-7-6(e)(3) is clear and unambiguous, we need not resort to further tools of statutory construction and we need not consider this argument. See Robinson, 172 Ill.2d 452, 217 Ill.Dec. 729, 667 N.E.2d 1305.
*301 The judgment of the circuit court of Rock Island County is affirmed.
Affirmed.
O'BRIEN and BARRY, JJ., concur.
Appellate Court of Illinois, Third District.
The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois ex rel. The DIRECTOR OF the DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Lonnie BOOTH, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 3-03-0821.
Sept. 2, 2004.
**1206 *298 ***403 Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, Gary S. Feinerman, Solicitor General, Jan E. Hughes, Assistant Attorney General, Chicago, for the People.
Lonnie Booth, Danville, for Lonnie Booth.
Justice McDADE delivered the opinion of the court:
The plaintiff, the Director of the Department of Corrections (DOC), sued the defendant,**1207 ***404 Lonnie Booth, an inmate in the DOC, to recover the costs of the defendant's incarceration. The circuit court judge entered an order for summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff for $40,656.89 plus costs, but held that section 12-1001(h)(4) of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/12-1001(h)(4) (West 2002)) exempted $7,500 from the award. The plaintiff appeals, contending that the exemption should not apply in this case. We affirm.
The defendant was incarcerated in April 2001. In May 2001, he received a settlement from personal injury litigation in the amount of $41,715.57 after attorney fees and costs.
In January 2003, the plaintiff filed suit against the defendant, seeking to recover $40,656.89 as reimbursement for the cost of the defendant's incarceration. After the defendant failed to appear at a hearing on a motion for attachment, the circuit court entered an order in favor of the plaintiff for $40,656.89. In response, the defendant moved for declaratory judgment, contending that his settlement money was exempt under section 12-1001(h)(4) of the Code of Civil Procedure. The plaintiff moved for summary judgment, contending that no material facts were in dispute and that the plaintiff had a statutory right to reimbursement pursuant to section 3-7-6 of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/3-7-6 (West 2002)).
The circuit court granted the plaintiff's motion and entered judgment for $40,656.89, but held that section 12-1001(h)(4) exempted $7,500 from the award. The plaintiff appeals, contending that section 3-7-6 does not provide for any exemptions to DOC suits for recovery of incarceration costs.
*299 This case presents an issue of statutory construction. When construing a statute, we are to determine and give effect to the legislature's intent. People v. Robinson, 172 Ill.2d 452, 217 Ill.Dec. 729, 667 N.E.2d 1305 (1996). In doing so, we look to the plain language of the statute; if the statute's plain meaning is clear and unambiguous, we are to apply the statute without using further tools of statutory construction. Robinson, 172 Ill.2d 452, 217 Ill.Dec. 729, 667 N.E.2d 1305. Because statutory construction is a question of law, we review the circuit court's order de novo. Robinson, 172 Ill.2d 452, 217 Ill.Dec. 729, 667 N.E.2d 1305.
Initially, we note that the defendant did not file an appellee's brief with this court. Generally, we will not act as an advocate for an appellee who fails to file a brief. See First Capitol Mortgage Corp. v. Talandis Construction Corp., 63 Ill.2d 128, 345 N.E.2d 493 (1976). However, when a record is simple and the claimed error can easily be decided without the aid of an appellee's brief, we should decide the appeal's merits. First Capitol Mortgage Corp., 63 Ill.2d 128, 345 N.E.2d 493. We believe we can decide the merits of this appeal without the aid of an appellee's brief.
Section 3-7-6(a) of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/3-7-6(a) (West 2002)) provides that inmates shall be responsible to the DOC for the cost of their incarceration. Section 3-7-6(d) of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/3-7-6(d) (West 2002)) provides that, upon authorization from the Director of the DOC, the Attorney General can institute proceedings to reach an inmate's assets in order to cover the cost of incarceration. Assets are defined as:
"[A]ny property, tangible or intangible, real or personal, belonging to or due to a committed or formerly committed person including income or payments to the person from social security, worker's compensation, veteran's compensation, pension benefits, or from any other **1208 ***405 source whatsoever and any and all assets and property of whatever character held in the name of the person, held for the benefit of the person, or payable or otherwise deliverable to the person. Any trust, or portion of a trust, of which a convicted person is a beneficiary, shall be construed as an asset of the person, to the extent that benefits thereunder are required to be paid to the person, or shall in fact be paid to the person. At the time of a legal proceeding by the Attorney General under this Section, if it appears that the committed person has any assets which ought to be subjected to the claim of the Department under this Section, the court may issue an order requiring any person, corporation, or other legal entity possessed or having custody of those assets to appropriate any of the assets or a portion thereof toward reimbursing the Department as provided for under this Section. No provision of *300 this Section shall be construed in violation of any State or federal limitation on the collection of money judgments." (Emphasis added.) (730 ILCS 5/3-7-6(e)(3) (West 2002)).
Furthermore, section 4-101(11) of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/4-101(11) (West 2002)) provides that the Attorney General may attach the property of an inmate in cases brought under section 3-7-6 of the Unified Code of Corrections. An exemption exists, however, for an amount no greater than $7,500 from a payment received by the debtor due to personal bodily injury. 735 ILCS 5/12-1001(h)(4) (West 2002).
The plaintiff contends that the last sentence in section 3-7-6(e)(3) means that denying an exemption, such as the one in section 12-1001(h)(4), in cases involving the attachment of prisoner assets does not violate any state or federal statute. The plaintiff essentially argues that section 3-7-6(e)(3) authorizes the Director of the DOC and the Attorney General to reach as far as possible into prisoners' assets because the normal restrictions on attachments do not apply to prisoners. We do not believe the legislature intended this reading of section 3-7-6(e)(3).
The plain language of section 3-7-6(e)(3) does indeed authorize the Director of the DOC and the Attorney General to reach far into prisoners' assets; however, the last sentence forbids the Director of the DOC and the Attorney General from violating any state or federal law limiting a creditor's ability to collect in the process. Because the exemption in section 12-1001(h)(4) clearly applies to the defendant's personal injury settlement award, and because section 3-7-6(e)(3) clearly requires that the Attorney General honor such exemptions, we decline to construe section 3-7-6(e)(3) as denying prisoners the protections afforded to debtors in section 12-1001(h)(4). We therefore hold that the circuit court properly construed section 3-7-6(e)(3) when it applied the section 12-1001(h)(4) exemption in the case below.
The plaintiff also argues that a tool of statutory construction-when two statutes deal with a similar legal issue, the more specific statute controls-mandates that we vacate the portion of the circuit court's order exempting $7,500 from the award. Because the plain language of section 3-7-6(e)(3) is clear and unambiguous, we need not resort to further tools of statutory construction and we need not consider this argument. See Robinson, 172 Ill.2d 452, 217 Ill.Dec. 729, 667 N.E.2d 1305.
*301 The judgment of the circuit court of Rock Island County is affirmed.
Affirmed.
O'BRIEN and BARRY, JJ., concur.
Illinois v. Booth
Year | 2004 |
---|---|
Cite | 815 N.E.2d 1206 (Ill. App.3d Cir. 2004). |
Level | State Court of Appeals |
Conclusion | Bench Verdict |
Attorney Fees | 0 |
Damages | 0 |
Injunction Status | Granted |
People ex rel Director of the Dep't of Corrections v. Booth, 815 N.E.2d 1206, 352 Ill.App.3d 297, 287 Ill.Dec. 403 (Ill.App. Dist.3 09/02/2004)
[1] IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS THIRD DISTRICT A.D., 2004
[2] No. 3-03-0821
[3] 815 N.E.2d 1206, 352 Ill.App.3d 297, 287 Ill.Dec. 403, 2004
[4] September 02, 2004
[5] THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS EX REL. THE DIRECTOR OF THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT,
v.
LONNIE BOOTH, DEFENDANT-APPELLEE.
[6] Appeal from the Circuit Court of the 14th Judicial Circuit, Rock Island County, Illinois, No. 03-AR-21. Honorable Mark A. VandeWiele, Judge, Presiding.
[7] The opinion of the court was delivered by: Justice McDADE
[8] PUBLISHED
[9] The plaintiff, the Director of the Department of Corrections (DOC), sued the defendant, Lonnie Booth, an inmate in the DOC, to recover the costs of the defendant's incarceration. The circuit court judge entered an order for summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff for $40,656.89 plus costs, but held that section 12--1001(h)(4) of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/12--1001(h)(4) (West 2002)) exempted $7,500 from the award. The plaintiff appeals, contending that the exemption should not apply in this case. We affirm.
[10] The defendant was incarcerated in April 2001. In May 2001, he received a settlement from personal injury litigation in the amount of $41,715.57 after attorney fees and costs.
[11] In January 2003, the plaintiff filed suit against the defendant, seeking to recover $40,656.89 as reimbursement for the cost of the defendant's incarceration. After the defendant failed to appear at a hearing on a motion for attachment, the circuit court entered an order in favor of the plaintiff for $40,656.89. In response, the defendant moved for declaratory judgment, contending that his settlement money was exempt under section 12--1001(h)(4) of the Code of Civil Procedure. The plaintiff moved for summary judgment, contending that no material facts were in dispute and that the plaintiff had a statutory right to reimbursement pursuant to section 3--7--6 of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/3--7--6 (West 2002)).
[12] The circuit court granted the plaintiff's motion and entered judgment for $40,656.89, but held that section 12--1001(h)(4) exempted $7,500 from the award. The plaintiff appeals, contending that section 3--7--6 does not provide for any exemptions to DOC suits for recovery of incarceration costs.
[13] This case presents an issue of statutory construction. When construing a statute, we are to determine and give effect to the legislature's intent. People v. Robinson, 172 Ill. 2d 452, 667 N.E.2d 1305 (1996). In doing so, we look to the plain language of the statute; if the statute's plain meaning is clear and unambiguous, we are to apply the statute without using further tools of statutory construction. Robinson, 172 Ill. 2d 452, 667 N.E.2d 1305. Because statutory construction is a question of law, we review the circuit court's order de novo. Robinson, 172 Ill. 2d 452, 667 N.E.2d 1305.
[14] Initially, we note that the defendant did not file an appellee's brief with this court. Generally, we will not act as an advocate for an appellee who fails to file a brief. See First Capitol Mortgage Corp. v. Talandis Construction Corp., 63 Ill. 2d 128, 345 N.E.2d 493 (1976). However, when a record is simple and the claimed error can easily be decided without the aid of an appellee's brief, we should decide the appeal's merits. First Capitol Mortgage Corp., 63 Ill. 2d 128, 345 N.E.2d 493. We believe we can decide the merits of this appeal without the aid of an appellee's brief.
[15] Section 3--7--6(a) of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/3--7--6(a) (West 2002)) provides that inmates shall be responsible to the DOC for the cost of their incarceration. Section 3--7--6(d) of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/3--7--6(d) (West 2002)) provides that, upon authorization from the Director of the DOC, the Attorney General can institute proceedings to reach an inmate's assets in order to cover the cost of incarceration. Assets are defined as:
[16] "[A]ny property, tangible or intangible, real or personal, belonging to or due to a committed or formerly committed person including income or payments to the person from social security, worker's compensation, veteran's compensation, pension benefits, or from any other source whatsoever and any and all assets and property of whatever character held in the name of the person, held for the benefit of the person, or payable or otherwise deliverable to the person. Any trust, or portion of a trust, of which a convicted person is a beneficiary, shall be construed as an asset of the person, to the extent that benefits thereunder are required to be paid to the person, or shall in fact be paid to the person. At the time of a legal proceeding by the Attorney General under this Section, if it appears that the committed person has any assets which ought to be subjected to the claim of the Department under this Section, the court may issue an order requiring any person, corporation, or other legal entity possessed or having custody of those assets to appropriate any of the assets or a portion thereof toward reimbursing the Department as provided for under this Section. No provision of this Section shall be construed in violation of any State or federal limitation on the collection of money judgments." (Emphasis added.) 730 ILCS 5/3--7--6(e)(3) (West 2002)).
[17] Furthermore, section 4--101(11) of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/4--101(11) (West 2002)) provides that the Attorney General may attach the property of an inmate in cases brought under section 3--7--6 of the Unified Code of Corrections. An exemption exists, however, for an amount no greater than $7,500 from a payment received by the debtor due to personal bodily injury. 735 ILCS 5/12--1001(h)(4) (West 2002).
[18] The plaintiff contends that the last sentence in sSection 3--7--6(e)(3) means that denying an exemption, such as the one in section 12--1001(h)(4), in cases involving the attachment of prisoner assets does not violate any state or federal statute. The plaintiff essentially argues that section 3--7--6(e)(3) authorizes the Director of the DOC and the Attorney General to reach as far as possible into prisoners' assets because the normal restrictions on attachments do not apply to prisoners. We do not believe the legislature intended this reading of section 3--7--6(e)(3).
[19] The plain language of section 3--7--6(e)(3) does indeed authorize the Director of the DOC and the Attorney General to reach far into prisoners' assets; however, the last sentence forbids the Director of the DOC and the Attorney General from violating any state or federal law limiting a creditor's ability to collect in the process. Because the exemption in section 12--1001(h)(4) clearly applies to the defendant's personal injury settlement award, and because section 3--7--6(e)(3) clearly requires that the Attorney General honor such exemptions, we decline to construe section 3--7--6(e)(3) as denying prisoners the protections afforded to debtors in section 12--1001(h)(4). We therefore hold that the circuit court properly construed section 3--7--6(e)(3) when it applied the section 12--1001(h)(4) exemption in the case below.
[20] The plaintiff also argues that a tool of statutory construction--when two statutes deal with a similar legal issue, the more specific statute controls--mandates that we vacate the portion of the circuit court's order exempting $7,500 from the award. Because the plain language of section 3--7--6(e)(3) is clear and unambiguous, we need not resort to further tools of statutory construction and we need not consider this argument. See Robinson, 172 Ill. 2d 452, 667 N.E.2d 1305.
[21] The judgment of the circuit court of Rock Island County is affirmed.
[22] Affirmed.
[23] O'BRIEN and BARRY, JJ., concur.
[1] IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS THIRD DISTRICT A.D., 2004
[2] No. 3-03-0821
[3] 815 N.E.2d 1206, 352 Ill.App.3d 297, 287 Ill.Dec. 403, 2004
[4] September 02, 2004
[5] THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS EX REL. THE DIRECTOR OF THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT,
v.
LONNIE BOOTH, DEFENDANT-APPELLEE.
[6] Appeal from the Circuit Court of the 14th Judicial Circuit, Rock Island County, Illinois, No. 03-AR-21. Honorable Mark A. VandeWiele, Judge, Presiding.
[7] The opinion of the court was delivered by: Justice McDADE
[8] PUBLISHED
[9] The plaintiff, the Director of the Department of Corrections (DOC), sued the defendant, Lonnie Booth, an inmate in the DOC, to recover the costs of the defendant's incarceration. The circuit court judge entered an order for summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff for $40,656.89 plus costs, but held that section 12--1001(h)(4) of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/12--1001(h)(4) (West 2002)) exempted $7,500 from the award. The plaintiff appeals, contending that the exemption should not apply in this case. We affirm.
[10] The defendant was incarcerated in April 2001. In May 2001, he received a settlement from personal injury litigation in the amount of $41,715.57 after attorney fees and costs.
[11] In January 2003, the plaintiff filed suit against the defendant, seeking to recover $40,656.89 as reimbursement for the cost of the defendant's incarceration. After the defendant failed to appear at a hearing on a motion for attachment, the circuit court entered an order in favor of the plaintiff for $40,656.89. In response, the defendant moved for declaratory judgment, contending that his settlement money was exempt under section 12--1001(h)(4) of the Code of Civil Procedure. The plaintiff moved for summary judgment, contending that no material facts were in dispute and that the plaintiff had a statutory right to reimbursement pursuant to section 3--7--6 of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/3--7--6 (West 2002)).
[12] The circuit court granted the plaintiff's motion and entered judgment for $40,656.89, but held that section 12--1001(h)(4) exempted $7,500 from the award. The plaintiff appeals, contending that section 3--7--6 does not provide for any exemptions to DOC suits for recovery of incarceration costs.
[13] This case presents an issue of statutory construction. When construing a statute, we are to determine and give effect to the legislature's intent. People v. Robinson, 172 Ill. 2d 452, 667 N.E.2d 1305 (1996). In doing so, we look to the plain language of the statute; if the statute's plain meaning is clear and unambiguous, we are to apply the statute without using further tools of statutory construction. Robinson, 172 Ill. 2d 452, 667 N.E.2d 1305. Because statutory construction is a question of law, we review the circuit court's order de novo. Robinson, 172 Ill. 2d 452, 667 N.E.2d 1305.
[14] Initially, we note that the defendant did not file an appellee's brief with this court. Generally, we will not act as an advocate for an appellee who fails to file a brief. See First Capitol Mortgage Corp. v. Talandis Construction Corp., 63 Ill. 2d 128, 345 N.E.2d 493 (1976). However, when a record is simple and the claimed error can easily be decided without the aid of an appellee's brief, we should decide the appeal's merits. First Capitol Mortgage Corp., 63 Ill. 2d 128, 345 N.E.2d 493. We believe we can decide the merits of this appeal without the aid of an appellee's brief.
[15] Section 3--7--6(a) of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/3--7--6(a) (West 2002)) provides that inmates shall be responsible to the DOC for the cost of their incarceration. Section 3--7--6(d) of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/3--7--6(d) (West 2002)) provides that, upon authorization from the Director of the DOC, the Attorney General can institute proceedings to reach an inmate's assets in order to cover the cost of incarceration. Assets are defined as:
[16] "[A]ny property, tangible or intangible, real or personal, belonging to or due to a committed or formerly committed person including income or payments to the person from social security, worker's compensation, veteran's compensation, pension benefits, or from any other source whatsoever and any and all assets and property of whatever character held in the name of the person, held for the benefit of the person, or payable or otherwise deliverable to the person. Any trust, or portion of a trust, of which a convicted person is a beneficiary, shall be construed as an asset of the person, to the extent that benefits thereunder are required to be paid to the person, or shall in fact be paid to the person. At the time of a legal proceeding by the Attorney General under this Section, if it appears that the committed person has any assets which ought to be subjected to the claim of the Department under this Section, the court may issue an order requiring any person, corporation, or other legal entity possessed or having custody of those assets to appropriate any of the assets or a portion thereof toward reimbursing the Department as provided for under this Section. No provision of this Section shall be construed in violation of any State or federal limitation on the collection of money judgments." (Emphasis added.) 730 ILCS 5/3--7--6(e)(3) (West 2002)).
[17] Furthermore, section 4--101(11) of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/4--101(11) (West 2002)) provides that the Attorney General may attach the property of an inmate in cases brought under section 3--7--6 of the Unified Code of Corrections. An exemption exists, however, for an amount no greater than $7,500 from a payment received by the debtor due to personal bodily injury. 735 ILCS 5/12--1001(h)(4) (West 2002).
[18] The plaintiff contends that the last sentence in sSection 3--7--6(e)(3) means that denying an exemption, such as the one in section 12--1001(h)(4), in cases involving the attachment of prisoner assets does not violate any state or federal statute. The plaintiff essentially argues that section 3--7--6(e)(3) authorizes the Director of the DOC and the Attorney General to reach as far as possible into prisoners' assets because the normal restrictions on attachments do not apply to prisoners. We do not believe the legislature intended this reading of section 3--7--6(e)(3).
[19] The plain language of section 3--7--6(e)(3) does indeed authorize the Director of the DOC and the Attorney General to reach far into prisoners' assets; however, the last sentence forbids the Director of the DOC and the Attorney General from violating any state or federal law limiting a creditor's ability to collect in the process. Because the exemption in section 12--1001(h)(4) clearly applies to the defendant's personal injury settlement award, and because section 3--7--6(e)(3) clearly requires that the Attorney General honor such exemptions, we decline to construe section 3--7--6(e)(3) as denying prisoners the protections afforded to debtors in section 12--1001(h)(4). We therefore hold that the circuit court properly construed section 3--7--6(e)(3) when it applied the section 12--1001(h)(4) exemption in the case below.
[20] The plaintiff also argues that a tool of statutory construction--when two statutes deal with a similar legal issue, the more specific statute controls--mandates that we vacate the portion of the circuit court's order exempting $7,500 from the award. Because the plain language of section 3--7--6(e)(3) is clear and unambiguous, we need not resort to further tools of statutory construction and we need not consider this argument. See Robinson, 172 Ill. 2d 452, 667 N.E.2d 1305.
[21] The judgment of the circuit court of Rock Island County is affirmed.
[22] Affirmed.
[23] O'BRIEN and BARRY, JJ., concur.