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PLRA Exhaustion Requirement Inapplicable to Suit Filed When Plaintiff Not Incarcerated
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has upheld an Iowa District Courts order denying a plaintiff in forma pauperis status, but reversed its order dismissing the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
Proceeding pro se, Steven R. Nerness filed a civil rights action against guards at an undisclosed Iowa jail, alleging they were deliberately indifferent to his urgent medical needs during his arrest and ensuing seven-hour confinement at the jail.
In denying Nerness request to proceed in forma pauperis, the court cited Nerness failure to include an affidavit containing his assets as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). Because Nerness only attempt to comply with § 1915 was to attach his 2002 federal tax returns rather than an affidavit detailing his assets, the Eighth Circuit held the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying in forma pauperis status. Nerness, however, was to be allowed to comply with § 1915 or pay the filing fee, the appellate court held.
The Eighth Circuits focus then turned to the dismissal for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The appeals court said it had previously held the Prison Litigation Reform Acts exhaustion requirement was an affirmative defense that the defendant has the burden to plead and prove. The failure to exhaust administrative remedies does not deprive a federal court of subject matter jurisdiction. There is no requirement that a plaintiff plead exhaustion, and dismissal on that basis was improper.
Additionally, the Eighth Circuit found Nerness was not incarcerated when he filed his complaint. The appellate court held the exhaustion requirement does not apply to plaintiffs who file § 1983 cases after being released from incarceration. The district courts dismissal order was reversed. Accordingly, this action was affirmed in part and reversed in part. See: Nerness v. Johnson, 401 F.3d 874 (8th Cir. 2005).
Proceeding pro se, Steven R. Nerness filed a civil rights action against guards at an undisclosed Iowa jail, alleging they were deliberately indifferent to his urgent medical needs during his arrest and ensuing seven-hour confinement at the jail.
In denying Nerness request to proceed in forma pauperis, the court cited Nerness failure to include an affidavit containing his assets as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). Because Nerness only attempt to comply with § 1915 was to attach his 2002 federal tax returns rather than an affidavit detailing his assets, the Eighth Circuit held the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying in forma pauperis status. Nerness, however, was to be allowed to comply with § 1915 or pay the filing fee, the appellate court held.
The Eighth Circuits focus then turned to the dismissal for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The appeals court said it had previously held the Prison Litigation Reform Acts exhaustion requirement was an affirmative defense that the defendant has the burden to plead and prove. The failure to exhaust administrative remedies does not deprive a federal court of subject matter jurisdiction. There is no requirement that a plaintiff plead exhaustion, and dismissal on that basis was improper.
Additionally, the Eighth Circuit found Nerness was not incarcerated when he filed his complaint. The appellate court held the exhaustion requirement does not apply to plaintiffs who file § 1983 cases after being released from incarceration. The district courts dismissal order was reversed. Accordingly, this action was affirmed in part and reversed in part. See: Nerness v. Johnson, 401 F.3d 874 (8th Cir. 2005).
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Related legal case
Nerness v. Johnson
| Year | 2005 |
|---|---|
| Cite | 401 F.3d 874 (8th Cir. 2005) |
| Level | Court of Appeals |
| Attorney Fees | 0 |
| Damages | 0 |
| Injunction Status | N/A |
Nerness v. Johnson, 401 F.3d 874 (8th Cir. 03/18/2005)
[1] UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
[2] No. 04-2679
[3] 401 F.3d 874, 2005
[4] March 18, 2005
[5] STEVE R. NERNESS, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT,
v.
DAN JOHNSON, OFFICER; VERN JEFFERSON, OFFICER; BRYAN ELLENBECKER, OFFICER, DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES.
[6] Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa.
[7] Before Wollman, Lay, and Hansen, Circuit Judges.
[8] Per curiam.
[9] [TO BE PUBLISHED]
[10] Submitted: March 14, 2005
[11] Steve R. Nerness, proceeding pro se in the district court, filed a § 1983 claim against certain named officers whom he claimed were deliberately indifferent to his urgent medical needs during his arrest and ensuing seven-hour confinement in the local jail. Nerness also filed with the district court applications to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP), and for appointment of counsel. The district court denied Nerness' motion to proceed IFP because Nerness failed to include a signed affidavit identifying his assets as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). The district court further dismissed his underlying § 1983 claim, without prejudice, because his complaint failed to plead that he had fully exhausted his administrative remedies. We affirm the district court's denial of leave to proceed IFP, but reverse the district court's dismissal of Nerness' complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
[12] We review the district court's denial of an application for leave to proceed IFP for abuse of discretion. Forester v. California Adult Auth., 510 F.2d 58, 60 (8th Cir. 1975). In filing his application to proceed IFP, Nerness submitted only his 2002 federal tax returns to verify his indigence. These tax returns did not include a statement of assets nor did they otherwise qualify as an affidavit. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). We note that the district court was rather charitable when it concluded in its Initial Review Order of June 10, 2004, that Nerness' application to proceed IFP was insufficient " as filed " and that the district court did "not believe it [was] appropriate at this time to grant in forma pauperis status." (emphasis added). Even though Nerness was a pro se litigant unfamiliar with court procedure, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by requiring Nerness to follow the basic requirements of the statute.
[13] Nerness next claims that the district court erred by dismissing his underlying § 1983 claim for failure to exhaust his administrative remedies. We review the district court's application of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) de novo and its findings of fact for clear error. See Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1117 (9th Cir. 2003).
[14] The PLRA's exhaustion requirement is not a heightened pleading requirement. Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1117-18. This circuit considers the PLRA's exhaustion requirement to be an affirmative defense that the defendant has the burden to plead and to prove. Foulk v. Charrier, 262 F.3d 687, 697 (8th Cir. 2001) (citing Chelette v. Harris, 229 F.3d 684, 686-88 (8th Cir. 2000)). Likewise, a lack of exhaustion does not deprive federal courts of subject matter jurisdiction. Id. Additionally, the PLRA's exhaustion requirement only applies to "person[s] incarcerated or detained...." 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(h). Accordingly, the exhaustion requirement does not apply to plaintiffs who file § 1983 claims after being released from incarceration. Doe v. Washington County, 150 F.3d 920, 924 (8th Cir. 1998).
[15] We conclude the district court erred when it applied the PLRA's exhaustion requirement to Nerness' complaint. First, he was not subject to the PLRA's exhaustion requirement because he was not a prisoner or otherwise incarcerated when he filed his complaint.*fn1 Second, even if he was subject to the PLRA, Nerness was under no obligation to plead exhaustion in his complaint. See Foulk, 262 F.3d at 697. Accordingly, the district court's application of the PLRA and its resulting dismissal of Nerness' complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies was an error of law.
[16] This case is remanded to the district court for consideration consistent with this opinion and with the suggestion that the Plaintiff be permitted the option of either paying the district court filing fee in full or resubmitting a proper application to proceed in forma pauperis for the district court's further consideration.
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Opinion Footnotes
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[17] *fn1 We note that the record available to the district court was ambiguous as to whether Nerness was a prisoner when he filed his complaint. On appeal, however, it is now clear that he was not a prisoner.
[1] UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
[2] No. 04-2679
[3] 401 F.3d 874, 2005
[4] March 18, 2005
[5] STEVE R. NERNESS, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT,
v.
DAN JOHNSON, OFFICER; VERN JEFFERSON, OFFICER; BRYAN ELLENBECKER, OFFICER, DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES.
[6] Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa.
[7] Before Wollman, Lay, and Hansen, Circuit Judges.
[8] Per curiam.
[9] [TO BE PUBLISHED]
[10] Submitted: March 14, 2005
[11] Steve R. Nerness, proceeding pro se in the district court, filed a § 1983 claim against certain named officers whom he claimed were deliberately indifferent to his urgent medical needs during his arrest and ensuing seven-hour confinement in the local jail. Nerness also filed with the district court applications to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP), and for appointment of counsel. The district court denied Nerness' motion to proceed IFP because Nerness failed to include a signed affidavit identifying his assets as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). The district court further dismissed his underlying § 1983 claim, without prejudice, because his complaint failed to plead that he had fully exhausted his administrative remedies. We affirm the district court's denial of leave to proceed IFP, but reverse the district court's dismissal of Nerness' complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
[12] We review the district court's denial of an application for leave to proceed IFP for abuse of discretion. Forester v. California Adult Auth., 510 F.2d 58, 60 (8th Cir. 1975). In filing his application to proceed IFP, Nerness submitted only his 2002 federal tax returns to verify his indigence. These tax returns did not include a statement of assets nor did they otherwise qualify as an affidavit. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). We note that the district court was rather charitable when it concluded in its Initial Review Order of June 10, 2004, that Nerness' application to proceed IFP was insufficient " as filed " and that the district court did "not believe it [was] appropriate at this time to grant in forma pauperis status." (emphasis added). Even though Nerness was a pro se litigant unfamiliar with court procedure, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by requiring Nerness to follow the basic requirements of the statute.
[13] Nerness next claims that the district court erred by dismissing his underlying § 1983 claim for failure to exhaust his administrative remedies. We review the district court's application of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) de novo and its findings of fact for clear error. See Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1117 (9th Cir. 2003).
[14] The PLRA's exhaustion requirement is not a heightened pleading requirement. Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1117-18. This circuit considers the PLRA's exhaustion requirement to be an affirmative defense that the defendant has the burden to plead and to prove. Foulk v. Charrier, 262 F.3d 687, 697 (8th Cir. 2001) (citing Chelette v. Harris, 229 F.3d 684, 686-88 (8th Cir. 2000)). Likewise, a lack of exhaustion does not deprive federal courts of subject matter jurisdiction. Id. Additionally, the PLRA's exhaustion requirement only applies to "person[s] incarcerated or detained...." 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(h). Accordingly, the exhaustion requirement does not apply to plaintiffs who file § 1983 claims after being released from incarceration. Doe v. Washington County, 150 F.3d 920, 924 (8th Cir. 1998).
[15] We conclude the district court erred when it applied the PLRA's exhaustion requirement to Nerness' complaint. First, he was not subject to the PLRA's exhaustion requirement because he was not a prisoner or otherwise incarcerated when he filed his complaint.*fn1 Second, even if he was subject to the PLRA, Nerness was under no obligation to plead exhaustion in his complaint. See Foulk, 262 F.3d at 697. Accordingly, the district court's application of the PLRA and its resulting dismissal of Nerness' complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies was an error of law.
[16] This case is remanded to the district court for consideration consistent with this opinion and with the suggestion that the Plaintiff be permitted the option of either paying the district court filing fee in full or resubmitting a proper application to proceed in forma pauperis for the district court's further consideration.
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Opinion Footnotes
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[17] *fn1 We note that the record available to the district court was ambiguous as to whether Nerness was a prisoner when he filed his complaint. On appeal, however, it is now clear that he was not a prisoner.