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Abstention Doctrine Discussed
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a federal court may not abstain from jurisdiction over a case because resolution of a federal question may result in the overturning of a state policy. This action brought by the next of kin of four young people held at Ohio's Cuyahoga County Juvenile Detention, alleging they were subjected to physical abuse, lengthy solitary confinement inflicted without hearing, and inhumane" conditions in the Detention Home. The district court dismissed the complaint based on a rarely used abstention doctrine in Buford v. Sun Oil Col, 319 .S. 315, 63 S. Ct. 1098, 87 L. Ed. 2d 1424 (1943), which allowed abstention where a complex state scheme for allocation of property rights were concerned in which the federal court lacked expertise.
The Sixth Circuit held abstention from hearing claims of institutional violation of rights guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution is inappropriate and federal courts must hear federal constitutional claims. Many federal courts have exercised and should exercise jurisdiction over complaints alleging federal constitutional abuse in state or local institutions housing juveniles charged with, or guilty of, criminal violations.
The Court held abstention is confined to three general categories: (a) in cases presenting a federal constitutional issue that might be mooted or presented in a different posture by a state court determination of pertinent state law; (b) where there has been presented difficult questions of state law bearing on policy problems of substantial public import whose importance transcends the result in the case at bar; or (c) where, absent bad faith, harassment or a patently invalid state statue, federal jurisdiction has been invoked for the purpose of restraining state criminal proceedings or state nuisance proceedings antecedent to a criminal prosecution, which are directed at obtaining the closure of places exhibiting obscene films.
The Court held that this case represents no interference or intervention in state judicial processes criminal or otherwise. Thus, the abstention in this case was improper and the matter was remanded for further proceedings. See: Hanna v. Toner, 630 F.2d 442 (6th Cir. 1980).
The Sixth Circuit held abstention from hearing claims of institutional violation of rights guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution is inappropriate and federal courts must hear federal constitutional claims. Many federal courts have exercised and should exercise jurisdiction over complaints alleging federal constitutional abuse in state or local institutions housing juveniles charged with, or guilty of, criminal violations.
The Court held abstention is confined to three general categories: (a) in cases presenting a federal constitutional issue that might be mooted or presented in a different posture by a state court determination of pertinent state law; (b) where there has been presented difficult questions of state law bearing on policy problems of substantial public import whose importance transcends the result in the case at bar; or (c) where, absent bad faith, harassment or a patently invalid state statue, federal jurisdiction has been invoked for the purpose of restraining state criminal proceedings or state nuisance proceedings antecedent to a criminal prosecution, which are directed at obtaining the closure of places exhibiting obscene films.
The Court held that this case represents no interference or intervention in state judicial processes criminal or otherwise. Thus, the abstention in this case was improper and the matter was remanded for further proceedings. See: Hanna v. Toner, 630 F.2d 442 (6th Cir. 1980).
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Related legal case
Hanna v. Toner
| Year | 1980 |
|---|---|
| Cite | 630 F.2d 442 (6th Cir. 1980). |
| Level | Court of Appeals |
| Attorney Fees | 0 |
| Damages | 0 |
| Injunction Status | N/A |
630 F.2d 442
United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.
Jonathan HANNA et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
John J. TONER et al., Defendants-Appellees.
No. 79-3476.
Argued Feb. 15, 1980.
Decided Sept. 2, 1980.
Action was brought alleging physical abuse, lengthy solitary confinement inflicted without hearing, inhumane conditions, and deprivation of education in county juvenile detention home, in violation of the Federal Constitution. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, Robert B. Krupansky, J., invoked abstention doctrine to dismiss the complaint sua sponte and appeal was taken. The Court of Appeals, Edwards, Chief Judge, held that it was inappropriate for the district court to abstain from hearing the complaint, where no one pointed to any interpretation by the state's highest court which might avoid a federal constitutional adjudication, the case did not represent interference or intervention in state judicial processes, criminal or otherwise, and the case did not deal with any complex state scheme for allocation of property rights as to which federal courts might lack expertise.
Judgment reversed and remanded.
*443 Carolyn L. Carter, Margaret L. Terry, Cleveland, Ohio, for plaintiffs-appellants.
Geraldine Frank, Harry Swanger, National Juvenile Law Center, Inc., Youth Legal Assistance Project, St. Louis, Mo., for amici curiae Nat. Juvenile.
Jeffrey P. Posner, Asst. Pros. Atty., Cleveland, Ohio, for Toner, Wierzbinski, and Kelley.
George V. McCullough, Rocky River, Ohio, for Philips.
Before EDWARDS, Chief Judge, and KEITH and BROWN, Circuit Judges.
EDWARDS, Chief Judge.
The federal courts were created to vindicate the constitution and laws of the United States, Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971); Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684, 66 S.Ct. 773, 777, 90 L.Ed. 939 (1946); Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 163, 177, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803). The rule, of course, is that their doors are open to complaints of violation of such laws. Exceptions to that rule are few and narrowly drawn. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 813, 96 S.Ct. 1236, 1244, 47 L.Ed.2d 483 (1975); County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185, 188-89, 79 S.Ct. 1060, 1062-1063, 3 L.Ed.2d 1163 (1959). The exceptions would swallow the rule if a federal court were required or allowed to close its doors to a complaint charging, as here, abuse of the fundamental constitutional rights of children in a county detention home.
The complaint in this case was filed under 42 U.S.C. s 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 against individuals who have administrative responsibility for the operation of the Cuyahoga County Juvenile Detention Home. Jurisdiction is alleged under 28 U.S.C. ss 1441 and 1343 (1976).
The named plaintiffs are four young people, represented by next of kin, who are alleged to have been subjected to physical abuse, lengthy solitary confinement inflicted without hearing, "inhumane" conditions and deprivation of education in the Detention Home all in violation of Amendments I, IV, VIII and XIV of the federal Constitution. The suit is brought as a class action on behalf of all young persons similarly confined; the plaintiffs sought class certification, injunctive relief and compensatory monetary damages. None of the allegations of this complaint have been heard or *444 adjudicated and, of course, we pass no judgment upon them. After a hearing on the plaintiffs' motion for class certification, the complaint was dismissed without prejudice sua sponte by the District Judge in reliance upon a rarely used abstention doctrine which originated in the case of Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 63 S.Ct. 1098, 87 L.Ed. 1424 (1943).
In Burford, the Supreme Court found an overriding state concern and superior competence in the courts of Texas to deal with a complex state regulatory scheme for controlling the drilling of oil wells into a general underground oil pool. Since we find the Burford doctrine inapplicable to the facts of this case, we reverse and remand for trial on the merits.
Settled federal law holds that allegations of violations of the U. S. Constitution in state and local prisons and jails are subject to the jurisdiction of the federal courts. Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 88 S.Ct. 391, 19 L.Ed.2d 444 (1967); McNeese v. Board of Education, 373 U.S. 668, 82 S.Ct. 1433, 10 L.Ed.2d 622 (1963); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 94 S.Ct. 1800, 40 L.Ed.2d 224 (1978); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974); Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 98 S.Ct. 2565, 57 L.Ed.2d 522 (1978); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979). In Martinez, supra, the U. S. Supreme Court said:
"(A) policy of judicial restraint cannot encompass any failure to take cognizance of valid constitutional claims whether arising in a federal or state institution. When a prison regulation or practice offends a fundamental constitutional guarantee, federal courts will discharge their duty to protect constitutional rights."
416 U.S. at 405-406, 94 S.Ct. at 1807.
United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.
Jonathan HANNA et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
John J. TONER et al., Defendants-Appellees.
No. 79-3476.
Argued Feb. 15, 1980.
Decided Sept. 2, 1980.
Action was brought alleging physical abuse, lengthy solitary confinement inflicted without hearing, inhumane conditions, and deprivation of education in county juvenile detention home, in violation of the Federal Constitution. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, Robert B. Krupansky, J., invoked abstention doctrine to dismiss the complaint sua sponte and appeal was taken. The Court of Appeals, Edwards, Chief Judge, held that it was inappropriate for the district court to abstain from hearing the complaint, where no one pointed to any interpretation by the state's highest court which might avoid a federal constitutional adjudication, the case did not represent interference or intervention in state judicial processes, criminal or otherwise, and the case did not deal with any complex state scheme for allocation of property rights as to which federal courts might lack expertise.
Judgment reversed and remanded.
*443 Carolyn L. Carter, Margaret L. Terry, Cleveland, Ohio, for plaintiffs-appellants.
Geraldine Frank, Harry Swanger, National Juvenile Law Center, Inc., Youth Legal Assistance Project, St. Louis, Mo., for amici curiae Nat. Juvenile.
Jeffrey P. Posner, Asst. Pros. Atty., Cleveland, Ohio, for Toner, Wierzbinski, and Kelley.
George V. McCullough, Rocky River, Ohio, for Philips.
Before EDWARDS, Chief Judge, and KEITH and BROWN, Circuit Judges.
EDWARDS, Chief Judge.
The federal courts were created to vindicate the constitution and laws of the United States, Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971); Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684, 66 S.Ct. 773, 777, 90 L.Ed. 939 (1946); Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 163, 177, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803). The rule, of course, is that their doors are open to complaints of violation of such laws. Exceptions to that rule are few and narrowly drawn. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 813, 96 S.Ct. 1236, 1244, 47 L.Ed.2d 483 (1975); County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185, 188-89, 79 S.Ct. 1060, 1062-1063, 3 L.Ed.2d 1163 (1959). The exceptions would swallow the rule if a federal court were required or allowed to close its doors to a complaint charging, as here, abuse of the fundamental constitutional rights of children in a county detention home.
The complaint in this case was filed under 42 U.S.C. s 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 against individuals who have administrative responsibility for the operation of the Cuyahoga County Juvenile Detention Home. Jurisdiction is alleged under 28 U.S.C. ss 1441 and 1343 (1976).
The named plaintiffs are four young people, represented by next of kin, who are alleged to have been subjected to physical abuse, lengthy solitary confinement inflicted without hearing, "inhumane" conditions and deprivation of education in the Detention Home all in violation of Amendments I, IV, VIII and XIV of the federal Constitution. The suit is brought as a class action on behalf of all young persons similarly confined; the plaintiffs sought class certification, injunctive relief and compensatory monetary damages. None of the allegations of this complaint have been heard or *444 adjudicated and, of course, we pass no judgment upon them. After a hearing on the plaintiffs' motion for class certification, the complaint was dismissed without prejudice sua sponte by the District Judge in reliance upon a rarely used abstention doctrine which originated in the case of Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 63 S.Ct. 1098, 87 L.Ed. 1424 (1943).
In Burford, the Supreme Court found an overriding state concern and superior competence in the courts of Texas to deal with a complex state regulatory scheme for controlling the drilling of oil wells into a general underground oil pool. Since we find the Burford doctrine inapplicable to the facts of this case, we reverse and remand for trial on the merits.
Settled federal law holds that allegations of violations of the U. S. Constitution in state and local prisons and jails are subject to the jurisdiction of the federal courts. Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 88 S.Ct. 391, 19 L.Ed.2d 444 (1967); McNeese v. Board of Education, 373 U.S. 668, 82 S.Ct. 1433, 10 L.Ed.2d 622 (1963); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 94 S.Ct. 1800, 40 L.Ed.2d 224 (1978); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974); Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 98 S.Ct. 2565, 57 L.Ed.2d 522 (1978); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979). In Martinez, supra, the U. S. Supreme Court said:
"(A) policy of judicial restraint cannot encompass any failure to take cognizance of valid constitutional claims whether arising in a federal or state institution. When a prison regulation or practice offends a fundamental constitutional guarantee, federal courts will discharge their duty to protect constitutional rights."
416 U.S. at 405-406, 94 S.Ct. at 1807.