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Denial of Mail and Phone Privileges Unreasonable Disciplinary Measures
The U.S. District Court of Maine held that denial of detainee's access to
mail and telephone privileges were unreasonable disciplinary measures.
Jeffery Simpson, a pre-trial detainee, while at the Penobscot County jail,
violated jail rules. He was placed in disciplinary segregation for
approximately three months. During this time Simpson was denied access to
phone and his mail was restricted to only three personal letters per week.
Simpson filed a request to use the phone and to additional mail access.
When he was denied he filed grievances which were also denied.
After Simpson was released from the county jail he filed suit under 42
U.S. § 1983. Simpson claimed he was denied a constitutional right to
prepare his defense and to make bail. He alleged that due to the
interference with his mail and phone access he could not properly
determine who to have his investigator interview, which caused a delay in
the preparation of his defense and subsequent acquittal.
Defendants filed a motion to dismiss under FRCP Rule 12(b)(6). Using Heck
v. Humphrey, 112 S.Ct. 2364 (1994), they argued that Simpson lacked
standing since he had not had his disciplinary case overturned.
The District Court determined that restricting access to mail and phone
calls during Simpson's segregation would not have undermined jail
discipline and was therefore impermissible. The Court held that Heck was
inappropriate as Simpson was not attacking the disciplinary action but
rather access to means to adequately prepare his defense.
Using the doctrine of Bell v. Wolfish, 99 S.Ct. 1861 (1979), the court
concluded that Simpson's claim was not ripe for dismissal and denied
defendant's motion to dismiss under rule 12(b)(6). However, the court
could not make a determination as to whether the conditions of Simpson's
segregation were reasonably related to the essential objective" of
pretrial confinement. See: Simpson v. Gallant, 231 F.Supp. 341 (D.Me.
2002).
mail and telephone privileges were unreasonable disciplinary measures.
Jeffery Simpson, a pre-trial detainee, while at the Penobscot County jail,
violated jail rules. He was placed in disciplinary segregation for
approximately three months. During this time Simpson was denied access to
phone and his mail was restricted to only three personal letters per week.
Simpson filed a request to use the phone and to additional mail access.
When he was denied he filed grievances which were also denied.
After Simpson was released from the county jail he filed suit under 42
U.S. § 1983. Simpson claimed he was denied a constitutional right to
prepare his defense and to make bail. He alleged that due to the
interference with his mail and phone access he could not properly
determine who to have his investigator interview, which caused a delay in
the preparation of his defense and subsequent acquittal.
Defendants filed a motion to dismiss under FRCP Rule 12(b)(6). Using Heck
v. Humphrey, 112 S.Ct. 2364 (1994), they argued that Simpson lacked
standing since he had not had his disciplinary case overturned.
The District Court determined that restricting access to mail and phone
calls during Simpson's segregation would not have undermined jail
discipline and was therefore impermissible. The Court held that Heck was
inappropriate as Simpson was not attacking the disciplinary action but
rather access to means to adequately prepare his defense.
Using the doctrine of Bell v. Wolfish, 99 S.Ct. 1861 (1979), the court
concluded that Simpson's claim was not ripe for dismissal and denied
defendant's motion to dismiss under rule 12(b)(6). However, the court
could not make a determination as to whether the conditions of Simpson's
segregation were reasonably related to the essential objective" of
pretrial confinement. See: Simpson v. Gallant, 231 F.Supp. 341 (D.Me.
2002).
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Related legal case
Simpson v. Gallant
| Year | 2002 |
|---|---|
| Cite | 231 F.Supp.2d 341 (D.Me. 2002). |
| Level | District Court |
| Attorney Fees | 0 |
| Damages | 0 |
| Injunction Status | N/A |
SIMPSON v. GALLANT, 231 F.Supp.2d 341 (D.Me. 07/17/2002)
[1] United States District Court, District of Maine
[2] Civil No: 02-15-B-S
[3] 231 F. Supp.2d 341
[4] July 17, 2002
[5] JEFFREY E. SIMPSON, PLAINTIFF
V.
CHERYL GALLANT, RICHARD CLUKEY AND EDWARD REYNOLDS, DEFENDANTS.
[6] Jeffrey E. Simpson, Maine Correctional Center, South Windham, Me, Plaintiff Pro Se.
[7] Michael J. Schmidt, Esq., Wheeler & Arey, P.A. Waterville, Me, for Defendants Cheryl Gallant, Richard Clukey, and Edward Reynolds.
[8] The opinion of the court was delivered by: George Z. Singal, United States District Judge.
[9]
ORDER AFFIRMING THE RECOMMENDED DECISION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE
[10] No objection having been filed to the Magistrate Judge's Recommended Decision filed June 26, 2002, the Recommended Decision is accepted.
[11] Accordingly, it is ORDERED that Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the Complaint be and hereby is DENIED.
[12]
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO AMEND AND RECOMMENDED DECISION ON MOTION TO DISMISS 42 U.S.C. § 1983 COMPLAINT
[13] Jeffrey Simpson, in an amended complaint, is seeking remedies for alleged violations of his constitutional right involving access to the telephone and mail services when he was a pretrial detainee at the Penobscot County Jail. (Docket Nos. 1, 7, & 8.) The defendants, Cheryl Gallant, Richard Clukey, and Edward Reynolds, have filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on three grounds. They argue that Simpson has not stated a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim*fn1; assuming he has, that they are entitled to qualified immunity; and that Simpson has not sufficiently exhausted his administrative remedies as required by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). After the filing of this motion, Simpson filed a motion to amend his amended complaint, (Docket No. 15.)*fn2 I herein GRANT the second motion to amend and, for the reasons set forth below, I recommend that the Court DENY the motion to dismiss.
[14] Simpson's Pleadings
[15] A. Allegations of Amended Complaint
[16] In his amended complaint filed April 10, 2002, Simpson makes the following statement of claim.
[17] While a pretrial detainee at the Penobscot County Jail Simpson was placed in disciplinary segregation on or about October 10, 2001, for violations of jail rules. During the over three-month period he spent in segregation he was completely denied access to the phones and he was allowed to mail only three personal letters a week, with postage paid by the jail pursuant to a jail policy. He was not allowed to send additional mail using his own postage.
[18] With respect to phone access Simpson submitted a slip to non-defendant, Sergeant Scott Basco on December 1, 2001, requesting a phone call so that he could arrange bail and/or call a lawyer.
[19] This request was denied and Simpson submitted on the same day a Penobscot County Sheriff's grievance form indicating that he was a pretrial detainee and that he had a right to use the phone to arrange bail or call an attorney. Assistant Jail Administrator, Richard Clukey, a defendant in this action, denied Simpson's grievance. Regarding his mail privileges, Simpson submitted request forms on December 14, 2001, and January 11, 2002, asking that he be able to use his own funds to send additional letters. Both of these requests were denied.
[20] Due to this interference with his telephone and mail access, Simpson could not determine who to have his court appointed investigator interview and his November 7, 2001, trial had to be continued as a consequence. On January 21, 2002, Simpson was released from custody on a $10,500 cash bail that was posted by an associate. On February 21, 2002, Simpson was found not guilty after a jury trial.
[21] On February 14, 2002, all additional counts against Simpson triggering his detention from October 10, 2001, through January 21, 2002, had been dismissed.
[22] Simpson's theory of the case is that Penobscot Jail policies pertaining to outgoing mail and its policy prohibiting the use of a phone for any reasons by inmates not in good standing violated his right to prepare his defense and make bail. He states that defendant Gallant, as the Penobscot Jail administrator, is responsible to the Sheriff for recommending, drafting, and enforcing policies. Simpson charges Clukey, as assistant jail administrator, with assisting Gallant in drafting and enforcing these policies. With respect to Reynolds, Simpson asserts that, as Penobscot County Sheriff, he approves these policies and procedures.
[23] The injuries of which Simpson complains are the postponement of his November trial, his over ninety-days of lost freedom, and the suffering of an extreme amount of stress and emotional anguish, that was exacerbated by his inability to contact family members.
[24] B. Proposed Second Amendment
[25] In his second amended complaint Simpson adds that when Clukey denied his December 1, 2001, grievance he stated that it did not meet the criteria of a defined grievance and it did not present a grievable issue. (2d Am. Compl. ¶ 8.) On an unspecified date Simpson submitted a request form asking the jail administration to provide the address for his associate, providing them with his phone number, which request was denied. (Id. ¶ 17.) He also clarifies that for purposes of this complaint Gallant, Clukey, and Reynolds are named in their official capacities. (Id. at ¶¶ 14-16.)
[26] Simpson also expands his conclusion, faulting the Jail's policies and customs for causing his loss of liberty and maintaining that the continuous limitations on outgoing mail and the phone restrictions placed on pretrial detainees who are not in good standing infringed his right to immediate release on bail.
[27] He argues that the three personal letters a week, with the corresponding lag in delivery and response time, were not a sufficient substitute for phone access, particularly in light of the fact that he did not have the addresses for his associate. Simpson needed to have phone access and better mail access to prepare for trial, to contact witnesses, to find addresses of individuals who could assist with bail, to contact the investigator, and to arrange to have belongings stored and bills paid.
[28] He states that he is seeking $500,000 in compensatory damages from the three defendants jointly and severally.
[29] Discussion
[30] A. Second Motion to Amend
[31] As outlined above, the principal amendment achieved by this pleading is to clarify that Simpson is seeking to sue the three defendants in their official capacities. With respect to each defendant he states:
[32] "For purposes of this claim" they are named in their official capacities. (2d. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 14-16.) While Simpson has alleged conduct by Clukey upon which he could attempt to premise a claim for individual liability, this amendment makes it clear that Simpson does not wish to so proceed against Clukey.
[33] With respect to Simpson's second motion to amend, the defendants' only response to date is contained in their reply to Simpson's response to their motion to dismiss. The defendants state only that the amendments contained in the second amended complaint "do not eliminate the basis for which Defendants are seeking dismissal, and therefore Defendants request that the Plaintiff's Complaint, or assuming Plaintiff files an Amended Complaint, be dismissed." (Reply to Resp. to Mot. Dismiss at 3.)
[34] In light of the absence of more formal opposition by the defendants I GRANT the motion to amend. With respect to the amendments clarifying that Simpson pursues these defendants in their official capacities, this amendment serves to focus this suit on the standards for § 1983 actions challenging the constitutionality of a governmental entity's policy or custom. See Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978) (observing that a § 1983 suit may be brought "when execution of a government's policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible under § 1983); Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 480-81(1986) (observing that "it is plain that municipal liability may be imposed for a single decision by municipal policymakers under appropriate circumstances" but cautioning that "[m]unicipal liability attaches only where the decisionmaker possesses final authority to establish municipal policy with respect to the action ordered"); see also City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112 (1988).
[35] With respect to the allegations in the second amended complaint concerning Simpson's interactions with Clukey respecting the grievance and Simpson's allegation that the jail authorities refused to locate a phone number when provided with his associate's address, these are in the nature of additional facts that can be contested in later stages of this suit. As I indicate below, Simpson's first amended complaint (should have) sufficiently put the defendants on notice of the contours of his § 1983 claim.*fn3
[36] B. Motion to Dismiss
[37] 1. Standard for Motion to Dismiss
[38] In passing on this motion to dismiss I accept all of Simpson's allegations as true. Buckley v. RennieFitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 261 (1993). Since Simpson is proceeding pro se I subject his submissions to the "less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). Also in light of Simpson's pro se status, I examine his other pleadings to understand the nature and basis of Simpson's claims. Gray v. Poole, 275 F.3d 1113, 1115 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (citing the holding of Richardson v. United States, 193 F.3d 545, 548 (D.C.Cir. 1999) that District Court abused its discretion when it failed to consider the pro se plaintiff's complaint in light of his reply to the motion to dismiss).
[39] 2. Nature of the Constitutional Claim
[40] a. Motion to Dismiss Based on Failure to State a Claim
[41] The defendants' motion to dismiss characterizes Simpson's complaint as one seeking redress for the imposition of disciplinary sanctions. Citing Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), they argue that Simpson cannot challenge constitutional frailties vis-à-vis the disciplinary determination without first having the disciplinary determination overturned. Addressing the limitations on mail and phone access, the defendants argue that even if a policy impinges an inmate's constitutional rights it can withstand a challenge to its constitutionality if it is reasonably related to penological interests. They contend that withholding mail from an inmate for punitive reasons does not run afoul of the Constitution because it is not "an atypical and significant hardship" within the measure of Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995).*fn4
[42] b. Proper Characterization of the Constitutional Claim
[43] I conclude that the defendants have mischaracterized Simpson's claim as challenging the imposition of disciplinary sanctions. Simpson is not arguing that he did not violate the Jail's rules so as to justify the imposition of some disciplinary sanction. His is not in the nature of a Due Process challenge to his disciplinary proceedings. Rather, he is arguing that the nature of the sanction imposed violated his constitutional right to pursue bail and prepare his defense while a pretrial detainee. Therefore, a court determination that it was impermissible to block Simpson's access to the phone and the mail during his segregation would not undermine the validity of the underlying disciplinary determination. Thus, the principals of Heck are inapposite.
[44] The question then becomes that assuming that Simpson was appropriately subject to punishment for the unspecified infraction did the conditions of his segregation run afoul of his Constitutional rights?
[45] Though the defendants, a bit warily, recommend the standard to me, I conclude that Sandin and Warren v. Irvin, 985 F. Supp. 350 (W.D.N.Y. 1997), a case cited by the defendants, do not govern the claim Simpson advances. During the period in question Simpson was a non-convicted pre-trial detainee who was seeking access to the phones and mail to procure his freedom and advance his defense. This situation is unlike that of a convicted inmate who has no right to bail and has had his day in court; such individuals must suffer typical retractions of privileges as a consequence of post-conviction misconduct.
[46] Rather than a Sandin concern, there are overlapping Constitutional principles that are implicated by Simpson's allegations. As a challenge to the jail's reaction to a disciplinary infraction, Simpson's claim could be characterized as a condition of pretrial detention claim under Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979). Therein the Supreme Court stated:
[47]
[I]f a particular condition or restriction of pretrial detention is reasonably related to a legitimate governmental objective, it does not, without more, amount to "punishment." Conversely, if a restriction or condition is not reasonably related to a legitimate goal if it is arbitrary or purposeless a court permissibly may infer that the purpose of the governmental action is punishment that may not constitutionally be inflicted upon detainees qua detainees. Courts must be mindful that these inquiries spring from constitutional requirements and that judicial answers to them must reflect that fact rather than a court's idea of how best to operate a detention facility.
[48] 441 U.S. at 539 (footnotes and citations omitted). The concern underlying Bell is that the challenged conditions are not "imposed to sanction prior unproven criminal conduct," but are "imposed to enforce reasonable prison disciplinary requirements." Collazo-Leon v. United States Bureau of Prisons, 51 F.3d 315, 318 (1st Cir. 1995).
[49] As I construe Simpson's allegations as supporting a claim of this ilk, I cannot recommend granting the defendants' motion to dismiss for there is nothing before me at this pleading stage as to the nature of Simpson's infraction and the Jail's justifications for its policy or custom by which I could judge the reasonableness of the segregation limitations. For instance, I cannot make a determination at this juncture whether the conditions of segregation allegedly imposed here were reasonably related to the "essential objective" of pretrial confinement of insuring that Simpson was present for trial. Bell, 441 U.S. at 535; see also Martucci v. Johnson, 944 F.2d 291, 294 (6th Cir. 1991). Nor can I gage whether the restriction or condition was "reasonably related to a legitimate goal" or, conversely, whether it was "arbitrary or purposeless." Bell, 441 U.S. at 539. The defendants have not denied that the policy with respect to mail and phone access for pretrial detainees is as it is characterized by Simpson. Nor have the defendants asserted any argument as to the reasons for the blanket prohibition on phone access for pretrial detainees in disciplinary segregation other than that the withholding of privileges is a legitimate form of punishment. Also the pleadings provide no hint as to either the charges on which Simpson was being detained or the reasons why Jail authorities placed Simpson in segregation. Based on Bell, I conclude that this is not a claim ripe for dismissal.
[1] United States District Court, District of Maine
[2] Civil No: 02-15-B-S
[3] 231 F. Supp.2d 341
[4] July 17, 2002
[5] JEFFREY E. SIMPSON, PLAINTIFF
V.
CHERYL GALLANT, RICHARD CLUKEY AND EDWARD REYNOLDS, DEFENDANTS.
[6] Jeffrey E. Simpson, Maine Correctional Center, South Windham, Me, Plaintiff Pro Se.
[7] Michael J. Schmidt, Esq., Wheeler & Arey, P.A. Waterville, Me, for Defendants Cheryl Gallant, Richard Clukey, and Edward Reynolds.
[8] The opinion of the court was delivered by: George Z. Singal, United States District Judge.
[9]
ORDER AFFIRMING THE RECOMMENDED DECISION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE
[10] No objection having been filed to the Magistrate Judge's Recommended Decision filed June 26, 2002, the Recommended Decision is accepted.
[11] Accordingly, it is ORDERED that Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the Complaint be and hereby is DENIED.
[12]
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO AMEND AND RECOMMENDED DECISION ON MOTION TO DISMISS 42 U.S.C. § 1983 COMPLAINT
[13] Jeffrey Simpson, in an amended complaint, is seeking remedies for alleged violations of his constitutional right involving access to the telephone and mail services when he was a pretrial detainee at the Penobscot County Jail. (Docket Nos. 1, 7, & 8.) The defendants, Cheryl Gallant, Richard Clukey, and Edward Reynolds, have filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on three grounds. They argue that Simpson has not stated a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim*fn1; assuming he has, that they are entitled to qualified immunity; and that Simpson has not sufficiently exhausted his administrative remedies as required by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). After the filing of this motion, Simpson filed a motion to amend his amended complaint, (Docket No. 15.)*fn2 I herein GRANT the second motion to amend and, for the reasons set forth below, I recommend that the Court DENY the motion to dismiss.
[14] Simpson's Pleadings
[15] A. Allegations of Amended Complaint
[16] In his amended complaint filed April 10, 2002, Simpson makes the following statement of claim.
[17] While a pretrial detainee at the Penobscot County Jail Simpson was placed in disciplinary segregation on or about October 10, 2001, for violations of jail rules. During the over three-month period he spent in segregation he was completely denied access to the phones and he was allowed to mail only three personal letters a week, with postage paid by the jail pursuant to a jail policy. He was not allowed to send additional mail using his own postage.
[18] With respect to phone access Simpson submitted a slip to non-defendant, Sergeant Scott Basco on December 1, 2001, requesting a phone call so that he could arrange bail and/or call a lawyer.
[19] This request was denied and Simpson submitted on the same day a Penobscot County Sheriff's grievance form indicating that he was a pretrial detainee and that he had a right to use the phone to arrange bail or call an attorney. Assistant Jail Administrator, Richard Clukey, a defendant in this action, denied Simpson's grievance. Regarding his mail privileges, Simpson submitted request forms on December 14, 2001, and January 11, 2002, asking that he be able to use his own funds to send additional letters. Both of these requests were denied.
[20] Due to this interference with his telephone and mail access, Simpson could not determine who to have his court appointed investigator interview and his November 7, 2001, trial had to be continued as a consequence. On January 21, 2002, Simpson was released from custody on a $10,500 cash bail that was posted by an associate. On February 21, 2002, Simpson was found not guilty after a jury trial.
[21] On February 14, 2002, all additional counts against Simpson triggering his detention from October 10, 2001, through January 21, 2002, had been dismissed.
[22] Simpson's theory of the case is that Penobscot Jail policies pertaining to outgoing mail and its policy prohibiting the use of a phone for any reasons by inmates not in good standing violated his right to prepare his defense and make bail. He states that defendant Gallant, as the Penobscot Jail administrator, is responsible to the Sheriff for recommending, drafting, and enforcing policies. Simpson charges Clukey, as assistant jail administrator, with assisting Gallant in drafting and enforcing these policies. With respect to Reynolds, Simpson asserts that, as Penobscot County Sheriff, he approves these policies and procedures.
[23] The injuries of which Simpson complains are the postponement of his November trial, his over ninety-days of lost freedom, and the suffering of an extreme amount of stress and emotional anguish, that was exacerbated by his inability to contact family members.
[24] B. Proposed Second Amendment
[25] In his second amended complaint Simpson adds that when Clukey denied his December 1, 2001, grievance he stated that it did not meet the criteria of a defined grievance and it did not present a grievable issue. (2d Am. Compl. ¶ 8.) On an unspecified date Simpson submitted a request form asking the jail administration to provide the address for his associate, providing them with his phone number, which request was denied. (Id. ¶ 17.) He also clarifies that for purposes of this complaint Gallant, Clukey, and Reynolds are named in their official capacities. (Id. at ¶¶ 14-16.)
[26] Simpson also expands his conclusion, faulting the Jail's policies and customs for causing his loss of liberty and maintaining that the continuous limitations on outgoing mail and the phone restrictions placed on pretrial detainees who are not in good standing infringed his right to immediate release on bail.
[27] He argues that the three personal letters a week, with the corresponding lag in delivery and response time, were not a sufficient substitute for phone access, particularly in light of the fact that he did not have the addresses for his associate. Simpson needed to have phone access and better mail access to prepare for trial, to contact witnesses, to find addresses of individuals who could assist with bail, to contact the investigator, and to arrange to have belongings stored and bills paid.
[28] He states that he is seeking $500,000 in compensatory damages from the three defendants jointly and severally.
[29] Discussion
[30] A. Second Motion to Amend
[31] As outlined above, the principal amendment achieved by this pleading is to clarify that Simpson is seeking to sue the three defendants in their official capacities. With respect to each defendant he states:
[32] "For purposes of this claim" they are named in their official capacities. (2d. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 14-16.) While Simpson has alleged conduct by Clukey upon which he could attempt to premise a claim for individual liability, this amendment makes it clear that Simpson does not wish to so proceed against Clukey.
[33] With respect to Simpson's second motion to amend, the defendants' only response to date is contained in their reply to Simpson's response to their motion to dismiss. The defendants state only that the amendments contained in the second amended complaint "do not eliminate the basis for which Defendants are seeking dismissal, and therefore Defendants request that the Plaintiff's Complaint, or assuming Plaintiff files an Amended Complaint, be dismissed." (Reply to Resp. to Mot. Dismiss at 3.)
[34] In light of the absence of more formal opposition by the defendants I GRANT the motion to amend. With respect to the amendments clarifying that Simpson pursues these defendants in their official capacities, this amendment serves to focus this suit on the standards for § 1983 actions challenging the constitutionality of a governmental entity's policy or custom. See Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978) (observing that a § 1983 suit may be brought "when execution of a government's policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible under § 1983); Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 480-81(1986) (observing that "it is plain that municipal liability may be imposed for a single decision by municipal policymakers under appropriate circumstances" but cautioning that "[m]unicipal liability attaches only where the decisionmaker possesses final authority to establish municipal policy with respect to the action ordered"); see also City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112 (1988).
[35] With respect to the allegations in the second amended complaint concerning Simpson's interactions with Clukey respecting the grievance and Simpson's allegation that the jail authorities refused to locate a phone number when provided with his associate's address, these are in the nature of additional facts that can be contested in later stages of this suit. As I indicate below, Simpson's first amended complaint (should have) sufficiently put the defendants on notice of the contours of his § 1983 claim.*fn3
[36] B. Motion to Dismiss
[37] 1. Standard for Motion to Dismiss
[38] In passing on this motion to dismiss I accept all of Simpson's allegations as true. Buckley v. RennieFitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 261 (1993). Since Simpson is proceeding pro se I subject his submissions to the "less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). Also in light of Simpson's pro se status, I examine his other pleadings to understand the nature and basis of Simpson's claims. Gray v. Poole, 275 F.3d 1113, 1115 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (citing the holding of Richardson v. United States, 193 F.3d 545, 548 (D.C.Cir. 1999) that District Court abused its discretion when it failed to consider the pro se plaintiff's complaint in light of his reply to the motion to dismiss).
[39] 2. Nature of the Constitutional Claim
[40] a. Motion to Dismiss Based on Failure to State a Claim
[41] The defendants' motion to dismiss characterizes Simpson's complaint as one seeking redress for the imposition of disciplinary sanctions. Citing Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), they argue that Simpson cannot challenge constitutional frailties vis-à-vis the disciplinary determination without first having the disciplinary determination overturned. Addressing the limitations on mail and phone access, the defendants argue that even if a policy impinges an inmate's constitutional rights it can withstand a challenge to its constitutionality if it is reasonably related to penological interests. They contend that withholding mail from an inmate for punitive reasons does not run afoul of the Constitution because it is not "an atypical and significant hardship" within the measure of Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995).*fn4
[42] b. Proper Characterization of the Constitutional Claim
[43] I conclude that the defendants have mischaracterized Simpson's claim as challenging the imposition of disciplinary sanctions. Simpson is not arguing that he did not violate the Jail's rules so as to justify the imposition of some disciplinary sanction. His is not in the nature of a Due Process challenge to his disciplinary proceedings. Rather, he is arguing that the nature of the sanction imposed violated his constitutional right to pursue bail and prepare his defense while a pretrial detainee. Therefore, a court determination that it was impermissible to block Simpson's access to the phone and the mail during his segregation would not undermine the validity of the underlying disciplinary determination. Thus, the principals of Heck are inapposite.
[44] The question then becomes that assuming that Simpson was appropriately subject to punishment for the unspecified infraction did the conditions of his segregation run afoul of his Constitutional rights?
[45] Though the defendants, a bit warily, recommend the standard to me, I conclude that Sandin and Warren v. Irvin, 985 F. Supp. 350 (W.D.N.Y. 1997), a case cited by the defendants, do not govern the claim Simpson advances. During the period in question Simpson was a non-convicted pre-trial detainee who was seeking access to the phones and mail to procure his freedom and advance his defense. This situation is unlike that of a convicted inmate who has no right to bail and has had his day in court; such individuals must suffer typical retractions of privileges as a consequence of post-conviction misconduct.
[46] Rather than a Sandin concern, there are overlapping Constitutional principles that are implicated by Simpson's allegations. As a challenge to the jail's reaction to a disciplinary infraction, Simpson's claim could be characterized as a condition of pretrial detention claim under Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979). Therein the Supreme Court stated:
[47]
[I]f a particular condition or restriction of pretrial detention is reasonably related to a legitimate governmental objective, it does not, without more, amount to "punishment." Conversely, if a restriction or condition is not reasonably related to a legitimate goal if it is arbitrary or purposeless a court permissibly may infer that the purpose of the governmental action is punishment that may not constitutionally be inflicted upon detainees qua detainees. Courts must be mindful that these inquiries spring from constitutional requirements and that judicial answers to them must reflect that fact rather than a court's idea of how best to operate a detention facility.
[48] 441 U.S. at 539 (footnotes and citations omitted). The concern underlying Bell is that the challenged conditions are not "imposed to sanction prior unproven criminal conduct," but are "imposed to enforce reasonable prison disciplinary requirements." Collazo-Leon v. United States Bureau of Prisons, 51 F.3d 315, 318 (1st Cir. 1995).
[49] As I construe Simpson's allegations as supporting a claim of this ilk, I cannot recommend granting the defendants' motion to dismiss for there is nothing before me at this pleading stage as to the nature of Simpson's infraction and the Jail's justifications for its policy or custom by which I could judge the reasonableness of the segregation limitations. For instance, I cannot make a determination at this juncture whether the conditions of segregation allegedly imposed here were reasonably related to the "essential objective" of pretrial confinement of insuring that Simpson was present for trial. Bell, 441 U.S. at 535; see also Martucci v. Johnson, 944 F.2d 291, 294 (6th Cir. 1991). Nor can I gage whether the restriction or condition was "reasonably related to a legitimate goal" or, conversely, whether it was "arbitrary or purposeless." Bell, 441 U.S. at 539. The defendants have not denied that the policy with respect to mail and phone access for pretrial detainees is as it is characterized by Simpson. Nor have the defendants asserted any argument as to the reasons for the blanket prohibition on phone access for pretrial detainees in disciplinary segregation other than that the withholding of privileges is a legitimate form of punishment. Also the pleadings provide no hint as to either the charges on which Simpson was being detained or the reasons why Jail authorities placed Simpson in segregation. Based on Bell, I conclude that this is not a claim ripe for dismissal.