Sections 504 and 202 both borrow their remedies from Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. 29 U.S.C. § 794a(a)(2); 42 U.S.C. § 12133. The pertinent question, therefore, is what remedies Title VI permits. Unfortunately, Title VI expressly provides neither a private cause of action nor remedies for such an action. See 42 U.S.C. § § 2000d et seq. In Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 694-703, 99 S.Ct. 1946, 60 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), however, the Supreme Court held that Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 created an implied cause of action in its protected class. In doing so, the Supreme Court relied heavily on the fact that Title IX had been modeled on Title VI. The Court assumed Congress knew that Title VI had been interpreted by some lower courts to contain an implied cause of action. Id. at 696-97, 99 S.Ct. 1946. Therefore, the Court concluded, Congress must have intended Title IX to similarly include an implied cause of action. This reading has since been turned around to conclude that Title VI must also contain an implied cause of action. Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 191, 116 S.Ct. 2092, 135 L.Ed.2d 486 (1996); Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 597, 612, 615-16, 635-36, 103 S.Ct. 3221, 77 L.Ed.2d 866 (1983) (seven members of the court recognizing implied action in Title VI in fragmented opinions). For our part, we have twice permitted damages under section 504, thereby corroborating, albeit without discussion, the notion that Title VI contains an implied cause of action. Rodgers, 34 F.3d 642; Miener, 673 F.2d 969.

We turn next to Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools, 503 U.S. 60, 112 S.Ct. 1028, 117 L.Ed.2d 208 (1992), which considered the remedies available under the cause of action implied in Title IX. There, the Court affirmed the rule, articulated earlier in Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684, 66 S.Ct. 773, 90 L.Ed. 939 (1946), that "absent clear direction to the contrary by Congress, the federal courts have the power to award any appropriate relief in a cognizable cause of action brought pursuant to a federal statute." Franklin, 503 U.S. at 70-71, 112 S.Ct. 1028. The Supreme Court has long made clear that punitive damages are an integral part of the common law tradition and the judicial arsenal. See *746Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 15-18, 111 S.Ct. 1032, 113 L.Ed.2d 1 (1991) (reviewing history of punitive damages from Blackstone through the English and American courts); Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 363, 370, 14 L.Ed. 181 (1852) (noting well established common law principle that juries may exact "exemplary, punitive or vindictive" damages). Punitive damages, therefore, fall within the panoply of remedies usually available to American courts. Given an implied cause of action in Title VI, Franklin compels the conclusion that absent express congressional statement to the contrary, Title VI also affords all appropriate remedies, including punitive damages. [FN6]

FN6. The availability of additional remedies is not precluded by Congress' express provision in Title VI of administrative remedies. It is an elemental canon of statutory construction that where a statute expressly provides a particular remedy or remedies, a court must be chary of reading others into it. Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. (TAMA) v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 19, 100 S.Ct. 242, 62 L.Ed.2d 146 (1979). However, Title IX uses the same textual structure and remedies, yet in Franklin the Court found the implied private cause of action to sustain an award of monetary damages. This follows only if the administrative and private causes of action are separate and distinct such that a limitation on one does not operate against the other.

The Court in Franklin next took up "whether Congress intended to limit application of this general principle in the enforcement of Title IX." 503 U.S. at 71, 112 S.Ct. 1028. Because the cause of action in question was implied rather than expressed, the Court put aside what it considered a pointless discussion of legislative history. [FN7] Id. Rather, it looked to the judicial backdrop against which Congress had legislated. The Court observed that "[i]n the years before and after Congress enacted this statute, the Court followed a common-law tradition and regarded the denial of a remedy as the exception rather than the rule." Id. (quotation and brackets omitted). Once again indulging the assumption that Congress legislates in light of prevailing precedent, the Court found Congress to have intended the availability of all remedies. The Court then reviewed Congress' subsequent treatment of Title IX. In both 1986 and 1987, Congress amended Title IX without disturbing either the Court's holding in Cannon, that Title IX afforded a private remedy, or limiting the availability of remedies thereunder. In fact, the language of the 1986 amendment impliedly recognized the existence of a private cause of action. Id. at 72-73, 112 S.Ct. 1028. The Court concluded, "[o]ur reading of the two amendments to Title IX enacted after Cannon leads us to conclude that Congress did not intend to limit the remedies available in a suit brought under Title IX." Id. at 72, 112 S.Ct. 1028.

FN7. That the cause of action was implied did not preclude the availability of remedies as the latter is analytically distinct from the question of whether a cause of action exists at all. Franklin, 503 U.S. at 65-66, 112 S.Ct. 1028.

Application of Franklin's methodology to this case must begin with the enactment of Title VI in 1964. Cannon and our own holdings in Rodgers and Miener compel the conclusion that in 1964 Congress created an implied cause of action in Title VI. [FN8] At that time, the rule in *747 Bell, relied on in Franklin, that a cause of action affords all appropriate remedies unless expressly limited, was alive and well. As in Franklin, we must therefore conclude that Congress assumed the availability of all remedies, including punitive damages, under Title VI. Congress has not since amended Title VI to limit any cause of action implied thereunder, nor the remedies that might accompany such a cause of action. Congress extended the remedies available under Title VI to section 504 in 1978, 29 U.S.C. § 794a, and then to section 202 in 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12133. Congress has never expressly limited the remedies available under those sections either. Therefore, logic dictates, the full panoply of remedies available under Title VI, including punitive damages, must be available under sections 504 and 202.

FN8. When a court "implies" a cause of action it does not "create" it, but rather "discovers" it in an act of statutory construction. See, e.g., Franklin, 503 U.S. at 71-72, 112 S.Ct. 1028; J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 430-31, 84 S.Ct. 1555, 12 L.Ed.2d 423 (1964). The upshot of this understanding is that the cause of action has always existed, despite having lain dormant. This logic holds for any judicial statutory interpretation--even those which change pre-existing interpretations. Regardless of the merits of this understanding, it flows from our judicial interpretive, as opposed to legislative, function.

The Sixth Circuit reached the contrary conclusion in Moreno, 99 F.3d 782. It relied largely on two concerns. First, it noted that since the enactment of these various sections, lower federal courts have been in near unanimity that they do not support punitive awards. Id. at 789-91. Second, given this fact, it pointed to the Civil Rights Act of 1991 as proof that Congress itself did not intend the availability of punitive damages. Id. at 790. It additionally pointed to this same evidence to support the proposition that punitive damages would not be "appropriate" in that case. Id. at 791- 92.

We are sympathetic to the Sixth Circuit's concerns, but find its methodology and conclusions foreclosed by Cannon and Franklin. The Sixth Circuit first pointed to the 1986, 1987 and 1991 amendments to the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA, wherein Congress amended these acts but did not disturb decisions ruling punitive damages unavailable under sections 504 and 202. Noting the assumption, made in Franklin and Cannon, that Congress legislates in light of then-prevailing judicial interpretations, the Sixth Circuit concluded "[t]he only inference of congressional intent that can be drawn from [the amendments] is that Congress intended § 504 remedies to remain in statu quo-- i.e., no punitive damages." Id. at 791.

This reasoning, however, misapplies the Supreme Court's methodology in Franklin and also undermines basic principles of statutory construction. Franklin first requires the determination of what remedies a statutory cause of action afforded at its enactment. It then permits reference to subsequent amendments only to see whether Congress later altered that initial understanding. This comports with the general rule that a statute adopts its meaning at the time of its enactment, and not at some later point by negative inference. In this case, because sections 504 and 202 draw their remedies from Title VI, the inquiry must start with the enactment of Title VI in 1964. As discussed above, Cannon and Franklin compel the conclusion that punitive damages were available as a remedy to a private cause of action under Title VI in 1964, and it is that assumption which provides the baseline against which subsequent amendments must be gauged. Therefore, the 1986, 1987 and 1991 amendments must be read as having not affected the status quo-that punitive damages are available under sections 504 and 202. To draw a contrary conclusion from those amendments would be to hold that Congress' understanding of section 504 in 1986 and 1987, and its understanding of sections 504 and 202 in 1991 trumped Congress' intent regarding those statutes when they were originally enacted, and in this way retroactively amended them. See *748Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FDA., 153 F.3d 155, 167 (4th Cir.1998) (noting that a statute's intent at the time of its enactment governs over subsequent congressional understandings) (citing MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. AT & T, 512 U.S. 218, 222, 114 S.Ct. 2223, 129 L.Ed.2d 182 (1994)), aff'd, 529 U.S. 120, 120 S.Ct. 1291, 146 L.Ed.2d 121 (2000).

Despite our conclusion, the Sixth Circuit's concerns are hardly misplaced. When Congress enacted the Rehabilitation Act and at the time of the subsequent amendments, courts generally agreed Title VI and section 504 did not afford monetary damages, and were in near unanimity that they did not permit punitive damages. [FN9] However, the governing statutes and precedents in this case operate as a one-way ratchet: once a cause of action is discovered, it automatically entitles a plaintiff to all appropriate remedies; and that finding then extends those remedies to all other interrelated statutes. This now precludes consideration of what Congress intended through consideration of these earlier court decisions.

FN9. See, e.g., Americans Disabled for Accessible Pub. Transp. v. SkyWest Airlines, Inc., 762 F.Supp. 320 (D.Utah 1991) (finding no punitive or compensatory damage remedy under section 504); Doe v. Southeastern Univ., 732 F.Supp. 7 (D.D.C.1990) (limiting section 504 to equitable remedies); Robinson v. University of Pa., No. 87-2476, 1988 WL 120738 (E.D.Pa. Nov.8, 1988) (holding neither punitive nor compensatory damages available under Title VI); Singh v. Superintending Sch. Comm., 601 F.Supp. 865 (D.Maine 1985) (permitting compensatory remedy but not punitive remedy under Title VI); Moreno v. Texas S. Univ., 573 F.Supp. 73 (S.D.Tex.1983) (finding no private cause of action for compensatory or punitive damages under Title VI); Rendon v. Utah State Dep't of Employment Sec. Job Serv., 454 F.Supp. 534 (D.Utah 1978) (same). But see Neighborhood Action Coalition v. City of Canton, 882 F.2d 1012 (6th Cir.1989) (permitting Title VI action for compensatory and punitive damages to continue without addressing their availability); Hutchings v. Erie City & County Library Bd. of Directors, 516 F.Supp. 1265 (W.D.Pa.1981) (permitting damages remedies under section 504 in suit where plaintiff sought punitive damages); Patton v. Dumpson, 498 F.Supp. 933 (S.D.N.Y.1980) (finding section 504 to afford compensatory damages); Gilliam v. City of Omaha, 388 F.Supp. 842 (D.Neb.1975) (recognizing action for monetary damages under Title VI), aff'd on other grounds, 524 F.2d 1013 (8th Cir.1975). Since Franklin, courts have begun to re-evaluate these holdings. See, e.g., Burns-Vidlak v. Chandler, 980 F.Supp. 1144 (D.Haw.1997) (finding punitive and compensatory damages available under sections 504 and 202).

This tension becomes particularly clear in the context of the 1991 Civil Rights Act. The product of extensive compromise between President George Herbert Walker Bush and Congress, that Act amended the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act to permit limited punitive damages. Specifically, it permitted employees suing under section 107(a) of the ADA and section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act to recover compensatory and punitive damages subject to statutory caps ranging from $50,000 to $300,000. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a. It did not, however, affect sections 504 or 202. The text and history of the 1991 Act suggest Congress intended to expand, and not to contract, the available remedies. Congress provided that a "complaining party may recover compensatory and punitive damages," using broadening, and not limiting language. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(2). Legislative history corroborates this interpretation. See, e.g., H.R.Rep. No. 102-40(I & II) (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 673 (discussing punitive damage provisions as an expansion of remedies). The following year, those who had pushed for the inclusion of punitive damages in the 1991 Act introduced a bill to remove its damages caps. The proposed bill would have deleted 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3), which contains the caps, but would not have removed the language authorizing *749 punitive and compensatory damages, suggesting that even then, they considered the new language necessary to create a punitive damage remedy under the acts. See Equal Remedies Act, S.Rep. No. 102-286 (1992), 1992 WL 113471 (Leg.Hist.); see also Kolstad v. American Dental Ass'n, 527 U.S. 526, 534, 119 S.Ct. 2118, 144 L.Ed.2d 494 (1999) ("With the passage of the 1991 Act, Congress provided for additional remedies, including punitive damages, for certain classes of ... violations.").

Applying the Supreme Court's reasoning in Franklin turns this understanding on its head. Cannon, Rodgers and Miener postulate the creation of a private cause of action in Title VI in 1964. Under Franklin we are to assume that action to have provided all remedies. Absent any subsequent contrary instruction, we are to assume those remedies to remain available under sections 504 and 202 today. We therefore rule, albeit not with great satisfaction, that these sections permit an award of punitive damages. Perhaps our parting ways with our sister circuit will prompt the Supreme Court or Congress to inject additional clarity into this area.

Our analysis thus far does not entirely conclude this matter, as an award of damages must be "appropriate" in a specific case. [FN10] District courts must undertake an independent review of the evidence to determine whether it supports punitive damages. Grabinski v. Blue Springs Ford Sales, Inc., 203 F.3d 1024, 1025 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 825, 121 S.Ct. 70, 148 L.Ed.2d 35 (2000); accord Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 109 S.Ct. 2909, 106 L.Ed.2d 219 (1989). The defendant's conduct must be shown to have been "motivated by evil motive or intent, or ... reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others." Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56, 103 S.Ct. 1625, 75 L.Ed.2d 632 (1983); see also Kolstad, 527 U.S. 526, 119 S.Ct. 2118, 144 L.Ed.2d 494 (discussing punitive damages scheme under 42 U.S.C. § 1981a). Punitive damages may also not be excessive. Watkins v. Lundell, 169 F.3d 540, 545 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 928, 120 S.Ct. 324, 145 L.Ed.2d 253 (1999). We have a subsequent obligation to review the district court's finding. At oral argument, Gorman's counsel admitted this to be the case and conceded that the district court did not do so, as it found punitive damages precluded as a matter of law. The facts in this case were hotly contested. We therefore remand for consideration of this point.

FN10. The Moreno court also argued that given the legislative and judicial backdrop, punitive damages were not "appropriate" as required by Franklin. Moreno, 99 F.3d at 791-92. We do not think the word "appropriate" to have been writ so large, and do not think the Court intended to create an escape hatch for all foregoing judicial interpretations. In his concurring opinion, Justice Scalia opined that given an action's implied nature, implied limitations on remedies ought also be considered. Franklin, 503 U.S. at 77-78 (Scalia, J. concurring in the judgment). Justice Scalia's comments underscore the breadth of the Court's holding.

IV.
The Police Board next appeals whether Gorman is a qualified individual with a disability under the ADA. The Police Board argues that while at the time of trial, our law clearly established that disability should be gauged without reference to corrective devices, subsequent Supreme Court decisions have required an individualized assessment of disability including consideration of available corrective devices. See, e.g., *750Murphy v. UPS, Inc., 527 U.S. 516, 119 S.Ct. 2133, 144 L.Ed.2d 484 (1999); Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 119 S.Ct. 2139, 144 L.Ed.2d 450 (1999). It seeks a remand to litigate this issue.

This argument is well off the mark. In Sutton, the Court concluded that a person with severe myopia, whose vision could be corrected with eyeglasses to the point that the disability did not severely impede a major life activity was not a qualified individual. 527 U.S. at 481-83, 119 S.Ct. 2139. Gorman's wheelchair permits him some mobility, but hardly replaces his legs. Moreover, the events challenged in this lawsuit center largely on his removal from the wheelchair and placement in the back of a police van, where he had no corrective device. No corrective device--no issue. We see little need to further pursue this question.

V.
The Police Board next raises two challenges to the jury instructions. The Board asserts that the jury was not instructed as to each element of an action under sections 504 and 202, and also objects to an instruction that the Board had an obligation to provide "safe" transportation. A jury instruction must, when taken as a whole and viewed in light of the evidence and applicable law, fairly and adequately submit the issues in the case to the jury. Horstmyer v. Black & Decker, (U.S.), Inc., 151 F.3d 765, 771 (8th Cir.1998). Where a party fails to object to an instruction before the district court, we will review only for plain error. Id.

In instruction 16, the district court instructed the jury that liability would lie under the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA upon proof of all the following elements:
First, that the defendants failed to provide plaintiff appropriate transportation that reasonably accommodated his disability after he was arrested, and
Second, that as a direct result of the defendants' failure, plaintiff sustained damages.

The district court then instructed the jury in its instruction number 17 that "for purposes of Instruction No. 16, making a 'reasonable accommodation' for the plaintiff means making modifications to the defendants' practices for transporting the plaintiff after he was arrested so that he would be transported in a manner that was safe and appropriate consistent with his disability."

The Board failed to object at trial to the form of instruction 16, as given at trial. In fact, the Board agreed to its text and stated an intention to not object. We will therefore reverse only for plain error. We have previously held that in order to prevail under section 202, a plaintiff must prove that "1) he is a qualified individual with a disability; 2) he was ... denied the benefits of a public entity's services ...; and 3) that such ... denial... was by reason of his disability." Layton v. Elder, 143 F.3d 469, 472 (8th Cir.1998). Such language, however, is not sacrosanct. Rather, an instruction must fairly and accurately submit the issue in light of the evidence and the law. Horstmyer, 151 F.3d at 771. In this case, the court's instructions resulted from lengthy negotiations between the court and the parties during which the parties agreed to drop certain elements from the instructions. Moreover, the language used fairly captures the elements of the actions. Section 202 requires reasonable transportation modifications if necessary. The court's instruction that damages flow from a failure to reasonably accommodate a disability implicitly requires a finding of denial and disability. The instruction similarly covers the essential elements of section 504. In light of the facts of this case and the *751 language used, we sustain the instruction given. [FN11]

FN11. In the future, the district court should separate out instructions under different acts and more carefully parse elements, for clarity on appeal.

The Board also takes issue with the district court's use of the word "safe" in instruction 17 as an incorrect statement of the law, and expresses the fear that it required the Board to insure the safety of future detainees. The district court quoted the word "safe" from our prior opinion in this case. See Gorman, 152 F.3d at 913. We agree with the Police Board that in Gorman we did not impose an obligation of providing "safe" transportation. We also, however, do not think that the district court's instruction warrants the interpretation given it by the Police Board. The instruction required transportation safe and appropriate consistent with Gorman's disability. This seems the essence of a reasonable accommodation--the police cannot reasonably accommodate a disabled detainee by placing him in a position where, by virtue of his disability, he is left helpless. The district court did not require the Police Board to insure Gorman against other harms, such as a crash on the way to the station or a self-imposed injury. On this reading, we approve the instruction.

VI.
The Board also challenges the district court's denial of its motion for a new trial, on the basis that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence, along with various evidentiary rulings. After reviewing the record we affirm the district court on these points.

We remand to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

257 F.3d 738, 11 A.D. Cases 1599, 21 NDLR P 179

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