×
You have 2 more free articles available this month. Subscribe today.
Eleventh Circuit Remands ADA and Section 1983 Claims for Amended Complaint
Eleventh Circuit Remands ADA and § 1983 Claims for Amended Complaint
by John E. Dannenberg
In two similar cases, the Eleventh Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals issued orders remanding prisoner complaints of Georgia?s violations of Title II of the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA; 42 U.S.C. § 12131, et seq.) that had been brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, to permit the prisoners to amend their complaints to distinguish and specify which of the claims and defendants had offended the ADA and which had offended § 1983. These orders followed the U.S. Supreme Court's earlier reversal of the Eleventh Circuit's dismissal of all such claims based upon Georgia's assertion of Eleventh Amendment immunity. (U.S. v. Georgia, 126 S.Ct. 877 (2006) (?Georgia?) [PLN, Mar. 2006, p. 14]).
Tony Goodman, a paraplegic Georgia prisoner, had sued state defendants for denial of wheelchair access. Although his claim had been framed in Eighth Amendment arguments (cruel and unusual punishment), he sued under both the ADA and § 1983, which the Eleventh Circuit dismissed. On certiorari in Georgia, the high court ruled that Goodman?s ADA complaint trumped the Eleventh Amendment if those claims articulated an actual Fourteenth Amendment (§ 1) violation, and reversed the Eleventh Circuit.
On remand, the Eleventh Circuit vacated its earlier ruling (120 Fed.Appx. 785) and ordered Goodman to identify (1) what conduct violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments that was actionable under § 1983, (2) to what extent this also violated Title II of the ADA, (3) what conduct, if any, violated the ADA but did not violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, and (4) which named defendants were sued under the ADA, § 1983 or both, and whether they were sued in their individual or official capacity. See: Goodman v. Ray, 449 F.3d 1152 (11th Cir. 2006).
Separately, the Eleventh Circuit vacated Miller v. King, 348 F.3d 1248 (11th Cir. 2004), wherein the court had similarly dismissed Georgia prisoner Tracy Miller?s suit regarding due process, retaliation, Eighth Amendment and Title II ADA claims. Based on Georgia, the appellate court resurrected Miller's Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment claims to redetermine, in the district court below, if summary judgment should be granted against defendant Sikes, the State of Georgia and the Georgia Department of Corrections for alleged Eighth Amendment violations.
Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit ordered Miller (now represented by pro bono counsel) to amend his complaint, using the same four-point format prescribed above in the Goodman case. See: Miller v. King, 449 F.3d 1149 (11th Cir. 2006).
by John E. Dannenberg
In two similar cases, the Eleventh Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals issued orders remanding prisoner complaints of Georgia?s violations of Title II of the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA; 42 U.S.C. § 12131, et seq.) that had been brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, to permit the prisoners to amend their complaints to distinguish and specify which of the claims and defendants had offended the ADA and which had offended § 1983. These orders followed the U.S. Supreme Court's earlier reversal of the Eleventh Circuit's dismissal of all such claims based upon Georgia's assertion of Eleventh Amendment immunity. (U.S. v. Georgia, 126 S.Ct. 877 (2006) (?Georgia?) [PLN, Mar. 2006, p. 14]).
Tony Goodman, a paraplegic Georgia prisoner, had sued state defendants for denial of wheelchair access. Although his claim had been framed in Eighth Amendment arguments (cruel and unusual punishment), he sued under both the ADA and § 1983, which the Eleventh Circuit dismissed. On certiorari in Georgia, the high court ruled that Goodman?s ADA complaint trumped the Eleventh Amendment if those claims articulated an actual Fourteenth Amendment (§ 1) violation, and reversed the Eleventh Circuit.
On remand, the Eleventh Circuit vacated its earlier ruling (120 Fed.Appx. 785) and ordered Goodman to identify (1) what conduct violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments that was actionable under § 1983, (2) to what extent this also violated Title II of the ADA, (3) what conduct, if any, violated the ADA but did not violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, and (4) which named defendants were sued under the ADA, § 1983 or both, and whether they were sued in their individual or official capacity. See: Goodman v. Ray, 449 F.3d 1152 (11th Cir. 2006).
Separately, the Eleventh Circuit vacated Miller v. King, 348 F.3d 1248 (11th Cir. 2004), wherein the court had similarly dismissed Georgia prisoner Tracy Miller?s suit regarding due process, retaliation, Eighth Amendment and Title II ADA claims. Based on Georgia, the appellate court resurrected Miller's Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment claims to redetermine, in the district court below, if summary judgment should be granted against defendant Sikes, the State of Georgia and the Georgia Department of Corrections for alleged Eighth Amendment violations.
Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit ordered Miller (now represented by pro bono counsel) to amend his complaint, using the same four-point format prescribed above in the Goodman case. See: Miller v. King, 449 F.3d 1149 (11th Cir. 2006).
As a digital subscriber to Prison Legal News, you can access full text and downloads for this and other premium content.
Already a subscriber? Login
Related legal cases
Miller v. King
| Year | 2006 |
|---|---|
| Cite | 449 F.3d 1149 (11th Cir. 2006) |
| Level | Court of Appeals |
| Injunction Status | N/A |
Miller v. King, 449 F.3d 1149, 17 A.D. Cases 1758 (11th Cir. 05/17/2006)
[1] IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
[2] No. 02-13348
[3] 449 F.3d 1149, 17 A.D. Cases 1758,
[4] May 17, 2006; as amended May 19, 2006
[5] TRACY MILLER, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, INTERVENOR,
v.
RONALD KING, DEFENDANT-APPELLEE,
WAYNE GARNER, THE STATE OF GEORGIA, THE GEORGIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, JOHNNY SIKES, DEFENDANTS.
[6] Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia D. C. Docket No. 98-00109-CV-6.
[7] Per curiam.
[8] [PUBLISH]
[9] Before CARNES, HULL and HILL, Circuit Judges.
[10] In light of the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. 877 (2006), we vacate in full our prior opinion in Miller v. King, 384 F.3d 1248 (11th Cir. 2004), and substitute the following in its place.
[11] I. APPEAL
[12] On appeal Tracy Miller ("Miller") argues that: (1) the jury's verdict on his due process and retaliation claims was not supported by substantial evidence; (2) the magistrate judge improperly conducted voir dire and lacked jurisdiction; (3) the magistrate judge and district court improperly denied Miller's motions for preliminary injunctions; and (4) the magistrate judge and district court erred in granting summary judgment to the defendants on his Eighth Amendment claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and his claims under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12131 et seq. (the "ADA").*fn1 Except for the Eighth Amendment and ADA claims, these arguments lack merit and warrant no further discussion. We thus turn to the grant of summary judgment to all defendants on Miller's Eighth Amendment and ADA claims.*fn2
[13] As to Miller's Eighth Amendment and ADA claims, Miller's pro se complaint and amended complaint make voluminous claims and, as noted in our prior opinion, many of his claims are unintelligible or nonsensical, but a few claims are intelligible and potentially viable. However, the analytical difficulties created by Miller's pro se pleadings are now heightened by the Supreme Court's decision in Georgia, which indicates that it is important for lower courts to determine on a claim-by-claim basis (1) which aspects of the State's alleged conduct violate Title II; (2) to what extent such alleged misconduct also violates the Constitution; and (3) whether such alleged misconduct violates Title II but does not violate the Constitution. Georgia, 546 U.S. at ___, 126 S.Ct. at 882. It is unclear from Miller's pro se pleadings whether he asserts any Title II claims premised on conduct that does not independently violate the Eighth Amendment, which makes the analysis required by Georgia impossible.
[14] In sum, given the Supreme Court's intervening decision in Georgia, the current status of Miller's pro se pleadings and his now being represented by counsel,*fn3 we conclude that this case should be remanded to the district court for Miller to amend his complaint so that the proper claim-by-claim analysis can be undertaken. Thus, we (1) vacate the district court's February 25, 2000 order to the extent that order granted summary judgment on Miller's Eighth Amendment claims against defendant Sikes individually and in his official capacity, (2) vacate the magistrate judge's January 29, 2002 order to the extent it granted summary judgment on Miller's ADA claims against defendants Sikes in his official capacity, the State of Georgia, and the Department of Corrections, and (3) remand this case to the district court with instructions to permit Miller to amend his complaint and then for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court's decision in Georgia.
[15] In his amended complaint, Miller shall specify on a claim-by-claim basis and in separate counts (1) the specific conduct he alleges violates the Eighth Amendment and is actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2) to what extent the alleged conduct underlying Miller's constitutional claims also violates Title II of the ADA; (3) what specific conduct allegedly violates Title II of the ADA but does not violate the Eighth Amendment; (4) as to his Eighth Amendment claims under § 1983, whether the defendant Warden Sikes is sued individually or in an official capacity or both; and (5) as to his ADA claims, whether the claim is brought against defendant Sikes in his official capacity, the defendant State of Georgia, and/or the defendant Department of Corrections. After Miller files his amended complaint in the district court, defendants Sikes, the State of Georgia, and the Georgia Department of Corrections shall be given a reasonable opportunity to file new motions to dismiss or for summary judgment, which the district court in the first instance shall adjudicate consistent with the Supreme Court's decision in Georgia.*fn4
[16] In sum, except for Miller's Eighth Amendment and ADA claims against defendant Sikes and his ADA claims against the defendants State of Georgia and the Georgia Department of Corrections, as to which we vacate and remand as described above, we affirm as to all claims as to all defendants. We remand this case to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
[17] AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED and REMANDED IN PART.
Opinion Footnotes
[18] *fn1 On appeal, Miller also contends that he is entitled to proceed under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). This claim was never raised in the district court, and thus we do not consider it for the first time on appeal. See Draper v. Reynolds, 369 F.3d 1270, 1274 n.5 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 988, 125 S.Ct. 507 (2004).
[19] *fn2 "We review the district court's rulings on motions for summary judgment de novo, applying the same legal standards that bound the district court." Jackson v. BellSouth Telecomm., 372 F.3d 1250, 1279 (11th Cir. 2004). This Court, like the trial court, must view all evidence and all factual inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Burton v. City of Belle Glade, 178 F.3d 1175, 1187 (11th Cir. 1999).
[20] *fn3 Miller filed his complaints pro se and remained pro se until this Court appointed him pro bono counsel on appeal. Counsel has advised this Court that counsel is willing to continue to represent Miller on remand in the district court, and thus the district court should enter an appointment order on remand.
[21] *fn4 We do not express any opinion about the merits of Miller's claims or as to what person or entity is the proper defendant on Miller's remaining claims. We leave all of those issues to be decided by the district court in the first instance.
[1] IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
[2] No. 02-13348
[3] 449 F.3d 1149, 17 A.D. Cases 1758,
[4] May 17, 2006; as amended May 19, 2006
[5] TRACY MILLER, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, INTERVENOR,
v.
RONALD KING, DEFENDANT-APPELLEE,
WAYNE GARNER, THE STATE OF GEORGIA, THE GEORGIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, JOHNNY SIKES, DEFENDANTS.
[6] Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia D. C. Docket No. 98-00109-CV-6.
[7] Per curiam.
[8] [PUBLISH]
[9] Before CARNES, HULL and HILL, Circuit Judges.
[10] In light of the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. 877 (2006), we vacate in full our prior opinion in Miller v. King, 384 F.3d 1248 (11th Cir. 2004), and substitute the following in its place.
[11] I. APPEAL
[12] On appeal Tracy Miller ("Miller") argues that: (1) the jury's verdict on his due process and retaliation claims was not supported by substantial evidence; (2) the magistrate judge improperly conducted voir dire and lacked jurisdiction; (3) the magistrate judge and district court improperly denied Miller's motions for preliminary injunctions; and (4) the magistrate judge and district court erred in granting summary judgment to the defendants on his Eighth Amendment claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and his claims under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12131 et seq. (the "ADA").*fn1 Except for the Eighth Amendment and ADA claims, these arguments lack merit and warrant no further discussion. We thus turn to the grant of summary judgment to all defendants on Miller's Eighth Amendment and ADA claims.*fn2
[13] As to Miller's Eighth Amendment and ADA claims, Miller's pro se complaint and amended complaint make voluminous claims and, as noted in our prior opinion, many of his claims are unintelligible or nonsensical, but a few claims are intelligible and potentially viable. However, the analytical difficulties created by Miller's pro se pleadings are now heightened by the Supreme Court's decision in Georgia, which indicates that it is important for lower courts to determine on a claim-by-claim basis (1) which aspects of the State's alleged conduct violate Title II; (2) to what extent such alleged misconduct also violates the Constitution; and (3) whether such alleged misconduct violates Title II but does not violate the Constitution. Georgia, 546 U.S. at ___, 126 S.Ct. at 882. It is unclear from Miller's pro se pleadings whether he asserts any Title II claims premised on conduct that does not independently violate the Eighth Amendment, which makes the analysis required by Georgia impossible.
[14] In sum, given the Supreme Court's intervening decision in Georgia, the current status of Miller's pro se pleadings and his now being represented by counsel,*fn3 we conclude that this case should be remanded to the district court for Miller to amend his complaint so that the proper claim-by-claim analysis can be undertaken. Thus, we (1) vacate the district court's February 25, 2000 order to the extent that order granted summary judgment on Miller's Eighth Amendment claims against defendant Sikes individually and in his official capacity, (2) vacate the magistrate judge's January 29, 2002 order to the extent it granted summary judgment on Miller's ADA claims against defendants Sikes in his official capacity, the State of Georgia, and the Department of Corrections, and (3) remand this case to the district court with instructions to permit Miller to amend his complaint and then for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court's decision in Georgia.
[15] In his amended complaint, Miller shall specify on a claim-by-claim basis and in separate counts (1) the specific conduct he alleges violates the Eighth Amendment and is actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2) to what extent the alleged conduct underlying Miller's constitutional claims also violates Title II of the ADA; (3) what specific conduct allegedly violates Title II of the ADA but does not violate the Eighth Amendment; (4) as to his Eighth Amendment claims under § 1983, whether the defendant Warden Sikes is sued individually or in an official capacity or both; and (5) as to his ADA claims, whether the claim is brought against defendant Sikes in his official capacity, the defendant State of Georgia, and/or the defendant Department of Corrections. After Miller files his amended complaint in the district court, defendants Sikes, the State of Georgia, and the Georgia Department of Corrections shall be given a reasonable opportunity to file new motions to dismiss or for summary judgment, which the district court in the first instance shall adjudicate consistent with the Supreme Court's decision in Georgia.*fn4
[16] In sum, except for Miller's Eighth Amendment and ADA claims against defendant Sikes and his ADA claims against the defendants State of Georgia and the Georgia Department of Corrections, as to which we vacate and remand as described above, we affirm as to all claims as to all defendants. We remand this case to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
[17] AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED and REMANDED IN PART.
Opinion Footnotes
[18] *fn1 On appeal, Miller also contends that he is entitled to proceed under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). This claim was never raised in the district court, and thus we do not consider it for the first time on appeal. See Draper v. Reynolds, 369 F.3d 1270, 1274 n.5 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 988, 125 S.Ct. 507 (2004).
[19] *fn2 "We review the district court's rulings on motions for summary judgment de novo, applying the same legal standards that bound the district court." Jackson v. BellSouth Telecomm., 372 F.3d 1250, 1279 (11th Cir. 2004). This Court, like the trial court, must view all evidence and all factual inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Burton v. City of Belle Glade, 178 F.3d 1175, 1187 (11th Cir. 1999).
[20] *fn3 Miller filed his complaints pro se and remained pro se until this Court appointed him pro bono counsel on appeal. Counsel has advised this Court that counsel is willing to continue to represent Miller on remand in the district court, and thus the district court should enter an appointment order on remand.
[21] *fn4 We do not express any opinion about the merits of Miller's claims or as to what person or entity is the proper defendant on Miller's remaining claims. We leave all of those issues to be decided by the district court in the first instance.
Goodman v. Ray
| Year | 2006 |
|---|---|
| Cite | 449 F.3d 1152 (11th Cir. 2006) |
| Level | Court of Appeals |
| Injunction Status | N/A |
Goodman v. Ray, 449 F.3d 1152, 17 A.D. Cases 1759 (11th Cir. 05/17/2006)
[1] IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
[2] No. 02-10168
[3] 449 F.3d 1152, 17 A.D. Cases 1759
[4] May 17, 2006
[5] TONY GOODMAN, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT,
v.
O. T. RAY, ET AL., DEFENDANTS,
THE STATE OF GEORGIA, DEFENDANT-APPELLEE, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, INTERVENOR.
[6] Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia D. C. Docket No. 99-00012-CV-JEG-6.
[7] Per curiam.
[8] [PUBLISH]
[9] Before CARNES, HULL and HILL, Circuit Judges.
[10] ON REMAND FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
[11] This case is now before this Court on remand from the United States Supreme Court as set forth in United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. 877 (2006). The procedural history of this case is discussed at length in the Supreme Court's decision. Id. at ___, 126 S.Ct. at 879-80.
[12] In light of the Supreme Court's reversal of this Court's final judgment in this case, we vacate in full (1) our prior opinion in Goodman v. Ray, No. 02-10168 (11th Cir. Sept. 16, 2004); (2) the district court's August 20, 1999 order dismissing Goodman's Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against all defendants and dismissing Goodman's claims under Title II of the ADA*fn1 against certain defendants but not as to other defendants; (3) the district court's March 16, 2000 order denying Goodman's and the remaining defendants' motions for summary judgment as to Goodman's ADA claims; and (4) the magistrate judge's December 20, 2001 order granting summary judgment to the remaining defendants as to Goodman's ADA claims.
[13] We remand this case to the district court with instructions to permit Goodman to amend his complaint and then for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court's decision. In his amended complaint, Goodman shall specify in separate counts (1) what specific conduct he alleges violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments and is actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2) to what extent the alleged conduct underlying Goodman's constitutional claims also violates Title II of the ADA; (3) what specific conduct, if any, allegedly violates Title II of the ADA but does not violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments; and (4) what named defendants are sued under § 1983, Title II of the ADA, or both, and in what capacity each named defendant is sued (such as, whether individually or in official capacity). See Georgia, 546 U.S. at ___, 126 S.Ct. at 882.*fn2
[14] After Goodman files his amended complaint in the district court, the defendants shall be given a reasonable opportunity to file new motions to dismiss or for summary judgment, which the district court in the first instance shall adjudicate consistent with the Supreme Court's decision in this case.*fn3
[15] VACATED and REMANDED.
Opinion Footnotes
[16] *fn1 See Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12131 et seq. (the "ADA").
[17] *fn2 Goodman filed his complaints pro se and remained pro se until this Court appointed him pro bono counsel on appeal. Counsel has advised this Court that counsel is willing to continue to represent Goodman on remand in the district court, and thus the district court should enter an appointment order on remand.
[18] *fn3 We do not express any opinion about the merits of Goodman's claims or as to what person or entity is the proper defendant on Goodman's remaining claims. We leave all of those issues to be decided by the district court in the first instance.
[1] IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
[2] No. 02-10168
[3] 449 F.3d 1152, 17 A.D. Cases 1759
[4] May 17, 2006
[5] TONY GOODMAN, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT,
v.
O. T. RAY, ET AL., DEFENDANTS,
THE STATE OF GEORGIA, DEFENDANT-APPELLEE, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, INTERVENOR.
[6] Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia D. C. Docket No. 99-00012-CV-JEG-6.
[7] Per curiam.
[8] [PUBLISH]
[9] Before CARNES, HULL and HILL, Circuit Judges.
[10] ON REMAND FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
[11] This case is now before this Court on remand from the United States Supreme Court as set forth in United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. 877 (2006). The procedural history of this case is discussed at length in the Supreme Court's decision. Id. at ___, 126 S.Ct. at 879-80.
[12] In light of the Supreme Court's reversal of this Court's final judgment in this case, we vacate in full (1) our prior opinion in Goodman v. Ray, No. 02-10168 (11th Cir. Sept. 16, 2004); (2) the district court's August 20, 1999 order dismissing Goodman's Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against all defendants and dismissing Goodman's claims under Title II of the ADA*fn1 against certain defendants but not as to other defendants; (3) the district court's March 16, 2000 order denying Goodman's and the remaining defendants' motions for summary judgment as to Goodman's ADA claims; and (4) the magistrate judge's December 20, 2001 order granting summary judgment to the remaining defendants as to Goodman's ADA claims.
[13] We remand this case to the district court with instructions to permit Goodman to amend his complaint and then for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court's decision. In his amended complaint, Goodman shall specify in separate counts (1) what specific conduct he alleges violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments and is actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2) to what extent the alleged conduct underlying Goodman's constitutional claims also violates Title II of the ADA; (3) what specific conduct, if any, allegedly violates Title II of the ADA but does not violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments; and (4) what named defendants are sued under § 1983, Title II of the ADA, or both, and in what capacity each named defendant is sued (such as, whether individually or in official capacity). See Georgia, 546 U.S. at ___, 126 S.Ct. at 882.*fn2
[14] After Goodman files his amended complaint in the district court, the defendants shall be given a reasonable opportunity to file new motions to dismiss or for summary judgment, which the district court in the first instance shall adjudicate consistent with the Supreme Court's decision in this case.*fn3
[15] VACATED and REMANDED.
Opinion Footnotes
[16] *fn1 See Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12131 et seq. (the "ADA").
[17] *fn2 Goodman filed his complaints pro se and remained pro se until this Court appointed him pro bono counsel on appeal. Counsel has advised this Court that counsel is willing to continue to represent Goodman on remand in the district court, and thus the district court should enter an appointment order on remand.
[18] *fn3 We do not express any opinion about the merits of Goodman's claims or as to what person or entity is the proper defendant on Goodman's remaining claims. We leave all of those issues to be decided by the district court in the first instance.