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Juvenile Curfew Law Struck Down
The court invalidates a juvenile curfew ordinance insofar as it barred
juveniles from being on the streets with parental consent.
The court applies intermediate scrutiny to the claim. At 175:
"Intermediate scrutiny typically is used to review laws that employ
quasi-suspect classifications, . . . such as gender, . . . or legitimacy. .
. . On occasion intermediate scrutiny has been applied to review a law
that affects 'an important, though not constitutional, right.'" (Citations
omitted. As to the last point, the court cites Plyler v. Doe as "applying,
without labeling it as such, an intermediate form of scrutiny to review of
a law that implicated right to education").
Here the court applies intermediate scrutiny because the right to
intrastate travel is a constitutional right for adults (hence, rational
basis review is inappropriate) but there are inherent differences between
children and adults that make inappropriate a "constitutional preference
for 'blindness'" (hence strict scrutiny is inappropriate) (179). This is
an extremely sketchy summary of a long discussion. See: Ramos v. Town of
Vernon, 353 F.3d 171 (2d Cir. 2004) (Cardamone, J., with Sack concurring
and Winter dissenting).
juveniles from being on the streets with parental consent.
The court applies intermediate scrutiny to the claim. At 175:
"Intermediate scrutiny typically is used to review laws that employ
quasi-suspect classifications, . . . such as gender, . . . or legitimacy. .
. . On occasion intermediate scrutiny has been applied to review a law
that affects 'an important, though not constitutional, right.'" (Citations
omitted. As to the last point, the court cites Plyler v. Doe as "applying,
without labeling it as such, an intermediate form of scrutiny to review of
a law that implicated right to education").
Here the court applies intermediate scrutiny because the right to
intrastate travel is a constitutional right for adults (hence, rational
basis review is inappropriate) but there are inherent differences between
children and adults that make inappropriate a "constitutional preference
for 'blindness'" (hence strict scrutiny is inappropriate) (179). This is
an extremely sketchy summary of a long discussion. See: Ramos v. Town of
Vernon, 353 F.3d 171 (2d Cir. 2004) (Cardamone, J., with Sack concurring
and Winter dissenting).
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Related legal case
Ramos v. Town of Vernon
| Year | 2004 |
|---|---|
| Cite | 353 F.3d 171 (2d Cir. 2004) |
| Level | Court of Appeals |
| Attorney Fees | 0 |
| Damages | 0 |
| Injunction Status | N/A |
JANET RAMOS, individually and as next of friend to Angel Ramos and Richard Ramos; ANGEL RAMOS, by and through his next friend, Janet Ramos; and RICHARD RAMOS, by and through his next friend, Janet Ramos, Plaintiffs-Appellants, -- v.-- TOWN OF VERNON and RUDOLPH ROSSMY, Chief of Police in his official capacity, Defendants-Appellees.
Docket No. 01-7118
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
353 F.3d 171; 2004 U.S. App.
January 22, 2004, Decided
PRIOR HISTORY: Ramos v. Town of Vernon, 353 F.3d 171, 2003 U.S. App. (2d Cir. Conn., June 2, 2003)
COUNSEL: For JANET RAMOS, Ind & as next of friend to Angel Ramos & Richard Ramos, ANGEL RAMOS, by & through his next friend, Janet Ramos, RICHARD RAMOS, by & thorugh his next friend, Janet Ramos, Plaintiffs - Appellants: Jon L. Schoenhorn, Esq., Schoenhorn & Associates, Hartford, CT.
For Town of Vernon, RUDOLPH ROSSMY, Chief of, Defendants - Appellees: Wesley W. Horton, Esq., Horton, Shields & Knox, PC, Hartford, Ct.
JUDGES: [**1] Chief Judge Walker, joined by Circuit Judges Jacobs, Cabranes, Raggi, and Wesley dissent from the denial of rehearing in banc.
OPINION:
A three-judge panel decided this case on June 2, 2003. A petition for rehearing by the panel and a petition for rehearing in banc was filed on June 13, 2003. On December 19, 2003, the panel granted the petition for rehearing by the panel and issued an amended opinion. A new petition for rehearing in banc was filed with this court on December 31, 2003. There being no majority in favor thereof, the petition for rehearing in banc is DENIED.
DISSENT BY: JOHN M. WALKER, JR.
DISSENT: [*196] JOHN M. WALKER, JR., Chief Judge, with whom JACOBS, CABRANES, RAGGI, and WESLEY, Circuit Judges, join, dissenting in the denial of rehearing in banc:
I respectfully dissent from the denial to rehear this appeal in banc. The appeal raises novel issues of constitutional law [*197] with potentially far-reaching implications as to whether the fundamental right to travel extends to unsupervised minors, the appropriate balance between state interests in protecting minors from harm and parental interests in raising children as they see fit, and the use of age to draw distinctions [**2] in curfew ordinances. These issues and the arguments set forth in the majority opinion, see Ramos v. Town of Vernon, 331 F.3d 315, 2003 WL 22989226 (2d Cir. 2003), and Judge Winter's dissent, see id., 331 F.3d 315 [WL] at *16 (Winter, J., dissenting), which I believe merit Supreme Court review, would have benefitted from consideration by the full court before they are presented by certiorari to the Supreme Court.
Docket No. 01-7118
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
353 F.3d 171; 2004 U.S. App.
January 22, 2004, Decided
PRIOR HISTORY: Ramos v. Town of Vernon, 353 F.3d 171, 2003 U.S. App. (2d Cir. Conn., June 2, 2003)
COUNSEL: For JANET RAMOS, Ind & as next of friend to Angel Ramos & Richard Ramos, ANGEL RAMOS, by & through his next friend, Janet Ramos, RICHARD RAMOS, by & thorugh his next friend, Janet Ramos, Plaintiffs - Appellants: Jon L. Schoenhorn, Esq., Schoenhorn & Associates, Hartford, CT.
For Town of Vernon, RUDOLPH ROSSMY, Chief of, Defendants - Appellees: Wesley W. Horton, Esq., Horton, Shields & Knox, PC, Hartford, Ct.
JUDGES: [**1] Chief Judge Walker, joined by Circuit Judges Jacobs, Cabranes, Raggi, and Wesley dissent from the denial of rehearing in banc.
OPINION:
A three-judge panel decided this case on June 2, 2003. A petition for rehearing by the panel and a petition for rehearing in banc was filed on June 13, 2003. On December 19, 2003, the panel granted the petition for rehearing by the panel and issued an amended opinion. A new petition for rehearing in banc was filed with this court on December 31, 2003. There being no majority in favor thereof, the petition for rehearing in banc is DENIED.
DISSENT BY: JOHN M. WALKER, JR.
DISSENT: [*196] JOHN M. WALKER, JR., Chief Judge, with whom JACOBS, CABRANES, RAGGI, and WESLEY, Circuit Judges, join, dissenting in the denial of rehearing in banc:
I respectfully dissent from the denial to rehear this appeal in banc. The appeal raises novel issues of constitutional law [*197] with potentially far-reaching implications as to whether the fundamental right to travel extends to unsupervised minors, the appropriate balance between state interests in protecting minors from harm and parental interests in raising children as they see fit, and the use of age to draw distinctions [**2] in curfew ordinances. These issues and the arguments set forth in the majority opinion, see Ramos v. Town of Vernon, 331 F.3d 315, 2003 WL 22989226 (2d Cir. 2003), and Judge Winter's dissent, see id., 331 F.3d 315 [WL] at *16 (Winter, J., dissenting), which I believe merit Supreme Court review, would have benefitted from consideration by the full court before they are presented by certiorari to the Supreme Court.