×
You have 2 more free articles available this month. Subscribe today.
Outgoing Mail Censorship Assessed Under Procunier, not Turner; Oregon Court Applies Wrong Standard
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has reversed a district court’s dismissal of an Oregon prisoner’s outgoing mail censorship suit, finding that the “dismissal relied on an incorrect legal standard.”
Oregon State Penitentiary (OSP) prisoner Jacob Barrett attempted to mail a series of letters to his mother and grandmother. Guards read and confiscated the letters because Barrett described prison officials in “vulgar and offensive racist language.” He was disciplined for the content of his letters and sanctioned to “a loss of good time, revocation of certain privileges, and other punitive measures.”
Barrett sued in federal court, alleging that the censorship violated his rights under the First Amendment. “Acting without the benefit of any substantive briefing from the parties, the district court reasoned that the prison had a ‘legitimate penological interest...’ in preventing Barrett from using ‘crude and racist language’ that outweighed any countervailing First Amendment interest,” the Court of Appeals noted.
The district court then dismissed, sua sponte, with prejudice, for failure to state a claim. Barrett sought reconsideration under Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 94 S.Ct. 1800 (1974) and its progeny, but the court denied his motion without comment.
The Ninth Circuit reversed, reminding the lower court that Procunier established the standard for evaluating censor-ship claims involving outgoing prisoner mail. Under Procunier, such censorship must: (1) further an important or substantial governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of expression, and (2) be no greater than necessary or essential to the protection of the stated governmental interest. “Procunier is controlling law in the Ninth Circuit and elsewhere as ap-plied to claims involving outgoing prisoner mail,” the Court of Appeals explained.
The district court had erroneously failed to apply this standard, relying instead “on case law addressing prison regulations that concern communications between prisoners,” including Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners’ Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 97 S.Ct. 2532 (1977) and Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 107 S.Ct. 2254 (1987). The appellate court found that “those authorities are not controlling here,” and under the proper standard, Barrett’s complaint “states a claim that is clearly cognizable under Procunier.” See: Barrett v. Belleque, 544 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2008).
Following remand, on August 10, 2009, the district court appointed counsel to represent Barrett for the limited purpose of handling summary judgment motions. This case is still pending.
Oregon State Penitentiary (OSP) prisoner Jacob Barrett attempted to mail a series of letters to his mother and grandmother. Guards read and confiscated the letters because Barrett described prison officials in “vulgar and offensive racist language.” He was disciplined for the content of his letters and sanctioned to “a loss of good time, revocation of certain privileges, and other punitive measures.”
Barrett sued in federal court, alleging that the censorship violated his rights under the First Amendment. “Acting without the benefit of any substantive briefing from the parties, the district court reasoned that the prison had a ‘legitimate penological interest...’ in preventing Barrett from using ‘crude and racist language’ that outweighed any countervailing First Amendment interest,” the Court of Appeals noted.
The district court then dismissed, sua sponte, with prejudice, for failure to state a claim. Barrett sought reconsideration under Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 94 S.Ct. 1800 (1974) and its progeny, but the court denied his motion without comment.
The Ninth Circuit reversed, reminding the lower court that Procunier established the standard for evaluating censor-ship claims involving outgoing prisoner mail. Under Procunier, such censorship must: (1) further an important or substantial governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of expression, and (2) be no greater than necessary or essential to the protection of the stated governmental interest. “Procunier is controlling law in the Ninth Circuit and elsewhere as ap-plied to claims involving outgoing prisoner mail,” the Court of Appeals explained.
The district court had erroneously failed to apply this standard, relying instead “on case law addressing prison regulations that concern communications between prisoners,” including Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners’ Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 97 S.Ct. 2532 (1977) and Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 107 S.Ct. 2254 (1987). The appellate court found that “those authorities are not controlling here,” and under the proper standard, Barrett’s complaint “states a claim that is clearly cognizable under Procunier.” See: Barrett v. Belleque, 544 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2008).
Following remand, on August 10, 2009, the district court appointed counsel to represent Barrett for the limited purpose of handling summary judgment motions. This case is still pending.
As a digital subscriber to Prison Legal News, you can access full text and downloads for this and other premium content.
Already a subscriber? Login
Related legal case
Barrett v. Belleque
| Year | 2008 |
|---|---|
| Cite | 544 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2008) |
| Level | Court of Appeals |
JACOB HENRY BARRETT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BRIAN BELLEQUE; J. NOFZIGER; REBECCA PRINSLOW; GARY RUSSELL; J. TAYLOR; KENT PARKER, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 06-35667
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
544 F.3d 1060; 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 20087
March 14, 2008, Argued and Submitted, Seattle, Washington
September 22, 2008, Filed
OPINION
[*1061] PER CURIAM:
Plaintiff-Appellant Jacob Barrett's pro se complaint was dismissed sua sponte by the district court, with prejudice, for failure to state a claim. Barrett, a prisoner at the Oregon State Penitentiary, attempted to mail a series of letters to his grandmother and mother--those letters used vulgar and offensive racist language to describe prison officials. After reviewing the letters, prison officials cited Barrett for violation of various prison disciplinary rules, resulting in a loss of good time, revocation of certain privileges, and other [**2] punitive measures. Barrett responded by filing a complaint in federal court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the prison officials violated his rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Acting without the benefit of any substantive briefing from the parties, the district court reasoned that the prison had a "legitimate penological interest []" in preventing Barrett from using "crude and racist language," that outweighed any countervailing First Amendment interest. The district court's dismissal relied on an incorrect legal standard; under the correct standard Barrett has stated a claim for relief. We therefore reverse and remand. 1
FOOTNOTES
1 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
Dismissal for failure to state a claim is reviewed de novo. Weilburg v. Shapiro, 488 F.3d 1202, 1205 (9th Cir. 2007). Factual allegations in the complaint are taken as true and all reasonable inferences are drawn in the plaintiff's favor. Id. "Pro se complaints are to be [*1062] construed liberally and may be dismissed for failure to state a claim only where it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Id. (citation [**3] and internal quotation marks omitted).
The standards for evaluation of a First Amendment claim concerning outgoing correspondence sent by a prisoner to an external recipient were established by the Supreme Court in Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 94 S. Ct. 1800, 40 L. Ed. 2d 224 (1974), overruled on other grounds by Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 413-14, 109 S. Ct. 1874, 104 L. Ed. 2d 459 (1989). Under these standards, censorship of prisoner mail is justified only if "the regulation or practice in question [] further[s] an important or substantial governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of expression" and "the limitation of First Amendment freedoms [is] no greater than is necessary or essential to the protection of the particular governmental interest involved." Id. at 413. Procunier is controlling law in the Ninth Circuit and elsewhere as applied to claims involving outgoing prisoner mail. Bradley v. Hall, 64 F.3d 1276, 1281 n.2 (9th Cir. 1995); Loggins v. Delo, 999 F.2d 364, 366 (8th Cir. 1993); Brooks v. Andolina, 826 F.2d 1266, 1268-69 (3d Cir. 1987); McNamara v. Moody, 606 F.2d 621, 624 (5th Cir. 1979).
Barrett's complaint--which unequivocally pleads facts alleging that the prison censored his outgoing mail and punished him for [**4] its contents--states a claim that is clearly cognizable under Procunier. The district court was not in a position to decide, on the pleadings, whether the Oregon State Penitentiary's rules "further an important or substantial government interest," or impose limitations "no greater than is necessary or essential to the protection" of those interests. Procunier, 416 U.S. at 413. These are questions that go to the merits of Barrett's claim, not to whether he has stated a claim.
Instead of analyzing Barrett's claim under Procunier, which is precedent that takes account of the fact that the recipient's First Amendment rights are implicated when outgoing prisoner mail is censored, the district court relied on case law addressing prison regulations that concern communications between prisoners. See, e.g., Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 97 S. Ct. 2532, 53 L. Ed. 2d 629 (1977); see also Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 107 S. Ct. 2254, 96 L. Ed. 2d 64 (1987). These authorities are not controlling here. 2
FOOTNOTES
2 We note that, after dismissal, Barrett brought Procunier and its progeny to the district court's attention in a motion for reconsideration. That motion was denied by the district court without comment.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
No. 06-35667
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
544 F.3d 1060; 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 20087
March 14, 2008, Argued and Submitted, Seattle, Washington
September 22, 2008, Filed
OPINION
[*1061] PER CURIAM:
Plaintiff-Appellant Jacob Barrett's pro se complaint was dismissed sua sponte by the district court, with prejudice, for failure to state a claim. Barrett, a prisoner at the Oregon State Penitentiary, attempted to mail a series of letters to his grandmother and mother--those letters used vulgar and offensive racist language to describe prison officials. After reviewing the letters, prison officials cited Barrett for violation of various prison disciplinary rules, resulting in a loss of good time, revocation of certain privileges, and other [**2] punitive measures. Barrett responded by filing a complaint in federal court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the prison officials violated his rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Acting without the benefit of any substantive briefing from the parties, the district court reasoned that the prison had a "legitimate penological interest []" in preventing Barrett from using "crude and racist language," that outweighed any countervailing First Amendment interest. The district court's dismissal relied on an incorrect legal standard; under the correct standard Barrett has stated a claim for relief. We therefore reverse and remand. 1
FOOTNOTES
1 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
Dismissal for failure to state a claim is reviewed de novo. Weilburg v. Shapiro, 488 F.3d 1202, 1205 (9th Cir. 2007). Factual allegations in the complaint are taken as true and all reasonable inferences are drawn in the plaintiff's favor. Id. "Pro se complaints are to be [*1062] construed liberally and may be dismissed for failure to state a claim only where it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Id. (citation [**3] and internal quotation marks omitted).
The standards for evaluation of a First Amendment claim concerning outgoing correspondence sent by a prisoner to an external recipient were established by the Supreme Court in Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 94 S. Ct. 1800, 40 L. Ed. 2d 224 (1974), overruled on other grounds by Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 413-14, 109 S. Ct. 1874, 104 L. Ed. 2d 459 (1989). Under these standards, censorship of prisoner mail is justified only if "the regulation or practice in question [] further[s] an important or substantial governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of expression" and "the limitation of First Amendment freedoms [is] no greater than is necessary or essential to the protection of the particular governmental interest involved." Id. at 413. Procunier is controlling law in the Ninth Circuit and elsewhere as applied to claims involving outgoing prisoner mail. Bradley v. Hall, 64 F.3d 1276, 1281 n.2 (9th Cir. 1995); Loggins v. Delo, 999 F.2d 364, 366 (8th Cir. 1993); Brooks v. Andolina, 826 F.2d 1266, 1268-69 (3d Cir. 1987); McNamara v. Moody, 606 F.2d 621, 624 (5th Cir. 1979).
Barrett's complaint--which unequivocally pleads facts alleging that the prison censored his outgoing mail and punished him for [**4] its contents--states a claim that is clearly cognizable under Procunier. The district court was not in a position to decide, on the pleadings, whether the Oregon State Penitentiary's rules "further an important or substantial government interest," or impose limitations "no greater than is necessary or essential to the protection" of those interests. Procunier, 416 U.S. at 413. These are questions that go to the merits of Barrett's claim, not to whether he has stated a claim.
Instead of analyzing Barrett's claim under Procunier, which is precedent that takes account of the fact that the recipient's First Amendment rights are implicated when outgoing prisoner mail is censored, the district court relied on case law addressing prison regulations that concern communications between prisoners. See, e.g., Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 97 S. Ct. 2532, 53 L. Ed. 2d 629 (1977); see also Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 107 S. Ct. 2254, 96 L. Ed. 2d 64 (1987). These authorities are not controlling here. 2
FOOTNOTES
2 We note that, after dismissal, Barrett brought Procunier and its progeny to the district court's attention in a motion for reconsideration. That motion was denied by the district court without comment.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.