Iowa Supreme Court Holds Miller Retroactive; Governor’s Commutation Cannot Cure Violation

by David Reutter

The Iowa Supreme Court held that the Governor Commutation of sentences of life without parole imposed upon juveniles cannot circumvent the holding in Miller v. Alabama. The court’s ruling further held Miller applies retroactively and a sentence that is the practical equivalent of a life sentence without parole violates the spirit of Miller.

The U.S. Supreme Court issued its landmark ruling in Miller v. Alabama, 132 S.Ct. 2455, on June 25, 2012. The next day, the Governor of Iowa commuted the sentences of 28 prisoners who received statutorily mandated sentences of life without parole for crimes committed as juveniles. The commutation provided for sentences of life with no possibility for parole for sixty years and directed that no credit be given for earned time.

Jeff Ragland was seventeen in 1986 when he and two friends attacked a group of boys, killing one of them. Considered the “Ring Leader,” Ragland was charged as an adult and convicted of first-degree felony murder. Notably, the friend who struck the lethal blow with a tire iron pleaded guilty to second-degree murder and served only three years in prison.

The Iowa Supreme Court had ordered the district court prior to the Miller decision was issued to consider the constitutionality of Ragland’s sentence. The district court held a hearing after the commutation, and it resentenced him to life in prison with the possibility of parole after 25 years. The state sought discretionary review by the Iowa Supreme Court, arguing the commutation rendered the sentence legal and it should have served as a starting point for the district court.

The Supreme Court disagreed. The first issue the court decided was the retroactive application of Miller. The court noted that different jurisdictions have held both ways on the issue. In a seven page analysis, the court held that Miller is a new substantive rule that must be applied retroactively to all who are similarly situated.

It then turned to the effect of the commutation. The court made several findings. First, it found the commutation “to a term of years did not affect the mandatory nature of the sentence or cure the absence of process of individualized sentencing considerations mandated under Miller.”

The court then analyzed the commuted sentence. “The mere possibility of commutation or clemency is fundamentally distinct from the eligibility for parole and does not leave a juvenile offender a meaningful opportunity to avoid a lifetime of incarceration,” wrote the court. The rationale of Miller “reveals that the unconstitutional imposition of a mandatory life-without-parole sentence is not fixed by substituting with a sentence with parole that is the practical equivalent of a life sentence without parole. “

“Oftentimes, it is important that the spirit of the law not be lost in the application of the law. This is one such time,” continued the court. “The spirit of the constitutional mandates of Miller and Graham instruct that much more is at stake in the sentencing of juveniles that merely making sure that parole is possible… At the core of all this also lies the profound sense of what a person loses by beginning to serve a lifetime of incarceration as a youth.”

The district court’s resentencing of Ragland was affirmed. See: Iowa v. Ragland, 836 N.W.2d 107 (Iowa 2013) [PLN, May 2014, p.38].

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