Ninth Circuit Vacates Involuntary Medication Order for Sell Violations

On May 7, 2014, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated an involuntary medication order to restore a criminal defendant’s competency to stand trial, finding that it violated Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (U.S. 2003).

Joseph Harvey Brooks, 53, has suffered from paranoid schizophrenia and other serious mental illnesses for many years. In 2004 and 2005, a Washington court ordered his involuntary antipsychotic treatment, to restore his competency to stand trial for assault.

In 2011, Brooks was indicted on a federal arson charge when he attempted to set fire to cables connecting a radio antenna on the roof of Oregon Health Sciences University.

The district court found Brooks mentally incompetent to stand trial. The government moved, pursuant to Sell, to involuntarily medicate Brooks with antipsychotics, so he would regain competency to stand trial.

On August 7, 2012, the district court held a hearing on the motion. “Brooks testified that a ‘Ku Klux Klan Mafia mob organization’ was trying to murder him, as foretold in the Biblical Book of Revelations.” Brooks maintained that “a contract to kill him had been put out by the ‘kingpin’ of the Ku Klux Klan - allegedly ‘the owner and manager of the Riverside Motel in Vancouver, Washington.’”

The district court granted the government’s motion to involuntary medicate Brooks, finding that each of the Sell requirements was met. However, its written order did not expressly explain how the government had established the first prong of the Sell test.” The order also “did not include a time limitation.”

The Ninth Circuit vacated the order. “Among the most weighty decisions our society can make is to subject someone to a powerful medication against his or her will,” the court declared. “The government must meet the demanding standard” required by Sell “before involuntary medication may be administered in an effort to restore a defendant’s competency to stand trial.” The Court agreed with Brooks that the “district court did not adequately address” the first Sell factor - that there are important governmental interests. Even so, the court declined to examine the factor, noting that it “is a fact-intensive analysis that the district court is better suited to conduct in the first instance.”

Additionally, “a Sell order must identify ‘the duration of time that involuntary treatment of the defendant may continue before the treating physicians are required to report back to the court on the defendant’s mental condition and progress,”’ the Court explained. Since “the district court’s order did not specify the time limitation,” remand was necessary.

“Given that more than a year has passed since the district court’s initial Sell hearing,” the Ninth Circuit repeatedly indicated that “the court should also ascertain whether there have been significant changes in Brooks’ mental and medical condition or in the relevant standard of care for treatment aimed at restoring competency.” See: United States v. Brooks, 750 F.3d 1090 (9th Cir. Or. 2014).

Related legal case