Officers’ Unions’ Motions to Intervene in Federal Stop-And-Frisk Suits Held Untimely and Insubstantial

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has affirmed a lower court’s denial of the officers’ unions’ motions to intervene in stop-and-frisk suits against the City of New York (“City”) and has granted the City’s motion to dismiss its appeals, among other holdings.

The U.S. District court for the Southern District of New York found the City liable of violating the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights of plaintiffs in two class action suits based on the City’s conduct and practices in stop-and-frisks. The court entered orders for liability and remedies and the City appealed. Several police unions subsequently appealed and sought to intervene in the suits and the City’s appeals. Upon motion by the City, the suits were remanded to the district court and after the parties settled, the City moved to dismiss its appeals with prejudice. The district court then denied the unions’ motions to intervene in the suits based on untimeliness, the failure to assert a protected interest and prejudice to the parties. The unions appealed. On October 31, 2014, the appellate court affirmed the district court’s judgment, denied the unions’ motions to intervene in the appeals and dismissed the City’s appeals with prejudice.

On August 12, 2013, following a preliminary injunction and the district court’s finding of liability against the City for it deliberate indifference in the New York Police Department’s (“NYPD”) unjustified “stops” and “frisks” and its “policy of indirect racial profiling by targeting racially defined groups” for “stops” and “frisks,” the district court imposed a liability order and a remedial order, the latter directing a court appointed monitor to oversee reforms of the NYPD’s practices. The City then appealed.

On approximately September 11, 2013, the Sergeants Benevolent Association, the Detectives’ Endowment Association, Inc. and other New York police unions (together, the “unions”), appealed the district court’s orders and filed motions in the court to intervene in the suit – alleging their interests in the district court’s attack to the reputations of its members and of their collective bargaining rights, both not being litigated by the parties. On October 31, 2013, the appellate court granted the City’s motion for a stay, ordering the plaintiffs’ suits to be reassigned to another district court judge. Following the City’s municipal government elections, the unions moved to intervene in the City’s appeals.

The appellate court remanded the plaintiffs’ suits to the district court on February 21, 2014, for purposes of settlement and to address the unions’ motions to intervene in the plaintiffs’ suits. On March 4, 2014, the parties agreed to settle, filing a joint motion for modification of the district court’s remedial order. The district court granted the motion on July 30, 2014, the City sought to dismiss its appeals with prejudice.

According to federal law, a party may intervene in a suit by right or permission if he (1) files a timely application, (2) show[s] an interest in the action, (3) evidences prejudice “by the disposition of the action, and (4) show[s] that the interest is not protected adequately by the parties to the action.” The appellate court held that the district court properly denied the unions’ motions to intervene as to the first two elements.

In following federal law as to timeliness and in affirming the district court’s denial, the appellate court determined that “[t]he unions knew, or should have known, of their asserted interests in the members’ reputations and collection bargaining rights well before they filed their motions” through the “years of extensive public filings” and media coverage of the plaintiffs’ suits. Additionally, the unions should have known that their interests would not be protected before the City’s new mayor elected to drop the appeals and settle the suits, which did not “mitigate[e] in favor of a finding of timeliness.” The appellate court further found untimeliness in the prejudice that the parties would suffer in granting intervention by delaying justice, interfering with the parties’ legitimate decisions to settle and adding to the complexity and length of the suits.

Next, the appellate court agreed that the unions had failed to establish interests that, according to law, were “direct, substantial, and legally protectable.” The unions had not shown that their members’ reputations had been compromised or their safety jeopardized. Likewise, the appellate court concluded, quoting the district court, that the unions had failed to demonstrate that the settlement had “any ‘practical impact’ on ‘questions of workload, staffing and employee safety’ that [were] within the scope of the unions’ collective bargaining rights.”

Finally, “[f]or substantially the same reasons, [the appellate court] den[ied] the unions’ motions to intervene in the appeals.” Moreover, the appellate court reasoned that as the City had settled the suits by agreeing to comply with the modified remedial order, the court had no position to review the merits of the district court’s initial liability and remedial orders.

The appellate court therefore affirmed the denial of the unions’ motions to intervene in the suits, denied the unions’ motions to intervene in the City’s appeals, granted the City’s motion to dismiss its appeals with prejudice, and remanded the cases to the district court for appropriate actions. See: Floyd v. City of New York, 770 F.3d 1051 (2d Cir. N.Y. 2014).

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