Texas Supreme Court Holds No Compensation for Wrongly-Convicted Prisoner Imprisoned on Other Charges

by Matt Clarke

On August 23, 2013, the Supreme Court of Texas held that a former death row prisoner who had been wrongfully convicted of the capital crime, but confessed to other crimes before he was acquitted, was not eligible for compensation.

Michael N. Blair, a Texas state prisoner, was wrongfully convicted of the murder of a seven-year-old girl and sentenced to death. He freely admitted to having sexually abused other children, but staunchly maintained his innocence as to the murder. Nine years into his stint on death row, Blair wrote the district court and admitted having molested the children of a witness who testified against him in the murder trial. This led to his indictment and guilty plea for four incidents of indecency with a child for which he was given four life sentences—three consecutive and one concurrent.

In 2008, after he had been on death row for 14 years, DNA testing proved Blair was innocent of the murder. The state dismissed the charge and Blair applied to the state Comptroller for over $1 million in compensation under the Tim Cole Act, Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code §§ 103.001-154. In doing so, he alleged that, but for the wrongful murder conviction, he would have remained free, albeit on parole for prior offenses.

The Comptroller denied the application because Blair was incarcerated and the legislative intent of the Act was to provide compensation to eligible applicants so they could put their lives back together after their release and, even if he had been released, he would have still been on parole.

Later, in In re Smith, 333 S.W.3d 582 (Tex. 2011), the Texas Supreme Court held that parolees who were wrongfully convicted and would have remained on parole but for the wrongful conviction were entitled to compensation. Blair applied again.

The Comptroller said that the application was identical to the first one and denied it again. Blair filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in the Supreme Court of Texas.

The Supreme Court held that the Comptroller was incorrect in holding that the only purpose of the act was to assist wrongfully incarcerated individuals who are reentering society. The Act provides that a person who "is convicted" of certain crimes may not receive compensation. However, the Act does not specify that the conviction has to occur after the person becomes eligible for compensation. "The phrase 'is convicted,’ can reasonably be read to refer to the claimant’s status and not only the moment guilt is adjudicated. Thus construed, the statute denies compensation payments for wrongful imprisonment to a claimant who, during the time he would receive them, is convicted of a felony, regardless of when the conviction was adjudicated, whether before or after he actually became eligible for compensation." Therefore, the Supreme Court denied Blair’s petition.

This tortured reading of the language of the Act does not square with the court’s Smith opinion. After all, a person on parole "is convicted" under the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the phrase in this case. See: In re Blair, 408 S.W.3d 843 (Tex. 2013).

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