Massachusetts Supreme Court Rules on Fallout Procedures Implemented After Crime Lab Scandal

by Matt Clarke

On July 22, 2013, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts issued an opinion in three cases dealing with the validity of some of the procedures adopted to handle the flood of post-conviction matters in criminal cases for which disgraced Hinton Crime Lab chemist Ann Dookhan was the primary or confirmatory chemist. The procedures required incarcerated defendants to first file a motion to stay execution of their sentences (motion to stay), and then file a subsequent motion for a new trial.

Dookhan was involved in at least 34,000 cases. To help handle the anticipated flood of post-conviction matters, the Chief Justice of the Superior Court appointed five retired Superior Court judges as Special Judicial Magistrates (Magistrates). The three cases resulted in the following three questions being raised on appeal and referred to the Supreme Court for deposition:

1) Does a Magistrate or superior court judge have the authority to allow a motion to stay while a motion for a new trial is pending?

2) Does a Magistrate have the authority to reconsider and allow a motion to stay when a judge has previously denied a similar motion in the same case?

3) Does a Magistrate have the authority to conduct a guilty plea colloquy and report related findings to a judge, where either party can object to this procedure?

The Supreme Court held that Mass.R.Crim.P. 31(a) permitted a stay of the execution of a sentence only when an appeal is pending. However, "a judge has the inherent power to stay sentences for 'exceptional reasons permitted by law’" and the crime lab scandal was such a reason. This power is limited to judges. Magistrates have no such power. The interest of justice is not served in allowing the continued incarceration of a defendant who might prevail in a motion for a new trial. Therefore, the judge did not abuse his discretion in staying the execution of the sentence of Shubar Charles.

In the case of Commonwealth v. Milette, a Magistrate had granted a motion for reconsideration and stayed the execution of a sentence after a judge had denied the motion to stay. The Supreme Court held that Magistrates did not have the authority to grant a stay after a judge denied a motion to stay.

In turning to the third question, the Supreme Court held that the Magistrates were retired judges and "well acquainted with the content, scope and importance of the plea colloquies." Therefore, it was permissible for them to perform an initial plea colloquy and make findings regarding the voluntariness of the plea and related issues which are given to the judge, who independently verifies the defendant's responses. This is true despite the uncertainty of some prosecutors about the procedure, which, after this ruling, is clearly permissible. See: Commonwealth v. Charles, 466 Mass. 63 (Mass. 2013).

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