Alaska Supreme Court Revives Prisoner’s Claim for 11-Month Solitary Confinement That DOC Admitted Was Improper
by Douglas Ankney
On December 22, 2023, the Supreme Court of Alaska reversed dismissal of a state prisoner’s claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) against officials with the state Department of Corrections (DOC) who admitted improperly holding him in segregation for 504 days, 335 of which—over 11 months—were spent in solitary confinement. In its ruling, the Court also reversed a finding by the Third Judicial District Superior Court in Anchorage that DOC Defendants acted within the scope of their employment, as well as the lower court’s denial of discovery to the prisoner, Richard R. Watkinson.
DOC had transferred him to a private prison in Colorado, where a guard accused Watkinson of assaulting him in September 2013. The guard wanted to prosecute him, but Watkinson was already en route to Alaska’s Goose Creek Correctional Center (GCCC), where DOC officials placed him upon arrival in the most restrictive isolation known as “Ad Seg 10.”
At an administrative hearing three days later, Watkinson was not provided an attorney nor a hearing advisor, and the hearing officer admitted that she had been instructed to keep him in Ad Seg 10 until a formal disciplinary hearing. That wasn’t held until December 2013, when none of the witness testimony or other evidence that Watkinson requested was provided. Nor was counsel provided. Finding him guilty of the assault, the disciplinary committee imposed a penalty of “Time Served.” Yet Watkinson remained in isolation until he appealed to the superior court. There, in January 2015, DOC admitted that Watkinson had been improperly placed in administrative segregation. It rescinded the disciplinary decision and removed the record from his file. The superior court then dismissed Watkinson’s appeal as moot. But altogether, he had spent 504 days in administrative segregation, including 335 in Ad Seg 10.
In September 2015, Watkinson filed his complaint pro se in the same court, accusing DOC officials of IIED. He described suffering from acute anxiety, insomnia, social withdrawal, a severe depressive state and suicidal ideation. He also presented evidence that he was diagnosed with multiple forms of mental illness prior to his incarceration, which his time in Ad Seg further aggravated. Affidavits from video and telephonic visitors further attested to his severe distress, recalling how he would weep uncharacteristically during visits.
During discovery, the state Attorney General certified that DOC employee defendants were acting within the scope of their employment. That meant Watkinson’s complaint was against the State and not its individual employees. Watkinson objected that their actions were “willful, reckless, or intentional misconduct” or taken “with gross negligence or malice” and therefore outside the scope of their employment. But the superior court overruled that objection.
Watkinson also moved for in camera review of DOC records to identify who authorized removal of the disciplinary infraction from his record. The superior court denied that motion, too, finding that it would violate attorney-client privilege. Defendants then moved for summary judgment. The superior court determined that their conduct was not outrageous and that Wilkinson’s emotional distress was not sufficiently serious to support his IIED claim. The motion was granted, and Watkinson appealed.
The Supreme Court began by observing that a successful IIED claim “must establish (1) that the defendant’s conduct was extreme and outrageous, (2) that the conduct was intentional or reckless, (3) that this conduct caused the plaintiff emotional distress, and (4) that the distress was severe,” as laid out in Cameron v. Beard, 864 P.2d 538 (Alaska 1993). Violations of constitutional rights provide important context in determining whether conduct is extreme and outrageous, as held in Rivera v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 999 F.3d 647 (9th Cir. 2021).
Watkinson claimed that his due-process rights had been violated, and the Court agreed that prisoners have a right to meaningful hearing on review of their placement in solitary confinement. But a hearing where the outcome is predetermined is not meaningful, as held in Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460 (1983). Watkinson was not permitted to present evidence, call witnesses or provided counsel, and the hearing officer admitted that his placement in Ad Seg 10 was predetermined. Taken together, these facts demonstrated conduct that was extreme and outrageous, the Court declared.
Turning to his IIED claim, the Court noted that affidavits from witnesses describing a plaintiff’s mental state “may be sufficient evidence to support a threshold finding of severe emotional distress,” quoting Teamsters Loc. 959 v. Wells, 749 P.2d 349 (Alaska 1988). Watkinson’s 504 days in administrative segregation was also significantly longer than the 355 days which the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found to be “egregious” in Rivera. So Wilkinson had “set forth sufficient evidence to demonstrate genuine issues of material fact” regarding his IIED claim.
As to whether DOC officials acted within the “scope of employment,” the Court noted that can’t be true if they were “acting, or failing to act, with willful, reckless, or intentional misconduct, or with gross negligence or malice,” per Alaska Statute 09.50.253(D). So the superior court used an incorrect standard in upholding certification, and on remand it must conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine if Defendants acted willfully or recklessly.
Finally, the Court concluded it was an abuse of discretion to deny Watkinson’s motion for in camera review of documents related to removing his disciplinary infraction from his record. The identity of the official who authorized removal is “not a communication for the purpose of providing legal services” and therefore not protected by attorney-client privilege.
Accordingly, the lower court’s order was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. Before the Court, Watkinson continued to proceed pro se. See: Watkinson v. Dep’t of Corr., 540 P.3d 254 (Alaska 2023).
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