On February 29, 2024, a jury in federal court for the Western District of Pennsylvania awarded $500 to a state prisoner for his excessive force claim against a state Department of Corrections (DOC) guard. Along the way to that small victory for Stefon Johnson, the district court provided important clarification about DOC’s procedures for claims related to “abuse” versus other grievances about conditions of confinement.

Johnson was confined at the State Correctional Institute in Forest when guards allegedly denied him a meal tray nearly two dozen times between December 5 and 15, 2018. Sgt. Randy Moore also aimed a 30-­second blast of O/C spray into his cell. Johnson sued the staffers for violating his Eighth Amendment guarantee of freedom from cruel and unusual punishment.

Defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that Johnson failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). But DOC provides both an “Inmate Grievance System” (DC-­ADM 804) as well as a separate procedure for reporting “Inmate Abuse” (DC-­ADM 001). Here, a dispute arose over which procedure applied to Johnson’s claims and whether he had properly exhausted it.

The “grievance” policy provides a three-­step procedure from (1) an initial review by a grievance officer; and if denied there, (2) an appeal to the warden or facility manager; and if still denied, (3) a final appeal to the DOC Secretary’s Office of Inmate Grievance Appeals. Prisoners must declare in their grievances if they seek money or other legal relief.

The “abuse” policy differs in important ways. There is no time limit for reporting, and there are multiple ways to report—including filing a grievance under the other policy. Any “abuse” report must be forwarded to DOC’s Office of Special Investigations and Intelligence (OSII), which must then investigate and report to the prisoner by letter. Crucially, there is no requirement for prisoners to state whether they seek money or other relief.

Johnson filed claims under the “grievance” policy concerning both the denial of meals and the excessive-­force use of O/C spray, pursuing them through all three levels. However, he did not request any money. After he filed his suit, DOC moved to dismiss it, arguing that he failed to administratively exhaust his claims for money damages under DC-­ADM 804. The prisoner countered that both claims were cognizable under DC-­ADM 801, which allows him to use the other form but does not require him to specify any relief sought.

District Court’s Analysis and Conclusion

The district court first determined that Johnson’s denial of food claim was not cognizable as “Inmate Abuse” because it did not fit one of the definitions outlined in DC-­ADM 001: “a. the use of excessive force upon an inmate; b. the improper use of force upon an inmate; c. an occurrence of an unwarranted life-­threatening act against an inmate; or d. an articulated verbal or written threat to inflict physical injury directed toward an inmate.” Even though denial of food could be life-­threatening, the district court said, that would require “a continuing course of conduct,” not a single “occurrence” as described in part c. of the policy.

Moreover, the “abuse” policy specifically exempts claims concerning a prisoner’s “conditions of confinement” or “nonperformance of duty by a staff member.” Without meaningful analysis, the district court concluded that Johnson’s meal deprivation claim related to one of those, requiring exhaustion under DC-­ADM 804. And because Johnson did not seek money damages in his grievances about meal deprivations, he had in fact failed to exhaust those claims under the latter policy, entitling Defendants to summary judgment.

But Johnson’s excessive force claim was another matter, the district court continued, because spraying O/C into his cell clearly fell within the definition of “abuse.” Johnson presented evidence showing that he reported the incident to a guard, Lt. Clouser, who failed to forward the complaint to OSII as required. That the prisoner also filed a claim under the “grievance” policy without requesting monetary relief was irrelevant to whether the claim was exhausted under DC-­ADM 001, the district court said.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit “has not considered whether a Pennsylvania prisoner can exhaust his administrative remedies through DC-­ADM 001,” the district court noted, pointing to Victor v. Lawler, 565 F. App’x 126 (3d Cir. 2014). But other federal courts in the state “assume DC-­ADM 001 to be an alternative to DC-­ADM 804,” as in Brockington v. Garcia, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 140050 , (M.D. Pa. 2022). Thus, “allegations of abuse do not have to be filed through all levels of the DC-­ADM 804 system if the inmate reports abuse through DC-­ADM 001,” the district court concluded, citing Lewis v. English, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23852 (E.D. Pa. 2022).

The evidence showed that Johnson properly exhausted his administrative remedies with respect to his excessive force claim because “nothing more was required” under the “abuse” policy. And Lt. Clouser’s failure to process the complaint as required rendered the administrative remedy “unavailable.” Therefore Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on this claim was denied. See: Johnson v. Co. 1 Lasko, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 172700 (W.D. Pa. 2022).

Johnson’s excessive force claim then proceeded to trial, at which he represented himself. He played surveillance video of the incident proving that Sgt. Moore deployed O/C spray into his cell for a protracted period. The jury then awarded $250 in compensatory damages and another $250 in in punitive damages, for a total of $500. No other defendants were found liable. See: Johnson v. Sgt. Moore, USDC (W.D. Pa.), No. 1:20-­cv-­149.

The valuable lesson for Pennsylvania prisoners is to exhaust administrative remedies for all claims pursuant to DC-­ADM 804, including a request for monetary or other forms of relief. Had Johnson done so for his meal deprivation claim, more defendants might have faced trial for their unconstitutional conduct. The jury may have returned a larger damage award, too. Nonetheless, Johnson is to be commended for winning a favorable verdict pro se.  

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