Massachusetts Appeals Court Revives Prisoners’ Challenge to DOC Trust Account Policy Change
by Douglas Ankney
When the Massachusetts Department of Corrections (DOC) changed its Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) in January 2019 to prohibit prisoners from sending money from their trust accounts to private individuals, it didn’t promulgate a new rule under G. L. c. 30A. Prisoners called foul and sued, but a state court judge dismissed their claim. They then turned to the Appeals Court of Massachusetts, which found the policy invalid and unenforceable on July 17, 2023. Because it conflicted with existing regulations yet wasn’t promulgated as a new regulation, the rule violated the prisoners’ due process rights, the Court said.
Prisoners Gordon Haas, Daniel Holland, Ricky Alford, James Keown and Martin Lovato were all serving life sentences at Massachusetts Correctional Institution (MCI) in Norfolk on July 24, 2019, when they filed suit in state superior court against DOC officials, challenging the new SOP. Its stated purpose was to thwart “illicit or improper activity” with core provisions tht prohibited prisoners from sending money (1) “directly to private individuals outside prison walls” or (2) to “businesses or organizations” without an accompanying invoice or order.
Haas said that his requests to send $25 to two individuals in Detroit were denied. When he submitted a complaint, the prison replied that “per [the SOP], you are no longer allowed to send money to outside individuals. This is DOC-wide.”
Holland requested to send $20 to Mellon Bank to invest in stocks designated for his son upon Holland’s death. His request and subsequent complaint were also denied. So was Alford’s request—along with his complaint and grievance—to send money to his incarcerated son, even though he had previously done so 29 times to assist in purchasing “hygienic necessities and other items.” Keown wanted $25 sent to his sister to help pay for his mother’s visit from Missouri, plus $10 sent to a state representative’s reelection campaign fund. Both requests were denied under the new SOP, as a was Lovato’s request, even though he had been sending funds monthly to the recipient, Allete, Inc., to provide a “legacy of stocks” for his niece upon his death.
Importantly, none of the Plaintiffs had ever been disciplined for misusing personal funds, and none had ever tested positive for substance use while incarcerated. Nevertheless the superior court denied the complaint for failure to state a claim. Plaintiffs appealed, arguing that the SOP was unenforceable because: (1) it conflicted with current regulations governing prisoner funds found at 103 Code Mass. Regs. § 405.12; (2) meaning that the new SOP was in fact a new “regulation” as defined in G. L. c. 30A, so it required a public hearing before implementation; beyond which (3) the SOP arbitrarily restricted access to their property in violation of their due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Appeals Court observed that DOC’s “inmate funds regulations” have “the force of law … and must be accorded all the deference due to a statute,” quoting Borden, Inc., v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 448 N.E.2d 367 (Mass. 1983). Furthermore, after a state agency has promulgated regulations, “it must comply with those regulations,” as held in Royce v. Comm’r of Corr., 456 N.E.2d 1127 (Mass. 1983). The existing inmate funds regulations require prisoners seeking disbursements from personal accounts to “fill out a withdrawal/issue slip,” the Court noted, which includes “the date, the amount to be withdrawn, purpose, inmate’s signature, and staff verification signature.” Finally, per § 405.12(2)(a) - (d), the prison’s “Accounting Clerk/Cashier” must then check that the signatures are present and verify the prisoner’s account has sufficient funds before disbursing them.
The Court opined that the “plain language of this regulation” requires disbursement “in accordance with the request”; it does not “restrict the purpose for which a disbursement may be made or the person or entity to whom or which it may be made.” Thus the Court concluded that Plaintiffs had stated a claim that the SOP conflicted with 103 Code Mass. Regs. § 405.12.
The Court also decided that the SOP was a regulation as defined in G. L. c. 30A, § 1(5)(b). Borrowing that statute’s language, it said that the “new substantive limitations on what inmates may do with their own money” under the revised SOP “substantially affected the rights” of all DOC inmates, who are a “portion of the public affected by the agency’s activities.” Thus the Court concluded that the Plaintiffs had also stated a claim that the SOP is an unenforceable regulation “not promulgated through G. L. c. 30A procedures.”
As to the Fourteenth Amendment Claim, the Court observed that under Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987), prisoners’ constitutional rights may be impinged by a prison regulation if four factors are met. But the superior court had failed to conduct any analysis of those Turner factors before it had errantly dismissed the complaint.
Accordingly, the Court reversed those portions of ruling and remanded the case. Hass ably represented himself and his fellow Plaintiffs, which was no small feat. See: Haas v. Comm’r of Corr., 214 N.E.3d 445 (Mass. App. 2023).
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