California Supreme Court Refuses Challenge to LWOP Sentence Imposed for Crime Committed After Age 18
Under California Penal Code § 3051, prisoners who were 18 to 25 years old when they committed certain crimes are eligible for parole after serving 15, 20 or 25 years, even if sentenced to life without parole (LWOP)—unless they were over 18 at the time of their offense. On March 4, 2024, the state Supreme Court rejected a challenge to that exclusion filed by state prisoner Tony Hardin.
In 1989, when he was 25, Hardin killed neighbor Norma Barber while robbing her home and car. That earned him a 1990 conviction for first-degree murder with a “special circumstance” because it happened during a robbery, and he was sentenced to LWOP. When § 3501.1 was adopted in 2023, he remained ineligible for parole because of the age exclusion. Hardin, by then 59, filed an appeal, claiming violation of his right to equal protection under the law as provided by the Fourteenth Amendment.
The state Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, ruled in his favor in October 2022, finding him eligible for an evidentiary hearing because “disparate treatment of offenders like Hardin cannot stand.” The appellate court found young adults serving LWOP are similarly situated to other youthful offenders, including those serving parole-eligible life sentences, so excluding them had no rational basis. See: People v. Hardin, 84 Cal.App.5th 273 (Cal.App.2d Dist. 2022). The state appealed and California’s Supreme Court reversed.
The high Court acknowledged that § 3051 treats LWOP-sentenced young adults differently from otherwise similar offenders. But that is just one part of a two-part analysis to evaluate equal protection claims, one that did not apply here since the law by design treats groups or classes of people differently. Rather, the Court said, “[t]he only pertinent inquiry is whether the challenged difference in treatment is adequately justified.”
With respect to Hardin’s challenge, the question was whether exclusion of LWOP-sentenced young adults in § 3501 has a rational basis. The Supreme Court found it does. Hardin argued that the “sole” purpose of the statute was to create a “meaningful opportunity” for parole consideration for youthful offenders regardless of the seriousness of their offense. But the Court found that was not the only purpose of the law; the legislature had other reasons related to “culpability and the appropriate level of punishment for certain very serious crimes.” While providing parole opportunities for some offenders, state lawmakers intentionally excluded others due to the severity of their offense.
Moreover, there was a rational basis for that distinction, the Court said, since LWOP sentences are imposed only for the most serious crimes. Hardin had failed to show why § 3501’s exclusion was irrational and thus unconstitutional. Equal protection, the Court ruled, does not require the legislature to evaluate criminal culpability in a particular way, even if other offenders not serving LWOP—but sentenced to the functional equivalent—remain eligible for parole.
Justices Liu and Evans issued a lengthy dissent, arguing that § 3501’s exclusion of offenders serving LWOP violates equal protection and perpetuates racial bias, noting that LWOP sentences are rooted in a “superpredator” myth that relied on racial stereotypes. That’s why 86% of the approximately 3,100 youthful prisoners serving LWOP in California are non-white, they said, and § 3501’s exclusion of them “bears the taint of racial prejudice and perpetuates extreme racial disparities plaguing our juvenile and criminal justice systems.”
Before the Court, Hardin was represented by Thousand Oaks attorney William L. Heyman, along with fellow attorneys from the University of Southern California Post-Conviction Justice Project and Munger, Tolles & Olson LLP in Washington, DC. See: People v. Hardin, 15 Cal.5th 834 (Cal. 2024).
Additional source: CalMatters