Washington Parole Board Failed to Meaningfully Apply Presumption of Release for Prisoner Sentenced to LWOP as Juvenile
On April 11, 2024, the Washington Court of Appeals refused to reconsider an earlier finding that the state’s Indeterminate Sentence Review Board (ISRB) failed to meaningfully apply the statutory presumption that prisoners sentenced as adults for crimes committed as juveniles should be released at their first parole hearing.
In 1997, Donald Lambert pleaded guilty to aggravated first-degree murder which was committed when he was 15 years old. He was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole (LWOP). However, a later statutory amendment mandated that juvenile defendants sentenced to life as adults for first degree murder must receive an indeterminate term of 25 years to life. Lambert was resentenced in 2014, and his 25-year minimum term expired in March 2023.
Lambert was entitled to a release hearing 180 days before the minimum term expired. In preparation for the hearing, he was evaluated by psychologist Dr. Lisa Robtoy. She chronicled Lambert’s tragic childhood: raised by a drug-addicted mother, growing up in abject poverty, surrounded by crime. She also noted that Lambert joined the Sureño gang shortly after entering prison and was involved in numerous fights, including stabbing another prisoner in 2007.
But all that happened during his first 10 years of incarceration. As Lambert matured, he quit the Sureño gang in 2010, investing his time in rehabilitative programs and working in the prison. He got into a final fight that year with three gang members who jumped him, kicking one in the jaw. But Dr. Robtoy blamed the scuffle on a poor housing decision by Department of Corrections (DOC) staff, who left Lambert housed with members of his former gang.
She also noted that Lambert had extensive community support and that DOC staff stated he did not need to complete any additional programs. Dr. Robtoy therefore stated her “clinical opinion that Mr. Lambert has addressed his criminogenic needs,” so he “would be able to continue living a prosocial life in less restricted environments, to include the community.”
ISRB held a release hearing for Lambert, issuing two decisions. The first found Lambert ineligible for release, based mostly on his criminal history and prison assaults from 2007 and 2010. A second decision amended the first with reference to Dr. Robtoy’s report; but again ISRB found Lambert was not entitled to release because he “is more likely than not to commit a new crime[.]” Lambert then filed a personal restraint petition challenging the decision.
Resolution of the petition turned on several points, the first that sentencing juvenile offenders to LWOP violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, as held in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012). Second, in recognizing this, the state Legislature had created a statutory scheme providing “a process of redemption for juvenile offenders” that created a presumption of release after 25 years for prisoners like Lambert.
Lambert argued that ISRB failed to meaningfully apply this presumption and paid only lip service to significant evidence of his rehabilitation, in particular Dr. Robtoy’s favorable report and recommendation. The Court agreed.
First, it faulted ISRB for failing to be “forward looking,” focusing on static factors like Lambert’s criminal conviction rather than dynamic factors like changes he made since dropping out of the Sureño gang—changes for which ISRB gave him no credit.
Second, ISRB’s decision was based almost entirely on “embellishments or misstatements of the true facts” about Lambert’s prison conduct, the Court continued. ISRB penalized him for the 2010 fight while failing to acknowledge that DOC was at least partly to blame for leaving him housed with former fellow gang members.
Finally, ISRB failed to meaningfully consider Dr. Robtoy’s favorable recommendation, the Court said. While not required to follow it, ISRB cannot simply ignore the report, either, especially when Dr. Robtoy “determined that Lambert had an adjusted low risk to reoffend”—something ISRB utterly failed to acknowledge.
On February 20, 2024, the Court therefore determined that ISRB misapplied the statutory presumption of release and granted Lambert’s petition, ordering a new hearing where Dr. Robtoy’s recommendation must also be considered. A motion for reconsideration by ISRB was then also denied by the Court. Lambert was represented by attorney Robert C. Boruchowitz, Professor and Director of the Defender Initiative at Seattle University School of Law. See: In re Pers. Restraint of Lambert, 29 Wn. App. 2d 878 (2024); and 2024 Wash. App. LEXIS 713 (Ct. App.).