Sixth Circuit: Leaman Doctrine Did Not Bar Ohio Prisoner’s Pro Se Federal Civil Rights Suit Over Interference with Legal Mail
In an important decision on February 6, 2024, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that an Ohio prisoner’s federal civil rights claims against state prison employees for interfering with his legal mail were not barred when he filed a suit in state court based on the same facts—one of which was that the interference cost him a chance at a habeas corpus petition.
Ohio prisoner Lionel Harris filed his federal civil rights action pro se, accusing various employees at Madison Correctional Institution (MaCI) of mishandling his legal mail, in retaliation for his use of the institutional grievance process. Among other claims, Harris alleged that mailroom employee Michelle Lovette and her supervisor Cynthia Ricker retaliated against him for previous grievances against the mailroom and interfered with this right to access the courts when they failed to mail his opening brief in his state court habeas corpus case, causing the case to be dismissed for failure to prosecute.
Harris also alleged that prison secretary Melanie Fultz destroyed a federal civil rights complaint he intended to file against other MaCI employees when he gave her the document to notarize and mail. Harris asserted that Fultz also unconstitutionally denied him access to the courts, also in retaliation for grievances and other complaints that he filed.
Two months before Harris filed his federal court claims against these defendants, he commenced an action against the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction (DRC) in the state Court of Claims that was based on the same facts. Harris was not represented by counsel in the state court action, and the Court of Claims dismissed the case.
After he filed his federal suit against them, Lovette, Ricker and Fultz moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that Harris’s claims were barred under Leaman v. Ohio Dep’t of Mental Retardation & Developmental Disabilities, 825 F.2d 946 (6th Cir. 1987) (en banc), and the Ohio Revised Code (ORC) § 2743.02(A)(1). The statute provides that “filing a civil action in the court of claims results in a complete waiver of any cause of action, based on the same act or omission, that the filing party has against any officer or employee[.]”
The Sixth Circuit held in Leaman that this statute is not inconsistent with 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the federal civil rights statute, and is not invalid under the Supremacy Clause to the U.S. Constitution. Thus, a plaintiff who sues the state or one of its agencies in the Court of Claims may not later file a § 1983 action in federal court against state employees based on the same factual allegations and claims raised in the state court matter, as explained in Plinton v. Cty. of Summit, 540 F.3d 459 (6th Cir. 2008).
However, Leaman also explained that the waiver of the right to sue in federal court must be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary under § 2743.02(A)(1), and will only be presumed if the plaintiff was represented by competent counsel before the Ohio Court of Claims. When the plaintiff proceeds pro se, the federal district court must make a “factual finding as to whether [the plaintiff] knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to proceed in federal court,” as laid out in Kajfasz v. Haviland, 55 F. App’x 719 (6th Cir. 2003). A waiver may be deemed valid if the civil defendant establishes that the “plaintiff was familiar with the provisions of the Court of Claims Act,” per Russell v. Heineman, 992 F.2d 1217 (6th Cir. 1993) (unpublished table decision).
In Harris’s case, the Sixth Circuit concluded that the district court erred in determining that he “knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to file a federal civil action against the defendants when he filed a civil action against the ODRC in the Ohio Court of Claims” because the “defendants offered no convincing evidence that Harris was familiar with the waiver provision of the Ohio Court of Claims Act.” Rather, the Court said that Harris’s lack of knowledge about the waiver provision in § 2743.02(A)(1) showed that he “did not understand that his filing in the Court of Claims would operate as a waiver under Ohio law.”
Accordingly, dismissal of Harris’s case was reversed and his claims against Lovette, Ricker, and Fultz were remanded for further proceedings consistent with the Sixth Circuit’s opinion. Harris is to be commended for successfully prosecuting his appeal at the Court pro se. His case has now returned to the district court, and PLN will report on developments as they become available. See: Harris v. Sowers, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 2772 (6th Cir. 2024) (unpublished).
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