Eighth Circuit Affirms Denial of Qualified Immunity to Missouri Guards in Transgender Prisoner’s Suit Alleging Retaliation and Unreasonable Search
by Douglas Ankney
On April 4, 2024, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed denial of qualified immunity (QI) to defendant Missouri Department of Corrections (DOC) guards in a transgender prisoner’s claims that they subjected her to retaliation and unreasonable search in violation of her First and Fourth Amendment rights.
Sease Michael Beard was diagnosed with gender dysphoria and identifies as a transgender woman. She filed several complaints while housed inside High Security Unit 8 (HSU 8) at the Jefferson City Correctional Center (JCCC)—the prison’s highest security unit. As she awaited an appointment with an investigator, guard Jeremy Epps took issue with Beard’s homemade miniskirt and ordered her to change out of it. When she refused, he allegedly slammed Beard to the ground. Guards Nathan Falter and Dennis Carignan joined Epps to hold Beard down, pepper-spraying her and applying restraints. Six additional JCCC guards joined the fray—Tuckur Matherly and five “John Does.”
The guards cut off Beard’s “shirt, skirt, bra, and socks,” leaving her clad only in underwear. They then carried her through the hallways, exposing her undressed to other prisoners en route to the “Rubber Room” suicide watch call, where she was secured in a “Wrap” restraint device. After leaving her there for an “extended period of time,” the guards returned and wheeled Beard to a cell, finally releasing her from the Wrap and providing a T-shirt.
Beard filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against those involved in the incident as well as JCCC Warden Doris Falkenrath and other DOC staffers. While the suit was pending, Falter allegedly vowed to keep Beard’s promotion out of HSU 8 from being approved; shortly thereafter, a review panel denied the promotion. About a week after Beard filed suit, Falter and Epps cut off Beard’s access to showers. Other guards named Sonne, Mauler and Dobbins removed “legal documents, personal mail, religious materials, stamps, personal hygiene items, and photographs” from Beard’s cell and refused to return them, she said. Beard amended the complaint to include claims of retaliation in violation of the First Amendment. Defendants moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Evidence 12(b)(6), claiming QI. The federal court for the Western District of Missouri denied the motion, and Defendants appealed.
The Eighth Circuit observed that the question of QI turned on two questions: whether the alleged behavior rose to a constitutional violation and, if so, whether the right was clearly established at the time—both as laid out in Morgan v. Robinson, 920 F.3d 521 (8th Cir. 2019) (en banc). Though prisoners are entitled to “a far lower expectation of privacy,” the Court allowed, but the Fourth Amendment still protects them from “unreasonable searches of their bodies,” according to LeVine v. Roebuck, 550 F.3d 684 (8th Cir. 2008). What matters is the “scope, manner, and location” of the search, per United States v. Williams, 477 F.3d 974 (8th Cir. 2007). “Strip searches raise special considerations,” the Court said, pointing to Robinson v. Hawkins, 937 F.3d 1128 (8th Cir. 2019), which held that touching, prodding or use of force “are important considerations in weighing the level of insult to personal privacy.” Two factors in determining the reasonableness of a search are (1) the need for it and (2) the level of “invasion which the search entailed,” per Smothers v. Gibson, 778 F.2d 470 (8th Cir. 1985).
In this case, the need for the search was obviated when guards admitted that they were not searching Beard for contraband but cut off her clothes to force her to change them. As to the level of invasion, the Court concluded that the search “plausibly crossed the line” due to “numerous guards, the use of pepper spray, the placement of a knee directly into Beard’s back, and the forceful removal of Beard’s clothes.” Two years prior to Beard’s ordeal, the Court had held in Robinson that a “degrading, humiliating, or abusive strip search of an arrestee violated the Fourth Amendment.” As in Kisela v. Hughes, 584 U.S. 100 (2018), the Court concluded that Defendants reasonably should have understood that they were violating’ Beard’s Fourth Amendment rights.
Regarding Beard’s retaliation claim, the Court said that filing grievances and a lawsuit were “protected First Amendment activit[ies],” under Haynes v. Stephenson, 588 F.3d 1152 (8th Cir. 2009). But a Plaintiff bringing a retaliation claim must also point to an adverse action “that would chill a person of ordinary firmness from continuing” and was “a but-for cause of the injury,”quoting Molina v. City of St. Louis, 59 F.4th 334 (8th Cir. 2022).
Given the harsh conditions of HSU 8—no phone, no eating in the dining hall, no congregating with other prisoners, limited property, no cellmate, etc.—denial of promotion for 90 days “would chill a person of ordinary firmness,” the Court said. Moreover, Falter’s threat “plausibly suggest[ed] that Beard’s lawsuit was the but-for cause” of the denial anticipated by Santiago v. Blair, 707 F.3d 984 (8th Cir. 2013). This and other cases put “prison officials on notice that responding to constitutionally protected activities with a retaliatory housing assignment violated the First Amendment,” the Court said, point to Nelson v. Shuffman, 603 F.3d 439 (8th Cir. 2010).
The same was true when Falter and Epps denied Beard showers just a week after she reported the two guards for the Rubber Room incident. The “temporal proximity alone may establish causation,” the Court said, especially when the time lapse is two months or less, as in Charleston v. McCarthy, 8 F.4th 772 (8th Cir. 2021). Furthermore, neither guard offered a non-retaliatory reason for denying the showers or for refusing to return Beard’s legal documents.
“Taking items like religious materials and personal mail is not ‘trivial,’” the Court said, quoting Gonzalez v. Bendt, 971 F.3d 742 (8th Cir. 2020). In fact, taking legal documents supported an inference of retaliatory motive and but-for causation, a point highlighted in Auer v. City of Minot, 896 F.3d 854 (8th Cir. 2018), because it would make it harder for Beard to litigate the instant case.
Accordingly, the district court’s judgment was affirmed in these respects to the above-named defendants and claims, though otherwise reversed. Before the Court, Beard was represented by attorneys Jean P. Bradshaw II and Rhett M. Buchmiller of Lathrop GPM LLP in Kansas City. See: Beard v. Falkenrath, 97 F.4th 1109 (8th Cir. 2024).
Back at the district court, those attorneys announced a settlement between the parties, who stipulated to dismissal of the case on October 21, 2024. PLN has requested a copy of the agreement and will update details as they are available. See: Beard v. Falkenrath, USDC (W.D. Mo.), Case No. 2:21-cv-04211.
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