by Douglas Ankney

On June 3, 2024, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit declined to join most sister circuits, which admit evidentiary challenges to class certification of a lawsuit. The Court called admissibility a “red herring” at such an early stage—before proceeding to find other reasons to revoke class certification in a challenge to conditions of confinement at a now-shuttered St. Louis jail.Plaintiffs James Cody, Jasmine Borden, Michael Mosley, Diedre Wortham and Eddie Williams filed a complaint for damages against the City of St. Louis for alleged inhumane conditions they experienced while confined at the City’s Medium Security Institution (MSI)—“a facility with a checkered past,” the Court noted, which was colloquially known as the “Workhouse” before it was shut down in 2021 by then-newly elected Mayor Tishaura Jones (D).

Originally filed in federal court for the Eastern District of Missouri, Plaintiffs’ complaint sought to certify four classes of detainees under FRCP 23(b)(3). Two classes were defined as “all pretrial” and “all postconviction” detainees “who were or will be released from MSI on or after November 13, 2012.” The other two classes were “heat” subclasses defined as all members of the first two classes, “who were assigned to a dorm, pod, or other area at MSI in which the internal temperature equaled or exceeded 88 degrees Fahrenheit.”

The district court denied class certification because of the “open-ended class periods” and also because “it was undisputed that the City improved the conditions at MSI over that time, for example, by installing air conditioning and substantially reducing the prison population.” The district court further objected that the proposed classes combined complaints about poor conditions with complaints about use of excessive force—though different legal standards governed each type of complaint.

Plaintiffs filed a renewed motion for class certification, proposing four new classes. The pretrial and postconviction classes were renamed as two “conditions” classes and eliminated the excessive force claims. The two “heat” subclasses were narrowed to include only those held in dormitories and “on days where the ambient air temperature” in St. Louis “equaled or exceeded 88 degrees Fahrenheit.” Additionally, Plaintiffs set an end date for the two “conditions” classes of July 1, 2018, and for the two heat subclasses an end date of July 24, 2017.

The district court then certified the four classes under Fed. Rule of Civ. Procedure 23(b)(3), citing Hargrove v. Sleepy’s LLC, 974 F.3d 467 (3d Cir. 2020), as supporting authority to consider the renewed motion. The City cried foul because the evidentiary record had not changed, nor had the underlying law, and sought permission to appeal. The Eighth Circuit granted permission.

As a threshold matter, the Court rejected the City’s arguments that Rule 23(c)(1)(C) requires a party to prove a change in the law or provide new evidence in order to succeed on a renewed motion for class certification. In reaching the opposite conclusion, the Court split with most other federal circuits; only the Sixth Circuit also permits class certification without a determination that the underlying evidence first be found admissible.

Citing In Re Wholesale Grocery Prods. Antitrust Litig., 946 F.3d 995 (8th Cir. 2019), the Court said that it had already held that granting a motion to reconsider class certification is “a matter within the court’s broad discretion,” one that “extends to requests, as here, to reconsider a prior class certification denial.” However, as in that case, the Court found no abuse of discretion in reconsidering a prior class certification unless the district court relied on “erroneous factual findings or if its decision relies on erroneous legal conclusions,” as that earlier case held.

Rather, citing Hargrove, the district court had held that Rule 23(c)(1)(C) “allows multiple bites at the apple” of evidence that may be admissible and “does not impose an additional requirement on parties to prove a change in law or show new evidence to succeed on a renewed motion for certification.” The Eighth Circuit refused to find error in this, calling Hargrove “consistent with the law in our circuit.”

But the Court then reversed class certification on other grounds.

First, the classes failed to show commonality required by Rule 23(b)(3)—“that the questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.” For example, while Plaintiffs complained of unsanitary conditions, not all members of the class were held at MSI for the same length of time. Yet determining whether an unsanitary condition of confinement violates the constitution turns on both the nature of the condition and the length of exposure to it, the Court said, citing Owens v. Scott County Jail, 328 F.3d 1026 (8th Cir. 2003).

Furthermore, the City could be held liable for its policies or customs under Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), but the district court failed to undertake the required “rigorous analysis” to determine which theory of liability was in play; there are several theories, each with differing elements whose commonality must be pleaded before certifying classes, the Court said, pointing to IBEW Loc. 98 Pension Fund v. Best Buy Co., 818 F.3d 775 (8th Cir. 2016) and Woodall v. Wayne Cty., 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 34149 (6th Cir.).

Accordingly, the Court reversed the district court order certifying the classes and remanded the case. See: Cody v. City of St. Louis, 103 F.4th 523 (8th Cir. 2024). The case then returned to the district court, which turned away the City’s objections to letting Plaintiffs refile their motion for class certification on October 31, 2024. See: Cody v. City of St. Louis, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 198628 (E.D. Mo.). PLN will update developments as they are available. Plaintiffs are represented by attorneys with Arch City Defenders in St. Louis; Arnold & Porter LLP in Chicago; and DLA Piper LLP in Boston, New York, Phoenix, San Diego and Seattle. See: Cody v. City of St. Louis, USDC (E.D. Mo.), Case No. 4:17-cv-02707.

Meanwhile, demolition of most of the former MSI complex was set to begin on December 16, 2024. A memorial is planned on part of the site for detainees who suffered in poor conditions at the “Workhouse” during the 55 years it was in operation after its 1963 opening.  

Additional source: KDSK

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