On March 20, 2024, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed dismissal of an Islamic prisoner’s federal civil rights lawsuit accusing West Virginia Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (DCR) officials of violating his rights under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. ch. 21C § 2000cc et seq, by forcing him to eat a special religious diet consisting of mostly soy—to which he is allergic. Ricky Pendleton prevailed under a clever argument that the gastrointestinal problems he suffered as a result rendered the food “Haram,” or forbidden by his religion.

How? His complaint said that the “Sufi Original Traditions” of Islam which he follows, require a diet that “aids in the purification of the mind, body and the reparation of [the] mental/inner self” while promoting “compassion and harmlessness to living creatures.” But DCR’s one-size-fits-all “religious special diet” relies on soy to replace protein calories missing from meat. Though Pendleton’s faith does not prohibit soy, it causes him vomiting, abdominal pain, constipation and other digestive issues. Since that clearly does not “aid[] in the purification of the mind [and] body,” he argued that the food was “Haram,” forbidden by Islamic law, and sought a special religious accommodation, filing a series of grievances that were all denied.

Proceeding pro se, Pendleton then filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia, accusing DCR officials of violating his religious rights under the First Amendment and RLUIPA. He also filed a request, which the district court construed as a motion for preliminary injunction, to be served food consistent with his religious dietary belief. The district court denied Pendleton’s request and granted DCR’s motion to dismiss, ruling that he had not adequately alleged that he was being forced to consume food forbidden by his religion. After securing representation from attorney Helen E. White of Munger, Tolles & Olson, LLP in Washington, D.C., Pendleton appealed to the Fourth Circuit.

The first issue the Court confronted involved precisely which documents Pendleton had filed in the district court; Pendleton’s complaint used a standardized form, to which he attached a “memorandum of law” setting forth his claims under RLUIPA. The Court decided that was fine—even attorneys may “incorporate” other documents “into the complaint by reference,” the Court said, citing Goines v. Valley Cmty. Servs. Bd., 822 F.3d 159 (4th Cir. 2016). Moreover, as a pro se prisoner, Pendleton’s filings were entitled to “a liberal construction,” per Allen v. Atlas Box & Crating Co., 59 F.4th 145 (4th Cir. 2023).

The Court then turned to the core issue: whether prison officials violated Pendleton’s rights. RLUIPA forbids imposing a “substantial burden” on a prisoner’s religious exercise, absent a showing that it furthers “compelling government interest” and is “the least restrictive means” of doing so. The law does not define what constitutes a “substantial burden,” but the Fourth Circuit had previously found it resulted “when a state or local government, through act or omission, puts substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs,” as held in Lovelace v. Lee, 472 F.3d 174 (4th Cir. 2006).

Putting someone “between a rock and a hard place” by “forcing [him] to choose between a government-provided benefit and [his] religious convictions” is how a government imposes a substantial burden on religious practice, the Court declared, quoting Incumaa v. Stirling, 791 F.3d 517 (4th Cir. 2015). Pendleton’s complaint said that he faced “exactly that predicament.” The Court agreed that “[t]he rock against which Pendleton says the defendants have put him, then, is the prospect of going without adequate food.”.

Prison officials nonetheless contended that they had not substantially burdened Pendleton’s religious practice because his complaint did not allege that “returning to the regular diet and avoiding meat would leave him malnourished.” Moreover, they argued, Pendleton’s RLUIPA claim must fail because he could get nutritionally complete meals by “supplementing his diet by purchasing items from the prison commissary.”

The Court “firmly” rejected these arguments for two reasons.

First, RLUIPA guarantees prisoners the right to an adequate diet consistent with their religious beliefs, as the Court declared in Carter v. Fleming, 879 F.3d 132 (4th Cir. 2018). By incarcerating Pendleton, West Virginia deprived him of the ability to provide that diet for himself and made him “dependent on the” prison system “for food,” the Court said, quoting Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493 (2011). Pendleton’s complaint sufficiently alleged that the special diet consists of soy “95% of the time” and meat is served with nearly every standard meal (neither of which he can eat). This plausibly established that “subtracting a major component from a diet designed to be nutritionally sound would render that diet no longer nutritionally sound,” the Court said.

Second, although RLUIPA does not require states to pay for a prisoner’s “devotional accessories” such as holy books or prayer oils, per Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005), “food is no accessory, and providing a religiously compliant diet is not optional,” the Court said. As several other circuits have recognized, prison officials may not shift their obligation under RLUIPA to provide adequate meals consistent with a prisoner’s religion by showing that the prisoner may obtain supplemental nutrition through commissary purchases, as held for example in Jones v. Carter, 915 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 2019), and Moussazadeh v. Texas Dep’t of Crim. Just., 703 F.3d 781 (5th. Cir. 2012).

DCR’s final argument was that Pendleton refused to submit to medical testing to prove his soy allergy. Because they brought their motion to dismiss before discovery, Pendleton was not required to produce such evidence. Yet the Court said, “Instead, it is enough that he has plausibly alleged that he cannot digest soy and that he suffered gastrointestinal distress after switching to the religious special diet.” Moreover, he never asserted that his religion prohibits him from eating food to which he is medically allergic, but rather food that he has trouble digesting “regardless of whether any resulting distress is medically significant or would be enough for a doctor to tell him he should avoid soy for health reasons,” the Court pointed out.

For these reasons, the Fourth Circuit found error in the district court’s dismissal of Pendleton’s RLUIPA claim and reversed it. Since that was also the predicate for dismissing his First Amendment claim and request for injunctive relief, those rulings were also vacated and the case remanded. See: Pendleton v. Jividen, 96 F.4th 652 (4th Cir. 2024).

Back at the district court, where Pendleton once again proceeded pro se, the parties announced a settlement was reached, stipulating to dismissal on July 19, 2024. PLN has requested a copy of the agreement and will update details as they are available. See: Pendleton v. Jividen, USDC (S.D. W.Va.), Case No. 2:22-cv-00178.  

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