Bail Fail - Why the U.S. Should End the Practice of Using Money for Bail, JPI, 2012
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BAIL FAIL: Why the U.S. Should End the Practice of USING Money for BaiL JUSTICE POLICY INSTITUTE | SEPTEMBER 2012 2 justice policy institute CONTENTS 3 PART 1: INTRODUCTION 5 PART 2: BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT 5 The Justice Policy Institute is a national organization focused on reducing the use of incarceration and the justice system and promoting policies that improve the well-being of all people and communities. The pretrial system is a complex process to navigate. 6 The History of Pretrial Detention and Use of Bail 8 The General Pretrial Process 10 PART 3: THE USE OF MONEY BAIL 10 The use of financial release has increased over the past years. 10 The amount of money bail set for defendants’ release has risen. 13 The use of money in the pretrial process disproportionately impacts vulnerable communities. 17 PART 4: Money Bail Effects on the Judicial Process 17 Money bail keeps people in jail when they otherwise could safely remain in the community while awaiting trial. 20 21 Special Feature: Travis Alston Money bail does not increase community safety. 24 Money bail poses adverse risks to those who have been charged with offenses. 27 PART 5: Effective Alternatives to Money Bail 27 There are alternatives to money bail that improve outcomes for people awaiting trial and the community. 28 Special Feature: Tyriel Simms 35 Measures of pretrial detention should be implemented to provide national measurements of our pretrial processes and drive pretrial reform efforts. 1012 14th Street, NW, Suite 400 Washington, DC 20005 TEL (202) 558-7974 FAX (202) 558-7978 36 40 Special Feature: Darian Watson PART 6: Recommendations 41 WWW.JUSTICEPOLICY.ORG 46 Endnotes Special Feature: Spurgeon Kennedy “What has been demonstrated here is that usually only one factor determines whether a defendant stays in jail before he comes to trial. That factor is not guilt or innocence. It is not the nature of the crime. It is not the character of the defendant. That factor is, simply, money. How much money does the defendant have?” —U.S. Attorney General Robert Kennedy1 BAIL FAIL: Why the U.S. Should End the Practice of USING Money for BaiL JUSTICE POLICY INSTITUTE | SEPTEMBER 2012 2 justice policy institute Money determines pretrial release for 7 out of 10 people accused of felonies. B A IL FA IL part 1 Introduction The vaguely understood pretrial process of bail costs the taxpayers of the United States billions of dollars and infringes on the liberty and rights of millions of Americans each year. Fortunately, there are alternatives that states and court dates was costing counties, alone, around $9 localities can pursue that have been shown to billion a year.2 effectively promote safety, deliver justice, and decrease the number of people in jails all while reducing the price of this incarceration to taxpayers and those directly impacted. The use of bail money is generally accepted for securing release from jail after an arrest. It is a part of our culture: there are jokes about getting bail money if one anticipates getting into trouble and a Numerous reports and studies have supported the very common fundraiser involves donating dollars elimination of money bail since the early 1900’s; in order to “bail out” a person raising money for however, reform efforts have been slow. With the a cause. However what is not well known is that era of mass incarceration putting the United States starting at the time of arrest, many people charged at the top of the world regarding the number of its with an offense undergo a confusing, coercive, residents behind bars, the need for reform has be- and expensive process intended to deliver justice. come increasingly urgent. States that cannot main- Constitutional safeguards, court rulings, and laws tain burgeoning criminal justice systems are now provide for both the protection of people who are open to safer, more effective ideas. accused of offenses, as well as, the power of gov- Current policies and practices around money bail are among the primary drivers of growth in our jail populations. On any given day, 60 percent of the U.S. jail population is composed of people who are not convicted but are being held in detention as they await the resolution of their charge. This ernment to pursue justice and safety in the community. However, the extensive use of money bail as the primary release mechanism has distorted the pretrial justice process. While cases are resolved, justice is not always served and our communities are not always safer. time in detention hinders them from taking care of However, the ability to pay money bail is neither their families, jobs and communities while over- an indicator of a defendant’s guilt nor an indicator crowding jails and creating unsustainable budgets. of risk in release. The focus on money alone as a In 2011, detaining people in county jails until their mechanism for pretrial release means people often 3 4 justice policy institute are not properly screened for more rational mea- • Discussion of issues involved in the use of sures of public safety risk: their propensity to flee money bail, such as disproportionate impact before their court date or their risk of causing public on certain communities, loss of liberty, and its harm. Meanwhile, those too poor to pay a money linkage to the practice of plea-bargaining. bail remain in jail regardless of their risk level or presumed innocence. Evidence suggests that up • practices to give readers an idea of what could to 25 percent more people could be safely released be done instead of depending on money bail. from U.S. jails while awaiting trial if the proper procedures are put in place,3 including valid risk assessments and appropriate community supervision. Overview of more effective, just, and cost-saving • Recommendations for beginning to practically address the issue of money bail. This report provides an explanation and analysis of There are vastly more effective and cost-saving the use of money bail in the pretrial justice system. practices that should replace money bail as our pri- The following sections are designed to facilitate mary release mechanism. By implementing more meaningful discussion and reform: effective and efficient programs and services, vari- • Overview of the pretrial process so that ous jurisdictions across the U.S. are demonstrating even readers with little to no familiarity the cost savings and enhancement of community with the process can understand what may safety that could be gained. happen from arrest through a charge being resolved. B A IL FA IL part 2 Background AND CONTEXT Between June 2010 and June 2011, about 11.8 million people were processed through jails across the United States. At midyear 2011, the total U.S. jail population was 735,601 people. U.S. jails have operated at an average of 91 percent capacity since the year 2000, resulting in a huge financial burden to states, cities, and counties.4 Since 2005, a majority of people held in jail have more than a majority waited 51 days or more). Me- not been convicted of the offense for which they are dian waits ranged from 31 days for forgery to more charged: approximately 60 percent of people in jails than 150 days for rape charges.6 are merely awaiting trial or are in the trial process for the offense in question.5 The Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments provide the constitutional basis for the legal principle commonly referred to as “innocent until proven guilty,” which is a critical safeguard within our criminal justice system. The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, along with many court rulings since their passage, also provide guidance for if, when, and how long, courts may order the detainment of an accused individual. The Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides that bail not be excessive for people accused of offenses. These protections are in place so that the courts may adequately examine a person’s guilt or innocence, while also safeguarding the person’s life and liberty. The pretrial system is a complex process to navigate. What pretrial process a person will go through depends on the state and jurisdiction in which he or she is arrested. The United States Constitution’s Fifth Amendment affirms that people cannot be deprived of their liberty without due process of law. However, states and jurisdictions have varying laws on detainment for capital offense charges, consideration of safety, and requirements around imposing the least restrictive bail conditions. The American Bar Association and the National Association of Pretrial Service Agencies have provided standards to guide pretrial activities; however, at There are no national data regarding how long this time, many practices do not yet comply with people stay in jail until their case is resolved; how- these recommendations. ever, in the 75 most populous counties, people accused of felonies who did not post bail in 2002 waited a median of 51 days in jail until trial (that is, Summons and Citations: In some jurisdictions, law enforcement has the option to dispense 5 6 justice policy institute The History of Pretrial Detention and Use of Bail The use of pretrial detention and bail in motivating appearance at court hearings has an extensive history. As early as 1275, officials in England were debating and curtailing the use of pretrial detention and bail. The use of bail carried over from England into the U.S.; however, initial laws greatly limited the use of pretrial detention and excessive bail. The role of the for-profit bail industry began in the United States in the 1800’s primarily due to the lack of large family or community ties as well as large areas where a defendant could flee during the settling of the country. However, as early as 1920, critiques of the bail system’s use of for-profit bail bonding companies emerged and called for alternatives to surety bonds. Even then, the bail bonding system was criticized as it “neither guarantees security to society nor safeguards the right of the accused.” Recommendations were made for the use of citations rather than arrests and systematic “fact-finding” in determining bail for the accused. In 1954, reports began to show that an increasing majority of people detained while awaiting trial were of low income; these observations paved the way for pilot programs, such as the Manhattan Bail Project, testing the use of Release-On-Recognizance and other forms of pretrial release. Due largely to reform efforts, the Bail Reform Act of 1966 was passed which created a foundation for reducing dependence on money bail and increasing the use of nonfinancial release options. The Bail Reform Act of 1984, a component of a larger Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, added the consideration of safety in the community as a factor in pretrial release decisions. Challenges to this Act were defeated in United States v. Salerno, in which the Supreme Court concluded that the protection the Act provided did not violate Constitutional rights as long as detention was not applied excessive. Since the 1970s, various states and jurisdictions have worked to improve the pretrial process through various programs and pilots; meanwhile, the for-profit bail bonding industry has continued its efforts to keep for-profit bail companies a part of the judicial system. Timothy R. Schnacke, and others, “The History of Bail and Pretrial Release,” Pretrial Justice Institute, September 2010. B A IL FA IL citations or summons for certain charges in order courts may detain people charged with a particular to reduce the number of arrests and lessen the bur- offense of interest to the state, with prior convic- den on the local jail to process people charged of tion history, and/or having the status as an un- offenses. The process from arrest to charge resolu- documented immigrant. About 21 states have laws tion generally proceeds as shown in the flow chart disallowing the detainment of people for charges “The General Pretrial Process”; however, the spe- other than capital offenses, and at least two states— cifics and requirements involved will vary among Alaska and Tennessee—do not allow courts to deny jurisdictions. bail even for capital offenses.8 Upon Arrest: Depending on the potential or Release on Bail: There are several ways a per- actual charge and the jurisdiction, a person may be son may be released after their arrest as they await released from the police station after having their their court date. charge processed and bail set there. Others may have to go through a booking at a jail prior to having bail set. Booking typically involves paperwork Release options that do not involve money upfront: • Release on recognizance—The person signs a to collect personal information, details about the contract agreeing to appear in court for their arrest and charge, and, in some jurisdictions, fin- hearing as required. gerprinting and a photograph. Usually, the accused person is then held in detention until appearing • Unsecured bond—The person signs a con- before a judicial officer or a judge to have the con- tract agreeing to appear in court for their ditions of their release set. hearings and accepting liability for a set amount of money should they not appear in Bail Setting: The Supreme Court has affirmed court as required. that people have the right to counsel at the bail setting before a judicial officer; 7 however, this is • Conditional release—The person is given a list not provided in most jurisdictions. In some places, of stipulations that must be honored in order a second bail hearing or review will be held very to remain out of jail while awaiting trial. These soon after the first bail determination where the often include drug and alcohol use screenings, original decision of whether to grant bail and how orders to attend mental or substance abuse dis- much can be reviewed by the judge; counsel for order treatment, and/or monitoring by a third the defendant is required at this hearing in some party, such as a family member, pretrial service places. In other places, only if a person requests it agency, or others. will they get a second bail hearing. • Release to pretrial services—Where available, Bail Denied: In accordance to the laws of the someone may be required to be supervised by jurisdictions, judicial officials may deny bail to a pretrial services agency. These organizations prevent the pretrial release of people accused of typically conduct risk assessments and provide certain offenses. In accordance to the Bail Reform the appropriate supervision as indicated by Act of 1984, most states allow for bail to be denied risk assessment findings. for capital offenses, which are crimes punishable by death. Around 28 states have laws that allow for bail to be denied for charges other than capital offenses with rationales that vary greatly. Often 7 8 justice policy institute THE GENERAL PRETRIAL PROCESS SUMMONS Arrest CITATION BOOKING/LOCK-UP BAIL SET BAIL DENIED JAIL Cash Bond Surety Bond Conditional Release Deposit Bond Release to Pretrial Services Property Bond Unsecured Bod Released On Recognizance UNABLE TO PAY BAIL REMAIN IN JAIL COURT HEARING PLEA BARGAIN FAILURE TO APPEAR RE-ARREST JAIL COURT HEARING CHARGE RESOLVED PLEA BARGAIN B A IL FA IL Release options that require money in order to get Held on Bail: When a bail is assigned that re- out of jail pretrial: quires money upfront, people who are unable to • Cash bond—The person (or their friends and family) pays the bail amount in full in order to be released from jail. Upon return to court, • plea bargain). The general pretrial process is described in the fol- ministrator’s or other court fees). Some juris- lowing flow chart. However, each jurisdiction will dictions allow cash bail to be paid with a credit differ in the specifics of how the process will pro- card; others forbid this. ceed; therefore, this chart is only intended as a gen- Deposit bond—The person pays a percentage the understanding that failing to appear to court will make them liable for the full bail amount. This percentage usually is required in the form of cash or a payer’s check. Commercial bail bond—Also known as a surety bond, the person (or their friends and family) gets a bail bondsman (a private citizen working for a for-profit bail bonding company) to sign a promissory note to the court for the full bond amount. They are required to pay the bondsman a non-refundable fee that is typically 10% of the bond amount. Depending on the bondsman, some people will be required to put up collateral as well (such as a vehicle, home, etc.). • ing or the charge is resolved (usually through a they will be reimbursed this money (less ad- of the bail amount (usually 10 percent) with • pay are “held on bail” in jail until their court hear- Property bond—In lieu of cash, the person may provide a deed and other paperwork to allow the courts to put a lien on a property for the value of the bond amount. Until the person appears in court, the court holds the deed on a house or title to other property such as a boat or car. Sometimes, judges or court representatives will mix the release options. A person may be required to sign for an unsecured bond and abide under certain conditions to be released. In other situations, judges will require that a person post a money bond while also remaining under supervision of pretrial service agencies. eral explanation of the steps a typical person may encounter from arrest until their charge is resolved through acquittal, having charges dropped, or conviction. 9 10 justice policy institute part 3 The Use of Money Bail According to the most recently released State Court Processing Statistics data, the proportion of people charged with a felony who were granted nonfinancial release declined by 32 percent from 1992 to 2006; at the same time, financial release, primarily through commercial bonds, increased by 32 percent. The use of financial release has increased over the past years. for those detained until their hearing more than Release on recognizance was the most common lation affected by these increasing bail assignments. type of pretrial release in 1992; however, its use had declined by 33 percent by 2006. Overall, 70 percent of people charged with a felony were assigned money bail in 2006. The proportion of people detained pretrial increased by about 14 percent to a high of 42 percent of all those charged with felonies in 2006 (only 5 percent of these were held without bail).9 The amount of money bail set for defendants’ release has risen. doubled from an average bail of $40,000 in 1992 to $90,000 in 2006. Median bail amounts show the extent of the popuIn 2006, the total population had a median bail amount of $10,000 which means that at least half of felony defendants are assigned a minimum of $10,000 in bail. The average bail amount nearly doubled between 1992 and 2006 from an amount of $25,400 to $55,500. Among people released, the average bail amount increased from $7,800 in 1992 to $17,100 in 2006. Of defendants remaining in jail or prison pretrial, 50% percent had a bail amount of $40,000 or more in 2006. Since 2000, the median bail amount for those detained has been $25,000, up from $10,000 in 1992. The proportion of felony cases assigned bail under $5,000 decreased by nearly 15 percentage points A Bureau of Justice Statistics survey of felony from 1998 to 2006; and the percent of cases with cases in the 75 most populous counties of the U.S. amounts from $5,000 to $24,999 has remained rela- showed that average bail amounts have increased tively stable. by over $30,000 between 1992 and 2006,10 posing a serious concern for indigent populations involved Meanwhile, more cases are receiving very high bail in the criminal justice system. Average amounts amounts. For example, in 1998, 25 percent of cases B A IL FA IL Defendents released on nonfinancial bail prior to trial declined as those detained on financial bail increased. 50% Percent of felony defendents 45% 40% 35% 30% 25% 20% 1992 1994 1996 1998 Detained 2000 2002 2004 Financial Release 2006 Nonfinancial Release Source: State Court Processing Statistics data as retrieved from the Felony Defendants in Large Urban Counties reports, 1992 – 2006. Between 1992 and 2006, the median bail amount for those detained increased by $15,000. 25,000 Median Bail Amounts ($) 20,000 15,000 10,000 5,000 0 1992 1994 1996 1998 Detained 2000 2002 2004 Released Source: State Court Processing Statistics data as retrieved from the Felony Defendants in Large Urban Counties reports, 1992 – 2006. 2006 11 justice policy institute Cases with bail amounts under $5,000 have dropped since 1998. 35 Proportion of cases 30 25 20 15 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 $5,000 - $9,999 Under $5,000 $10,000 - $24,999 Source: State Court Processing Statistics data as retrieved from the Felony Defendants in Large Urban Counties reports, 1992 – 2006. An increasing number of cases are assigned high bail amounts. 40% 35% 30% Percentage of cases 12 25% 20% 15% 10% 5% 0 1994 1996 $25,000 or more 1998 2000 $25,000 - 49,999 2002 2004 $50,000 or more Source: State Court Processing Statistics data as retrieved from the Felony Defendants in Large Urban Counties reports, 1992 – 2006. B A IL FA IL were assigned a bail amount of $25,000 or more; pretrial.14 The use of money bail puts people with- yet, in 2004, 23 percent received a bail amount of out expendable income at risk of suffering the ad- $50,000 or more. These increasing bail amounts verse impacts of detention in their cases. suggest that bail inflation has occurred along with an increase in the use of surety bonds involving the for-profit bail bonding industry. This means that the amount of money that bondmen can collect has increased along with the rise in money bail amounts. Overall, whereas 25 percent had a bail amount of $25,000 or more in 1998, this number increased to 37 percent by 2004. People who are able to put together enough money to post bail or pay a bail bondsman’s fee may deplete their funds and the funds of families and friends are that is needed to pay rent, buy groceries, and cover other bills.15 People who are unable to pay their money bail (or a bond for a portion of the bail) and remain in jail may lose their jobs, default on vehicles, lose their homes, get behind on Not only do high bail amounts pose a threat to consti- child support payments, lose custody of dependent tutional rights to liberty pretrial, but they are believed children, and more. The implications can make or to put low income populations at a disadvantage break a person’s ability to resume life after their when facing plea bargains: people may feel pres- case is resolved. 11 sured to plead guilty as remaining in jail has such significant negative consequences, such as losing a job or not being available to take care of a dependent. “The requirement that virtually every defendant must post [money] bail… imposes personal hardship on them, Whereas the Bail Reform Act mandates that people their families, and on the public which be released to the “least restrictive” conditions that must bear the cost of their detention will also assure appearance at trial and the safety of and frequently support their depen- the community, many are not able to access those dants on welfare.” least restrictive conditions due to an inability to pay bail. The role of finances in this equation not only violates the mandates of the Bail Reform Act but also is believed to violate the Equal Protection Clause.12 —American Bar Association, Standards Relating to Pretrial Release, 196816 For all intents and purposes, those held in jail are set up to fail, even if they are innocent of the charge. The use of money in the pretrial process disproportionately impacts vulnerable communities. When held in jail, a person is not able dress as pre- Many studies have shown over the years that to limited phone use, obligations to work long shifts people held in jail pretrial end up with worse trial in jail programs,19 placement in jails long distances outcomes than people who are free while awaiting away from their counsel,20 and other reasons. trial. Those held pretrial are more likely to be convicted of a felony,13 receive a sentence of incarceration, and be sentenced longer than those released sentably as one who is able to come from their own home dressed and prepared.17 Jurors who see defendants in jail uniforms and shackles may be biased as being in jail is equated to dangerousness and guilt.18 They are not able to work with their counsel to prepare their defense, gather witnesses, and other activities needed to present a strong case due People held in jail pretrial may lose their job due to absence;21 and if they are self-employed, pretrial 13 14 justice policy institute detention effectively shuts their business down. matters should be available to all people awaiting Not only does the lack of income impact the indi- their court date, keeping within the parameters vidual, their family, and their communities, but of safety but not requiring they have financial re- the collective amount of lost income due to pretrial sources to do so. detention can amount to millions of dollars and impact a country’s economy. A number of studies have shown the loss of income in other countries due to pretrial detention: In Mexico, $100 million dollars of income was lost to pretrial detention in 2006.22 In Argentina, over $10 million dollars of income is lost to pretrial detention each year.23 Similar information about income loss in the U.S. are not available, but considering that thousands of people are held pretrial throughout the year, the loss of income is likely to be significant. Pretrial detention causes some people to lose their home, apartment, or spot in a shelter.24 They may “The argument that Madoff and Dreier had a fundamental right to the extensive conditions they received ignores the fact that such conditions are unavailable and unrealistic for the broader population. Rather, these extensive conditions represent special privilege, and there is no fundamental right to pay for preferential treatment in the criminal justice system.” —Jonathan Zweig, Harvard Journal on Legislation28 suffer a disruption in their medical care as provided The question of whether money bail leads to viola- by Medicaid and may even lose their health insur- tions of the Equal Protection Clause of the Four- ance due to being in jail.25 Their families are often teenth Amendment has been raised. The Equal adversely impacted, as their children may have to Protection Clause provides that laws are to be car- move to another parent or relative’s home, suffering ried out in a way that does not differ between peo- disruptions in their education and home life, as well ple in similar situations.29 Accordingly, a number of as the trauma of having an incarcerated parent.26 court decisions have agreed that a person should In addition to the use of money bail, people with financial resources are currently able to pay “for extensive conditions of release” that would otherwise not be permissible.27 One commentator noted the expensive conditions for pretrial release that Bernard Madoff and Marc Dreier were able to pay for in order to avoid pretrial detention for charges of financial “white collar” crime. In addition to being able to post a bond for their bail, they paid for security, video monitoring, and other restrictions in order to remain in their homes and attend to business while awaiting trial. In addition to the use of money to pay bail, this expanded use of money to pay for conditional requirements widens the gap between defendants who have money and those who do not. The ability to maintain one’s job, housing, caregiver responsibilities, and other not be incarcerated on the basis of wealth, but all should have equal treatment and constitutional access to their fundamental rights under the law without regard to their financial status. However, the use of money bail with populations that do not have access to financial resources results in very different treatment compared to those who can afford to post a bond. Although an upper middle class person and a low-income person may be arrested and charged with the same offense, the upper middle class person The average bail amount for detained people has increased from $39,800 in 1992 to $89,900 in 2006. B A IL FA IL is much more likely to be able to post a bond and and sentencing decisions, racial disparities in the might even be able to secure a release on the same pretrial process have a ripple effect throughout day. Meanwhile, the low-income person remains the justice system. The U.S. Supreme Court has in jail because he cannot pay a bond—regardless affirmed the pretrial process as “perhaps the most of the fact that the offense charge was exactly the critical period of the proceedings”,32 so the impact same as his released counterpart’s and regardless of race on decisions during this time is of particular of his presumed innocence. importance. Previous studies have shown differing results when trying to find a direct relationship Due to disparities in the pretrial process, African American and Latino populations are more impacted by the use of money bail. between race and pretrial decisions. However, a Approximately 11.8 million people were processed ence pretrial decisions and outcomes. The study through jails during 2011; the total jailed popula- revealed correlations between race and all pretrial tion at a single point in time (midyear) was 736,000 outcomes analyzed, concluding that “each correla- people. Annual jail populations show that a high- tion indicated harsher treatment for African Ameri- er number of white people are in jail; however, con- cans.”33 The results showed that: 30 sidering that the black population only comprises 13 percent of the total U.S. population, it is disturb- recent study looked at how race affects extralegal factors, such as education and financial support, which then affect legal factors, such as prior record and severity of charge. Together these factors influ- • leased on their own recognizance than white ing that they comprised 38 percent of the U.S. jail defendants.34 population in 2012. Estimates show that the rate of Black/African American people being detained in jail was nearly 5 times higher than white and 3 times higher than Hispanic people.31 Disparities in jail populations have persisted despite years of studies on race and pretrial decisions. Since being jailed while awaiting trial has a direct impact on case outcomes such as conviction rates African Americans were less likely to be re- • African Americans ages 18 through 29 received significantly higher bail amounts than all other types of defendants.35 Although the study did not show “race” directly predicting pretrial decisions, the relationship or “interaction” between race and other factors, such as age, gender, and socioeconomic status, was what directly impacted pretrial decisions. For example, although a judicial officer may not give a high bail amount specifically because of a defendant’s race, the person may have had difficulty getting a job due to his race, and thus, was rated as a higher flight risk due to an unstable source of income. Awareness of how this may happen at the bail setting stage is crucial for reducing disparities due to pretrial decisions, particularly as there is little oversight 15 justice policy institute 350,000 The racial and ethnic breakdown of detention rates reveal serious racial disparities in pretrial detention. 800 700 300,000 600 250,000 500 200,000 400 150,000 300 100,000 200 50,000 Detention Rate for 100,000 # in U.S. Jail Population 16 100 0 0 White Black/ African American U.S. Jail Population Hispanic/ Latino Other Detention Rate per 100,000 Sources: Karen R. Humes, and others, “Overview of Race and Hispanic Origin: 2010,” 2010 Census Briefs, 2011, Table 1; Todd Minton, “Jail Inmates at Midyear 2011 – Statistical Tables,” 2012, Table 6. of decision making processes at this phase. In most Although judges and judicial officers may deny or jurisdictions, people do not have legal representa- simply not be aware of any racial bias in pretrial deci- tion at the time their bail is first set. Without under- sions, there is strong evidence that these bail decision standing how race and extralegal factors impact the makers consider the lost freedom caused by pretrial pretrial process, the effect of race on other circum- detention to be a greater loss for whites than for stances and life factors will continue to be used to blacks. By creating a predictive model that consid- “reinforce stereotypes of more dangerous offenders ered details of the charges, the people charged, and in the minds of judges.”36 other variables, researchers estimated what the bail “…the disparity in bond amounts occurring at a less visible stage of case processing translate indirectly into racial disparities in imprisonment due to the relatively strong effect of bond amounts on…prison sentences…” —John Wooldredge37 decisions should have been for defendants and compared them with what the decisions actually were. They then estimated the cost of loss of freedom and other consequences of detainment in jail pretrial such as loss of employment, etc. Their calculations suggest that judicial officials valued the loss of freedom for blacks less; in essence, whites’ freedom was valued to be worth more by about 60 to 80 dollars per day.38 B A IL FA IL part 4 Money Bail Effects on the Judicial Process The use of money bail as a standard practice keeps many people in detention when, in reality, they could be safely released while waiting for their case to be resolved. Money bail keeps people in jail when they otherwise could safely remain in the community while awaiting trial. extensive use of money bail in a jurisdiction and point to ways to effectively reduce jail populations; however, not all jurisdictions track bail amounts. For example, a recent study on the Los Angeles County Jail revealed that bail amounts in Los Angeles were overwritten with “zero” once a defendant posted bail.41 This made it difficult to assess and make recommendations on how the county was using bail schedules and other pretrial service A study using the State Court Processing Statistics options to manage the number of people held on found that in many of the largest U.S. jurisdictions, bail while awaiting trial. around half of those kept in jail would have been less likely to be rearrested than those who had been released. The study also suggested that with Case Study: Baltimore, Maryland 39 proper screening mechanisms, an additional 25 percent of people could be released pretrial without increasing offenses or failures to appear.40 However, as many jurisdictions do not have adequate screening or pretrial monitoring programs in place, judicial officials continue to rely on money bail as a release option. One detention center that does track bail amounts is the Baltimore City Jail in Baltimore, Maryland. It is one of the 20 largest jails in the U.S. and one of the few local jails run by the state correctional agency, and has a higher than average percentage of its population—90 percent—on pretrial status.42 A snapshot of data showed that about 1 out of every 14 people in pretrial detention were held on a Data are inconsistent on how many people are total bail amount of $5,000 or less on February 13, jailed because they cannot afford to post the bail 2012. This means that some individuals may have amount or even acquire the services of a for-profit been detained because they were unable to pay the bondsman. Tracking bail amounts would reveal the full bail amount or a bail bond of $500—the typical 17 18 JUSTICE POLICY I NSTI TUTE 10 percent fee charged by bail bondsmen to post the bail. On February 13, 2012, sixty-two people were held on a bail amount adding up to $1,000 or less and 19 people were held on a bail amount of $100-250.43 These 62 people were charged with offenses like trespassing, theft, driving on a suspended license, prostitution, failure to pay child support, minor drug charges and technical violations of probation. People who remain incarcerated on these low bail offenses usually do not have the small amount of money necessary to secure their release. Considering the financial burden of simply detaining someone in a jail even proportions are applied to the February 13, 2012, jail population, 973 people were classified as low security while 2,055 people were held with a medium security classification. for 24 hours, it is likely that in these cases with very low bail amounts, a release option other than money bail would be a better use of public dollars. A person who remains in detainment due to On February 13, 2012, 62 people were in the Baltimore City Jail on bail amounts of $1,000 or less. Total bail amount* # of people in jail $100-250 19 $251-500 21 $501-1,000 22 $1,001-2,500 47 $2,501-5,000 123 $5,001-7,500 49 $7,501-10,000 71 $10,001-25,000 190 $25,001-50,000 173 $50,001-75,000 62 $75,001-100,000 82 The immediate financial impact of unnecessary $100,001-1,000,000 281 pretrial detention along with the later social costs $1,000,001 + 4 No Bail 1,806 Detainer** 243 Total number of people held pretrial 3,193 Sentenced Inmates 412 Total number of people in jail 3,605 homelessness, a substance abuse issue, or a mental health disorder should be diverted to other programs for more cost effective services. In Baltimore, court dates ran an average of 30 days after arrest; however, some court dates may be set as long as 120 days after arrest. Those who remain in jail while awaiting trial because of their bail amounts drive up the average length of stay. Consequently, the average length of stay in the Baltimore City Jail in 2010 was 38 days.44 to society due to loss of employment, housing, transportation, child support, and other resources provide an impetuous for utilizing other means to ensuring a defendant’s presence at his or her court hearing. This is particularly important for those with nonviolent charges being held in lower security settings. In Baltimore City in 2010, 27% of the jail population was held in low security while 57% was held in medium security settings.45 If those *Total bail amount may include multiple bails for that one person. People who have multiple charges, one of which has a NO BAIL set, will be included in the NO BAIL number, not the other bail amounts. **Detainers are when a person is being held by another jurisdiction or agency. People who were being held pretrial and had detainers were included in the Detainer total not under individual bail amounts, but were included in the sentenced category if they were already sentenced. Source: Jail Daily Extract, February 13, 2012 B A IL FA IL Research shows that 25% Case Study: Virginia for 51 percent of all those booked during that time span.47 In determining bail, California judicial officials rely heavily on bail schedules, which are lists An analysis of people of bail amounts preset for each offense. This is for in detention who were a variety of reasons, including providing “cover” more people investigated through to judicial officials when facts necessary to make Virginia’s Pretrial Ser- an independent bail decision are not available at pretrial without vices agencies, using the time of the hearing.48 Some jail administra- the Virginia Pretrial tors, however, have refused to jail people with failures to appear. Risk Assessment In- bail under a certain amount, on the rationale that strument, showed a they are generally low risk and will just increase considerable need for overcrowding. To thwart this initiative, judicial of- could be released increasing offenses or reducing low-risk populations held in jail on low ficers have assigned even higher bail amounts than bond amounts. This study revealed that 15 percent recommended in order to “force” a person to be of the 528 defendants had a bond set but remained jailed. One jail would not house those with a bail of in jail. Over three-quarters of the defendants were $25,000 or less for misdemeanor cases. People with held on a bond amount up to $5,000. Eighty-nine misdemeanor charges that remained in jail until people (17 percent) had a bond amount up to their hearing spent an average of 8.23 days in jail $1,000. Over 40 percent were classified as low to until disposition; those with felony charges spent average risk on their risk assessments. Compari- an average of 53.03 days in jail until disposition.49 sons of bail amounts revealed that defendants with a “Below Average” risk rating had the highest bond The use of money bail results in thousands of amount average at $6,975.46 people being held pretrial, and eventually increases the likelihood that more people will be incarcerated to serve sentences as well. This is not a necessary In Virginia, 77% of the pretrial population was held on a bail amount up to $5,000. Classification Low risk Below Average Average Above Average High Risk # (%) Average Bail Amounts 40 (8%) $2,903 81 (15%) $6,975 97 (18%) $4,010 105 (20%) $5,528 160 (31%) $6,914 Source: Virginia Community Criminal Justice Association, “October Study,” 2012. Case Study: California Although bail amounts are not tracked, a study of Los Angeles County Jail showed that in 2007-2008, about 200,000 people were held in jail from arrest through disposition of their case. This accounted evil, as alternative solutions are available and have worked in providing safe communities and functional pretrial justice for decades. A few snapshots of work being done in some states provide an idea of the magnitude of savings possible: 19 20 justice policy institute Travon Alston I wound up getting caught in an incident with three friends. A fight broke out, someone got shot, and I got arrested for it. The charges were attempted murder and first degree assault. That was my first time being charged as an adult. I was 18. My bail was set at $250,000—cash bond. I couldn’t pay. No one in my family could pay that. I knew I was sitting. I cried the first night. It was rough, you know, that first experience. I’d heard so many stories about it, about people getting raped. It wasn’t like that, but it was rough. It wasn’t like your mother could come get you; you were there to stay. It was hard, especially the city jail because in the summer, it’s extremely hot. The walls sweat. You’re not living to your needs; you’re living with what somebody else tells you to do. You’re in the cell with another guy who’s just chaotic, so it’s a psychological game at the same time. I was stabbed and all. It was a bad experience. I’d been in street fights before—clean fights—but it’s a whole other world in jail. It’s animalistic. It takes a strong mind, a strong will, to deal with jail, but at the end of the day, I kept my faith. I knew I wasn’t guilty, so I did a lot of praying. I was in city jail for nine and a half months. Then, one day, I got a bail reduction. They took my bail from $250,000 to $75,000 cash, so my family bailed me out. I wound up going to court about a month later and I beat the charges. The guy who was shot altered his statement and signed an affidavit where he told the truth, that I didn’t shoot him. The guy who said he saw me shoot him changed his statement, too. He said that he said I did it because he’d committed a crime and he was trying to protect himself; the police said they’d cut him a break if he gave them some information. In the end, they both got locked up for murder. When I came home in 2001, I had ambition. My ambition was to start work- “ “ Community Member ing and definitely go back to school and get my diploma because you can’t get no diploma in prison; at that time, they wouldn’t let you. I was in city jail, not prison, so there was no school. That was the foremost thing. I wrote to the school board, then I enrolled and wound up going to the Houghton Institute. I graduated and obtained my high school diploma, so that was a plus. Then I started working. B A IL FA IL • In California, at the end of the first quarter in evidence to support this idea. And, while a judge 2012, 47,155 people in county jails were not may have reason to detain a person out of con- convicted and are waiting for their trial date. cern for community safety and thus set a high bail This represented 64 percent of the total jail amount, the defendant still may be able to raise the population. These people were held at an es- money needed to pay his bond. Or, a for-profit bail timated $100 per day while pretrial programs bondsman may recognize that a 10 percent fee off could have provided supervision at $2.50 per a high bail amount will result in a hefty profit and person each day. decide to take a risk in releasing the defendant in 50 51 • • A Florida State University study reported that order to continue to his business. pretrial release supervision in selected Florida From the perspective of people who are victims of counties cost $1.48/day per person, and de- crime, even large bail amounts provide no reas- tention cost $107.71/day simply for housing. surance that the person charged will be kept from Preventing just 50 percent of the jail population harming others. People who are victims of crimes from ever going into jail (through pretrial diver- and their advocates provide a unique perspective sion or pretrial services) would have resulted in in what an ideal pretrial process would look like, a cost savings of over $210 million in 2010.52 as many of them are seeking true justice to be done An evaluation of a pretrial service program in Iowa showed increased safety and court appearance along with reduced technical violations of pretrial release conditions. While detention cost $19,253, release to pretrial services cost $3,860 resulting in a savings of $15,393 per person released. The total cost savings due to pretrial services from 2008 to 2009 was $5.3 million.53 MONEY BAIL DOES NOT INCREASE COMMUNITY SAFETY. regarding the harm caused to them. Many are also concerned with preventing similar offenses from occurring in the future either to themselves or others. While other parties are motivated in their work by a desire to reduce caseloads, increase financial gain, or other procedural concerns, victims can help shape policies that will optimize safety in the community. From this perspective, a few considerations are offered from Dr. Will Marling at the National Organization for Victim Assistance:54 • Victims have real concerns pretrial. These concerns revolve around their physical, emotional and financial safety. Although risk assessments and pretrial services are probably going to The Bail Reform Act of 1984 provided that courts reduce harm more so than simply releasing a may make considerations for the safety of the com- defendant on a cash bond, the pretrial process munity in bail decisions. Although a person in the should be thorough to ensure the safety of vic- pretrial process may or may not be one who com- tims by taking their concerns into account for mitted the offense, there are still a number of pre- release decisions. cautions that should be taken into consideration to ensure no further harm is done. The judicial system predominately depends on money bail to ensure safety and appearance at court on the premise that putting up a money bond will incentivize people to return to court. However there is no empirical • The use of money bail can actually perpetuate the impact of the offense, especially financial offenses, where money has been taken from the victim. The use of that money to pay a cash bond or surety bond fee can further exacerbate 21 22 justice policy institute the effects of that offense and make it more has a measure of discretion in determining how difficult for the victim to regain what is right- money bail will be used in the criminal justice pro- fully his. cess. Consequently, each jurisdiction differs on how As stated above, money bail is widely believed to incentivize a person’s return to court; however, despite the use of money bail at increasingly higher they determine what types of bail to set, how much money bail is set, and methods of allowable payment to secure one’s release. amounts, failure to appear rates have not changed In an effort to standardize aspects of the bail substantially. Whereas in the 1960s and ‘70s, the process, some jurisdictions use “bail schedules” failure to appear rate among the most populous or “bond schedules” to determine money bail cities was 6-9 percent , the failure to appear rate amounts as it relates to the alleged offense. These 55 for felony cases was at 22 percent in 2006. Failing schedules may be legislatively mandated or used to appear for court causes increased workloads for informally, and they are intended to standardize court staff, issuance of arrest warrants, incarcera- how much a bail is set regardless of the person’s tion on minor offenses for people who are non- personal characteristics or demographics.57 There compliant and longer jail stays in connection with is no official guideline for judges and officials who the present offense or future offenses. Failure to make up the schedules; consequently, even within appear on misdemeanor cases also results in the a state, the amount of bail set for a charge may loss of revenues from unpaid fines and fees. vary by county. Often, the bail set does not match 56 Data from 2006 on felony defendants of the 75 most the severity of the charge, with amounts greatly populous counties showed that about 12 percent were on pretrial release. This includes people released after posting a money bond or a surety bond through a for-profit bail bondsman. Many pretrial service agencies have implemented programs showing very high rates of success in lowering rearrest of individuals awaiting trial and, if further expanded in the 75 most populous counties, it is likely that the rate of people arrested while awaiting trial could be reduced substantially. For example, a program begun in Santa Cruz County, California, showed that 92 percent of defendants under supervision were not re-arrested for new offenses. The use of money bail is arbitrary and not guided by the use of risk assessments or national standards. A major barrier to understanding the extent and impact of money bail is that it is used differently in various states, counties, and cities. Each jurisdiction “Ultimately, the justification for bail is to provide an incentive for a defendant to return to court to face trial by imposing a monetary penalty if he doesn’t. In a bail bonds system, once the bondsman is paid, the defendant no longer has any incentive to return to court, because he will not be getting any money back if he shows up for court, unlike if he posted bail himself. So the justification for bail is undermined by the bail bonds system. No bail will ensure that a defendant won’t commit another crime while waiting for trial, and that, to me, is the crux of the decision of whether or not to release a defendant. Is it a public safety risk to release this individual? The overall amount of bail is irrelevant to this decision. It is only relevant to the decision as to how much incentive this defendant needs to return for trial.” –page croyder, former baltimore city prosecutor B A IL FA IL exceeding the potential cost of damage or loss. The Despite the unknowns around the effectiveness of bail a person could potentially receive for a basic bail schedules, they are still relied on heavily due drug possession charge would vary across the to the general acceptance of money bail in the judi- states as follows: cial system. A 2009 study of 112 of the most popu- • In California, an ACLU study found that 58 different bail schedules are in use across the state. For a drug possession charge, bail may • the participating jurisdictions utilized a bail schedule when determining money bail amounts.60 vary by $20,000 depending on the person’s “Each accused is entitled to any ben- location. Recommended bail amounts for drug efits due to his good record, and mis- possession are $5,000 for people in Fresno deeds or a bad record should prejudice or Sacramento, $10,000 in Los Angeles, and only those who are guilty of them. The $25,000 in San Bernardino.58 question when application for bail is In Maryland, a bail schedule is not used and non-judicial court commissioners make bail decisions based on a number of different factors as required by legislation, including the nature/circumstance of the offense, person’s prior record, community ties, a recommendation from the State Attorney’s Office, if provided, and more.59 Therefore, individuals charged in Maryland with drug possession likely will have different money bail amounts depending on the court commissioner who processed their case. • lous counties in the U.S. showed that 64 percent of In Washington, D.C., agencies depend on various non-financial release options instead of relying on money bail. Those with a drug possession charge would likely receive a conditional release that would potentially involve supervision, drug treatment, or some other requirement to encourage the defendant’s return to court as well as to assure the safety of the community. made relates to each one’s trustworthiness to appear for trial and what security will supply reasonable assurance of his appearance.” —U.S. Supreme Court Justice Jackon Another concern for bail schedules is that, if they are required to be used, judicial discretion in the bail setting is limited. In 1951, the United States Supreme Court wrote in Stack v. Boyle that “the fixing of bail for any individual defendant must be based on standards relevant to the purpose of assuring the presence of that defendant.”61 Additionally, by depending on bail schedules, the justice system plays into the hand of the for-profit bail bonding industry, which makes a percent profit depending on the amount of the bail set. Additionally, bail schedules may distract jurisdictions from the need to use valid risk assessments and release by other options than money bail, such as a conditional release that includes monitoring and supervision. As has been shown elsewhere in the criminal justice system, the seriousness of an offense (or alleged The use of bail schedules is problematic because offense) is not on its own a proxy for risk for re- there is no definitive association between a par- offense,62 or in the case of pretrial, failure to appear. ticular accusation and the amount of money that would guarantee appearance at court (or deter future criminal activity) for that offense. Hence, the bail amounts are arbitrary and guarantee neither safety in the community nor appearance in court. 23 24 justice policy institute Money bail also poses adverse risks to those who have been charged with offenses. People without access to counsel at bail settings may receive high bail amounts that result in their detention. The liberty of people accused of offenses is at risk when money bail can be used to force a detention. interrogations, initiation of adversarial process Judicial officials can use money bail to force a detention without a conviction. judicial criminal proceedings, show-ups at or after The 1984 Bail Reform Act provided that judicial application of the Sixth Amendment, which assures officials could consider the safety of the commu- the right to an attorney, is largely neglected as many nity when setting bail. However, due to the Eighth jurisdictions “instead rely on their own sense as to Amendment which assures that bail should not be when counsel should be appointed, if at all”.65 As used excessively, many states have laws regulating of 2011, only ten states and the District of Columbia the use of pretrial detention except when setting provided for indigent access to counsel at initial ap- bail for capital offenses. As a result, many judicial pearance before a judicial official and ten states had officials who consider a person a threat to the com- no provisions for indigent defense at this stage in munity may circumvent laws against pretrial deten- pretrial proceedings. The remaining 30 states pro- tion and instead assign a very high money bail that vided indigent access to counsel that varied among they believe a defendant will not be able to pay. different jurisdictions.66 The concern with the rise Since 1963, a number of court rulings provide for access to counsel at various stages prior to a criminal trial, including the following: custodial and without regard to involvement of the prosecutor, critical stages pretrial, including preliminary hearings, lineups at or after initiation of adversary initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedings, arraignment, and plea negotiations.64 Yet, the This means that despite the laws regulating detention of individuals prior to conviction, bail can now tive options, and more, that could keep people who “If you get locked up for 100 pieces of crack, that doesn’t mean you are Pablo Escobar. If I’m walking around with 100 pieces of crack, that’s $1,000. That means I’m a petty hustler. So if I got caught with $1,000, why would you charge me $250,000 to get out on bail? I might have put all my money there and then got locked up, so that’s all I have. How can I afford that if I only have $1,000? You’re charging me $249,000 more than I have.” might cause further harm in detention without de- –travon alston, community member be used as a way to keep a person from being able to leave jail. This coercive way of keeping people in “preventive detention” not only violates rights to liberty, but it also does not guarantee safety. The way that preventive detention is currently administered in many jurisdictions, i.e., without a valid risk assessment or other standardized way of processing people accused of offenses, is not proven to be effective nor grounded on a solid theoretical basis.63 However, little research has been done to measure the impact of preventive detention that is conducted in a standardized, meaningful way, including objective assessments, consideration of less restric- pending on financial means to keep them there. B A IL FA IL in the use of money bail is that liberty is granted to Office and $83 million for prosecutors across Mary- those who can afford to pay bail or those who can land.71 Three months later in April, 2012, the ruling pay a percentage to a bondsman, should they find a was amended to require legal representation only bondsman willing to take their case. at the second bail hearing, if held, when an actual A primary barrier to ensuring access to counsel at judge would review the first bail decision. the bail setting is that states and jurisdictions lack “Conservation of resources” now trumps constitu- the financial resources to staff the number of public tionally guaranteed court proceedings so much so defenders needed at this stage. 67 Recent develop- that “each pretrial step will explicitly tolerate a mod- ments in the state of Maryland provide a good est amount of error”.72 However, these errors lead to example of the challenges that may be encountered: high bail amounts, unnecessary detention, and a cost- In Baltimore, Maryland, an 18-month pilot project ly pretrial system that communities cannot sustain. where law students provided legal counsel at bail In at least one state—the state of Oklahoma—the use setting for 4,000 indigent or low-income defendants of money bail can lead to people not being able to get charged with nonviolent offenses showed positive legal representation for their case. Essentially, people benefits. The outcomes of this project revealed that of low income must chose between paying or getting representation by legal counsel led to 2.5 times help to pay for their money bond or getting a public more releases on recognizance when compared to defender. The statute currently on the books states defendants without representation. If money bail that anyone who pays a money bond or gets some- was used, legal representation led to bail amounts one to pay the money bond on their behalf (whether that were affordable for the defendant. Further- that be a for-profit bail bondman or family members) more, legal counselors were able to provide judicial subsequently will not meet the criteria for “indigent” officers with information and clarifying details and thus will not be provided a defense attorney.73 without putting people accused of offenses at risk of making incriminating remarks. Counselors were able to effectively advocate for the defendants’ trustworthiness and ties to the community without putting his or her employment, loved ones, or housing in jeopardy68 while increasing the number An inability to pay the money bail may coerce people to plead guilty so that they can get out of jail sooner despite being innocent. of defendants released on recognizance. Due to the People detained due to money bail are put under project’s impacts, researchers concluded that the greater pressure to enter a plea bargain, which has become the de facto standard in resolving more than lack of representation at the first bail setting was the leading reason for lengthy pretrial detention. 69 The Maryland Court of Appeals decided in January of 2012, in Dewolfe v. Richmond, that public defenders should provide legal representation at the first bail setting. However, the public defender’s office could not bear the burden of the additional 108,000 hearings added to their workload through this unfunded mandate.70 Compliance would reportedly require an additional $28 million for the Public Defenders’ 95 percent of cases each year. Prosecutors are often overburdened with the expectations and demands of their position along with massive caseloads. Prosecutors can and often do ask judges for pretrial detention as leverage in plea-bargaining discussions with people of limited financial resources. People with children at home, a job or housing at stake, or a desire to avoid the hard conditions of jail could be and have been coerced into entering a guilty plea to avoid pretrial detention, particularly 25 26 justice policy institute if the time they have already spent will count remains unaccounted for in the community and has toward the prospective sentence. This not only not been held responsible for his or her actions. The fulfills the prosecutor’s mission of closing another high faulty conviction rate also skews research that case with a “win”, but it enables the criminal jus- seeks to determine or predict which individuals may tice system to function. Should a greater number be at risk for committing future crimes or harming of people seek to maintain their innocence through the community. Instead, researchers are just getting a jury trial, the criminal justice system would not a good idea of which people are more likely to plead have the capacity to bear the case loads.75 Obtain- guilty regardless of their guilt or innocence. 74 ing quick plea bargains keeps the system moving; consequently, conviction rates may be high, but justice is not necessarily served. The fact that first time defendants are convicted and sentenced more harshly than those with previous convictions82 affirms that there is a problem with “We see clients at arraignment not this procedure of obtaining convictions. All of these wanting to plea, saying they want to examples show how pretrial detention is wielded fight their case. Then they hear the bail to serve purposes other than assuring court appear- that the prosecutor is going to ask for, ance and safety of the community. This is an abuse and they’ll turn to their defense lawyer of power that leads to wasteful use of taxpayer dol- and say, ‘I’ll take the plea’.” lars, unfair treatment of individuals based on finan- —Robin Steinberg, Bronx Defenders.76 cial resources, and violations of constitutional rights. Conviction rates for people charged with felonies stood at 68 percent in 2006 with 96 percent of those convictions a result of guilty pleas. Only 3 percent of those cases actually went to trial.77 This high rate of guilty pleas is of concern because people often will plead guilty despite their innocence. A 2012 study suggested that in an effort to avoid the ominous maximum penalties of a potential conviction in an inherently coercive78 and unfamiliar system, more than 50 percent of innocent defendants pled guilty to get a lower sentence rather than risk a conviction, albeit faulty, that would lead to the maximum penalty.79 This means that in 2006, over 16,875 people could have been wrongly convicted.80 Particularly in the face of mandatory minimum sentencing rules, people have a strong incentive to take a “lesser” deal from a prosecutor if they fear the defense (which may be an overburdened public However, many are in a position to recognize their power in reducing the burden on the criminal justice system by approaching prosecution with system outcomes in mind. For example, prosecutors in Kings County, New York, established a re-entry program to reduce the number of repeat offenders they encounter in their work. The emerging role of the “21st century prosecutor” is primarily to ensure public safety, which is expected to include safeguarding civil liberties, enhance capacity through community collaborations, ensure justice is served, and hold the public’s trust.83 Prosecutors who understand and support pretrial policies and practices that have been proven defender) will not be able to prove their innocence.81 more effective than Plea bargains can greatly compromise the safety of ing their communities communities. For every person that falsely pleads a tremendous service. guilty, the person who truly committed the offense money bail will be do- ONLY 3% of felony and misdemeanor cases went to trial in 2006. B A IL FA IL part 5 Effective Alternatives to Money Bail There are alternatives to money bail that improve outcomes for people awaiting trial and the community. Public opinion shows support for diverting public resources into more effective strategies rather than simply locking up people unnecessarily. A Pew Center on the States study showed that impacts of money bail on low-income popula- 84 percent of surveyed American voters believed tions while safely decreasing the number people that community-based programs could be bet- held in pretrial detention. ter used instead of relying on incarceration for people convicted of low-level, nonviolent offenses.84 A study of people in a large, Southern metropolitan area showed that 60 percent believed that writing a citation would be preferred over arresting a person for a low-level, nonviolent Valid risk assessments can provide risk-supported decisionmaking and eliminate the need for money bail. charge. They also supported the idea of releasing Although the use of pretrial risk assessments is in- people to pretrial supervision over requiring a tuitive and has the foundation of more than 30 years money bond or releasing on recognizance alone.85 of research, the practice of assessing risk in deter- There are a number of strategies, many of which mining pretrial release and bail setting is not com- are highlighted below, that reduce the negative monplace. Field experts estimate that only about 85 jurisdictions in the U.S. are using a validated risk assessment in their pretrial release determinations.86 However, the use of valid risk assessments and release options other than money bail is crucial for reducing the number of people held in jail while awaiting their court date while assuring safety in the community. Risk assessments support the release of people who can safely remain in the community pretrial (with or without additional conditions), and provide insight 27 28 justice policy institute Tyriel Simms It’s not easy to stay out of trouble in Baltimore City. Even the best of us end up in trouble. I have an extensive arrest history, but I do not have an extensive conviction rate. That’s normal for living in Baltimore City. It’s normal to be arrested for something that you didn’t do, to be looked at as a problem. It’s normal to be in the wrong place at the wrong time, which is everywhere. And it’s normal for guys to accept convictions for things that they didn’t do. People want to go home, and they can’t afford proper representation. So they get the public defender. How does he represent you? You probably never met him until your court date. Probably didn’t review your file until that morning. He doesn’t know your name, and then you go to court, and he’s asking you what you are going to do. You’re saying, “I’m innocent. I’m fighting this to the end. I really didn’t do this.” And he’s like, “This is the state’s offer.” I have broken the law, but I would say 80% of my arrest history has been for something I didn’t do. Of course I took the pleas. By the time you go in front of this judge, he’s had 20 cases of the same charge. How different do you look? You’d be surprised what a zip code can do to you in court. 21230 is a profile zip code. “Where does he live? 21230? Get him out of here.” And then you are taking a plea to get out of the city jail, which is the worst place ever to be. The last time I was arrested, I was initially offered $150,000 bail, and then the judge changed it to no bail because he was in a bad mood. He said that. They say whatever they want to say to us. The toughest guy, the most confident person, is broken down in front of these judges, because they have the power to use that pen. It’s not a sword; it’s a nuclear bomb. They could ruin your life at any time, and you have to put in the work time and money to get it back. You’ll be surprised how many guys come home after doing 80 percent of a 25-year sentence in the law library trying to find out their innocence. You have to put all those years in just to prove that you’re innocent. You have to prove that yourself. A guy might need $500 to get home, and he might not be able to afford that. And he might be innocent. “ “ Community Member If you are to give someone bail, some of the guidelines need to be changed. It might need to be based on your house or income or something of that sort. They have some pretrial opportunities that I have heard of. I think that they might be able to go home, for pretrial home detention. But, that standard is the highest. I’ve applied for it almost every time, and I have never gotten pretrial home detention. For some of the pettier charges, like simple possession charges, why wouldn’t they be allowed to come home and be put in a work program? Or make them do some type of volunteer work. At least give them a step forward in some kind of way. B A IL FA IL into the possible need to detain people who may pose a safety or flight risk. Few states have codified the use of risk assessments, but more are beginning to implement the use of these tools. Risk assessments are tools that, when used properly, can provide a dependable prediction of whether a person will be involved in pretrial misconduct, whether by failure to appear in court or being a danger to the community. Typically in the form of an electronic or paper survey, risk assessments provide a way to make an objective assessment of the person being charged with an offense while minimizing any possible bias on the part of the interviewer. The assessment findings provide a classification, usually “low risk”, “moderate risk”, or “high risk,” which aid in determining the most appropriate form of bail and pretrial supervision.87 PAGE CROYDER, Case Manager at Baltimore Outreach Services; Former Baltimore City Prosecutor To me, the harder cases are the non-violent cases. If you have a guy going into McDonald’s with a gun and robbing people, I’d be hard-pressed to say that person should be released pending trial. And yet those people are given bails. For non-violent crimes, we could make greater use of home detention enforced with electronic monitoring, daily reporting to somebody, and so forth. Instead of setting a bail, maybe the alternative is, you’re confined to your house and you have to wear this bracelet. That’s much better than locking somebody up. population not only supports the use of risk as- The really hard decisions are not in the bail amounts, but in who is what kind of risk. As a system, we have almost stopped thinking about that, sessments in bail determinations but also believes when it should be the first focus of bail reform. Opinions research shows that the general U.S. that risk assessments are routinely used. The public expects that such a practical tool would be used in determining bail.88 Several states are using validated risk assessments or are conducting the research needed to have the The reluctance to implement risk assessments appropriate tool in place. Although several factors broadly may stem from an incomplete understand- are consistently valid across different localities, it is ing of their proper role and use. Some professionals still important that each state evaluate its risk as- in the field express concern that risk assessments sessment to ensure each factor is accurately predict- may not account for the individual case character- ing pretrial conduct within the parameters of that istics that they believe will affect pretrial outcomes. state’s laws and environment. However, years of risk assessment studies have confirmed a number of factors that consistently predict pretrial misconduct across a variety of charge types and localities. This means that the risk assessments which are validated, meaning tested for accuracy for each jurisdiction, can provide reliable information for pretrial decisions. This information can be used to increase objectivity in the pretrial decision-making process and serve as a tool to move away from financial bail in favor of appropriate pretrial supervision. VIRGINIA: Development of the Virginia Pretrial Risk Assessment Instrument (VPRAI) began in 1998 and by 2005, the state had implemented it in all pretrial service agencies. In 2007, a validation study was conducted on the tool showing that it appropriately categorized people charged with offenses by risk level and accurately predicted pretrial behavior. Additionally, this study revealed that measuring “outstanding warrants” did not improve the accuracy of the tool so the list of factors assessed was reduced to the following: primary charge type, 29 30 justice policy institute The Bail Reform Act of 1966 provided 9 criteria to be included in pretrial risk assessments: 1. Nature and circumstance of the offense 2. Weight of evidence 3. Family ties pending charge(s), criminal history, two or more failures to appear, two or more violent convictions, length at current residence, employed/primary caregiver, and history of drug abuse. Florida: In 2011, six counties participated in the validation of a pretrial risk assessment tool based on the Virginia Pretrial Risk Assessment Instru- 4. Employment ment. This study showed positive results in catego- 5. Financial resources rizing defendants appropriately for pretrial release. 6. Character and mental condition The success rate (defined by court appearance and no re-arrest for new charges) was at 87%. The re- 7. Length of time at current residence sults showed that this tool is likely to be effective 8. Record of convictions in other counties in Florida and efforts to broaden 9. Appearance record at court proceedings implementation are underway. Kentucky: Since 1976, it has been illegal to post Barry Mahoney, and others, “Pretrial Services Programs: Responsibilities and Potential,” National Institute of Justice: Issue and Practices, March 2001 a bond for profit on behalf of a defendant in Kentucky.89 In 2009, the state of Kentucky validated an instrument that had been in use for years. This tool was edited to include only the most predic- Risk assessment factors validated by multiple studies: tive factors resulting in a twelve item Yes/No checklist with weighted questions allowing a sim- 1. Prior failure-to-appear ple capture of information indicative of a person’s 2. Prior convictions behavior on release while awaiting trial. 3. Present charge a felony Risk assessments should be conducted as soon as 4. Being unemployed possible after arrest to capture the most accurate 5. History of drug abuse 6. Having a pending case Other factors supported by research: information.90 They also show that conditions for release must be carefully applied, particularly to low-risk populations. (More on this is provided in the Conditional Release paragraph below.) Risk assessments that are pages in length and/or require 1. Active community supervision at time of arrest lengthy training or certification to be used will not 2. History of violence be a practical solution for pretrial assessment needs 3. Residence stability in most areas. Some jurisdictions also utilize risk assessments developed for predicting behavior of a 4. Community ties person leaving prison on probation or parole. It is 5. Caregiver responsibilities important to recognize the differences in the situ- Cynthia Mamalian, “State of the Science of Pretrial Risk Assessment,” Pretrial Justice Institute, March 2011; Marie VanNostrand and Kenneth Rose, “Pretrial Risk Assessment in Virginia: The Virginia Pretrial Risk Assessment Instrument,” May 2009. ations and populations being assessed and understand that risk assessments intended for re-entry will not predict with the same accuracy the behavior of those awaiting trial. B A IL FA IL The use of citations instead of arresting and transporting individuals to be booked at a facility can provide a cost-savings to the community. Many people can be safely released in the community on their own recognizance while awaiting trial. The use of citations has been recommended since risk generally complete the pretrial process success- the 1920’s to reduce arrests and subsequent de- fully by attending their hearings and not having pendence on bail bondsmen. Current models any incidence of re-arrest. They also are more likely using citations include a risk assessment compo- to complete the pretrial process successfully by nent (either completed by the police officer or a not having additional court-ordered expectations pretrial services agency), which allows officers to placed on them92 as they are already attending to confirm that the individual would be an appropri- other responsibilities. This means there is a large ate candidate for a citation versus going through proportion of people accused of offenses that can the booking process at a jail. Technology allowing be released on their own recognizance and trusted for fingerprinting and positive identification of to comply with pretrial requirements of attending people charged is now available to assist law en- court and avoiding re-arrest. forcement officers in this practice. At this time, the state of Kentucky has codified the use of citations and is currently in the process of releasing their jurisdictions that have begun to increase the use of citations include Maryland and the District of Columbia. A 2012 survey found public support for fenses as seen in the following graph:91 Percent of respondents totally in support of citations 60% People rating higher on the risk assessments generally are not as likely to be released on recognizance and usually are left with the only option of evaluation findings for this intervention. Other citations in lieu of arrest for various types of of- Risk assessment studies show that those rated low- posting a money bail (either by posting their own cash or acquiring the services of a for-profit bondsman). However, the irony is that those who have no financial support rate higher on the risk assessment and, hence, are more likely to be required to post a money bond in order to be released pretrial. Support is strong for giving citations instead of arresting and booking for some offenses. 54% 50% 51% 46% 46% 44% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0 Possession of small amounts of marijuana Reckless driving Driving with no operator's license Driving while license is revoked Disorderly conduct 31 32 justice policy institute One study revealed that those with financial sup- are already attending to other responsibilities. port were almost two times more likely to be re- Conditions are generally more useful for people leased on recognizance and having a high school who score at high risk on their risk assessment; degree provided a greater chance of being released however, judicial officers should also take care on recognizance. to place requirements that match the needs of 93 One of the negative pretrial outcomes that judicial officers are trying to avoid is failure to appear in court as this disrupts already overbooked court schedules. However, many missed court appearances are not due to flight but simple interruptions to life. Common reasons given for missing a hearing include forgetfulness, over- the person accused of the offense.97 For example, an individual without substance abuse problems or a history of substance abuse may not need to be required to undergo alcohol testing; adding such an unneeded condition could cause an unnecessary technical violation should the defendant forget to show up for a screening. sleeping, starting a new job, being told the wrong The voice of the victim advocates community court room, and needing to take a family mem- should be included when formulating conditions ber to the doctor. Recognizing these issues may to ensure that no further harm is done. Particu- help lessen the severity of a missed court appear- larly in cases of domestic violence, the intimate ance and encourage the use of this cost-effective partner/spouse may provide a perspective that release mechanism. is not intuitive but safer if a person charged with 94 domestic violence is released. For example, defen- Conditional release can expand the pool of people who may be safely released while awaiting trial. dants in domestic violence cases are often released When used in conjunction with a valid risk as- have the accused person in the household, resum- sessment, judicial officers may safely release ing a level of responsibility, rather than outside some people with conditions that will ensure the home and cut off from all communication. At return to court and safety in the community. times, a victim may feel safer to have the lines of Common conditions used by judicial officers communication open. These types of consider- include alcohol and/or drug testing, holding ations may not be obvious to someone who has or getting a job, working towards a diploma or not experienced domestic violence or worked with degree, curfews, no contact with victims and/ victims of violence, so it is important that victims or witnesses,95 and remaining under the super- and victim advocates have a role in the pretrial vision of a family member, community service release decision-making process.98 on the condition of no contact; however, at times, a no-contact order may exacerbate the situation. There may be times where a victim would rather organization, or pretrial services agency. However, judicial officers should take precautions to match the conditions with the level of risk determined by the risk assessment. Placing inappropriate or unnecessary conditions on people with low risk ratings, such as drug testing or additional supervision, results in higher failure Effective pretrial service agencies can provide the risk assessment and supervision needed to monitor defendants as needed prior to their court date. rates.96 It is recommended that minimal condi- Pretrial service agencies have a demonstrated re- tions be placed on people who pose less risk and cord of reducing pretrial jail populations, assuring B A IL FA IL appearance at court, and maintaining safe behavior and 738 fewer people were held in pretrial deten- among their clients. This is accomplished by pro- tion. An increase of 12 percent of people were viding three main services: risk assessment, bail released on non-financial bail options, such as recommendations, and supervision. Most pretrial ROR, and the number of people held because service agencies have an assessment tool they will they were unable to make bail dropped from 34 administer to determine risk for failing to appear to 25 percent. While the release rate of high-risk at court and engaging in illegal behavior while defendants remained steady, release of low and awaiting trial. Usually under very strict time medium risk defendants increased to 84 percent constraints, pretrial agency staff members will and 66 percent, respectively. Despite the increase conduct a fact finding to assure the information in releases, the appearance rate rose slightly from gathered from all parties is true. They will then 90 to 92 percent and the public safety rate (those make recommendations to judicial officers regard- not charged with a new offense) rose from 90 to ing the best bail decision for the person accused of 94 percent. Kentucky’s pretrial service agencies an offense. If the person is released under a condi- received an additional 1,285 referrals while seeing tion of pretrial service supervision, the pretrial a 14 percent decrease in arrest among people un- service agency will then provide the supervision der their supevision.100 services as needed in accordance to the risk assessment findings. Another component of services that some pretrial service agencies provide (that will not be examined here) are diversion programs in which people agree to undergo programming Court notifications are an effective way to ensure people appear for the court hearings. in exchange for having their record cleared of People in the community who have trials pending their charge. Not all pretrial service agencies pro- may miss their court date for myriad reasons that vide diversion programs. are unrelated to an unwillingness to appear, rang- As of 2011, less than a third of the 3,007 counties in the U.S. are served by about 300 pretrial service agencies.99 However, effective pretrial service agencies have been safely saving jurisdictions money since the 1960s by reducing the need to house people in jail and effectively monitoring them in the community prior to trial. One state to embrace pretrial services and ban commercial bail is the state of Kentucky. This state has recently expanded their pretrial service capacity through passage of the 2011 Penal Code and Controlled Substances Act. This legislation provided for increased pretrial release of people accused of offenses, as well as, increased use of citations ing from lack of transportation, uncertainty about the criminal court process, or just plain forgetfulness. Pretrial service agencies have been effective in reducing the number of failure to appears (FTAs) for people under its supervision, but for the thousands of people who are released pretrial without pretrials supervision, FTAs may still be a challenge without a reminder of a court date. People who are incarcerated because they failed to appear to court are not generally considered to be a risk to public safety and keeping them in detention is a drain of public resources. Other localities who have implemented court date notification systems show promising results in reducing FTAs. rather than arrests for misdemeanor charges. In general, court notification systems have been Preliminary results show that over 17,000 fewer proven to reduce FTAs and save thousands in tax cases were processed when compared to previous expenditures.101 FTAs require a substantial amount year case numbers (due to increased citations) of paperwork, and add an extra burden to local 33 34 JUSTICE POLICY I NSTI TUTE law enforcement of detaining those with warrants, by 52 percent, from 23 percent to 11 percent. overcrowding jails and increasing the daily cost it In 2010, program specialists made over 16,000 takes to care for persons in jail.102 Implementing a calls, 75 percent (over 12,000) of which were court date notification system can help reduce fail- considered successful. For successful calls, the ure to appear rates, saving resources and reducing average FTA rate for the year was 8.13 percent, the number of people incarcerated. never exceeding 10 percent. For unsuccessful calls, the average FTA rate was 27 percent.103 Two forms of court notification systems are currently utilized by some jurisdictions—personal Automated systems can provide automated phone respondent systems and automated systems. Per- calls, text messages, and emails for a large num- sonal respondent systems can provide more in- ber of people in a short period of time and do not formation to defendants than automated systems. require too much staff time. With these systems, They can answer questions, saving both defendants localities frequently contract out to private compa- and court clerks’ time. These systems can be more nies to provide a computerized telephone notifica- expensive than automated systems as they require tion system. Fees for automated calling depend on more administrative staff time. the vendor selected, and may be on a per call basis • In Baltimore County, according to the Maryland Association of Local Management • At about 12 cents per call, the Miami County, Boards’ FY 2008 annual report, the Respon- Ohio Municipal Court has reduced FTAs from dent Notification Program of just one full around 30 FTAs to 5 FTAs per week.104 time staff improved court appearance rates by 15 percent (from 40 percent to 55 percent). FTA writ admissions between October 2007 and April 2008 were down by 45.4 percent when compared to the same time period one year earlier. Additionally, overall secure detention admissions between October 2007 and April 2008 were also down by 22.8 percent when compared to the same time period one year earlier. • or a monthly contract. The Sheriff’s Office of Jefferson County, Colorado, has two fulltime employees dedicated to the court notification program, and they make about 50-100 calls a day. Weekly dockets are around 260-270 per week, and all people are called, except for those with counsel. In the first six months of the program, it reduced the FTA rate of the targeted population • The Los Angeles County Traffic Court’s automated program calls people three days in advance of their traffic court appearances, making an average of 700 calls per night. Since the system went live at the end of March 2009, traffic court failure to appear rates have declined 20 percent resulting in significant operational cost savings for Los Angeles Superior Court at a time when cost savings are critical to the Court’s continued operation. B A IL FA IL • Multnomah County, Oregon Circuit Court’s automated system calls people up to three times before each hearing and a 30-second, pre-recorded message reminds them of the time, date and location of their court hearings. In two years, FTAs in Multnomah County dropped from 29 to 16 percent, representing a nearly 45 percent decrease in the number of people who did not show up for court. The program, which was allotted $40,000 in funding when launched in 2005, is estimated to save up to $6.4 million worth of staff time each year. In 2007 alone, the program saved Multnomah County $1.6 million by reducing FTAs.105 Several other jurisdictions have reported dra- MEASURES OF PRETRIAL DETENTION SHOULD BE IMPLEMENTED TO PROVIDE NATIONAL MEASUREMENTS OF OUR PRETRIAL PROCESSES AND DRIVE PRETRIAL REFORM EFFORTS. “Considered in isolation, each shift away from accuracy [in pretrial proceedings] is defensible, but collectively the result is troubling.” —Andrew D. Leipold108 matic reductions in FTAs due to court notifica- Because national data for measures of pretrial per- tion programs or pilots including Araphaoe formance and outcomes are not collected, it is dif- County, Colorado which saw a reduction in ficult to understand how pretrial processes affect FTAs from 21.4 percent to 9.9 percent in its the system, develop meaningful policy to drive county court and from 9.0 percent to 3.5 percent change and protect effective services already in in its district court due to its personal respon- existence. The Bail Reform Act of 1966 was driven dent system. 106 Due to funding ending in 2011, largely by the compelling results of program pi- they have continued to function with volunteers lots and interventions implemented in New York making calls to defendants prior to their court City and elsewhere in the U.S. Consistent progress date. Fourteen counties in Nebraska piloted a toward effective, safe, and fair pretrial policies, notification program that used mailed post-cards however, will depend on a better understanding to remind defendants of court dates and saw a of the state of pretrial issues on a regular basis. reduction of FTAs from 12.6 percent to Gathering information for performance measures 9.7 percent. is not an exercise in data collection but a way to 107 begin codifying beneficial policies that are not driven by for-profit interests but benefit U.S. resi- A court notification dents through efficient use of taxpayer dollars and program in Multnomah improved safety. Items that should be reported failure to appear rates by number of risk assessment interviews, rationales County, OR, reduced 45% in two years. on a national level include number of bookings, for who is and is not assessed for risk, number of release by type of release (financial versus nonfinancial options), and average length of stay of people in pretrial, held in detention or released prior to their hearing. 35 justice policy institute Darian Watson “ Community Member I was in jail for one year before my trial. The first thing I remember is getting off the paddy wagon and then the handcuffs being put on you. That’s an experience in itself. The second thing I would say would be the whole routine, the strip search thing. That can be humiliating, stripping down in front of a bunch of guys; then, being put in solitary. It varies for different people, but for me, it was sixteen hours alone. I guess that was the procedure at the time, but I wouldn’t really know any better anyway—I was young. That was my first time going through the adult system, but I was still seventeen. Then I was placed on juvenile intake detail. This is the time when they give you your first phone call. That was pretty much it for that first actual day. I saw the bail commissioner when I was in that holding cell. There was no bail. So I was there for an entire year after that. As soon as I knew that I was denied bail, it just set in: well, you’re not going anywhere. No chance. It was really devastating for my immediate family, and especially traumatic for my mother. There was no hope of me getting out and my parents pretty much had the same attitude. I saw my family maybe once or twice a week, if that, and only if the jail wasn’t on lockdown. It would have been better if I had been released with some kind of supervision. You know, not just let me out to do what I please, but have restrictions placed on me, like home detention. That would have been better for both me and my family, and other aspects of my life. You know, being able to interact with my family, be in their physical presence and assure them that I’m okay all while still being able to attend school regularly. I think there should be a more defined measure for how they determine who gets bail. And if possible, it shouldn’t just be one judge who primarily handles all the bail decisions. That’s a lot for one person to handle, especially if all they are doing is handling bail cases all day long. Me, personally, I didn’t have any legal counsel at the time. You should have some legal counsel when you approach your first bail hearing instead of just representing yourself. Everybody should be entitled to that, and even if you have a lawyer, there should still be one on standby in case your lawyer is not able to make it. If you are up there alone, you are going to get a whole lot of lip. You are as lonely as an island down there. “ 36 B A IL FA IL National pretrial detention is currently captured in a way that is neither useful to the U.S. nor amenable to comparisons with other nations. Currently, no data is being collected in a standardized way regarding pretrial detention across the nation for both misdemeanors and felonies. Specific and consistent data on national indicators of pretrial detention are needed to better inform the United States’ status in pretrial services on a yearly basis. Although some data is collected through the State Court Processing Statistics project, this data comes from only the 75 most populous counties and usually is not published until many years after it is collected. It also focuses on felony cases, precluding an understanding of the impact of misdemeanors on the pretrial process as a whole. At this time, the information available about pretrial populations is usually in the form of a percentage that the large number of people incarcerated in the U.S. minimizes the segment of that population that is held while awaiting trial and masks the magnitude of people affected by pretrial detention. Better measures to track pretrial detention should be crafted to provide a more nuanced understanding of the United States’ pretrial population and provide a platform for meaningful reform. In addition to measuring the size of the population in the pretrial process, a national measurement of how long people are in the pretrial process is also important. Even if there are few people in pretrial detention, if their length of stay is exorbitant, then their Eighth Amendment rights could be violated. Some realistic recommendations for measuring pretrial detention include:110 VOLUME INDICATORS—Measuring the magnitude of the population affected: • numbers. of the prison population. Using population percentages (such as the statistic that 60 percent of the jail • of pretrial detention as the real meaning can be Measure the pretrial population using rates per 100,000 in the general population. population is currently held pretrial) does not effectively communicate the problems or successes Measure the pretrial population using raw • Measure the pretrial population using rates per total incarcerated population. masked in changes to the overall national population and changes to the general prison population.109 DURATION INDICATORS—Measuring how long For example, the United States in 2009 was reported people in pretrial are affected: to have 21 percent of its prison populations in pretrial detention, meaning they were unsentenced. Other • will provide an average time spent from arrest countries reported having the pretrial populations to conviction by the pretrial population. While of their prisons as high as 69–97 percent. When rely- handy for quick estimates, this number can be ing on these numbers, it looks like the U.S. is doing easily skewed by a handful of cases of espe- a good job managing its pretrial populations. How- cially lengthy detention. ever, when considering the total number of people held pretrial compared to the general population, it is apparent that the U.S. held many more people in jail pretrial than other countries. The U.S. held 158 people pretrial per 100,000 incarcerated people while other countries held from 19 to 97 people pretrial per 100,000 incarcerated people. This shows Measure of the mean time spent pretrial—this • Measure the median time spent pretrial per person—this will provide the amount of time spent by at least 50 percent of the population pretrial. This number will better explain extent of people impacted by pretrial detention. 111 37 38 justice policy institute Current pretrial data does not provide clarity around the different populations being held in detention. Jurisdictions can improve their data by clarify- Measurement of pretrial outcome and performance indicators could reveal effective pretrial service agency practices and areas for improvement. ing the proportion of their population that is held Despite the billions of taxpayer dollars spent on pretrial but not eligible for release due to factors, pretrial detention, there are no national indicators in such as having another case pending, etc. A good place to measure the impact of pretrial release and example is evident in the pretrial population at the pretrial supervision on the justice system. Although Los Angeles County Jail. About 70 percent of the pretrial service agencies should be protected from population in this jail is held pretrial and advocates unreasonable and unrealistic demands for reporting, use this number to estimate the cost-savings of there are measures that can be used to reveal effective potential pretrial services. However, in reality, 25 practice and areas for improvement. Accurate and percent of the L.A. County Jail pretrial population complete data collection can also help protect pre- is sentenced on previous charges and have at least trial services from unfounded criticism. In 2010, the one pending charge. An additional 11 percent are National Institute of Corrections’ Pretrial Executive held without bail. This means that only about 34 Network developed and published a list of suggested percent of those in L.A. County Jail are eligible for performance and outcome indicators to guide pretrial release under current statutes. agencies in collecting data that could be aggregated 112 Clarity is needed regarding the pretrial population held in “hold” categories, such as people in detention due to a violation of probation or parole, people in the Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detention system, people awaiting extradition to other jurisdictions, and people held in jails for the U.S. Marshals Service, to name a few. These situations may disqualify a person from pretrial release; so including these cases in the overall pretrial population may lead to inaccurate estimates regarding potential release and cost-savings. People who have had their probation or parole revoked pose additional considerations as their situation into a national dataset. Their objective was to provide a framework that would help agencies in gathering the data needed to evaluate their performance against organizational goals and justice system expectations. With consideration of the agencies’ limited resources, steps should be taken to standardize the data collection of these indicators so that the system can prove its merit and benefit to society. These indicators were developed to be in compliance with existing national pretrial release standards (American Bar Association’s Criminal Justice Standards on Pretrial Release 2002, National Association of Pretrial Service Agencies’ Standards on Pretrial Release 2004).113 will differ depending on whether their arrest was Considering the for-profit bail industry’s role in due to a technical violation or a new charge. jail populations and having such an important role in determining who is released or detained, private bail bonding companies should be required to report on similar indicators. Particularly since for-profit bail bonding companies are only concerned with failures to appear, it is especially important to understand how well they perform on other success indicators. B A IL FA IL Suggested Outcome and Performance Measures for Pretrial Service Programs Outcome Measure Appearance Rate Safety Rate Definition The percentage of supervised defendants who make all scheduled court appearances. The percentage of supervised defendants who are not charged with a new offense during the pretrial stage. Concurrence Rate The ratio of defendants whose supervision level or detention status corresponds with their assessed risk of pretrial misconduct. Success Rate The percentage of released defendants who (1) are not revoked for technical violations of the conditions of their release, (2) appear for all scheduled court appearances, and (3) are not charged with a new offense during pretrial supervision. Pretrial Detainee Length of Stay The average length of stay in jail for pretrial detainees who are eligible by statute for pretrial release. Performance Measures Universal Screening The percentage of defendants eligible for release by statute or local court rule that the program assesses for release eligibility. Recommendation Rate The percentage of time the program follows its risk assessment criteria when recommending release or detention. Response to Defendant Conduct The frequency of policy-approved responses to compliance and noncompliance with court-ordered release conditions. Pretrial Intervention Rate The pretrial agency’s effectiveness at resolving outstanding bench warrants, arrest warrants, and capiases. Indicators as provided by “Measuring What Matters: Outcome and Performance Measures for the Pretrial Services Field,” National Institute of Corrections, August 2011. 39 40 JUSTICE POLICY I NSTI TUTE PART 6 RECOMMENDATIONS There is no reason to continue the practice of requiring money in order to be released while waiting for a case to be resolved. That this practice continues seems to be a testament to the resilience of the status quo and influence of industries that stand to gain from the use of money bail. Considering that more effective ways exist to help people through the judicial process that better serve all those involved— including the accused, victims and innocent people, low income communities and taxpayers—the use of money bail in the U.S. should be discontinued. 1. ELIMINATE MONEY BAIL. there is no use of for-profit bail bondsmen services. Some U.S. jurisdictions have all but eradicated the percent successfully complete the pretrial process use of money bail in their pretrial justice process. by appearing in court and not being rearrested.115 These jurisdictions typically have a robust pretrial services agency, validated risk assessments, and other processes in place to assure defendants return to the community safely and attend their court hearings. Case study: Washington, D.C. The Pretrial Services Agency has reported that 88 While eliminating the use of money bail may be challenging, it is possible to begin taking steps in this direction through the following: • bonding companies. • all the provisions of the Bail Reform Act of 1966. • Increase capacity to provide pretrial services that include risk assessments and supervision. Due to their extremely limited use of nonfinancial bail options, for-profit bail bonding companies, Replace bail schedules with validated risk assessments. Since 1968, the District of Columbia has had a robust pretrial services system which implements Ban the use of for-profit commercial bail • Implement a deposit bond program with the although not banned, are nonexistent since there courts. The state of Illinois implemented a is not a market for their business.114 Due to close 10 Percent Deposit Plan in 1963 in order to collaboration between the D.C. Pretrial Services eliminate the need for for-profit bail bonding Agency and law enforcement, corrections, and the companies. Although money bail is still used, judicial system, 80 percent of people charged with the 10 Percent Deposit Plan allows defendants an offense are released on nonfinancial bail options to pay the “10 percent fee”, typically paid to to await resolution of their charge while 15 per- bail bondsmen as a non-refundable fee, to the cent are kept in pretrial detention. Only 5 percent courts with the agreement that they will be are released using some form of financial bail, but liable for the full bail amount if they fail to M O N E Y B A I L A N D P E O P LE IN J A IL SPURGEON KENNEDY There’s no reason for money bail. It ought to be abolished. One of the things that I get to do occasionally is ask judges across the country why they set bail. I get some of the most inappropriate reasons that have nothing to do with why bail is supposed to be set. “Well, I know this guy is going to get probation, so I’m going to show him what the inside of a jail looks like.” Or, “I want his parents and his family to feel some pain about this.” Or, they like bail bondsmen; they’ve always set money, so why do anything different? Unfortunately, money bail is the prevalent type of release, or I should say detention, in this country. Most people in jail today are there because they cannot afford or will not post an amount of money that a judge set on them. Usually, that amount of money has absolutely nothing to do with your risk of getting back to court or being a danger to the community. One of the things that D.C. has that most jurisdictions don’t is a preventive detention statute. If you talk to judges who use money a lot, one of the things that they will tell you is, “I don’t have an alternative. There’s no other way for me to address a truly dangerous defendant.” In D.C., we’ve given judges that option. Since 1970, we’ve had laws on the books that have allowed judges to hold those defendants pretrial, by statute, if they believe that those defendants are too dangerous to be released back into the community. That detention works in two stages: first, you make the initial decision that this person qualifies for preventive detention. Second, you have what is called a preventive detention hearing, where the defense and the prosecution present their sides and the judge decides whether the defendant warrants further detention. About 15 percent of the defendants who come through our lockup here in D.C. are going to be detained pretrial by statute. So instead of a judge throwing out a cash amount and crossing his or her fingers that this is enough to keep you in jail, they have a statutory way of doing detention that respects the defendant’s due process rights. It’s taken some time to implement, but it’s a much more honest way of identifying those defendants who pose a serious threat to community safety. It’s a far more honest way of keeping them detained than money. The other 85 percent are usually released on conditions of supervision. At some point, 5,500 or 6,000 defendants are under our supervision at any given time during the year. We supervise the majority of defendants who do get released, and usually those conditions of supervision are things such as drug testing; reporting to a case manager; for those defendants who we believe pose a greater threat to “ “ DIRECTOR OF RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS, PRETRIAL SERVICES AGENCY OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA community safety, we have the options of electronic surveillance, or more reporting to case managers; we also have substance abuse treatment and mental health services connections when we assess defendants under our supervision as needed. 41 42 JUSTICE POLICY I NSTI TUTE appear or are re-arrested prior to and during harm done (for example, domestic violence issues the trial process. They are refunded this 10 will be different than financial fraud issues), a sys- percent fee, paying only a small administrative tematic consideration of victim advocates’ perspec- fee (typically 3 percent). tive or guidance may help in determining the most effective pretrial processes that will ensure safety to 2. BAN FOR-PROFIT BAIL BONDING COMPANIES. Four states have banned the involvement of forprofit, private citizen businesses in the judicial process: Kentucky, Wisconsin, Illinois, and Oregon. Around the U.S., various jurisdictions have chosen to ban bail bondsmen even if their state has not, such as Broward County, Texas,116 and Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. As money bail already presents a number of problems, the addition of a for-profit entity only serves to reinforce the practice of money bail. For-profit bail bonding companies have an interest in preserving this practice as it is the source of their income, at the expense of individuals and their families, the criminal justice system, and taxpayers. In the event that a financial release option is used, it is more just to process the bond through the court in a way that will not cause the defendant to lose a portion of that bond through fees to a forprofit bondsman. 3. INCLUDE THE VOICES OF ALL INVOLVED PARTIES TO ENSURE THAT REFORMS TO THE PRETRIAL PROCESS ARE MEANINGFUL AND EFFECTIVE. the community. Victim advocates will also be supportive in creating a more just process as victims are interested in seeing the person who actually committed the harm be held accountable. 4. EXPAND COMMUNITY EDUCATION PROGRAMS, SUCH AS THE NEIGHBORHOOD DEFENDANT RIGHTS PROGRAMS, THAT INFORM PEOPLE IN THE COMMUNITY ABOUT HOW TO NAVIGATE THE PRETRIAL PROCESS. The confusing and inherently coercive pretrial process is challenging even for those with adequate financial resources and educational background. Understanding the process, legal rights, and what to expect could help people navigate the part of the case process more successfully. This is particularly important since the portion of the process is so important to the outcomes of the case. However, many people may be susceptible to fallacies in the pretrial process since they are concerned about responsibilities outside the jail. At that point, it is difficult to estimate the collateral consequences of a criminal record beyond the immediate impact of losing a job or not being there to take care of a dependent. Informing com- As victims and their advocates provide a unique munities of this process and the implications of and critical understanding of the harm done and their decisions could reduce the number of false potential harm that could be done, it is important pleas, reduce bail amounts, and promote a better, to build them into the pretrial release decision more just pretrial process. making process. As issues differ depending on the B A IL FA IL 5. Use citations and summons to reduce the number of people being arrested and processed through jails. and many states can provide models for how to Police officers should be enabled to remain on assess defendants in those jurisdictions and to the streets doing their job by using citations and develop a practical, effective tool for everyday use. summons instead of transporting every person Once the proper tool is in place, a process for ap- arrested to a booking facility. If more information plying assessment findings into pretrial decisions is necessary to determine if release is safe, police must be implemented. Judicial officials and all par- officers, working alone or in conjunction with ties involved must be educated about the tool and pretrial service agents, can use risk assessments how it can assist in making meaningful decisions. implement this practice into a jurisdiction. Some jurisdictions are currently using risk assessments that have not been validated, which is an ineffective practice. Not only can these reduce public safety, they may also reinforce racial and ethnic biases in the system. It is vitally important to conduct validation studies to ensure that these tools accurately to safely gather the person's personal information and conviction history. 6. Use standardized, validated risk assessments to determine who to release and how to release. Every jurisdiction should invest in a validated risk 7. Implement measures of pretrial detention and release services to evaluate current programming and better inform pretrial reform efforts. assessment for their locality. Risk assessments help Currently, no data is being collected in a standard- when implementing citation programs, as well as, ized way regarding pretrial detention across the in developing optimal pretrial release determina- nation for both misdemeanors and felonies. Little is tions that benefit both the jurisdiction, the jails, and being consistently measured across the many pretri- the person charged with an offense. Before making al service agencies regarding the outcomes of their a risk assessment mainstream, it is important to services. In order to better understand the impact of ensure the risk assessment put in place is appropri- pretrial detention and how the U.S. is performing ate. Standardized, validated risk assessments are compared to other nations, national data on pretrial crucial to maintaining objectivity in the pretrial detention should be gathered from jails and prisons process. These tools produce data that provide for that hold people who are going through the court informed bail decisions and support judicial offi- process. Additionally, within reasonable expecta- cials in having a reliable, bias-free opinion driving tions, pretrial service agencies should utilize the his or her determination. Validated risk assess- measures already created to provide the public with ments are gaining popularity as judges look for a clear picture of their work and effectiveness in more objective ways to conduct the pretrial process preventing failure to appear and re-arrests. 43 44 JUSTICE POLICY I NSTI TUTE 8. FOR-PROFIT BAIL BONDING BUSINESSES SHOULD BE REQUIRED REPORT ON PRETRIAL MEASURES TO BETTER TRACK FORFEITURE RATES, FTA RATES, AND OTHER PRETRIAL PERFORMANCE AND OUTCOMES INDICATORS. For-profit bail bonding companies are responsible for the release of millions of defendants each year. At this time, there is little regulation or oversight over this crucial aspect of public safety. Due to the extensive use of money bail, some people accused of offenses are assigned money bail when a better form of pretrial release would have provided greater public safety. Bail bondsmen then exercise a tremendous amount of power over people in detention by choosing, upon factors of their own financial gain, for whom they will post a bond.117 Bondsmen also have the ability to put a person they have posted a bond for back into jail at any time, for any reason. For-profit bondsmen play a crucial part in the justice system that affects the safety to the public at large, as well as, people’s rights to liberty. Only when for-profit bail bonding companies are required to report on indicators of pretrial performance and outcomes will policymakers be able to make educated decisions around the use of bail and bail bonding as opposed to nonfinancial release options. the effectiveness of the programs. Pretrial services can assist both law enforcement and judicial officers to promote citations and appropriate bail determinations by providing risk assessment and fact-finding services. Pretrial service agencies can provide more accurate and appropriate bail recommendations to judicial officials to aid in the bail determinations that will in compliance with the law. Using the findings from their risk assessments, pretrial service agencies can provide the pretrial supervision services most appropriate for each accused person to ensure they complete the pretrial process successfully. Given that pretrial agencies may also provide other services that can help people while awaiting trial (such as treatment, job placement, etc.), longer terms outcomes of money bail versus pretrial services should be examined. Cost studies confirm that it is much more affordable to assess and monitor people in the community through pretrial services rather than keep them in a jail. In order to reduce communities’ reliance on jails, pretrial services should be expanded to allow for the safe and informed release of people awaiting trial. Several jurisdictions have fully functioning pretrial service agencies that have a proven record of success; and the Pretrial Justice Institute has provided a Pretrial Services Program Implementation Starter Kit to assist jurisdictions in planning and implementing pretrial services in their area.118 10. USE COURT NOTIFICATIONS. Through personally manned or computerized programs, reminding people about upcoming hearings 9. UTILIZE PRETRIAL SUPERVISION AGENCIES. Evidence-based practices, such as screenings with a validated risk assessment, are important to ensure has proven to reduce failure-to-appear rates. Notification systems should be a part of every court budget to ensure dollars are not spent trying to track or punish people unnecessarily. B A IL FA IL 11. Research the 13. Better utilize effectiveness of current technology to improve and proposed pretrial pretrial processes. practices to ensure the Pretrial reform is a daunting task for cities and counties operating on a stringent budget. Although activities will lead to the cost savings of pretrial reform is becoming desired outcomes. clearer, determining how to shift funds to begin or The paucity of research around the use of money bail and its impact on community safety and pretrial compliance is startling. Analyses researching the use of money bail and resulting outcomes within various groups of the population should be conducted. A few areas where a lack of research currently exists include the following, among many others: • • can be challenging. Software is now available allowing modeling of communities and interventions so that jurisdictions can test changes to their systems and estimate outcomes before actually instituting changes. Electronic software can also be used to allow risk assessments, as well as, fingerprinting and positive identification to be conducted anywhere quickly. As noted previously, electronic How do money bail outcomes differ between court notification systems can automatically re- people of different socioeconomic groups mind people of upcoming hearings to effectively Parameters within which the practice of preventive detention is effective or not effective • expand services while maintaining current systems The loss of income on the national level due to pretrial detention 12. Amend the Bail Reform Act and policies to comply with the Equal Protection Clause. Current practices allow for people to be treated differently within the criminal justice system on account of their financial status. This is believed to be a violation of the Equal Protection Clause and should be remedied. Elimination of money bail is an important step toward eliminating disparities in pretrial outcomes due to financial status. reduce failure-to-appear rates. 45 46 justice policy institute ENDNOTES 1 Timothy R. Schnacke, Michael R. Jones, and Claire M. Brooker, “The History of Bail and Pretrial Release,” Pretrial Justice Institute, September 2010. 2 Eric Holder, “Attorney General Eric Holder Speaks at the National Symposium on Pretrial Justice,” June 1, 2011, U.S. Department of Justice, http://www.justice.gov/iso/ opa/ag/speeches/2011/ag-speech-110601.html. 3 Shima Baradaran and Frank McIntyre, “Predicting Violence,” Texas Law Review, 90(2012):497-570. 4 Todd D. Minton, “Jail Inmates at Midyear 2011—Statistical Tables,” Bureau of Justice Statistics, NCJ 237961, 2012, http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/jim11st.pdf. 5 Todd Minton, 2012, 1. 17 Douglas J Klein, “The Pretrial Detention ‘Crisis’: The Causes and the Cure,” Journal of Urban and Contemporary Law, 52(1997): 14. 18 Douglas J Klein, 1997, 293. 19 Alon Harsih and Alexis Shaw, “Man Forced to Work in Prison Sues Under Anti-Slavery Amendment,” ABC News, August 10, 2012, accessed August 2012, http://abcnews. go.com/US/man-alleging-prison-labor-violated-anti-slavery-amendment/story?id=16970464#.UEoHtCK9GmI. 20 Douglas J. Klein, 1997, 294. 21 Robert F. Kennedy, “Testimony by Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy on Bail Legislation Before the Subcommittees on Constitutional Rights and Improvement in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Judiciary Committee,” Department of Justice, August 4, 1964, http://www.justice.gov/ag/rfkspeeches/1964/08-04-1964.pdf, 3. 6 Thomas H. Coen and Brian A. Reaves, “Felony Defendants in Large Urban Counties, 2002,” U.S. Department of Justice, February 2006. 22 David Berry, “The Socioeconomic Impact of Pretrial Detention: A Global Campaign for Pretrial Justice Report,” Open Society Foundation, 2011, 28. 7 Douglas Colbert, “Prosecution Without Representation,” Buffalo Law Review, 59(2):333-453, 2011, 334. 23 David Berry, 2011, 28. 24 The Abell Foundation, 2001, 25. 8 Pretrial Justice Institute, Working Document, September 2011. 9 State Court Processing Statistics data as retrieved from the Felony Defendants in Large Urban Counties reports, 1992—2006. 10 State Court Processing Statistics data as retrieved from the Felony Defendants in Large Urban Counties reports, 1992-2006. 11 Michelle Alexander, “Go to Trial: Crash the Justice System.” Opinion article, The New York Times, 2012. Accessed at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/11/opinion/sunday/ go-to-trial-crash-the-justice-system.html. 12 Jonathan Zweig, “Extraordinary Conditions of Release Under the Bail Reform Act,” Harvard Journal on Legislation, 47 (2010):556. 13 Mary T. Phillips, “Pretrial Detention and Case Outcomes, Part 2: Felony Cases,” New York City Criminal Justice Agency, Inc., March 2008. 14 Marian R. Williams, “The Effects of Pretrial Detention on Imprisonment Decisions,” Criminal Justice Review, 28(2):299-316. 15 The Abell Foundation, “The Pretrial Release Project: A Study of Maryland’s Pretrial Release and Bail System,” September 12, 2001, 11. 16 ABA Standards for Criminal Justice: Pretrial Release, 3rd Edition, 2007 25 Amanda Gullings, “The Commercial Bail Industry: Profit or Public Safety?”, Center on Juvenile and Criminal Justice, May 2012. 26 David Berry, 2011, 29. 27 Zweig, 2010, 556. 28 Zweig, 2010, 563. 29 Cornell University Law School, “Equal Protection: An Overview,”August 19, 2010, http://www.law.cornell.edu/ wex/equal_protection, accessed August 11, 2012. 30 Todd Minton, 2012, 3. 31 Estimates based on population statistics from Table 1 in Karen R. Humes, Nicholas A. Jones, and Roberto R. Ramirez, “Overview of Race and Hispanic Origin: 2010,” 2010 Census Briefs, March 2011, http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/ briefs/c2010br-02.pdf and jail population statistics from Table 6 in Todd Minton, 2012, 6. Estimates are lower than actual rates as they are based on total population statistics and not limited to adult population statistics. 32 “Judicial Proceedings Before Trial,” http://law.justia. com/constitution/us/amendment-06/17-right-to-counselin-nontrial-situations.html. 33 John Wooldredge, “Distinguishing Race Effects on PreTrial Release and Sentencing Decisions,” Justice Quarterly, 29 (2012):41-75, 54. 34 John Wooldredge, 2012, 54. B A IL FA IL 35 John Wooldredge, 2012, 54. 36 John Wooldredge, 2012, 63. 37 John Wooldredge, 2012, 67. 38 Shawn D. Bushway and Jonah B. Gelbach, “Testing for Racial Discrimination in Bail Setting Using Nonparametric Estimation of a Parametric Model,” (February 14,2012), Yale University Department of Economics Labor/Public Economics Workshop. 39 Shima Baradaran and Frank McIntyre, 2011, 24. 40 Shima Baradaran and Frank McIntyre, 2011, 24. 41 Vera Institute of Justice, “Los Angeles County Jail Overcrowding Reduction Project, Final Report: Revised,” September 2011. 42 Nastassia Walsh, “Baltimore Behind Bars: How to Reduce the Jail Population, Save Money and Improve Public Safety,” (2010), http://www.justicepolicy.org/images/upload/10-06_REP_BaltBehindBars_MD-PS-AC-RD.pdf. 54 Personal communication with Dr. Will Marling, Executive Director of the National Organization for Victim Assistance, 8/15/2012. 55 Barry Mahoney, and others, “Pretrial Services Programs: Responsibilities and Potential,” National Institute of Justice: Issue and Practices, March 2001, https://www.ncjrs. gov/pdffiles1/nij/181939.pdf, 31. 56 Thomas H. Cohen and Tracey Kyckelhahn, “Felony Defendants in Large Urban Counties, 2006,” Bureau of Justice Statistics Bulletin: State Court Processing Statistics 2006, May 2010. 57 Lindsey Carlson, “Bail Schedules: A Violation of Judicial Discretion?” Criminal Justice 26 (2011). 58 Allen Hopper, Margaret Dooley-Sammuli, and Kelli Evans, 2012, 29. 59 Maryland Rule 4-216(d)(1). 43 Jail Daily Extract, February 13, 2012, provided by Division of Pretrial Detention and Services. 60 Pretrial Justice Institute, “Pretrial Justice in America: A Survey of County Pretrial Release Policies, Practices, and Outcomes,” 2010, http://www.pretrial.org/Docs/Documents/Pretrial%20Justice%20in%20America.pdf. 44 Nastassia Walsh, 2010. 61 45 Nastassia Walsh, 2010, 13. 62 Naomi J. Freeman, “The Adam Walsh Act: A False Sense of Security or an Effective Public Policy Initiative?” Policy Review, 21(2010): 31-49. 46 Virginia Community Criminal Justice Association, “October Study: An Investigation of Defendants Detained in Virginia Jails and their Subsequent Release on Bond in October 2011,” February 15, 2012. 47 Vera Institute of Justice, 2011. 48 Vera Institute of Justice, 2011, 11. 49 Vera Institute of Justice, 2011, 11. 50 State of California, “Jail Profile Survey: 2012, 1st Quarter Survey Results,” Facilities Standards and Operations Division, Corrections Standards Authority, http:// www.bscc.ca.gov/programs-and-services/cpp/resources/ jail-profile-survey. 51 Allen Hopper, Margaret Dooley-Sammuli, and Kelli Evans, Public Safety Realignment: California at a Crossroads (California: ACLU, March 2012), http://www.aclunc.org/ realignment. 52 Alex Piquero, “Cost-Benefit Analysis for Jail Alternatives and Jail,” 2010, http://www.criminologycenter.fsu. edu/p/pdf/pretrial/Broward%20Co.%20Cost%20Benefit%20Analysis%202010.pdf. 53 Marie VanNostrand, “Alternatives to Pretrial Detention: Southern District of Iowa, A Case Study,” Federal Probation, 74(2010), http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/ FederalCourts/PPS/Fedprob/2010-12/alternatives.html. Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1. 63 Christopher Slobogin, “Preventive Detention in Europe and the United States,” Public Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Number 12-27, Law & Economics Working Paper Number 12-20; Bernard E. Harcourt, “Punitive Preventive Justice: A Critique,” Institute for Law and Economics Working Paper No. 599 (2D Series), Public Law and Legal theory Working Paper No. 386, May 2012. 64 Phyllis E. Mann, "Ethical Obligations of Indigent Defense Attorneys to Their Clients," Missouri Law Review, 75 (2010): 715-749, 732. 65 Phyllis Mann, 2010. 66 Douglas Colbert, 2011. 67 Kate Taylor, "System Overload: The Cost of Underresourcing Public Defense," The Justice Policy Institute, 2011 accessed at http://www.justicepolicy.org/uploads/justicepolicy/documents/system_overload_final.pdf . 68 DeWolfe v. Richmond, No. 34, September Term 2011. 69 Douglas Colbert, Ray Paternoster, and Shawn Bushway, “Do Attorneys Really Matter? The Empirical and Legal Case for the Right of Counsel at Bail,” Cardozo Law Review, 23(2002): 1719-1792. 70 Paul DeWolfe, "The Burden of Bail: Addressing Challenges to Indigent Defense at Bail Hearings," Open Society 47 48 justice policy institute Institute—Baltimore, Bail Forum #2, May 16, 2012. Performance%20%20Framework%20FINAL.pdf. 71 Daniel Menefee, “$28M Needed to Comply with Court Ruling, Public Defenders Says; Prosecutors Say It Will Cost Them $83M,” MarylandReporter.com, (January 27, 2012), http://marylandreporter.com/2012/01/27/28m-needed-tocomply-with-court-ruling-public-defender-says-prosecutorssay-it-will-cost-them-83m/. 84 Public Opinions Strategies and The Mellman Group, “Public Opinion on Sentencing and Corrections Policy in America,” Pew Center on the States, March 2012. 72 Andrew D. Leipold, "How the Pretrial Process Contributes to Wrongful Convictions," The American Criminal Law Review, 42(2005):1123-1165, 1128. 73 Oklahoma Indigent Defense Act, 22 O.S.2011, 1355 (Section D). 74 Barry Mahoney and others, 2001, 16. 85 Marketwise, “Charlotte-Mecklenburg 2012 Criminal Justice System Survey Presentation of Results,” Charlotte, NC, April 1, 2012. 86 Email from Cherise Burdeen, Pretrial Justice Institute, July 19th, 2012. 87 Marie VanNostrand and Kenneth J. Rose, “Pretrial Risk Assessment in Virginia: The Virginia Pretrial Risk Assessment Instrument,” VA Dept of Criminal Justice Services, 2009. 75 Michelle Alexander. “Go to Trial: Crash the Justice System,” The New York Times, 2012, accessed at http://www. nytimes.com/2012/03/11/opinion/sunday/go-to-trialcrash-the-justice-system.html. 88 This information was gathered at a preliminary findings presentation of ongoing research sponsored by the Public Welfare Foundation and conducted by Lake Research Partners in 2012. 76 Nick Pinto, “Bail is Busted: How Jail Really Works, The Village Voice, April 25, 2012, www.villagevoice. com/2012-04-25/news/bail-is-busted-new-york-jail/all/. 89 Barry Mahoney and others, 2001. 90 VanNostrand and Rose, 2009, 14. 91 Marketwise, 2012, 17. 77 State Court Processing Statistics data as retrieved from the Felony Defendants in Large Urban Counties reports, 1992—2006. 78 Q&A session of The Burden of Bail: Addressing Challenges to Indigent Defense at Bail Hearing, May 16, 2012. 79 Lucian E. Dervan and Vanessa Edkins, “The Innocent Defendant’s Dilemma: An Innovative Empirical Study of Plea Bargaining’s Innocence Problem,” Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology, 103(forthcoming 2013). 80 This estimate made by calculating 50 percent of the 65 percent of defendants who plead guilty in 2006; Thomas H. Cohen and Tracey Kyckelhahn, ”Felony Defendants in Large Urban Counties, 2006,” (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics, May, 2010). 81 Chantale Lacasse and A. Abigail Payne, “Federal Sentencing Guidelines and Mandatory Minimum Sentences: Do Defendants Bargain in the Shadow of the Judge?”, Journal of Law and Economics 42 (1999): 245; Erik Luna, “Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Provisions Under Federal Law,” (testimony delivered to the United States Sentencing Commission, May 27, 2010), http://www.cato.org/publications/ congressional-testimony/mandatory-minimum-sentencingprovisions-under-federal-law. 82 Douglas J. Klein, 1997. 83 Steven Jansen and Robert Hood, “A Framework for High Performance Prosecutorial Services,” Prosecutor’s Report III, Washington, DC: Association of Prosecuting Attorneys, 2011, http://www.apainc.org/files/DDF/APA%20High%20 92 James Austin and others, “Kentucky Pretrial Risk Assessment Instrument Validation,” Denver, CO: The JFA Institute, October 29, 2010. 93 Wooldredge, 2012. 94 Personal communication with David M. Bennett, August 29, 2012. 95 VanNostrand and Rose, 2009, 23. 96 James Austin and others, 2010. 97 Amy L. Solomon and others, “Putting Public Safety First: 13 Strategies for Successful Supervision and Reentry,” Public Safety Policy Brief, No. 7, December 2008. 98 Focus group findings from ongoing research conducted by the Justice Policy Institute, supported by the Public Welfare Foundation. 99 Laurie Robinson, “National Symposium on Pretrial Justice Panel: The Next 50 Years,” Remarks of the Assistant Attorney General, June 1, 2011, Washington, D.C., http://www. ojp.usdoj.gov/newsroom/speeches/2011/11_0601lrobinson. htm. 100 Legislative Research Commission, “Report of the 2011 Task Force on the Penal Code and Controlled Substances Act (2011 House Bill 463),” Research Memorandum No. 508, December 2011, http://www.lrc.ky.gov/lrcpubs/rm508.pdf. 101 Bureau of Justice Assistance. “Forthcoming. Pretrial Diversion in the 21st Century: A National Survey of Pretrial Diversion Programs and Practices.” Washington, D.C.: U.S. B A IL FA IL Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Assistance. 116 Shawn D. Bushway and Jonah B. Gelbach, 2011, 9. 102 Connie Clem, “69 Ways To Save Millions,” American Jails (November/December 2009): 15, www.pretrial.org/ Docs/Documents/69%20Ways%20to%20Save%20MoneyNov-Dec%202009.pdf. 117 Robert F. Kennedy, 1964, 2. 103 Jefferson County, Colorado Court Date Notification Program, FTA Pilot Project Summary, 11-9-2005, www. co.jefferson.co.us/jeffco/cjp_uploads/FTA_Pilot_Project_ Summary.pdf; correspondence with Paula Hancock, Program Specialist, Jefferson County Sheriff’s Office, April 2011. 104 Correspondence with Jim Vaughn, Court Technology Administrator, Miami County, Ohio Municipal Court, August 2011. 105 Aimee Green, “Wake-Up Call: You Are Due in Court,” The Oregonian, October 17, 2007, www.co.multnomah.or.us/ dcj/oregonlivewakeupcall101707.pdf; phone correspondence with Jennifer Sanders, n.d. 106 Arapahoe County, “Court Date Notification,” Retrieved November 2010, www.co.arapahoe.co.us/Departments/CS/JudicialServices/Court%20Date%20Notification%20Program.asp. 107 Mitchel N. Herian and Brian H. Bornstein, “Reducing Failure to Appear in Nebraska: A Field Study,” The Nebraska Lawyer (Sept. 2010), http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/cgi/ viewcontent.cgi?article=1008&context=publicpolicyfacpub. 108 Andrew D. Leipold, “How the pretrial process contributes to wrongful convictions,” The American Criminal Law Review, 42(2005), 1128. 109 Todd Fogleson and Christopher E. Stone, “Prison Exit Samples as a Source for Indicators of Pretrial Detention,” Indicators in Development Safety and Justice, Harvard Kennedy School, April 2011. 110 Todd Fogleson and Christopher E. Stone, 2011, 6. 111 Todd Fogleson and Christopher E. Stone, 2011, 6. 112 James Austin and others, “Evaluation of the Current and Future Los Angeles County Jail Population,” Denver, CO: The JFA Institute, April 10, 2012. 113 The National Institute of Corrections Pretrial Executive Network, “Outcome and Performance Measures for the Pretrial Services Field,” The U.S Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., August 2011. 114 Timothy R. Schnacke, Michael R. Jones, and Claire M. Brooker, 2010, 13. 115 Pretrial Justice Institute, “The D.C. Pretrial Services Agency: Lessons from Five Decades of Innovation and Growth,” Case Studies, 2(1), Accessed 8/25/2012, http:// www.pretrial.org/AnalysisAndResearch/CaseStudies/ Pages/default.aspx. 118 Pretrial Justice Institute, “Pretrial Services Program Implementation: A Starter Kit,” http://www.pretrial.org/ Reports/PJI%20Reports/PJI%20Pretrial%20Services%20Program%20Implementation%20A%20Starter%20Kit.pdf. 49 Contribute to the Justice Policy Institute Thank you for your interest in our work! Please consider contributing to the Justice Policy Institute – there are a number of ways to give. Your gift to JPI funds groundbreaking research, education, and awareness pieces. Your tax-deductable donation to the Justice Policy Institute allows us to continue to change the conversation around justice reform, and advance policies that promote well-being and justice for all people and communities. Gift Amount: Donate by mail: (All amounts are in U.S. dollars.) O $50 O $75 O $100 O $200 O Other Amount: $_________ Donate online or make a donation by phone at: 202.558.7974 x312 Project Support: (specify amount) If you have a particular area or policy interest that you would like to support, please contact our Development Office at: 202.558.7974 x312 or jconn@justicepolicy.org. Your Information: Title: Name: Organization: Address: City: State: Country: Zip: Phone: Email: Thank You for Supporting the Justice Policy Institute Please mail checks to us at the following address: Justice Policy Institute 1012 14th Street NW Suite 400 Washington, DC 20005 B A IL FA IL ABOUT THE AUTHOR Melissa NeaL, Senior Research Associate Dr. Melissa Neal has worked to address criminal justice issues in a number of ways, ranging from being a mentor to co-founding a not-for-profit agency providing services to families impacted by incarceration and women in prison who were preparing to re-enter the community. She also has worked as an evaluations researcher developing performance-monitoring frameworks for federal programs addressing child welfare, child abuse and neglect cases. She received a Doctorate of Public Health degree from East Tennessee State University where she studied the impact of parental incarceration on children’s educational performance. She received her undergraduate degree in Biology from Elon University in North Carolina. Acknowledgements The Justice Policy Institute’s 2012 bail-related work, including this report, was made possible by the generous support of The Public Welfare Foundation. The Justice Policy Institute (JPI) thanks the following people for generously lending their time and expertise: Tim Murray, John Clarke, Cherise Burdeen, Will Marling, Travis Alston, Tyriel Simms, Darian Watson, Page Croyder, and Spurgeon Kennedy. Many thanks to Deborrah Brodsky and David M. Bennett for reviewing the report and providing helpful feedback. Special thanks to Jean Chung who provided the Special Features included in this report during her time as an Emerson Hunger Fellow at JPI. All of her work documenting the issues of bail in Baltimore, Maryland, will be presented in a forthcoming report. JPI staff includes Paul Ashton, Spike Bradford, Jacqueline Conn, Zerline Hughes, Adwoa Masozi, Melissa Neal, Kellie Shaw, Tracy Velazquez, and Keith Wallington. 53 B A IL FA IL $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ justicepolicy.org Reducing the use of incarceration and the justice system and promote policies that improve the well‐being of all people and communities. 1012 14th Street, NW, Suite 400 Washington, DC 20005 TEL (202) 558-7974 FAX (202) 558-7978 WWW.JUSTICEPOLICY.ORG 54