Skip navigation

Brennan Center for Justice, Conviction, Imprisonment, and Lost Earnings, 2020

Download original document:
Brief thumbnail
This text is machine-read, and may contain errors. Check the original document to verify accuracy.
research report

BRENNAN

CENTER
FOR JUSTICE

Conviction,
Imprisonment,
and Lost
Earnings
How Involvement with the Criminal Justice
System Deepens Inequality
By Terry-Ann Craigie, Ames Grawert, and Cameron Kimble
With a foreword by Joseph E. Stiglitz PUBLISHED SEPTEMBER 15, 2020

Brennan Center for Justice at New York University School of Law

Black people with no
criminal record earn less
than socioeconomically
similar white people
with a record.

LOST EARNINGS
BY THE NUMBERS

Annual Lost Earnings

$ 55.2 billion
FORMERLY IMPRISONED
AMERICANS

Black people
without a record

-

$39,000

White people
with a record

$49,000

CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM INVOLVEMENT

$ 372.3 billion
AMERICANS IMPACTED
BY CONVICTION OR
IMPRISONMENT

51.7%
Imprisonment

Average earnings
loss varies by level
of criminal justice
involvement.
21.7%
Felony
conviction
without
imprisonment

45 MILLION+
have been convicted
of a misdemeanor

7 MILLION+
have been
imprisoned

12 MILLION+
have been
convicted of a
felony without
imprisonment

16.0%
Misdemeanor
conviction

People who were
imprisoned early
in their lives earn
about half as
much annually as
socioeconomically
similar people
untouched by the
criminal justice
system.

RACIAL DISPARITIES
PERSIST AFTER RELEASE
FROM PRISON
U.S.
POPULATION

And thus
struggle
to achieve
financial
stability

LOST
INDIVIDUAL
WAGES

People
experiencing
poverty are more
likely to be
imprisoned

FORMERLY
IMPRISONED

WHITE
61%

34%

12%

35%

18%

30%

BLACK

ONE IN FIVE

AMERICANS WHO HAVE
A CRIMINAL RECORD OF
SOME KIND

People who have been to prison are
frequently overlooked by employers
LATINO
LOSS FOR COMMUNITY
OTHER

9%
Source: Brennan Center analysis.

1%

Table of Contents
Foreword .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 4

ABOUT THE BRENNAN CENTER
FOR JUSTICE

Introduction.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 6
I. The Scope of America’s Criminal Justice System.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 9
A. Formerly Imprisoned People. .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 10
B. People with a Felony Conviction Not Sentenced to Imprisonment .  .  .  .  .  .  . 11
C. People with a Misdemeanor Conviction.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 11
II. The Effect of Conviction and Imprisonment on Annual Earnings.  .  .  .  .  . 14
A. Formerly Imprisoned People. .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 14
B. People with a Felony Conviction Not Sentenced to Imprisonment .  .  .  .  .  . 14
C. People with a Misdemeanor Conviction.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 14
D. Aggregate Annual Effects .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 15
III. The Effect of Conviction and Imprisonment on Lifetime Earnings.  .  .  .  . 17

The Brennan Center for Justice at
NYU School of Law is a nonpartisan
law and policy institute that works
to reform, revitalize — and when
necessary defend — our country’s
systems of democracy and justice.
The Brennan Center is dedicated to
protecting the rule of law and the
values of constitutional democracy.
We focus on voting rights, campaign
finance reform, ending mass
incarceration, and preserving our
liberties while also maintaining our
national security. Part think tank,
part advocacy group, part cuttingedge communications hub, we start
with rigorous research. We craft
innovative policies. And we fight for
them — in Congress and the states,
in the courts, and in the court of
public opinion.

A. Consequences for Poverty and Income Inequality. .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 18
B. Consequences for Racial Inequality .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 19

ABOUT THE BRENNAN CENTER’S
JUSTICE PROGRAM

IV. Policy Recommendations .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 21
Conclusion .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 23
Appendix A: Literature Review.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 24
Appendix B: Methodology.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 28
Endnotes.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 34
About the Authors .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 42

The Brennan Center’s Justice
Program seeks to secure our nation’s
promise of equal justice for all by
creating a rational, effective, and fair
justice system. Its priority focus is
to reduce mass incarceration while
keeping down crime. The program
melds law, policy, and economics
to produce new empirical analyses
and innovative policy solutions to
advance this critical goal.

Acknowledgments .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 43
S TAY C O N N E C T E D T O
THE BRENNAN CENTER

Visit our website at
www.brennancenter.org

© 2020. This paper is covered by the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs license. It may be reproduced in its entirety as long
as the Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law is credited, a link to the Center’s web pages is provided, and no charge is imposed. The paper may
not be reproduced in part or in altered form, or if a fee is charged, without the Center’s permission. Please let the Center know if you reprint.

3 Brennan Center for Justice

Conviction, Imprisonment, and Lost Earnings

Foreword

A

merica is approaching a breaking point. For more than four decades,
economic inequality has risen inexorably, stunting productivity, weakening
our democracy, and leaving tens of millions struggling to get by in the world’s
most prosperous country. The crises that have rocked the United States since
the spring — the coronavirus pandemic, the resulting mass unemployment, and
a nationwide uprising for racial justice — have made the inequities plaguing
American society more glaring than ever.
This year’s intertwined emergencies have also driven
home a reality that some would rather ignore: that the
growing gap between rich and poor is a result not just
of the market’s invisible hand but of a set of deeply
misguided policy choices. Among them, this groundbreaking report reveals, is our entrenched system of
mass incarceration. Mass incarceration reflects and
exacerbates so many dimensions of this country’s
divides — in income and health, in voice and power, in
access to justice, and most importantly, over race.
The number of people incarcerated in America today
is more than four times larger than it was in 1980,
when wages began to stagnate and the social safety
net began to be rolled back. We’ve long known that
people involved in the criminal justice system — a
group that’s disproportionately poor and Black — face
economic barriers in the form of hiring discrimination
and lost job opportunities, among other factors. This
report demonstrates that more people than previously
believed have been caught up in the system, and it
quantifies the enormous financial loss they sustain as
a result; those who spend time in prison miss out on
more than half the future income they might otherwise
have earned.
Ascertaining through careful statistical analyses just
how costly the mass incarceration system has been to
the people ensnared by it is a major achievement. These
findings reframe our understanding of the issue: As a
perpetual drag on the earning potential of tens of
millions of Americans, these costs are not only borne
by individuals, their families, and their communities.
They are also system-wide drivers of inequality and are
so large as to have macroeconomic consequences.
That insight is vital today. The unprecedented
economic contraction triggered by the pandemic, and
the federal government’s botched response, appears
to be falling hardest on those who were already struggling, just like in past slumps. When employers cut
back, employees with criminal records are all too often
the first to be furloughed and the last to be rehired.
And while major corporations get billions of dollars in
relief, millions of the jobless are being largely left in
the cold.

4 Brennan Center for Justice

These costs come on top of other enormous costs
imposed on society by our mass incarceration system.
Some states have spent as much on prisons as on
universities. The pandemic will make public funds even
scarcer. More money spent on incarcerating more
people will weaken our future, while the same money
spent on expanding our universities will lead to a stronger 21st century economy.
Mass incarceration has been a key instrument in
voter suppression, because people with criminal
records are deprived of the right to vote in some states,
and in many states former prisoners are responsible for
re-registering once they are released. This undermines
democracy: since poor and Black people suffer from
mass incarceration disproportionately, they will be
underrepresented in our electorate.
Meanwhile, a nationwide reckoning over deep-rooted
racial injustice is forcing our country to come to terms
with the ways in which these injustices have been
perpetuated in the century and a half since the end of
slavery. For the past four decades, mass incarceration
— with the deprivation of political voice and economic
opportunity that is so often associated with it — has
been at the center. It renders economic mobility for so
many Black Americans nearly impossible.
And yet this moment also brings a historic opportunity. By laying bare the grotesque inequities that undergird our society, the upheavals of 2020 have given us
the needed room to profoundly change our course. An
ambitious, democratically driven movement to create
a fundamentally fairer and more resilient economy,
based on a renewed and strengthened social contract,
is at last gaining traction. But true progress will not
occur until economic mobility is possible for our most
marginalized and most vulnerable citizens. The urgent
policies advocated here are a step toward ending that
injustice and building a more prosperous and equal
society. This report shows what needs to be done to
stop mass incarceration. Equally important, it shows
how to deal with its legacy: the large number of American citizens with criminal records. It was wrong that
they lost so many of their formative years, often for
minor infractions. It is doubly wrong that they suffer

Conviction, Imprisonment, and Lost Earnings

for the rest of their lives from the stigma associated
with imprisonment. For them, and for our entire society, we need to minimize the consequences of that
stigma.
There is much that has to be done if our society is
to fully come to terms with our long history of racial
injustice. Stopping mass incarceration is an easy place

5 Brennan Center for Justice

to begin. This report makes a compelling case for
the enormous economic benefits to be derived from
doing so.
Joseph E. Stiglitz
University Professor
Columbia University

Conviction, Imprisonment, and Lost Earnings

Introduction

A

merica’s 400-year history of racial injustice continues to produce profound
economic inequalities — a reality our society must no longer ignore. The net
worth of a typical white family, for example, is 10 times that of a typical Black
1
family. Shockingly, despite the successes of the civil rights movement, this racial
wealth gap has barely changed in the last half century.2
At the same time, as we are all too aware, the criminal
justice system subjects Americans to profoundly unequal
treatment. A century ago, a Black man was four times as
likely as a white man to be incarcerated. In 1980, around
the height of the “war on drugs,” he was 11 times as likely.3
Black men and women are also jailed at more than triple
the rate of white men and women. And nearly half of all
people serving effective life sentences are Black.4 Disparate enforcement is one reason; for example, the majority
of people stopped in New York City’s controversial stopand-frisk program were Black.5 Perhaps most disturbingly,
Black men and women are far more likely to be the victims
of police use of force.6 The protests that erupted in the
spring of 2020, catalyzed by the Black Lives Matter movement, revealed and reinforced a growing public understanding of these systemic racial disparities in the
criminal justice system.7
Those two points are not unrelated. In fact, the staggering racial disparities in our criminal justice system flow
directly into economic inequality. These consequences are
magnified and reinforced throughout a lifetime of discrimination in employment and access to economic opportunity.8 They are felt by individuals, of course, but also by
families and communities. And they are felt in such large
numbers, and in such a systemic way, that they constitute
a major structural factor in economic inequality.
This report examines the long-term economic effects
of conviction and imprisonment. It demonstrates that
people involved in the criminal justice system tend to earn
significantly less over the course of their lives than otherwise would be the case. Among other factors, missed
opportunities, inadequate reentry services, and social
stigma contribute to this link between imprisonment and
poverty. The consequences, at both an individual and a
systemic level, are dire.
To reach these conclusions, the report starts by identifying how many of the more than 70 million people with
criminal records have become involved with the criminal
justice system in each of three discrete ways: through
imprisonment, conviction of a felony without subsequent
imprisonment, and conviction of a misdemeanor.
Then it assesses how each interaction depresses individuals’ earnings. Last, the report uses an innovative
method to illustrate how the reduction in earnings
persists over a lifetime, deepening poverty — particularly
for Black and Latino people.

6 Brennan Center for Justice

Specifically, this report finds the following:
ƒ Conviction and imprisonment affect more people,
in more serious ways, than was previously realized.
Using data through 2017, this report concludes that
about 7.7 million living Americans have at some point
been imprisoned, about 12.1 million have been convicted
of a felony without being imprisoned for it, and about
45 million have been convicted of at least one misdemeanor. (Due to data limitations, some overlap may
exist between these categories.)
ƒ Conviction and imprisonment experienced early in
life lower individuals’ annual earnings.
¡ People who have spent time in prison suffer the
greatest losses, with their subsequent annual
earnings reduced by an average of 52 percent.
¡ People convicted of a felony but not imprisoned
for it see their annual earnings reduced by an average of 22 percent.
¡ People convicted of a misdemeanor see their annual earnings reduced by an average of 16 percent.
ƒ These earnings losses entrench poverty. The reduced
earnings compound over the course of a lifetime. On
average, formerly imprisoned people earn nearly half a
million dollars less over their careers than they might
have otherwise. These losses are borne disproportionately by people already living in poverty, and they help
perpetuate it.
ƒ These earnings losses worsen economic disparities
between Black, Latino, and white communities.
White people who have a prison record see their earnings trend upwards, while formerly imprisoned Black
and Latino people experience a relatively flat earnings
trajectory. Because Black and Latino people are also
overrepresented in the criminal justice system, these
economic effects are concentrated in their communities and exacerbate the racial wealth gap.

Throughout this report, estimates of the effects of
criminal justice involvement were produced by comparing
people who have experienced imprisonment, felony
conviction without prison, or misdemeanor conviction
with people who have had no such experience but other-

Conviction, Imprisonment, and Lost Earnings

TABLE 1

Lost Earning Potential Due to Involvement in the Criminal
Justice System (2017)
NUMBER OF
PEOPLE

ANNUAL AVERAGE
EARNINGS LOSS

AVERAGE LIFETIME
EARNINGS LOSS

AGGREGATE ANNUAL
EARNINGS LOSS

Formerly
imprisoned
people

7.7 million

52%

$484,400

$55.2 billion

White

2.7 million

—

$267,000

—

Black

2.7 million

—

$358,900

—

Latino

2.3 million

—

$511,500

—

People
convicted but
not imprisoned

$98,800*

Felonies

12.1 million

22%

—

$77.1 billion

Misdemeanors

46.8 million

16%

—

$240.0 billion

Total

$372.3 billion †

* In this table, $98,800 represents lifetime earnings lost due to a conviction in general, whether for a felony, a
misdemeanor, or another offense. Because of data limitations, this report is not able to offer a more precise estimate.
† Because of potential overlap between categories, the actual annual aggregate loss may be smaller than $372.3 billion.

wise closely resemble them. Members of these comparison groups are referred to intermittently as “similarly
situated people” or “peers” of justice-involved people.
Table 1 summarizes this report’s quantitative findings.
The average annual wage loss experienced by each group
is multiplied by the size of its population to demonstrate
the aggregate effect of conviction and imprisonment.
As this table shows, the losses reach into the hundreds
of billions of dollars, but even that likely underestimates
the true economic impact of the criminal justice system,
for two reasons. First, this report does not study the
effect of jail on earnings. Reliable information on the jail
population is hard to find, but the jail system’s sprawling
size makes the issue an important area for future
research. Second, this report does not quantify the
secondary costs of involvement in the criminal justice
system, such as the earnings lost to a family when a
parent must leave a job to care for a child during a partner’s incarceration, transportation costs to visit loved
ones in prison, money sent to commissary accounts or

7

Brennan Center for Justice

spent on phone and video calls during a loved one’s
incarceration, money spent on court costs and criminal
justice debt, or the cost of a private attorney, to name
just a few. (A full cost-benefit analysis of current criminal
justice policies is beyond the scope of this report.)
Given the devastating financial consequences of
contact with the criminal justice system, policymakers
should, first and foremost, shrink its overall size and
reduce the use of conviction and imprisonment. For those
who are subjected to either sanction, steps to counter
discrimination and bolster the social safety net can mitigate subsequent harm to their livelihoods.
Specifically, the authors recommend the following
policy changes to confront the devastating and inequitable consequences of conviction and incarceration:
ƒ Jurisdictions should reclassify some felonies as misdemeanors and decriminalize other offenses. This step
would reduce the prevalence of all three criminal sanctions explored in this report.

Conviction, Imprisonment, and Lost Earnings

ƒ Policymakers should invest in paths away from arrest
and prosecution, such as programs that provide people
at risk of arrest with drug or mental health treatment.
Similar programs could allow criminal charges that
have already been filed to be dismissed and sealed upon
completion. Aside from reducing convictions, these
changes could reduce the risk of violent interactions
with police.
ƒ States and the federal government should invest in
alternatives to incarceration. Probation, community
service, or other sanctions are more appropriate than
prison in many cases and would reduce the harms
experienced by people with convictions.
ƒ Policymakers should expand opportunities for
justice-involved people to secure well-paying jobs. First,
they should reduce barriers to employment, such as
occupational licensing rules that exclude people with
criminal records. Second, jurisdictions that have yet to
do so should adopt “ban-the-box” rules for job applications. These rules, which defer inquiries about a
criminal record in the hiring process, expand employment opportunities and reduce the long-term consequences of a criminal record. The private sector can

8 Brennan Center for Justice

also help: Businesses should expand their hiring of
people with criminal records by, among other things,
limiting the scope of criminal background checks.
ƒ Jurisdictions should prevent employment and
housing discrimination based on criminal history.
People returning from prison often find themselves
turned away from jobs and housing without a second
look. While criminal records may be relevant to some
inquiries, they need not operate as automatic
disqualifications.
ƒ Policymakers should strengthen the social safety net
to help keep people with a criminal record out of
poverty, despair, and recidivism. For one thing, cities
should remove barriers to public housing and help
families living in such communities reunite after a
family member’s incarceration. Relatedly, the federal
government should repeal barriers to government
benefits. Until Congress does so, states can act on their
own to blunt the impact of these punitive rules. And
finally, correctional administrators should connect
people leaving incarceration with government benefits. This can help prevent hunger and recidivism in the
first days after release.

Conviction, Imprisonment, and Lost Earnings

I. The Scope of America’s Criminal Justice System

T

his analysis starts by estimating the number of people who have been affected
by the criminal justice system in each of three distinct ways: previous
imprisonment, conviction of a felony that did not result in imprisonment,
and conviction of a misdemeanor. Each of these sanctions is highly likely to reduce
earnings, making it important to understand how widespread they are.
There are many other ways that people can encounter
the criminal justice system. According to the FBI, more
than 70 million people in the United States have a criminal record of some kind, meaning they have at least
been arrested.9 Millions of people cycle through American jails annually. And tens of millions of people have a
family member who has been involved in the criminal
justice system in some way.10 All of these interactions
may disrupt earnings and result in other long-lasting,
serious harms. This report’s focus on conviction and

imprisonment should not be read as trivializing or ignoring the costs of these other types of criminal justice
involvement.
Previous analyses have studied the impact of incarceration on subsequent earnings but have examined the
effect of conviction only rarely. Few analyses have
attempted to disaggregate the effect of conviction from
the effect of incarceration, or the impact of being
convicted of a felony from that of a misdemeanor conviction. This report aims to fill those research gaps.

Modeling the Number of Formerly Imprisoned People
>> The size of each of the three populations studied in
this report was derived from data on the number of people
affected by each part of the criminal justice system in a
given year, reducing that figure to account for recidivism
and mortality, and then repeating the process for all
subsequent years for which there is available data.

authors calculated the likelihood that someone
released that year would have returned to prison by
2017. Estimates were calculated using data from the
National Corrections Reporting Program, drawing on
previous research in the field.13

ƒ Mortality data. Prisons are uniquely damaging to the
>> For formerly imprisoned people, the model starts with
the following data points:

ƒ People leaving incarceration. Data on people released
from prison for the years 1965 through 2017 was
obtained from the U.S. Department of Justice’s Bureau
of Justice Statistics (BJS).11 This report’s model starts at
1965 because — due to high rates of mortality among
the imprisoned population and the average age at which
people are incarcerated — the number of formerly
imprisoned people released before 1965 and still alive
today was found to be negligible.

ƒ Recidivism data. Government reports normally
provide recidivism data based on how many people are
rearrested, reconvicted, or reincarcerated within a
certain period (e.g., five years).12 What is relevant to this
report, though, is the likelihood that someone has
returned to prison at any point up to 2017, the end of
this report’s study period. Rather than using conventional recidivism rates, then, for each year studied, the

9 Brennan Center for Justice

physical and mental health of people incarcerated
there.14 Therefore, the authors made the sobering
assumption that formerly imprisoned people suffer
higher mortality rates than the general population.15
>> For each year, the model then matches annual releases
with that year’s corresponding mortality and recidivism
estimates.
>> To visualize this process, start with a representative
year, 2005. In that year, 701,632 people were released from
prison. The authors estimated that, given 12 years to
recidivate before 2017, 63 percent would return to prison. Of
the 37 percent of people who did not return to prison —
259,899 people — the authors estimated that 90 percent
have survived to the current day. As a result, of the people
released from prison in 2005 who did not return, an
estimated 234,914 are alive today.
>> The results from each year were then added together.

Conviction, Imprisonment, and Lost Earnings

A. Formerly Imprisoned People
Estimate: 7.7 million

Since no government source tracks the number of
formerly imprisoned people, the authors devised a model
to calculate an estimate. The authors started by entering
(or interpolating, where necessary to bridge data gaps)
the number of people released from prison in each year
in the study period. Next, these totals were adjusted for
recidivism rates to ensure that the model did not double
count people who, according to the dataset, later returned
to prison. Last, the data was adjusted for mortality rates
to remove the number of formerly imprisoned people who
likely have not survived to the present day. This process
broadly conforms to the structure of previous research
but includes more recent data.
According to this process, an estimated 7.7 million
people alive today — a little less than the population of
Virginia — have been to prison at some point in their lives.16
Interestingly, more than 75 percent of these people were

released in 2000 or later, meaning their prison terms likely
began in the late 1990s.17 Therefore, while it may be tempting to attribute the size of the formerly imprisoned population to archaic policies that have since been repealed, that
does not appear to be entirely accurate.
This estimate is broadly consistent with prior research.
Some smaller estimates cover just the working-age population or are now out of date.18 More recent research has
estimated that in 2010 there were roughly 7.3 million
currently or formerly imprisoned people in the United
States.19 Because this report’s estimate uses data from
1965 through 2017 — sufficient data on 2018 was not yet
available at the time of publication — a higher estimate
is to be expected here. This report’s estimate would be
even higher but for the relatively high mortality estimates
used here.20
As shown in table 2, men vastly outnumber women
among the formerly imprisoned population. Black and
Latino people also make up a majority of the formerly

TABLE 2

Demographics of the Formerly Imprisoned Population (2017)
TOTAL

MEN

WOMEN

White

2,660,000

2,280,000

380,000

Black

2,690,000

2,410,000

280,000

Latino

2,300,000

2,130,000

160,000

Other

78,000

—

—

Total

7,730,000

—

—

Source: Brennan Center analysis.

FIGURE 1

Racial Disparities Persist After Release from Prison (2017)
U.S. population

Formerly imprisoned population

White 61%

34%

Black 12%

35%

Latino 18%

30%

Other 9%

1%

Source: Brennan Center analysis.

10 Brennan Center for Justice

Conviction, Imprisonment, and Lost Earnings

imprisoned population, with formerly imprisoned Black
men and women outnumbering their white peers.
As depicted in figure 1, that is wildly out of proportion
with the general population. But the disproportionate
representation of Black and Latino people in the formerly
imprisoned population should not be surprising, given
the well-documented, continued existence of racial
disparities in prison populations.21 Indeed, according to
the most recently available data, the number of Black men
and women behind bars continues to exceed the number
of imprisoned white men and women.22 It would be
surprising if these persistent disparities were not reflected
in the formerly imprisoned population.

B. People with a Felony Conviction
Not Sentenced to Imprisonment
Estimate: 12.1 million

While imprisonment is a serious sanction, formerly
imprisoned people represent just a small slice of the
justice-involved population. Those who have been to
prison or are currently imprisoned — around 10 million
people in total — compose just 15 percent of the estimated 70 million Americans with a criminal record of
some kind.23
Felony convictions are on their own a serious sanction
likely to impact earning potential. Understanding their
prevalence and effect is vital to developing a full picture
of the economic impact of the criminal justice system.
However, isolating the number of people with felony
records who have not been sentenced to imprisonment
is difficult, as many people convicted of felonies do spend
time in prison.24
Most people convicted of felonies are sentenced to
prison, probation (a form of supervised release generally
imposed as an alternative to incarceration), or a split
sentence combining the two.25 To estimate the number of
people who have been convicted of a felony but not
sentenced to prison, then, this report starts with data on
the annual number of people entering probation every year.
As in the last section, this data was then adjusted to
account for recidivism and mortality. Recidivism data
was drawn from reports on people put on probation in
the federal system. 26 For mortality estimates, the
authors assumed that people convicted of felonies but
not sentenced to prison face mortality risks higher than
the general population’s but lower than the formerly
imprisoned population’s. The authors also added other
variables to ensure, to the extent possible, that the
model captured only people who were sentenced to
probation without having also been imprisoned. The
total number of probationers was then reduced by half
because, according to BJS data, half of people sentenced
to probation receive that sentence for a misdemeanor
conviction.27

11 Brennan Center for Justice

Repeating this process for each year’s cohort of people
entering probation, the authors estimate that approximately 12.1 million people alive today have been convicted
of a felony offense without being imprisoned for it. Unfortunately, BJS does not track the racial breakdown of
people entering or exiting probation.28 As a result, it is not
possible to estimate the demographic makeup of this
population.
There is a risk that this figure is an overestimate, since
it may include some people who have spent time in
prison. For example, someone who entered prison for a
separate offense after probation was terminated would
be counted in both groups. The patchwork nature of
criminal justice data makes it impossible to fully eliminate such a risk.
However, two additional limitations suggest that this
model might produce an underestimate. First, the data
necessary for this method goes back only as far as 1980,
so this model covers a shorter period than the model for
the formerly imprisoned population. Second, many people
convicted of felonies are sentenced to incarceration in
local jails, a population that neither this model nor the
previous section’s analysis captures.29 As a rough estimate, though, this method helps develop a broader understanding of the justice-involved population.

C. People with a Misdemeanor Conviction
Estimate: 45 million

Though less severe than felonies, misdemeanors also
have a long-term impact on earning potential. Convictions for these generally lower-level crimes may show up
on background checks, disqualify someone from holding
a professional license, or come with other burdensome
conditions. Any estimate of the prevalence of a criminal
conviction and its effects must reckon with the sprawling
misdemeanor justice system.
Most Americans are familiar from popular culture
with the classic model of the criminal case: refereed by
a judge, the prosecutor and defense attorney present
evidence and examine and cross-examine witnesses,
with guilt or innocence decided by an impartial jury. But
this model describes only a vanishingly small percentage
of cases.30 It fails to capture the reality of the misdemeanor system. People accused of such crimes face a
streamlined and, in many cases, stripped-down form of
justice.31
While this field of study is an evolving one, researchers
have documented more than 13 million annual misdemeanor cases in recent years.32 However, estimating the
number of people with a misdemeanor conviction is a
difficult task. Conviction rates and even the meaning of
a misdemeanor conviction vary from state to state. Some
lower-level offenses will qualify as a misdemeanor in
some states but not in others.33

Conviction, Imprisonment, and Lost Earnings

To estimate annual misdemeanor convictions, then,
this report employs a novel method that starts with FBI
arrest data and then calculates how many of those arrests
ended in conviction, using conviction rates estimated
from a longitudinal survey.
Next, to avoid double counting people, the authors
sought to estimate misdemeanor recidivism. But recidivism poses its own challenge: unlike felony sentences
and prison terms, people routinely receive multiple
misdemeanor convictions within a single year.34 To solve
this problem, repeat jail admissions were used as a proxy
for intra-year misdemeanor recidivism.35 That figure —
suggesting that the average person admitted to a majorcity jail is admitted roughly 1.4 times per year — was then
used to estimate how many unique people were
convicted of a misdemeanor in a given year. As in the
preceding sections, estimated inter-year recidivism and
mortality rates were then applied. Following this
method, the authors estimate that nearly 46.8 million
currently living people — one in seven Americans — have
a misdemeanor conviction and, therefore, a nontrivial
criminal record.
This estimate comes with some limitations. For one
thing, it likely includes people already counted in previ-

ous sections. That is, some of the 46.8 million people
identified using this model may have also spent time in
prison, or been convicted of a felony, before or after
incurring their misdemeanor conviction. This double
counting risk is unavoidable. This model’s recidivism
metrics theoretically guard against double counting
people who have been convicted of two misdemeanors
but cannot, given the limits of existing data, eliminate
people who have recidivated in other ways. Furthermore,
the authors were able to obtain enough data to run this
model over only 23 years, from 1995 through 2017. Rates
of actual intra-year recidivism may also be higher than
indicated by the limited research that was available to
build this model.
These limitations cannot be overcome given the significant gaps in data on the criminal justice system. Extensive original research, including large-scale data
collection, would be necessary to develop a more precise
understanding of the number of people who have been
convicted of a misdemeanor. Given these limitations, it
might be better to understand the total offered in this
report as a rough estimate, rather than a precise one:
around 45 million people, rather than precisely 46.8
million people, have been convicted of a misdemeanor.

Jail Incarceration’s Vast Reach
>> One significant group goes uncounted in this analysis:
people who have been detained or incarcerated in a jail.
Because jails process more than 10 million admissions
annually, the number of people who have been to jail at
some point must be vast.36
>> It is difficult to estimate the size of this population,
however. Part of the problem is that jails serve two purposes:
they detain people for short periods as they wait for trial, and
they incarcerate people who have already been convicted of a
crime — typically a low-level one. Generally, though, jail
recidivism data tracks only the latter group.37 Without a solid
understanding of the rate at which people return to jail for
any reason, a reasonable estimate of the formerly jailed
population is impossible. This is especially true given that 54
percent of the jail population turns over every week, magnifying the impact of any error in estimating recidivism.38
>> The length of a jail stay also varies sharply. While the
average jail stay is just 26 days, it is longer in larger
jurisdictions such as New York City.39 And years-long jail
stays are well documented.40 As a result, it is difficult to say
that everyone who spends time in jail is affected in a similar
way. Earnings loss and even job loss are certainly common

12 Brennan Center for Justice

experiences.41 But longer-term effects and how they are
distributed are more complicated questions.
>> Research conducted for this report did allow the
authors to conclude, on the basis of one important case,
that the number of people affected by jails is very large
indeed. Before the coronavirus pandemic, the New York City
Department of Correction — which oversees the Rikers
Island jail complex — held an average daily population of
around 8,000 people and admitted around 40,000 annually,
down from more than 120,000 in fiscal year (FY) 2001.42
That means it held roughly 1 percent of the average daily
population of all the jails in America.43
>> According to data obtained through a Freedom of Information Law request, New York City’s Department of
Correction admitted 949,919 individuals into custody
between 1983 and June 14, 2019.44 (A forthcoming study by
a team of sociologists will explore the lifetime risk of jail
incarceration for New Yorkers of different demographic
groups.) If New York City alone jailed nearly 1 million unique
people over a 36-year period, then the number of people
who have ever been incarcerated in any jail must run into
the tens of millions.

Conviction, Imprisonment, and Lost Earnings

How Conviction and Imprisonment May Affect Earnings
>> America’s sprawling criminal justice system can affect
someone’s life, directly or indirectly, in any number of ways.
This report focuses on misdemeanor convictions, felony
convictions, and imprisonment, presuming that these
interactions are likely to affect someone’s long-term
earnings. Why, though, do conviction and imprisonment
affect earnings? And why does imprisonment have a
particularly strong effect? Researchers have suggested the
following theories, among others:

ƒ Stigma. A criminal record may deter employers from
making a job offer or even conducting an interview.
According to one 2018 survey, 95 percent of employers
conduct some form of background check on job
candidates.45 Perhaps as a result, applicants with a
criminal record are around 50 percent less likely to
receive a callback interview, depriving them of even the
chance to explain their history.46 Some research
suggests that the type of criminal conviction determines
the severity of the stigma.47 Even so, conviction or
incarceration no matter the cause may contribute to
extended periods of joblessness, resulting in a high
unemployment rate among the justice-involved population (estimated at 27 percent for formerly imprisoned
people).48 They may also lead people to accept jobs that
pay less or offer fewer advancement opportunities than
positions they might have otherwise found.49

ƒ Legal barriers to work. As explored in more detail
below, some jobs require occupational licenses, and
thousands of rules limit access to licenses for people

That said, none of these caveats undercut this central
finding: a surprisingly large number of Americans have
a misdemeanor conviction, with (as this report will
show) serious consequences. Even if the misdemeanor
population were half as high as is estimated here — in the
20 million range, for example, due to a higher than
expected rate of intra-year recidivism — the total would
remain shocking, and the policy implications would be
unchanged. Research on the misdemeanor system is in its
earliest phases. Hopefully, this estimate will lead people
to undertake the data collection efforts needed to support
further research and will be refined in future studies.

13 Brennan Center for Justice

with a criminal record.50 These rules may prevent
formerly justice-involved people from securing work in
lucrative fields and in fields where they have expertise.
For example, California trains imprisoned people to be
elite firefighters, but legal restrictions bar many from
joining that profession upon release.51

ƒ Missed opportunities. The preceding two factors
describe challenges faced by anyone with a criminal
record. But people returning from prison or prolonged jail
incarceration encounter additional hurdles. For one, time
spent incarcerated means time out of the workforce and
time not spent accumulating the skills or social connections needed to find or succeed in a job (what economists
call “human capital”).52 And those effects stack over time:
according to one analysis, each additional year of
imprisonment reduces by nearly 4 percentage points the
likelihood that a person will find post-release employment.53 While research in this field tends to focus on the
effects of prison, one new study suggests that jails may
have similarly damaging effects.54

ƒ Mental and physical health. Incarceration jeopardizes
health and well-being.55 People who need health care
while in prison, for example, may not receive high-quality
treatment or any treatment at all.56 Health conditions
and problems often persist after release, making it
that much harder to find and keep a stable job.57
The dehumanizing experience of prison itself, and
the behaviors people must adopt to survive, may also
make it difficult to succeed in the workforce.58

¡ ¡ ¡

This analysis offers a way of understanding the scale of
mass incarceration in the United States that is more
detailed than past research. Of the more than 70 million
people with a criminal record today, tens of millions have
experienced some of the most severe sanctions known to
the criminal justice system — imprisonment or conviction
of a felony. And tens of millions more must contend with
the stigma of a misdemeanor conviction, which, while less
severe, still harms one’s ability to find a stable job.

Conviction, Imprisonment, and Lost Earnings

II. The Effect of Conviction and Imprisonment
on Annual Earnings

T

his report now evaluates how the earnings of these three populations are
affected by involvement with the criminal justice system. Drawing on survey
data, it finds that misdemeanor convictions are associated with a small earnings
reduction, felony convictions are associated with a moderate reduction, and
imprisonment is associated with a severe one.59
Many researchers have studied the effect of incarceration on earnings. This report adds to that understanding
by also estimating the effect of felony and misdemeanor
convictions. First, this section estimates the effect of
conviction and imprisonment on annual earnings. The next
section explores how these effects add up over a lifetime.

How This Report Estimates
Lost Earnings
>> To produce these estimates, the authors drew on
data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth’s
1979 and 1997 cohorts (NLSY79 and NLSY97, respectively). They then used a statistical technique called
propensity-score matching (PSM) to match people who
have become involved with the criminal justice system
with people who are comparable to them in terms of
certain key traits. Given a close enough match, the
earnings differential between justice-involved people and
this comparison group can be attributed to the effect of
criminal justice involvement.
>> Specifically, for this report, people who became
involved with the criminal justice system in early adulthood (on average, in their late teens or early twenties)
were compared with people who had no such history but
were similar in demographic characteristics (age, gender,
race-ethnicity, and education) and regional indicators
(unemployment and poverty rates).60 The gap between
the two groups’ annual earnings could then be explored.
>> Any study of the criminal justice system’s effects
must reckon with the risk that there are deeper,
unobserved differences between those who become
convicted or incarcerated and those who do not. Indeed,
research suggests that people who enter prison earned
significantly less than their peers prior to incarceration.61
To limit the effect of these unobserved traits, this report’s
results were validated using additional statistical
techniques. For details on these approaches, see
appendix B.

14 Brennan Center for Justice

A. Formerly Imprisoned People
Estimate: 52 percent reduction

This report estimates that formerly imprisoned people
earn around $6,700 annually, while their peers earn
around $13,800. The latter figure is slightly less than what
a full-time worker earning the federal minimum wage
would earn over the course of a year.62 The disparity
between the two groups translates to an annual income
reduction of around 52 percent.

B. People with a Felony Conviction
Not Sentenced to Imprisonment
Estimate: 22 percent reduction

Felony convictions imply serious crimes and have a significant effect on earning potential. But without imprisonment, the effect may be very different from the one felt by
people returning home from prison. Therefore, this report
presents a new model to estimate how a felony conviction,
even without imprisonment, affects earnings.
Here the authors used the NLSY97, which specifically
asked participants whether they had been convicted of a
felony.63 Studying this group of people using the PSM
method (described in appendix B) suggests that felony
convictions without imprisonment also have a significant
effect on annual earnings: about a 22 percent reduction.
The large effect identified here is consistent with theories about how a criminal record affects earning capacity.
People convicted of felonies may also be more likely to
have spent time in pretrial detention. As a result, it is
possible that the 22 percent estimate described here
includes the effect of pretrial detention, which has also
been linked to reduced earnings.64

C. People with a Misdemeanor Conviction
Estimate: 16 percent reduction

Based on the same methodology, a non-felony conviction
— assumed for the purposes of this analysis to be a misdemeanor conviction — reduces annual earnings by about
16 percent. As in the previous section, time spent in
pretrial detention may partially account for this effect.
It may seem surprising that a misdemeanor conviction
would have such a significant impact on earnings. But
research suggests that even misdemeanor arrests may
lead to reduced employment.65 Misdemeanor charges

Conviction, Imprisonment, and Lost Earnings

TABLE 3

Aggregate Annual Earnings Lost Due to Criminal Justice System
Involvement (2017)
FORMERLY IMPRISONED
PEOPLE

PEOPLE WITH FELONY
CONVICTIONS

PEOPLE WITH MISDEMEANOR
CONVICTIONS

Average
earnings

$6,700

$23,000

$26,900

Average
earnings of
peers

$13,800

$29,400

$32,000

Earnings effect

–51.7%

–21.7%

–16.0%

Size of group

7.7 million

12.1 million

46.8 million

Annual
earnings lost

$55.2 billion

$77.1 billion

$240.0 billion

Note: All data points were computed from unrounded estimates.
Source: Brennan Center analysis.

often entail pretrial detention. Misdemeanor prosecutions also increase the risk of future conviction and
justice involvement, even when they do not end in
conviction. According to one scholar, even when a case
ends in dismissal it allows prosecutors to begin building
a file that will inform future interactions with law
enforcement. Thus, being charged with a misdemeanor,
even if it does not end with conviction, may single someone out — or “mark” them — for closer scrutiny during
subsequent prosecutions, potentially increasing the risk
of conviction and, by extension, lowering earnings.66
Taken together, these factors make it unsurprising that
a misdemeanor conviction has some effect on
earnings.
The nebulous nature of the misdemeanor category
means that the misdemeanor effect likely varies significantly from person to person and from charge to charge.
For example, a conviction for driving while intoxicated
likely affects someone’s earnings differently from a conviction for simple assault — even though both are misdemeanors under New York State law.67 But the average effect
described here helps develop our understanding of the
effects of lower-level criminal justice involvement.

D. Aggregate Annual Effects

Each of the estimates above describes annual earnings
lost by an average member of each group. These effects

15

Brennan Center for Justice

are keenly felt by formerly imprisoned or convicted people,
their families, and their communities. As the next section
will demonstrate, these effects do not fade with time.
They are experienced by people at all phases of their lives
and careers.
Even in a single year, these lost earnings, in the aggregate, constitute an enormous sum of money. To quantify
that loss, table 3 presents each annual earnings loss estimate from the preceding section, in dollars, and multiplies
it by the size of the group, as identified in section I.
For example, the average formerly imprisoned person
will earn 52 percent less than a similarly situated person
who was never imprisoned. From the previous section,
we know there are at least 7.7 million formerly imprisoned
people in the United States. Applying the average earnings
penalty to this entire group suggests that, in the aggregate, formerly imprisoned people lose out on an estimated
$55.2 billion annually.
Assuming that people are not counted twice in separate categories, then underemployment related to imprisonment or conviction reduces people’s wages by as much
as $372.3 billion annually. Because incarceration and
criminal justice involvement already disproportionately
ensnare poor communities, this sum represents money
that largely goes unearned and uninvested in communities that need it most. For context, consider what $372.3
billion would be enough to do:

Conviction, Imprisonment, and Lost Earnings

ƒ close New York City’s poverty gap 60 times over;68
ƒ give every homeless person in the United States a house
worth $500,000, outright, with money to spare;69
ƒ fund NASA for roughly 15 years at the level NASA
believes would put it on track to return to the moon by
2024;70 or
ƒ fund the Justice Department’s Office of Community
Oriented Policing Services — which supports community policing initiatives — at FY 2020 levels for more
than 1,000 years.71

The losses described in this report are, first and foremost, felt by impacted individuals and their communities. But given the scale of these losses, there are
macroeconomic implications as well. Indeed, other
researchers, using different methods and studying
different metrics, have argued that mass incarceration
has a broad economic impact. For example, according
to sociologists Bruce Western and Becky Pettit, much
of the damage caused by overincarceration “is invisible
in standard data sources” because “prison and jail
inmates have no status in official employment statistics.” In a 2000 study, they attempted to correct this
omission and found that accounting for incarcerated
persons reduced the employment-to-population ratio
of Black men more than white men.72 Building on their
findings, in 2016 the Washington Post reported that,
after accounting for incarceration, the unemployment
rate for Black working-age men in 2014 was 7.2 percentage points higher than officially reported.73 This report
adds to the evidence of mass incarceration’s society-wide collateral costs.

16 Brennan Center for Justice

Does Prison Labor Offset This Earnings
Loss? No.
>> Theoretically, the economic impact of imprisonment
might be mitigated by opportunities to work while
imprisoned. Skills learned through prison labor might
offset the loss of what economists call “human capital”
behind bars, and earnings might help people amass
savings to help them begin new lives after release.
>> The reality is very different. First, wages from
prison labor do not come anywhere close to replacing
what people can earn outside of prison. If any pay is
offered at all, it is generally low — around $1 per hour.74
Many jurisdictions then deduct costs from that paycheck, whether to satisfy court fees and fines or to pay
fees associated with imprisonment, such as room and
board (that is, the cost of someone’s own incarceration).75 Some prisons also recoup the wages they pay
through marked-up commissary products.76 Prison
programming could help people retain and develop skills,
but there is little evidence that current programs provide
those benefits.77

The findings here suggest that imprisonment remains
a major driver of economic loss, severely depressing the
earnings of those affected by it. But it is not the only
factor. Roughly two-thirds of the aggregate $372.3 billion
loss identified here is the result of misdemeanor convictions. The repercussions of even a relatively minor criminal record represent a serious drain on earnings, and
top-to-bottom reform is necessary to blunt this effect.

Conviction, Imprisonment, and Lost Earnings

III. The Effect of Conviction and Imprisonment
on Lifetime Earnings

A

nnual lost earnings are a helpful metric for analyzing the macroeconomic
impact of mass incarceration. But for people living through the effects of a
criminal conviction or incarceration, these losses are most notable for how
they compound annually.
Building on the last section’s analysis of annual lost
earnings, this section presents a lifetime analysis, showing
that formerly imprisoned people earn less than half of
what their peers earn over their careers. As shown in
figure 2, the value of these lost earnings for formerly
imprisoned people approaches half a million dollars per
person, an amount that could easily make the difference
between escapable and inescapable poverty.
PSM was again used to produce these findings. People
with involvement in the justice system were again
matched with highly similar people who had no such
experience.
This section’s analysis defines the cohort’s prime
working years as running from their twenties to fifties,
because earnings growth is typically most stable over

this period. For simplicity, when describing results, this
30-year period is divided into three stages, based on the
average age of NLSY participants in the sample in each
stage: early career (ages 25–34), mid career (35–44), and
late career (45+). Due to data limitations, this section
does not distinguish between misdemeanor and felony
convictions.78
The damage done by conviction alone is significant.
Over the course of a lifetime, cumulative earnings losses
reach nearly $100,000 for the average person with a
conviction. These results pale in comparison to the effect
of imprisonment, however. By the end of a career, someone who was imprisoned as a young adult — regardless
of what offense led to incarceration — suffers an average
of about $484,400 in lost earnings.

FIGURE 2

People Who Have Been Convicted or Imprisoned Lose Up to Half
a Million Dollars in Earnings Over the Course of a Career
Lost earnings (cumulative)
$500,000
400,000
300,000

Early career
(25–34)

Mid career
(35–44)
Late career
(45+)

200,000
100,000
0
25
27
29
31
Imprisonment
Conviction

33

35

37

39

41

43

45

47

49

51

53

55

Source: Brennan Center analysis.

17 Brennan Center for Justice

Conviction, Imprisonment, and Lost Earnings

A. Consequences for Poverty
and Income Inequality

Some researchers have argued that the effects of a criminal record are “eternal,” due to the prevalence of law
enforcement and screening databases.79 This report’s
findings provide strong support for that claim. Over the
long term, the effect of incarceration on earnings appears
to grow as justice-involved people miss out on the wage
growth their peers benefit from — a surprising and troubling conclusion. As shown in figure 3, average formerly
imprisoned people will start their careers earning roughly
$7,100 less than their peers annually, and end them trailing their peers by more than $20,000 annually.
Socioeconomic disadvantage tends to compound itself,
and that principle appears to be at work here.80 Generally,
as people progress in their career and gain experience,
they make more money, peaking in their late forties or
early fifties.81 Several mechanisms likely impede that
growth for formerly imprisoned people. For one, a criminal history may make their career prospects more fragile.
Jobs available to them will often provide fewer opportunities for earnings growth and career advancement; they
may also be more vulnerable to layoffs. Opportunities for
licensure or credentialing (and the higher income both
can bring) are also limited and may provide weaker
returns on investment. Some professional licenses and
credentials are off-limits to people who have spent time
in prison; in other cases, since jobs in general are harder

to come by for formerly justice-involved people, those
credentials do not always translate to higher pay.
Previous research provides strong evidence that these
mechanisms are at work. First, 45 percent of formerly
imprisoned people are unemployed during the entire year
following their release.82 Unemployment becomes a
spiral, depriving people of opportunities to develop skills
and weakening their connections to potential employers.83 Additionally, when work is secured, it is often
temporary, part-time, and low paying; in one study of
people released from Indiana prisons, about half of those
who did find post-release employment had an annual
income of less than $5,000.84 Such low-wage jobs tend
to be characterized by less upward mobility and a higher
risk of future unemployment.85 Criminal records, in other
words, trap formerly imprisoned people in low-paying
work, which in turn places them on a lower incomegrowth trajectory.
Notably, these findings suggest that earnings losses
among the formerly imprisoned population may not be
due entirely to the prison experience itself or the time
spent removed from the workforce. Instead, at least part
of the earnings gap can be ascribed to the shadow that
imprisonment casts over subsequent economic opportunities. This distinction has serious consequences for policymakers, which are discussed in section IV.
This report’s results are also consistent with research
on intractable “deep poverty,” a chronic form of poverty

FIGURE 3

Formerly Imprisoned People Experience Little Earnings Growth
Annual earnings (average)
$40,000
35,000
30,000
25,000
20,000

Early career
(age 25–34)

Late career
(age 45+)

Mid career
(age 35–44)

15,000
10,000
5,000
0
25
27
29
31
Formerly imprisoned person

33
35
37
39
41
Peer (no justice involvement)

43

45

47

49

51

53

55

Federal poverty threshold
(two-person household)

Source: Brennan Center analysis.

18 Brennan Center for Justice

Conviction, Imprisonment, and Lost Earnings

that tends to persist generation after generation.86 As
shown in figure 3, above, the average early-career wages
of formerly imprisoned people hover at around half of the
federal poverty threshold for a family of two. Indeed, they
never exceed it.87
The lifetime effects of this earnings loss are staggering.
The roughly half-million dollars lost by the average
formerly imprisoned person is more than the entire lifetime earnings of someone who spends his or her life at
the poverty line ($382,000).88 And this loss does not
account for missed opportunities for additional wealth
generation, from Social Security benefits to accrued interest on retirement accounts to forgone investment opportunities. These factors, taken together, demonstrate that
imprisonment sets up people who are already disadvantaged for a profound loss of wealth and closes off pathways to upward economic mobility.

B. Consequences for Racial Inequality

This report has already shown that Black and Latino
people are overrepresented in the formerly imprisoned
population. It appears that their long-term earning potential is also more deeply affected by imprisonment. As

shown in figure 4, white people who have experienced
prison earn significantly more annually than Black or
Latino people with similar histories.
Formerly imprisoned Black and Latino people suffer
greater lifetime earnings losses — $358,900 and
$511,500, respectively — than their white counterparts,
whose losses amount to $267,000. Given the overrepresentation of Black and Latino people among the formerly
imprisoned population, these findings suggest that the
American prison system has a profoundly negative impact
on Black and Latino wealth. Of course, there is already a
vast racial wealth gap that has persisted with little change
over the past 50 years.89 In 2016, the median wealth of
white families ($171,000) exceeded the median wealth of
Black families ($17,409) and Latino families ($20,920) by
factors of around 10 and 8, respectively.90 Continued
disparities in yearly earning power — like the ones identified in this report — likely exacerbate that gap.91 Other
research suggests that low wealth is itself associated with
an increase in imprisonment, potentially setting up a
vicious cycle in which criminal justice involvement perpetuates wealth disparity, which in turn raises the risk of
imprisonment.92

FIGURE 4

Racial Disparities in Post-prison Earnings Are Severe and Grow
Over Time
Average earnings
$30,000
Early career
(age 25–34)

25,000

Mid career
(age 35–44)

20,000
15,000
10,000
5,000
0
25
Black

27
White

29

31

33

35

37

39

41

43

Latino

Source: Brennan Center analysis.

19 Brennan Center for Justice

Conviction, Imprisonment, and Lost Earnings

FIGURE 5

Black People with No Criminal Record Earn Less Annually than
Socioeconomically Similar White People with a Record
With conviction

$37,000
$49,000

Without conviction

$39,000
$52,000

■ Black ■ White
Source: Brennan Center analysis.

Last, this report’s estimates suggest that, for those who
are otherwise socioeconomically similar, Black men and
women with no history of conviction or imprisonment
earn less than white men and women with a conviction
record. By the end of a career, as shown in figure 5, white
men and women with a conviction earn about $49,000
a year on average, eclipsing the $39,000 a year that Black
people with no conviction earn over the same period.
These findings corroborate conclusions first drawn by

20

Brennan Center for Justice

sociologist Devah Pager. As she wrote, “race continues
to play a dominant role in shaping employment opportunities, equal to or greater than the impact of a criminal
record.”93
Apart from the effects of justice involvement, racial
discrimination in general continues to contribute to earnings disparities. While ending mass incarceration is critically important to rectifying these disparities, it cannot
by itself resolve them.

Conviction, Imprisonment, and Lost Earnings

IV. Policy Recommendations

T

his report demonstrates that the effects of conviction and imprisonment
persist for decades, entrenching inequality and perpetuating poverty.
Even people convicted of minor offenses see their earning potential reduced.
Because poor people are more likely to become involved in the criminal justice
system in the first place, conviction and incarceration can all too easily become
poverty traps. Policy interventions are needed to help break that cycle — and to
effect transformative change.
A. States should reduce penalties, reclassify
some felonies as misdemeanors, and
decriminalize other offenses altogether.

Even minor convictions appear to entail long-term
economic harm. Confronting this problem requires shrinking every aspect of the criminal justice system — from
prisons to misdemeanor courts. Some states have made
progress toward this goal through felony reclassification,
reducing some felony crimes to misdemeanors.94 Other
offenses can be safely decriminalized entirely, meaning
that they would be handled (if at all) outside the criminal
justice system.95 The Covid-19 public health crisis has
already inspired many police departments to temporarily
rethink who is arrested and why.96 Looking beyond the
pandemic, broader decriminalization efforts — targeting
misdemeanors and infractions for resolution outside the
criminal justice system or, at a minimum, eliminating
arrests and jail time for them — can preserve public safety
while reducing the collateral costs this report identifies.97

B. Jurisdictions should invest in paths away
from arrest and prosecution.

Providing early off-ramps from the criminal justice system
can spare people the effects of incarceration and conviction and shrink the size of the justice system. Pre-arrest
diversion programs accomplish these goals by identifying
people who might be arrested and intervening in other
ways, such as by connecting them with drug or mental
health treatment.98 Some such programs embed social
workers or clinicians with police so that these professionals can respond immediately where necessary.99 Other
diversion programs work by identifying people who may
be charged with certain types of crimes, offering alternative resolution options and dismissing criminal charges
upon their successful completion.100 Expanding these
programs would help reduce the number of people with
conviction records of any type. Critically, policymakers
should also ensure that successfully completing a diversion
program seals or expunges all record of the interaction,
since even dismissed cases can, in some circumstances,
remain a part of someone’s court records and encourage
prosecutors and judges to be less lenient in future cases.101

21 Brennan Center for Justice

C. Policymakers should expand the use of
alternatives to incarceration.

Imprisonment creates and deepens economic disadvantage. Judges and prosecutors should be given tools that
allow them to impose noncarceral sanctions that better
meet the needs of people who enter their courtrooms.
Probation, drug treatment, community service, counseling, and even fines tailored to a person’s ability to pay are
more appropriate than prison in many situations and
allow people to avoid the long-term consequences of
imprisonment.102 But all such alternatives to incarceration
(ATIs) must be implemented with care. Some diversion
programs come with a price tag, trapping defendants who
are unable to pay in the very cycle of poverty and incarceration that ATIs are designed to prevent.103 Furthermore,
people sentenced to an ATI generally still exit the courtroom with a criminal conviction, a serious sanction that
will still depress their earning potential.

D. States should eliminate unnecessary
barriers to employment.

Nearly 30 percent of workers need a state license to practice their occupations. These policies hinder job growth
and limit opportunities for people with criminal records.104
States have imposed at least 12,000 licensing restrictions
on individuals with a felony record, and 6,000 on people
with a misdemeanor record.105 By removing these barriers,
occupational licensing reform would open up a broader
array of jobs to people with criminal records. First, blanket
bans — automatic disqualification for individuals with a
criminal record — should be repealed.106 Second, policymakers and licensing bodies should remove vague and
overbroad standards, such as “good moral character,”
from qualification lists.107 And third, regulators should
provide clear guides to applicants about potential barriers
to licensure.108

E. The private and public sectors should
expand opportunities for people returning to
the workforce after conviction.

Job applications frequently ask about an applicant’s criminal record up front, allowing employers to screen out

Conviction, Imprisonment, and Lost Earnings

people with a record without meeting them or considering their qualifications. Ban-the-box policies require
employers to remove such conviction inquiries from initial
job applications. Records are disclosed later in the hiring
process — before a final decision is made, but after applicants have had a chance to advocate for themselves and
explain their past.
These policies encourage hiring managers to look at
someone’s application holistically. Many companies —
including some of the country’s largest employers — have
banned the box on their own initiative.109 Cities, states,
and the federal government have adopted similar policies
for their own hiring and in some cases require it of the
private sector as well.110 Early evidence is promising,
showing, for example, increased hiring in high-crime
neighborhoods and increased public-sector hiring of
people with criminal records. Other jurisdictions should
adopt or expand ban-the-box policies.111

F. Cities and states should prevent landlords
and employers from discriminating against
people with criminal records.

Even in ban-the-box jurisdictions, some employers will
automatically reject applicants once they learn of a criminal record. States should repeal laws that permit the blanket denial of jobs to people with a criminal record.112 They
should also consider adopting rules, like those in New
York State, that make it illegal for employers to turn away
job applicants based solely on their criminal record.113
Under New York’s law, employers may still consider criminal history, but only as part of a holistic inquiry, and they
may only reject an applicant on the basis of a conviction
for a specific, enumerated reason — such as if the conviction has a direct relationship to the job, presents a licensing concern, or suggests a risk to the general public.114
Some landlords will also automatically deny a lease to
people with a criminal record, contributing to an
increased risk of homelessness among formerly justice-involved people.115 As with employment, states and municipalities should pass laws to prohibit such discrimination.
Seattle’s Fair Chance Housing legislation of 2017, for
example, prevents landlords from unfairly rejecting applicants based on justice involvement and prohibits the use
in advertising of language that categorically excludes
formerly justice-involved individuals.116

G. Public housing authorities should relax or
eliminate rules that exclude people with a
criminal record.

Public housing is often the only affordable option for
people returning from prison, but many public housing
authorities (PHAs), taking a cue from federal laws, exclude
people with a criminal record. These rules often separate

22 Brennan Center for Justice

families and make it impossible for people to return
home.117
PHAs should relax these rules. Some have begun doing
so, with promising results. Following a pilot program that
saw low recidivism and a majority of participants successfully reaching other milestones, the New York City Housing Authority now partners with reentry organizations to
help people with conviction records transition into housing.118 Similarly, due to a recent policy change, a criminal
conviction is no longer an automatic disqualification for
public housing in New Orleans.119

H. Corrections authorities should
proactively connect people to health-care
benefits.

Justice-involved people experience chronic health conditions, including substance-use disorders and mental
illness, at higher rates than the general population.120
Poor health increases the risk of job loss and unemployment — effects surely felt by the justice-involved population.121 Therefore, corrections officials should ensure
that people being released from jail or prison understand
how to make use of services available to them, including
federal benefits and state-sponsored health insurance.122
Before their release, individuals should be provided with
all the documentation necessary to access health-care
benefits.123

I. State and federal policymakers should
expand the social safety net.

Government assistance programs are proven and effective means of reducing poverty.124 They may also reduce
recidivism by keeping people out of poverty and despair.125
A 1990s federal welfare reform law permits states to deny
important food and cash assistance benefits to people
convicted of some drug offenses.126 This provision is an
outdated and unnecessarily punitive relic of the “war on
drugs,” and Congress should repeal it outright.
Until Congress is poised to act, states should, as a stopgap measure, exercise their statutory right to opt out of
the exclusion.127 Many have already done so, but around
half still exclude some formerly justice-involved people
from benefits.128 All states should opt out of the provision
in its entirety.
Correctional administrators should also work with all
levels of government to ensure that people being released
from incarceration are connected immediately with
anti-poverty programs and benefits. As one example, New
York City preemptively enrolls people in the Supplemental
Nutritional Assistance Program (SNAP) as they approach
their release from city jails, ensuring that they do not wait
an unnecessarily long time for food benefits. More jurisdictions should do the same.129

Conviction, Imprisonment, and Lost Earnings

V. Conclusion

M

ore than 70 million Americans have a criminal record of some kind. This
report is the first to demonstrate that more than half of them have at least
one conviction for a misdemeanor or a more serious crime. Nearly 8 million
of them have been imprisoned at some point in their lives, testament to the sprawling
reach of incarceration.
This exposure to the criminal justice system, however
long or however brief, carries consequences that extend
far beyond a guilty plea, trial verdict, or release from
prison. People who have been convicted of a crime can
expect to earn at least 16 percent less, on average, than
their peers. And those who have been to prison will lose
around half of their earning potential. Over the course of
a lifetime, that loss, on average, approaches half a million
dollars — easily the difference between escapable and
inescapable poverty.

23 Brennan Center for Justice

These lost wages, in aggregate, cost people touched by
the criminal justice system more than $372 billion annually. And this loss is not evenly distributed. It is felt most
keenly by Black and Latino communities, which disproportionately lose their members and their wealth to incarceration and its effects.
Taken together, these findings demonstrate that ending
mass incarceration is an economic imperative as much
as a moral one. It is a vital step toward restoring prosperity to underserved communities across the country, and
toward closing the racial wealth gap.

Conviction, Imprisonment, and Lost Earnings

Appendix A: Literature Review
I. Estimates of Population Size

Formerly Imprisoned People
Scholars have repeatedly attempted to estimate the
number of people who have been to prison. The government does not publicly track this information. However,
data available from the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS)
and its National Prisoner Statistics Program generally
provides a solid starting point for estimating the size
of this population. Historically, scholars approached
the task by collecting data on annual prison releases,
adding them up over the study period, and then
controlling for mortality and recidivism. Findings from
some of the most recent studies, shown in table 4,
suggest that around 5 to 7 million people in the United
States who are alive today were imprisoned at some
point in their lives.130
People with Felony Convictions
BJS has not reported the number of felony convictions
entered annually since 2007, significantly complicating

any effort to estimate the number of people with a felony
conviction today.131 Previous BJS data suggests that around
2 million felony convictions occur annually.132
To bridge this gap in the data, researchers have developed creative techniques. Perhaps the best-known papers
in this field were produced by the Center for Economic
and Policy Research (CEPR) in 2010 and 2016. The first,
by economist John Schmitt and researcher Kris Warner,
started with BJS estimates of the number of people entering and leaving prison and then used data on the ratio of
felony convictions to prison sentences to extrapolate the
number of felony offenders convicted annually. Estimates
of recidivism and mortality were then applied.133 Researchers Cherrie Bucknor and Alan Barber updated this paper
in 2016, following the same methodology.134 A 2017 study
by sociologist Sarah Shannon and colleagues, building on
a 2011 paper, followed a similar methodology and incorporated a broader set of data.135 As shown in table 4, all
four studies concluded that more than 10 million living
people in the United States have a felony record.

TABLE4

Previous Studies of the Justice-Involved Population
AUTHORS

DATA THROUGH

ESTIMATE OF FORMERLY
IMPRISONED PEOPLE

ESTIMATE OF PEOPLE WITH A FELONY
CONVICTION

Schmitt and
Warner (2010)

2008

5.4-6.1 million

12.3-13.9 million

Shannon et al.
(2011)

2010

4.9 million

19.8 million

2014

6.1-6.9 million

14.0-15.8 million

2010*

7.3 million

19.0 million

Bucknor and
Barber (2016)
Shannon et al.
(2017)

*Totals include those subject to correctional
correctional control
control during
during the
the survey
survey year.
year.

John Schmitt
Schmitt and
and Kris
Kris Warner,
Warner,Ex-offenders
Ex-offendersand
andthe
theLabor
LaborMarket,
Market,Center
Centerfor
forEconomic
Economicand
andPolicy
PolicyResearch,
Research,
Source: John
2010, http:/
/cepr.net/documents/publications/ex-offenders-2010-11.pdf; Sarah
2010,
http://cepr.net/documents/publications/ex-offenders-2010-11.pdf;
SarahShannon
Shannonet
etal.,
al.,“Growth
"Growthininthe
theU.S.
U.S. Ex­
Ex-felon
Ex-prisoner
Population,
1948
2010”
(conference
paper,
2011),
http://paa2011.princeton.edu/papers/111687;
felon
andand
Ex-prisoner
Population,
1948
to to
2010"
(conference
paper,
2011),
http://paa2011.princeton.edu/papers/111687;
Cherrie Bucknor
Bucknor and
and Alan
Alan Barber,
Price We
Pay: Economic
Economic Costs
Costs of
of Barriers
Barriers to
to Employment
Employment for
for Former
Former Prisoners
Prisoners and
and
Cherrie
Barber, The
The Price
We Pay:
People Convicted of Felonies, Center for Economic and Policy Research, 2016, 1, https://cepr.net/report/the-price-we-payPeople Convicted of Felonies, Center for Economic and Policy Research, 2016, 1, https://cepr.net/report/the-price­
economic-costs-of-barriers-to-employment-for-former-prisoners-and-people-convicted-of-felonies; Sarah Shannon et al.,
we-pay-economic-costs-of-barriers-to-employment-for-former-prisoners-and-people-convicted-of-felonies;
Sarah
“The Growth, Scope, and Spatial Distribution of People with Felony Records in the United States, 1948–2010,”
Demography
Shannon
et al., "T1804–5
he Growth,
Scope,1. and Spatial Distribution of People with Felony Records in the United States, 194854, no. 5 (2017):
and table
2010," Demography 54, no. 5 (2017): 1804-5 and table 1.

24 Brennan Center for Justice

Conviction, Imprisonment, and Lost Earnings

Significantly, though, none of these papers sought to
identify the number of people who were convicted of a
felony but not imprisoned. Imprisonment is, of course, a
more severe sanction than conviction alone. It is also far
less common. Attempting to differentiate among the various levels of criminal justice involvement is one of this
paper’s major contributions.
People with Misdemeanor Convictions
National information on misdemeanor cases is difficult
to obtain for a number of reasons. For one, some jurisdictions do not keep track of the number of minor cases.136
Further, the term misdemeanor is an amorphous one; the
definition differs among states, making it that much
harder to study in the aggregate.137
Early efforts to fill this gap struggled with incomplete
data.138 But misdemeanor data availability is improving.
The National Center for State Courts (NCSC), a repository of information that relies on individual states to
provide their caseload data, began reporting detailed
information on state court dockets online in 2012. Not
all states participate in the NCSC every year; for those
that do not, data can often be found online in state
annual reports.139
Drawing on these resources, scholars have come closer
to estimating the number of misdemeanor cases filed
annually — around 13 million. Researchers Megan Stevenson and Sandra Mayson used publicly available caseload
statistics from 45 states — imputing missing data based
on misdemeanor case-filing rates in states that had similar characteristics — to calculate that there were 13.2
million misdemeanor cases filed in 2016.140 Law professor
Alexandra Natapoff, using a related methodology, arrived
at a similar estimate for misdemeanor cases filed in
2015.141 These figures exceed the number of all arrests
made in those years.142
Estimating the number of those cases that result in
convictions proves more difficult. Conviction rates appear
highly variable from one state to the next. BJS briefly
reported these figures; national misdemeanor conviction
rates for state prosecutors, according to one report series,
were 77 percent in 1996 and 88.7 percent in 2001.143 Law
professors Nancy King and Michael Heise have also estimated misdemeanor conviction rates for 25 states. They
estimated a national rate of 73 percent. Calculation methods for each state, however, differed significantly, and
fewer than half of all states had enough available data
from which to derive an estimate.144
State-by-state canvassing of available criminal justice
records is not adequate to fill gaps in this data, however,
as some jurisdictions do not report misdemeanor conviction rates in any form.

25 Brennan Center for Justice

II. Estimates of Wage Effects

People in Prisons
Relatively few studies have identified what people in
prison could have earned but for their incarceration. This
report does not directly analyze what wages are “lost”
during someone’s incarceration. But research in this area
provides helpful context, underscoring that people who
become imprisoned — and those who are highly similar
to them — tend to have preexisting disadvantages.
In 1999, economist David A. Anderson offered one estimate of this figure as part of a broader study aimed at
quantifying the total economic cost of crime. While previous researchers had found that incarcerating a single
person “costs society $5,700 in lost productivity per year,”
he wrote, that estimate was “based on the observation that
many prisoners did not work in the legal market prior to
their offense.” Moving past that assumption, and assuming
instead that people in prison could have earned about as
much as the average hourly worker, Anderson found that
“the average incarcerated worker is estimated to represent
$23,286 in lost productivity per year.”145
Subsequent researchers have built on Anderson’s work
to calculate their own estimates of the wages that people
in prison miss out on while incarcerated. In 2006, economist Jens Ludwig used Anderson’s research in testimony
on the “costs of crime” before the Senate Judiciary
Committee. The “lost productivity associated with time
that incarcerated criminals spend behind bars,” he
concluded, was around $35 billion annually.146 Updating
Anderson’s work to 2014 dollars, a 2016 study by economists at Washington University in St. Louis found that
people lose just over $33,000 per year while imprisoned.
Over the length of an average prison term (roughly 2.25
years in this paper), the study concluded, those entering
prison in 2014 could expect to lose a total of $70.5 billion
during their incarceration.147
Another study, by health economists Kathryn E.
McCollister, Michael T. French, and Hai Fang, employed
a different method to calculate lost wages. Using data
on prison populations and assuming that each incarcerated person could earn at least the minimum wage,
McCollister’s team found that the average person
convicted of murder would face around $150,000 in lost
wages while incarcerated, while the average person
convicted of larceny would lose less than $200.148
(Significantly, their calculations accounted only for time
spent in prison, not time spent in jail, where many
larceny defendants will serve their sentences.)
Formerly Imprisoned People
Economists and sociologists have consistently shown
that time behind bars decreases both the likelihood of
being employed post-release and the wages earned. This
problem was dramatically illustrated by the late sociologist Devah Pager in a series of real-world experiments.

Conviction, Imprisonment, and Lost Earnings

In the first, published in 2003, job candidates applied
for actual positions in Milwaukee using résumés indicating a drug conviction and an 18-month prison term.
Pager’s findings showed that even this relatively short
prison term presented “a major barrier” to employment,
especially for Black applicants.149 She repeated the study
in New York City in 2009, with similar results.150
Some researchers have used novel study designs to
evaluate the impact of prison on earnings. Criminologist
Naomi Sugie, a professor at the University of California,
Irvine, explored this topic in a 2014 dissertation. She
followed 156 recently released parolees via smartphones,
finding that returning citizens faced “a reentry period
characterized by very short-term, irregular, and poor-quality work.” Sugie suggested that stigma and “low social
connectivity and low emotional wellbeing about searching” were jointly to blame and that this situation tended
to make illegitimate (criminal) earning opportunities
more attractive for those who feel shut out of the conventional labor market.151
The U.S. Department of Labor does not track the unemployment rate for the formerly incarcerated, but it appears
to be high. Around 40 percent of formerly imprisoned
people released from Indiana state prisons in 2005
reported being unemployed in the years following their
release, according to the director of education of the Indiana Department of Correction, John M. Nally, and coauthors, writing in the Journal of Correctional Education in
2011. According to the study, that figure rose to roughly
65 percent in the late 2000s, potentially due to worsening
economic conditions.152
Putting a dollar value to this lost productivity, as this
report seeks to do, is another matter. In a 2001 paper,
sociologist Bruce Western, along with economists
David Weiman and Jeffrey R. Kling, found that prison
time had a significant negative effect on subsequent
earnings, on the order of a 10 to 30 percent reduction.
But they stopped short of separating this effect into
individual causes of reduced job prospects — such as
arrest, conviction, and time served behind bars — finding that more data was needed and that “studying the
effects of contact with the criminal justice system is a
hard scientific problem.”153 In a 2002 paper, Western
reached a similar result, writing that incarceration
disrupts key “life transitions,” causing slow wage
growth among returning citizens and leading to a 10 to
20 percent reduction in wages.154
One might expect this effect to be proportional with
the length of sentence, if time behind bars conveys more
than a stigma — for example, if prison causes people to
lose some of the skills necessary for success in the workplace or prevents them from gaining new skills. In fact,
one recent paper by economist Michael Mueller-Smith
concluded that formerly incarcerated people do earn less
after release, and that the effect increases based on how

26 Brennan Center for Justice

long the person spent behind bars. Mueller-Smith used
administrative data from both Harris County and the state
of Texas to compare the economic outcomes for defendants who, despite being similarly situated, were randomly
assigned to different judges in Houston. This method
revealed that each additional year of incarceration
reduced the likelihood of future employment by 3.6
percentage points. He wrote that “among felony defendants with stable pre-charge income incarcerated for one
or more years, reemployment drops by at least 24 percent
in the 5 years after being released.”155
Many other researchers have used longitudinal data —
studies that track a group of individuals over time — to
examine how incarceration affects earnings over the long
term. Sociologists Bruce Western and Katherine Beckett
in 1999,156 Western again in a 2006 book,157 sociologist
Amanda Geller and coauthors in 2006,158 economist
Steven Raphael in 2007,159 and the Pew Charitable Trusts
in 2010160 all used this research method, finding a significant negative employment effect.
People with a Felony Conviction
While there is little doubt that incarceration negatively
impacts lifetime earnings, researchers have yet to determine how much of this impact is due to imprisonment
— which entails prolonged separation from the job
market and (research shows) a severe social stigma — and
how much stems from the stigmatizing effect of a criminal conviction alone. This is an important question
because, as noted above, previous research showed that
the number of people with a felony conviction is likely to
be very large.
While several scholars have used longitudinal data to
study the effect of imprisonment, few have done the same
to estimate the effect of conviction. The authors of this
study found only one such study, by economist Richard
B. Freeman in 1991. Freeman estimated that a criminal
conviction translates to a 10–15 percent reduction in
weeks worked annually, compared with 25–30 percent
for incarceration.161
Other studies have simply assumed that conviction and
imprisonment affect someone equally. The CEPR studies
discussed in the previous section also reviewed the literature to find an average penalty paid by formerly incarcerated workers and then, assuming that people with a
conviction alone would face the same penalty, applied it
to the entire justice-involved population. Ultimately,
CEPR’s 2010 report estimated that conviction and incarceration lowered male employment by more than 1.5
percentage points and resulted in a loss to the U.S. economy of $57–$65 billion in economic output.162 The 2016
update, working under the same assumption, found that
incarceration reduced the labor pool by 1.7 to 1.9 million
workers in 2014, translating to $78–$87 billion in annual
lost economic output.163

Conviction, Imprisonment, and Lost Earnings

People with a Misdemeanor Conviction
The authors of this report found no study specifically
analyzing the effect of a misdemeanor conviction.
However, some studies have found that even a minor
criminal record can have profound employment implications. In one 2014 paper, sociologist and legal scholar
Christopher Uggen concluded that there is a “much
broader range of impropriety” that can impact employment opportunities. Uggen identified a 4 percentage point
reduction in employer callbacks for people with only a
minor arrest record. Uggen also observed that the effect
of conviction alone was an understudied problem in
sociology.164
Even today, few researchers have investigated these
“lesser boundaries of stigma.”165 Where they have, the
results suggest a wide variety of experiences. A study by
criminologist and statistician Daniel Nagin and economist Joel Waldfogel, for example, tied labor outcomes to

27 Brennan Center for Justice

the type of conviction, concluding that fraud convictions,
which imply a breach of trust, create serious economic
consequences, while convictions implying no breach of
trust may not.166 All told, this makes the effect of a misdemeanor conviction an important area for analysis.
Other developing research investigates whether an
arrest has its own effect on wages, potentially explaining
misdemeanor effects on wages or confounding attempts
to analyze them. Uggen’s research, mentioned above,
suggested that people with an arrest record were slightly
less likely to receive callback interviews.167 Using longitudinal data, one recent paper by economist Amanda Sheely
argues that arrest, rather than conviction or incarceration,
is in fact what drives economic loss.168 However, others
disagree, finding that “entry-level contacts in the form of
arrest are largely uncorrelated with wages.”169 Another
paper, forthcoming from Mueller-Smith, also explores
this issue using U.S. Census Bureau data.170

Conviction, Imprisonment, and Lost Earnings

Appendix B: Methodology

A

ll models of population size relied on data on
the number of people who interact with each
level of the criminal justice system, combined
with internally developed models of recidivism and
mortality. The National Longitudinal Survey of Youth
(NLSY) was used to supplement data gaps on
misdemeanors.
NLSY data also underpins this report’s analyses of the
earnings effects of justice involvement; as described below,
the authors used a propensity-score matching model to
compare justice-involved people with highly similar,
non-justice-involved people. In early drafts of the report,
NLSY Geocode data, which provides information on the
location of NLSY participants, was also used under agreement with the Bureau of Labor Statistics to refine these
estimates. Unfortunately, due to the Covid-19 pandemic, the
authors were unable to access the computer where Geocode
data was stored (and, contractually, the only place where
the authors were permitted to access it). Therefore, in the
final draft, regional data was used as a substitute.
The sources of data for each factor are explained in
turn below.

I. Estimates of Population Size

Formerly Incarcerated Individuals
To estimate the formerly incarcerated population, for each
year studied, this report sums the total number of people
released from prison, subtracts people who have likely
recidivated, and then controls for mortality. The following
data was used for each step of this analysis:
Data on people leaving prison. Data on prison
releases for the years 1960 through 2016 was obtained
from the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS). Yearly reports
provide data as far back as 1978; for the remaining years,
a BJS historical report stretches back to 1850.171 Prison
release data was incorporated going back to 1965 only,
because mortality figures suggest that the number of
formerly imprisoned people still living but released before
1965 is negligible.
Recidivism data. Rates tracking recidivism in threeand five-year increments are among those most
commonly referred to by criminal justice researchers,
making them an obvious choice when designing a study.172
But recidivism rates vary widely based on how long someone has been out of prison, rising quickly in the period
immediately after release and ultimately reaching a
plateau.173 That makes generally used recidivism rates, on
their own, inadequate to estimate how many people have
left prison but have since returned. Applying a five-year
recidivism rate to a group of people released in 1980, for
example, would not accurately estimate how many
returned between 1980 and 2017.

28 Brennan Center for Justice

Drawing from previous research, the authors calculated
new recidivism rates that vary based on how long someone has been out of prison. This calculation was
performed using the National Corrections Reporting
Program (NCRP) dataset.174 While the NCRP does not
include recidivism rates, it does have unique identifying
variables (“Inmate_ID”) for each person entering or leaving prison, which allowed us to calculate recidivism rates
based on when a person leaves prison and when he or she
reenters it. For example, the results show that someone
released in 2017 has a 3 percent chance of returning to
prison during the study period. But someone released 20
years prior, in 1997, has a 65 percent chance of recidivating before 2017.
Because of limitations on the data in the NCRP dataset,
rates used in this report were constructed for roughly 25
years — specifically, for each cohort of releases from 1991
to 2016 — and then extrapolated backwards. These recidivism rates were then matched to each cohort of released
prisoners; for example, someone released in 1991 was
matched with a 25-year recidivism rate. Theoretically, this
method should model the ebb and flow of prison
populations.
Numerous states inconsistently report prison information to the NCRP, which may confound any recidivism
estimates. The authors followed the Neal and Rick (2014)
recommendation and restricted the report’s recidivism
analyses to 11 states that are identified as having consistent reports: California, Colorado, Illinois, Kentucky,
Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Jersey, South
Dakota, Virginia, and Washington.175
Mortality data. Prisons are uniquely harmful to the
physical and mental health of people incarcerated there.176
To calculate a realistic mortality estimate, the authors
combined data from several sources, creating a new
mortality estimate designed to model the unique health
problems faced by previously incarcerated people.
Starting with a 2007 study by physician Ingrid
Binswanger, the authors conclude that people released
from prison face mortality rates 3.5 times higher than the
general public.177 Binswanger’s study focused only on
Washington State, but lacking any satisfactory alternative,
the authors felt more comfortable generalizing it to the
rest of the population than working with mortality data
that failed to take into account the effect of prison. With
those results in hand, mortality figures were derived by
starting with figures from the Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention (CDC), and mortality rates were multiplied
by 3.5 to calculate new survival rates.178
Demographic data. Last, the authors turned again to
the BJS and NCRP datasets for this report’s demographic
estimate of the formerly imprisoned population. Drawing

Conviction, Imprisonment, and Lost Earnings

from the NCRP, the authors used the 11 consistent state
reports identified in Neal and Rick (2014) to construct a
demographic breakdown of prison releases from 1991 to
2016, noting the proportions of each gender and race.
White women, for example, represent 6 percent of the
people released from state prison from 1991 to 2016. More
than 700,000 individuals were released from prison in
2010, according to BJS data, and the authors assumed
that approximately 26,600, or about 6 percent, were
white women. The authors then applied race- and
gender-specific mortality rates from the CDC and kept
only non-recidivist released prisoners in the sample.
Tables illustrating this process are available in supplemental data online.
Felony Conviction
The majority of people convicted of a felony offense will
be sentenced to either a term of imprisonment or probation. Therefore, probation is used as a proxy for felony
convictions not ending in imprisonment. This is an imprecise proxy for the reasons laid out in the report; specifically, some people convicted of felonies will serve a term
of incarceration in jail or be ordered to pay a fine. As a
result, the figure presented here may represent an
underestimate.
Like the preceding model, this estimate operates by
starting with the average “flow” of people affected by the
criminal justice system in a particular way, then discounting that population using recidivism and mortality estimates. The model proceeds with this data:
Probation entries. Entry into probation is used as a
proxy for conviction of a felony without imprisonment.
Data on probation entries for the years 1980 through
2016 was obtained from BJS. The authors were not able
to extend the Bureau’s estimate back through 1965 to
match the previous model.179
Probation recidivism data. For recidivism rates
within the first five years of probation, the authors used
a BJS report that tracked individuals placed on federal
probation in 2005 until 2010. Within five years, 43
percent of those placed on federal probation in 2005
were rearrested for a new offense.180 For recidivism after
that point, drawing from the NCRP, the authors used the
same recidivism rates constructed for estimating the
formerly imprisoned population.181
The authors also subtracted people who entered probation from prison, relying on the National Prisoner Statistics Program, to ensure that people accounted for in the
previous section would not be double counted. Specifically, the authors used the variables RLCOPROM and
RLCOPROF, which track conditional releases to probation or shock probation.182
Mortality data. The authors assumed that the mortality rates of individuals who have been placed on probation
are higher than the mortality rates of individuals with no

29 Brennan Center for Justice

criminal record or justice involvement, but lower than the
formerly imprisoned population. To estimate mortality,
the authors drew from the CDC’s most recent National
Vital Statistics Report.183 Black male mortality, being
above average, is used as a proxy for mortality rates of
people who have entered probation at some point in their
lives.
Nature of offense. Following this process so far would
produce an estimate of the number of people who have
served a term of probation without being incarcerated for
the offense that led to their probation. To identify how
many entered probation due to a felony conviction, rather
than a misdemeanor, the authors relied on a series of BJS
reports that include the ratio of felony to misdemeanor
offenses for adults on probation in each year.184
As with the preceding model, tables illustrating this
process are available in the supplemental data online.
Misdemeanor Conviction
Like the preceding models, this analysis estimates the
number of people annually affected by the misdemeanor
system and then controls for recidivism and mortality.
Due to the nature of the misdemeanor system, this
process required intermediate steps.
Annual misdemeanor convictions. To estimate the
number of misdemeanor convictions annually, the
authors initially sought data on the number of misdemeanor cases filed annually. In reviewing existing literature, the authors found estimates concluding that more
than 13 million misdemeanor cases were filed in both
2015 and 2016.185 But these two data points were insufficient to build a full estimate of the misdemeanor caseload. To fill in the gaps, the authors opted for a different
approach: calculating the number of misdemeanor
arrests and then estimating how often they convert to
conviction. That process started by tallying arrests according to the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) for offenses
that are likely to be misdemeanors.
The offenses counted as misdemeanors were as
follows: “other assaults,” stolen property, vandalism, prostitution, gambling, driving under the influence (DUI),
liquor law violations, drunkenness, disorderly conduct,
vagrancy, and “all other offenses,” with each arrest representing one individual case. This closely parallels a
process used by previous researchers.186 Arrest data was
available through 1995.
There are several reasons why this method might
understate the number of misdemeanor convictions
annually. For one, the UCR does not include arrests for
non-DUI traffic offenses, some of which, depending on
state law, may be misdemeanors. Further, some number
of misdemeanor cases begin as felony arrests, and not all
misdemeanor cases begin with an arrest. However, after
extensive research, the authors concluded that this
method was the best of imperfect alternatives.187

Conviction, Imprisonment, and Lost Earnings

To calculate how many of these arrests convert to
convictions, the authors turned to the NLSY, a survey that
followed a group of nationally representative young
people starting in both 1979 (the NLSY79 cohort) and
1997 (the NLSY97 cohort). Critically, the NLSY97 provides
data on whether, in a given year, respondents were
arrested and offers a few broadly defined categories of
criminal offenses. The NLSY97 recorded individual arrests
and convictions for three offenses likely to correspond to
misdemeanors or lower-level offenses: theft, major traffic
offenses, and public order offenses. The authors assumed
that the average conviction rate for these three offenses
was likely to be statistically similar to the conviction rate
for misdemeanor offenses in general. Therefore, finding
the percentage of arrestees who were convicted of these
three offenses would produce a fairly accurate estimate
of the conviction rate for all misdemeanor offenses.
The authors estimated misdemeanor conviction rates
for the years 1995 through 2015 and calculated an average
misdemeanor conviction rate of 72 percent — roughly in
line with past literature on this subject.188 Multiplying each
year’s conviction rate by the number of arrests identified
in the previous step yielded a rough estimate of the
number of misdemeanor convictions in a year.
Recidivism data. Misdemeanors typically result in
fines, alternatives to incarceration, or short sentences
typically served in jails rather than prisons. Therefore, this
report’s model had to control for something new: the
possibility of multiple misdemeanor convictions within
a single year. The authors found only one analysis discussing intra-year recidivism: a public health paper that studied jails in several large jurisdictions, concluding that each
person admitted to a jail in these jurisdictions entered 1.4
times annually.189 Using multiple jail admissions as a
rough proxy for multiple misdemeanor convictions, the
authors controlled for recidivism by first dividing the
conviction estimate in every year by 1.4. Recidivism data
from an Illinois Sentencing Policy Advisory Council report,
which included nine-year reconviction rates for people
released from probation for a misdemeanor offense, was
then applied.190
Mortality data. The authors assumed that people
convicted of only a misdemeanor have lower mortality
rates than people who experience extended incarceration.
With that in mind, Black male mortality rates were again
used as an estimate for the mortality rates of Americans
with misdemeanor convictions.
Data Limitations
Data on America’s sprawling criminal justice system is
surprisingly sparse. Gaps must at times be filled by interpolation or approximations based on limited available
research. As a result, the authors note that the estimates
in this study are subject to the following limitations:

30 Brennan Center for Justice

ƒ As noted above, this report’s estimate of the formerly
imprisoned population is based on data spanning from
1965 through 2017. But the other two estimates
provided in this report cover a more limited range of
time: the estimate of the felony-convicted population
relies on data that reaches back only as far as 1980, and
data used to estimate the misdemeanor-convicted
population is available only through 1995.
ƒ Estimates of the formerly imprisoned population, and
the population that has been convicted of a felony but
not imprisoned, were designed to overlap as little as
possible. But without better data, the authors cannot
entirely rule out the possibility that some people were
counted twice, once in each estimate.
ƒ Additionally, this report’s estimate of those who have
been convicted of felonies but not imprisoned is likely
a lower bound, as it does not account for those who
have been convicted of felonies and sentenced to
some sanction other than probation or prison (e.g.,
jail or a fine).
ƒ Relatedly, due to a lack of data, the misdemeanor-convicted population estimate almost certainly includes
people who have been convicted of a more serious
offense or even spent time in prison. As a result, this
estimate should be understood to overlap with the
other population estimates presented in this report.
ƒ Data on the misdemeanor system is very sparse. The estimate of the misdemeanor-convicted population presented
in this report was built using what is, to the best of the
authors’ knowledge, the best available data on this group.
However, this report’s estimate may ultimately prove high
as this field of research grows and a better understanding
of the model’s key elements — for example, intra-year
misdemeanor recidivism — develops.

Some of these limitations are discussed further in the
main body of the report.

II. Estimates of Earnings Effects

This report’s primary goal was to evaluate the effect of
criminal justice involvement on someone’s ability to earn
a living wage. This report accomplishes that goal by
using a statistical method to compare people who are
highly similar to each other except in one way: criminal
justice involvement (and degree of involvement).
Note that while these methods study the effects of
conviction and incarceration, they cannot exclude the
possibility that earnings reductions were at least partially
caused by other types of justice involvement incidental to
those events — e.g., arrest and pretrial incarceration.

Conviction, Imprisonment, and Lost Earnings

Survey Data
To accomplish this goal, the authors again started with the
NLSY. As noted above, NLSY Geocode data was initially
used, pursuant to an agreement with the Bureau of Labor
Statistics, but due to the intervening pandemic it could not
be relied on to develop final estimates for this report.
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, 1979
The NLSY79 is a nationally representative sample of
12,686 men and women, initially surveyed in 1979. At the
time of the baseline survey, the sample respondents were
14 to 22 years old. Sample respondents were interviewed
annually through 1994 and then biennially thereafter until
2014. Thus, the NLSY79 provides information on a large,
nationally representative sample aged 14 to 57.
NLSY79 data has an event history format. The start and
end of important life events are recorded, especially labor
market behavior, enabling users to ascertain the respondents’ annual earnings and education level in each survey
year. At baseline, the NLSY79 provides demographic
information on age, gender, and race or ethnicity. In
follow-up survey interviews, the NLSY79 asked an extensive set of questions on criminal activity and criminal
justice involvement. From this, the authors were able to
acquire data on the following:
ƒ Demographic characteristics. NLSY79 data enabled
the authors to track the broad demographic status of
sample participants, i.e., age, gender, racial-ethnic identity, and educational attainment.
ƒ Earning potential. In the NLSY79, the authors focused
on earnings data supplied in each interview year. Earnings were measured as total earnings over the prior 12
months. There were numerous outliers in the earnings
data, so the authors removed the top 2 percent of earners from the sample.
ƒ Criminal justice contact. The authors defined criminal justice contact in two distinct ways: (1) conviction
without incarceration, and (2) incarceration. The
NLSY79 provides data on both, but not for every survey
year. The authors therefore focused on the 1980 survey
year, in which respondents were asked whether they
were convicted of a crime. But the NLSY79 did not ask
respondents explicitly whether they were incarcerated.
Instead, this information had to be gleaned from the
type of residence the respondent reported. If the
respondent stated that he or she was living in a jail or
prison, the authors considered the respondent incarcerated for that survey year.

The clear limitation of the NLSY79 data is that survey
participants were likely to understate justice involvement in any given year. And, undoubtedly, some respon-

31 Brennan Center for Justice

dents could become convicted or arrested for a crime
after the 1980 surveys. Similarly, a respondent could
have been incarcerated between survey years.
ƒ Geography of residence. The NLSY79 data adds information on a survey respondent’s region of residence.
Regional identifiers enabled the authors to incorporate
key measures related to both earnings and justice
involvement (unemployment and poverty rates). The
original analyses used state of residence, based on NLSY
Geocode data, as the geographical identifier for these
measures.

National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, 1997
Like the NLSY79, the NLSY97 followed a cohort of participants annually or biannually, from 1997 to 2015. There
were approximately 9,000 participants born between
1980 and 1984, and at the initial interview in 1997, the
participants’ ages ranged from 12 to 17. As with the
NLSY79, the later survey again enabled the authors to
track demographic status, earning potential, and geography of residence.
The NLSY97 also added more comprehensive criminal
justice variables. In contrast to the NLSY79, the NLSY97
provides data on arrest, conviction, and incarceration in
every survey year. For each survey year, the NLSY97 asked
respondents whether they had ever been arrested,
convicted of a crime, or incarcerated. It also offers some
granularity on the nature of the arrest and conviction. The
NLSY97 data on criminal justice contact is thus richer
than that provided by the NLSY79.
The limitation of the NLSY97 data rests with the age
of the sample population. Because respondents were
teenagers at the time of the initial interview, this means
that they were no older than 35 years at the time of the
last survey, in 2015.
Statistical Methods
Using this survey data, the authors sought to compare
people who become involved in the criminal justice
system with each other and with other similarly situated
people in the survey dataset.
Propensity-Score Matching
To do so, the authors used propensity-score matching
(PSM). This approach compares those in contact with the
criminal justice system with others who have no criminal
justice contact, focusing on people who are “similar” in
terms of demographic and regional characteristics.
Propensity-score matching uses control variables to
calculate the probability that someone who has had no
criminal justice contact could have been justice involved.
PSM calculates a “propensity score” based on how similar those in the comparison group look to those in the
treatment group. The higher the propensity score, the

Conviction, Imprisonment, and Lost Earnings

more similar the individuals in the comparison group look
to those in the treatment group.
The authors compared justice-involved and non-justice-involved groups based on their similarities in these
traits:
ƒ demographic characteristics (age, race-ethnicity,
gender, and education),
ƒ regional characteristics (poverty rates and unemployment rates), and
ƒ interview-year fixed effects (i.e., indicators for each
interview year).

The authors used the PSM method to analyze earnings
loss over time due to incarceration or conviction in early
adulthood (i.e., early 20s on average). To do this, the
authors evaluated earnings among similarly matched
groups in the year the respondent was interviewed and
up to 30 years thereafter. This enabled the authors to plot
the trajectory of earnings for justice-involved and non-justice-involved individuals over a 30-year working period.
This 30-year analysis begins in the individuals’ late 20s
and therefore represents the prime working years of
people in the analysis sample. For the sake of clarity, the
authors split the 30-year period into 10-year blocks and
defined years 1–9 as “early career,” years 10–19 as “mid
career,” and years 20–30 as “late career.”
The authors also conducted numerous sensitivity
checks using additional control variables, including gaps
in employment, engagement in criminal or delinquent
activities, and other regional characteristics (such as
crime, arrest, and incarceration rates). The results from
these analyses were statistically similar to the ones
presented in this report. However, the authors wanted to
maintain the integrity of the PSM model by ensuring that
the means and the variances of the PSM-balanced sample
were close to 0 and 1, respectively. Our specification,
albeit sparse in controls, characterized a fully balanced
sample (in contrast to other specifications with numerous
control variables).
Heckman Correction
Although the PSM method helps minimize bias from
omitted variables, there is another problem that could
bias incarceration and conviction estimates. PSM estimations can observe and account for earnings only of individuals who are employed. People who are not working
may have a different earning potential, such that if the
authors could observe their earnings outcomes they
would likely be significantly lower than the earnings of
people who are employed. This inability to observe the
outcomes of people who are not working could bias the
report’s estimates.

32 Brennan Center for Justice

To remedy this sample selection problem, the authors
used a Heckman two-step correction procedure.191 In the
first step, the model uses an instrumental variable (i.e.,
region- and year-specific minimum wage rates) to predict
which individuals are employed (versus not), thereby
producing an inverse Mills ratio. The inverse Mills ratio
measures what the authors cannot observe — the probability of being employed over the cumulative probability
of employment. In the second step, the inverse Mills ratio
is then included in the general earnings equation along
with the incarceration and conviction indicators and individual- and region-level characteristics. The estimates on
incarceration and conviction should now be purged of the
bias from sample selection.
The authors found that after accounting for bias from
sample selection using the Heckman two-step procedure,
the lifetime earnings losses from incarceration and
conviction remained statistically significant and negative.
These estimates are substantially larger than the PSM
results for both incarceration and conviction, suggesting
that the sample selection bias from zero-earners understated the general findings.
Alternative Approaches
Ideally, analyses of the economic impact of incarceration
and conviction would also be performed using fixed
effects (FE) estimation. This method would not only
account for observed differences between justice-involved
and non-justice-involved individuals, but also control for
unobserved differences (such as productivity, values, and
propensity to commit crimes) that bias the estimated
effects of incarceration and conviction.
However, longitudinal data is unavailable for the number
of convictions in the NLSY79, preventing the authors from
producing FE estimates on the impact of conviction (without incarceration) on earnings. While the NLSY79 does
provide longitudinal data on incarceration, it notes that
status only in the year that someone reported actual incarceration; comparing people within that single year would
rely on an incarcerated sample of less than 1 percent of the
overall sample population. This limits the report’s ability
to present robust FE lifetime earnings trajectories as there
are relatively few incarcerated respondents to compute
“within-individual” differences over time.192
To address this limitation, the study relied on the PSM
method to measure the effects of conviction and incarceration as well as establish lifetime earning trajectories
for the justice-involved. PSM does not rely on within-individual differences and thus provides more efficient estimators of conviction and incarceration effects.
The study also used two strategies to account for bias
from omitted variables. The first strategy employed proxy
variables for unobserved factors such as attitudes, work
ethic, and cognitive ability. A simple strategy to mitigate
omitted variable bias is to use the proxy variable – ordinary

Conviction, Imprisonment, and Lost Earnings

least squares solution.193 This approach simply controls for
observed variables that might be good substitutes for
factors the authors cannot observe.
Both the NLSY79 and NLSY97 datasets provide suitable
proxy variables for key unobserved variables. In the
NLSY79, the authors used as proxy variables indicators
that explicitly measure the respondent’s attitude toward
school and work, cognitive ability (Armed Forces Qualification Test), and locus of control (Rotter scale score).194
For the NLSY97, proxy variables the authors used for
unobserved factors included the number of days absent
from school, percentage of peers belonging to a gang,
what the respondent thinks is the percent chance she or
he would be arrested after stealing a car, and cognitive
ability (Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery).
Accounting for these proxy variables in the lifetime
earnings model generally lowered the estimated effects
of incarceration and conviction. However, this approach
did not erase the robust effects of incarceration and
conviction on lifetime earnings, which remained both
significant and substantive.
Some critics argue that the proxy variable – ordinary
least squares solution is inadequate because proxies may
not fully capture the effects of unobserved variables. In
light of this concern, the authors implemented another
strategy that bound the estimated incarceration and
conviction effects based on the proportionality of the
selection on observables to the selection on unobservables.195 Simply put, the approach makes assumptions
about the degree to which the selection on observables
is proportional to the selection on unobservables, then
shows how estimated effects change based on this
proportionality. Oster (2019) formalizes this theory and
provides an accompanying STATA command (psacalc) to
execute the procedure.196 The findings show that selection
on unobservables would have to be stronger than the
selection on observables to completely explain away or
erase the effects of incarceration and conviction on lifetime earnings.

33 Brennan Center for Justice

Additionally, the authors performed analyses using the
logged form of earnings. This conveniently produces estimates that can be interpreted as percentages (rather than
dollar amounts). However, logging the earnings outcome
also had the side effect of condensing the data, which
inadvertently made the lifetime earnings effects appear
flatter over time. Given this, the authors used annual earnings (adjusted for inflation) as the preferred outcome
measure. Further, the authors also accounted for pre-incarceration/conviction earnings, and the results remained
consistent.
Data Limitations
To summarize points made elsewhere, the wage loss
estimates in this report are subject to the following
limitations:
ƒ The authors cannot exclude the possibility that experiences incidental to conviction and imprisonment —
that is, arrest and pretrial imprisonment — contribute
to the effects identified here.
ƒ PSM cannot fully account for unobserved differences
between treatment and control groups. As noted above,
these concerns were addressed by employing additional
methods to confirm the results. Further sensitivity
checks were also performed.
ƒ Because this report evaluates justice involvement in
the 1980 survey year, it cannot account for the possibility that survey participants would become involved
in the justice system again, at a later date.
ƒ All justice involvement in the NLSY is self-reported.
Therefore, there is a risk of measurement error, as
people may misrepresent their criminal history.

Conviction, Imprisonment, and Lost Earnings

Endnotes
1 Kriston McIntosh et al., “Examining the Black-White Wealth Gap,”
Brookings Institution, February 27, 2020, https://www.brookings.edu/
blog/up-front/2020/02/27/examining-the-black-white-wealth-gap.
2 Dionissi Aliprantis and Daniel Carroll, What Is Behind the Persistence
of the Racial Wealth Gap?, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, 2019, 1,
https://www.clevelandfed.org/newsroom-and-events/publications/
economic-commentary/2019-economic-commentaries/ec-201903what-is-behind-the-persistence-of-the-racial-wealth-gap.aspx. See also
William Darity Jr. et al., What We Get Wrong About Closing the Racial
Wealth Gap, Samuel DuBois Cook Center on Social Equity, April 2018,
https://socialequity.duke.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/
what-we-get-wrong.pdf.
3 Calvin Schermerhorn, “Why the Racial Wealth Gap Persists, More
than 150 Years After Emancipation,” Washington Post, June 19, 2019,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2019/06/19/why-racialwealth-gap-persists-more-than-years-after-emancipation.
4 See Report of the Sentencing Project to the United Nations Special
Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Racism, Racial Discrimination,
Xenophobia, and Related Intolerance Regarding Racial Disparities in
the United States Criminal Justice System, The Sentencing Project,
March 2018, https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/
un-report-on-racial-disparities.
5 New York Civil Liberties Union, “Stop-and-Frisk Data,” last
accessed August 7, 2020, https://www.nyclu.org/en/stop-and-Friskdata. A federal judge also concluded that the program operated with
discriminatory intent. See Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d
540, 661 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).

of Justice Statistics, accessed August 20, 2019, https://www.bjs.gov/
index.cfm?ty=nps; and Margaret Werner Cahalan, Historical
Corrections in the United States, 1850–1984, Bureau of Justice
Statistics, 1986, 182, https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/
hcsus5084.pdf.
12 For a discussion of recidivism rates, see Mariel Alper et al., 2018
Update on Prisoner Recidivism: A 9-Year Follow-Up Period (2005–
2014), Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2018, 3, https://www.bjs.gov/
index.cfm?ty=tp&tid=17.
13 Bureau of Justice Statistics, “National Corrections Reporting
Program, 1991–2016: Selected Variables,” 2018, https://www.icpsr.
umich.edu/icpsrweb/ICPSR/studies/37021/summary; and Crystal
S. Yang, “Local Labor Markets and Criminal Recidivism,” Journal of
Public Economics 147 (2016): 16–29, http://scholar.harvard.edu/
files/cyang/files/labor_recidivism_dec2016.pdf.
14 See, e.g., Beth Schwartzapfel, “How Bad Is Prison Health Care?
Depends on Who’s Watching,” Marshall Project, February 26, 2018,
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2018/02/25/how-bad-is-prison-health-care-depends-on-who-s-watching.
15 Ingrid A. Binswanger et al., “Release from Prison — A High Risk of
Death for Former Inmates,” New England Journal of Medicine 356, no. 2
(2007), http://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMsa064115; and
Elizabeth Arias and Jiaquan Xu, “United States Life Tables, 2017,”
National Vital Statistics System, 2019, tables 5–12, https://www.cdc.
gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr66/nvsr66_03.pdf.

6 Timothy Williams, “Study Supports Suspicion that Police Are More
Likely to Use Force on Blacks,” New York Times, July 7, 2016, https://
www.nytimes.com/2016/07/08/us/study-supports-suspicion-thatpolice-use-of-force-is-more-likely-for-blacks.html.

16 In 2017, the year studied in this report, Virginia’s population was
8.14 million. “Population Distribution by Race/Ethnicity,” Kaiser Family
Foundation, accessed May 27, 2020, https://www.kff.org/other/
state-indicator/distribution-by-raceethnicity/?dataView=1&currentTimeframe=1&sortModel=%7B%22colId%22:%22Location%22,%22sort%22:%22asc%22%7D.

7 Larry Buchanan, Quoctrung Bui, and Jugal K. Patel, “Black Lives
Matter May Be the Largest Movement in U.S. History,” New York Times,
July 3, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/07/03/
us/george-floyd-protests-crowd-size.html.

17 The average prison stay is about three years. Danielle Kaeble,
Time Served in State Prison, 2016, Bureau of Justice Statistics,
November 2018, https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=6446.

8 For example, the late Devah Pager, a renowned sociologist, noted
that racial discrimination and justice involvement both caused Black
job applicants to miss out on opportunities. “The Mark of a Criminal
Record,” American Journal of Sociology 108 (2003): 937, 958. This
study, and its relationship to this report’s findings, will be discussed at
greater length below.

18 See, e.g., Cherrie Bucknor and Alan Barber, The Price We Pay:
Economic Costs of Barriers to Employment for Former Prisoners and
People Convicted of Felonies, Center for Economic and Policy
Research, 2016, 1, 4–5, http://cepr.net/images/stories/reports/
employment-prisoners-felonies-2016-06.pdf?v=5; and John Schmitt
and Kris Warner, Ex-offenders and the Labor Market, Center for
Economic and Policy Research, 2010, 3, fig. 1, and 4, https://www.cepr.
net/documents/publications/ex-offenders-2010-11.pdf. Roughly 60
percent of the American population is “working age.” “Quick Facts,”
United States Census Bureau, accessed March 18, 2020, https://www.
census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/US/PST045218.

9 There is a risk that people with records in multiple states are
counted twice in the FBI database, and records may not be promptly
removed upon death, to say nothing of the confounding effects of
sealing and expungement. That said, 70 million appears to be the
consensus figure. See Matthew Friedman, “Just Facts: As Many
Americans Have Criminal Records as College Diplomas,” Brennan
Center for Justice, November 17, 2015, https://www.brennancenter.
org/blog/just-facts-many-americans-have-criminal-records-college-diplomas, citing Gary Fields and John R. Emshwiller, “As Arrest
Records Rise, Americans Find Consequences Can Last a Lifetime,”
Wall Street Journal, August 18, 2014, https://www.wsj.com/articles/
as-arrest-records-rise-americans-find-consequences-can-last-a-lifetime-1408415402. For a potential comparison point, see “NGI Monthly
Fact Sheet,” Next Generation Identification, last modified November
2019, https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/ngi-monthly-fact-sheet/
view (noting more than 77.7 million “criminal fingerprint” database
entries).
10 By some estimates, half of all Americans may have had a family
member incarcerated. See Every Second: The Impact of the Incarceration Crisis on America’s Families, FWD.us, 2018, https://everysecond.
fwd.us/downloads/EverySecond.fwd.us.pdf.
11

“Corrections Statistical Analysis Tool (CSAT) – Prisoners,” Bureau

34 Brennan Center for Justice

19 Sarah K. S. Shannon et al., “The Growth, Scope, and Spatial
Distribution of People with Felony Records in the United States,
1948–2010,” Demography 54, no. 5 (2017): 1804–5 and table 1.
20 This report assumes a mortality rate among the formerly
imprisoned population 3.5 times higher than that of the general
population. Previous researchers have assumed mortality rates
roughly 1.5 times higher than that of the general population. Shannon
et al., “The Growth, Scope, and Spatial Distribution,” 1802. For more on
this matter, see appendix B.
21 James Cullen, “Despite Progress, Prison Racial Disparities
Persist,” Brennan Center for Justice, August 19, 2016, https://www.
brennancenter.org/blog/despite-progress-prison-racial-disparities-persist.
22 E. Ann Carson, Prisoners in 2018, Bureau of Justice Statistics,
2020, 6, table 3, https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=6846.

Conviction, Imprisonment, and Lost Earnings

23 Roughly 1.5 million people were in a state or federal prison in
2017. Jennifer Bronson and E. Ann Carson, Prisoners in 2017, Bureau
of Justice Statistics, 2019, 1, https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=6546. Factoring in the 7.7 million formerly imprisoned
people identified in this report leads to the conclusion that roughly
9.2 million Americans had been imprisoned or were incarcerated in
2017.
24 Sean Rosenmerkel, Matthew Durose, and Donald Farole Jr.,
Felony Sentences in State Courts, 2006 – Statistical Tables, Bureau of
Justice Statistics, 2009, 4, table 1.2, https://bjs.gov/content/pub/
pdf/fssc06st.pdf.
25 Rosenmerkel, Durose, and Farole, Felony Sentences in State
Courts, 4, table 1.2.
26 Joshua A. Markman et al., Recidivism of Offenders Placed on
Federal Community Supervision in 2005: Patterns from 2005 to 2010,
Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2014, table 4, https://www.bjs.gov/
content/pub/pdf/ropfcs05p0510.pdf.
27 Lauren E. Glaze and Thomas P. Bonczar, Probation and Parole in
the United States, 2005, Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2006, table 3,
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ppus05.pdf.
28 Further, in 2001 BJS changed the way it reports the racial
composition of the probation population. Compare Lauren E. Glaze,
Probation and Parole in the United States, 2001, Bureau of Justice
Statistics, 2002, 4, table 4, https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=1111, with Bureau of Justice Statistics, Probation and Parole in
the United States, 2000, 2001, 6, table 5, https://www.bjs.gov/index.
cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=1230.
29 According to BJS, roughly 28 percent of people convicted of a
felony were sentenced to incarceration in a jail. Rosenmerkel, Durose,
and Farole, Felony Sentences in State Courts, 4, table 1.2. However, this
data is from 2006. The portion of people sentenced to jail may have
changed in the intervening decade as prisons became less crowded,
making them more attractive options to sentencing judges seeking to
impose a term of incarceration.
30 More than 90 percent of cases are resolved by plea bargain, for
example. Emily Yoffe, “Innocence Is Irrelevant,” Atlantic, September
2017, https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2017/09/
innocence-is-irrelevant/534171.
31 Megan T. Stevenson and Sandra G. Mayson, “The Scale of
Misdemeanor Justice,” Boston University Law Review 98 (2018):
735–36, http://www.bu.edu/bulawreview/files/2018/06/STEVENSON-MAYSON.pdf. As law professor Alexandra Natapoff puts it, “The
slipshod quality of petty offense processing is a dominant systemic
norm that competes vigorously with and sometimes overwhelms
foundational values of due process and adversarial adjudication.”
Alexandra Natapoff, “Misdemeanors,” South California Law Review 85
(2012): 1315–16, https://southerncalifornialawreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/85_1313.pdf. For a survey of New York City’s
misdemeanor system, see Issa Kohler-Hausmann, “Managerial
Justice and Mass Misdemeanors,” Stanford Law Review 66, no. 3
(2014): 629–39, http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/wp-content/
uploads/sites/3/2014/03/66_Stan_L_Rev_611_Kohler-Hausmann.
pdf.
32 Stevenson and Mayson, “The Scale of Misdemeanor Justice,”
737; Alexandra Natapoff, Punishment Without Crime (New York: Basic
Books, 2018), 258.
33 Stevenson and Mayson, “The Scale of Misdemeanor Justice,”
739–40.
34 The same is technically true of felony convictions not entailing
imprisonment, but the official recidivism data used in the report’s
model adequately captures that risk.
35 See Anne C. Spaulding et al., “HIV/AIDS Among Inmates of and
Releasees from US Correctional Facilities, 2006: Declining Share of
Epidemic but Persistent Public Health Opportunity,” PLOS ONE 4, no.
11 (2009): table 2, https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0007558.

35 Brennan Center for Justice

36 Zhen Zeng, Jail Inmates in 2017, Bureau of Justice Statistics,
2019, 2, table 1, https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=6547.
37 See, e.g., “Hampden County Sherriff’s Department: Research,”
accessed February 25, 2020, http://hcsdma.org/public-resources/
research.
38 Zeng, Jail Inmates in 2017, 8 table 8. One recent paper by the
Prison Policy Initiative sought to bridge this gap using a medical
dataset, the National Survey on Drug Use and Health, which tracks
how many times someone has been “arrested and booked” in the year
studied. The paper concluded that 4.9 million unique people are
arrested and jailed annually. But as the authors concede, the dataset
they used was not built with the justice system in mind. Alexi Jones
and Wendy Sawyer, Arrest, Release, Repeat: How Police and Jails Are
Misused to Respond to Social Problems, Prison Policy Initiative, 2019,
“Read About the Data,” https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/
repeatarrests.html#methodology.
39 Zeng, Jail Inmates in 2017, 8; and New York City Department of
Correction (hereinafter NYC DOC), “NYC Department of Correction at
a Glance: Information for the 12 Months of FY 2019,” accessed May 28,
2020, https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/doc/downloads/press-release/
DOC_At_Glance_FY2019_072319.pdf.
40 See, e.g., Benjamin Weiser, “Kalief Browder’s Suicide Brought
Changes to Rikers. Now It Has Led to a $3 Million Settlement,” New York
Times, January 24, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/24/
nyregion/kalief-browder-settlement-lawsuit.html.
41 Will Dobbie, Jacob Goldin, and Crystal S. Yang, “The Effects of
Pretrial Detention on Conviction, Future Crimes, and Employment:
Evidence from Randomly Assigned Judges,” American Economic
Review 108, no. 2 (2018): 201–40l, https://www.aeaweb.org/
articles?id=10.1257/aer.20161503; and Nick Pinto, “The Bail Trap,”
New York Times Magazine, August 13, 2015, http://www.nytimes.
com/2015/08/16/magazine/the-bail-trap.html?_r=1.
42 NYC DOC, “NYC Department of Correction at a Glance”; and NYC
Open Data, “Inmate Admissions,” updated February 1, 2020, https://
data.cityofnewyork.us/Public-Safety/Inmate-Admissions/
6teu-xtgp.
43 Zhen Zeng, Jail Inmates in 2018, Bureau of Justice Statistics,
2020, 2, table 1, https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ji18.pdf.
44 Adjuwa Thomas, legal assistant, Legal Division, NYC DOC, email
message to author, June 14, 2019.
45 Thomas Ahearn, “NAPBS Survey Reveals 95 Percent of
Employers Conducting Employment Background Screening in 2018,”
ESR News blog, July 2, 2018, https://www.esrcheck.com/wordpress/2018/07/02/napbs-survey-reveals-95-percent-employers-conducting-employment-background-screening-2018.
46 Devah Pager, Bruce Western, and Naomi Sugie, “Sequencing
Disadvantage: Barriers to Employment Facing Young Black and White
Men with Criminal Records,” Annals of the American Academy of
Political and Social Sciences 623, no. 1 (2009): 195–213, http://
scholar.harvard.edu/files/pager/files/annals_sequencingdisadvantage.pdf.
47 Society for Human Resource Management, Workers with
Criminal Records, last updated May 17, 2018, https://www.shrm.org/
hr-today/trends-and-forecasting/research-and-surveys/pages/
second-chances.aspx.
48 Lucius Couloute and Daniel Kopf, Out of Prison & Out of Work:
Unemployment Among Formerly Incarcerated People, Prison Policy
Initiative, 2018, https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/outofwork.
html.
49 Naomi F. Sugie, “Finding Work: A Smartphone Study of Job
Searching, Social Contacts, and Wellbeing After Prison” (PhD diss.,
Princeton University, 2014), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/
grants/248487.pdf.
50

Michelle Natividad Rodriguez and Beth Avery, Unlicensed &

Conviction, Imprisonment, and Lost Earnings

Untapped: Removing Barriers to State Occupational Licenses for
People with Records, National Employment Law Project, 2016, https://
www.nelp.org/publication/unlicensed-untapped-removing-barriers-state-occupational-licenses.
51 Ruth Sangree, “Prison Inmates Fighting California’s Wildfires
Can’t Do It Once They’re Released,” Brennan Center for Justice,
August 17, 2018, https://www.brennancenter.org/blog/prison-inmates-fighting-californias-wildfires-cant-do-it-once-theyre-released.
52 Steven Raphael, “The Impact of Incarceration on the Employment Outcomes of Former Inmates: Policy Options for Fostering
Self-Sufficiency and an Assessment of the Cost-Effectiveness of
Current Corrections Policy,” Goldman School of Public Policy (working
paper, Institute for Research on Poverty, Working Conference on
Pathways to Self Sufficiency: Getting Ahead in an Era Beyond Welfare
Reform, Madison, WI, September 6–7, 2007), 11, http://citeseerx.ist.
psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.484.1144&rep=rep1&type=pdf. See also Christopher J. Lyons and Becky Pettit,
“Compounded Disadvantage: Race, Incarceration, and Wage Growth”
(National Poverty Center Working Paper Series #08-16, October
2008), https://static.prisonpolicy.org/scans/working_paper08-16.
pdf; and Daniel Shoag and Stan Veuger, “The Economics of Prisoner
Reentry,” in Education for Liberation: The Politics of Promise and
Reform Inside and Beyond America’s Prisons, eds. Gerard Robinson
and Elizabeth English Smith (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield,
2018), 35–36.

incarceration, such as the incapacitating or deterrent effects of
incarceration. While the effect at America’s current level of incarceration is arguably marginal, incarceration could lower crime by
incapacitating individuals who engage in crime or deterring individuals
from crime. Next, those “benefits” would be set against the “costs” of
mass incarceration — such as the impact of imprisonment on children
and families, and the economic costs detailed in this report. For
discussions of the incapacitative and deterrent effects of imprisonment, see Daniel Kessler and Steven D. Levitt, “Using Sentence
Enhancements to Distinguish Between Deterrence and Incapacitation,” Journal of Law and Economics 42, no. S1 (1999): 343–64;
Francesco Drago, Roberto Galbiati, and Pietro Vertova, “The Deterrent
Effects of Prison: Evidence from a Natural Experiment,” Journal of
Political Economy 117, no. 2 (2009): 257–80; and Emily G. Owens,
“More Time, Less Crime? Estimating the Incapacitative Effect of
Sentence Enhancements,” Journal of Law and Economics 52, no. 3
(2009): 551–79. For an argument that such effects are marginal given
the high current rates of incarceration, see Oliver Roeder, LaurenBrooke Eisen, and Julia Bowling, What Caused the Crime Decline?,
Brennan Center for Justice, 2015, 7, 21–27, https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/what-caused-crime-decline.

54 See Dobbie, Goldin, and Yang, “The Effects of Pretrial Detention,”
203–4.

60 The authors also sought to use geocode data, obtained under
agreement with the Bureau of Labor Statistics, to account for state
rather than regional criminal justice variables. Initial analyses using
geocode data yielded promising results, indicating that imprisonment,
felony conviction, and misdemeanor conviction were all associated
with earnings loss. Due to its sensitive nature, though, geocode data
could be analyzed only on-site at the Brennan Center for Justice,
which became an impossibility as work on this report was being
finalized during the Covid-19 pandemic in April and May 2020. As a
result, the authors were unfortunately not able to incorporate geocode
data into the final models.

55 Indeed, “higher levels of incarceration are associated with higher
levels of both morbidity (percentage reporting fair or poor health) and
mortality.” Robert R. Weidner and Jennifer Schultz, “Examining the
Relationship Between U.S. Incarceration Rates and Population Health at
the County Level,” SSM – Population Health 9 (2019), https://www.
sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2352827319300874; and
Michael Massoglia and Brianna Remster, “Linkages Between Incarceration and Health,” Public Health Reports 134, no. 1 (2019): 8S–14S, https://
journals.sagepub.com/doi/epub/10.1177/0033354919826563.

61 Adam Looney and Nicholas Turner, Work and Opportunity Before
and After Incarceration, Brookings Institution, 2018, 8, https://www.
brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/es_20180314_looneyincarceration_final.pdf; Bernadette Rabuy and Daniel Kopf, Prisons
of Poverty: Uncovering the Pre-Incarceration Incomes of the Imprisoned, Prison Policy Initiative, 2015, https://www.prisonpolicy.org/
reports/income.html (analyzing Bureau of Justice Statistics, Survey
of Inmates in State Correctional Facilities, 2004, https://www.icpsr.
umich.edu/icpsrweb/NACJD/studies/4572).

56 Andrew P. Wilper, “The Health and Health Care of U.S. Prisoners:
Results of a Nationwide Survey,” American Journal of Public Health 99,
no. 4 (2009): 669; and David Cloud, On Life Support: Public Health in
the Age of Mass Incarceration, Vera Institute of Justice, 2014, 4,
https://www.vera.org/publications/on-life-support.

62 Center for Poverty Research, “What Are the Annual Earnings for a
Full-Time Minimum Wage Worker?,” University of California, Davis, last
updated January 12, 2018, https://poverty.ucdavis.edu/faq/
what-are-annual-earnings-full-time-minimum-wage-worker.

53 Michael Mueller-Smith, “The Criminal and Labor Impacts of
Incarceration” (working paper, University of Michigan, August 2015), 3,
https://sites.lsa.umich.edu/mgms/wp-content/uploads/
sites/283/2015/09/incar.pdf.

57 Larisa Antonisse and Rachel Garfield, “The Relationship Between
Work and Health: Findings from a Literature Review,” Henry J. Kaiser
Family Foundation, 2018, 2, https://www.kff.org/medicaid/issuebrief/the-relationship-between-work-and-health-findings-from-a-literature-review. Specific policy interventions focused on rehabilitation
could blunt these effects. See Bruce Western, “The Rehabilitation
Paradox,” New Yorker, May 6, 2016, https://www.newyorker.com/
news/news-desk/the-rehabilitation-paradox.
58 Summarizing the psychological effects of prison, one scholar
notes that prisons foster isolation, distrust, and diminished self-worth
and may create a post-traumatic stress reaction. Craig Haney, “The
Psychological Impact of Incarceration: Implications for Post-Prison
Adjustment” (working paper, National Policy Conference, From Prison
to Home: The Effect of Incarceration and Reentry on Children,
Families, and Communities, Washington, DC, January 30–31, 2002),
https://aspe.hhs.gov/basic-report/psychological-impact-incarceration-implications-post-prison-adjustment.
59 This report is not a cost-benefit analysis. However, its findings
can be used by future researchers to conduct a truly comprehensive
cost-benefit analysis of criminal justice policy, comparing the current
state of mass incarceration to a specific, future reform proposal. Such
an analysis would start by identifying some “benefits” of mass

36 Brennan Center for Justice

63 It is important to acknowledge that this approach may introduce
some measurement error. While felony is a term of art in the legal
world, it is possible that neither surveyors nor participants understood
the term with that same degree of precision. As a result, participants
may have under- or overreported felony involvement. While it is
difficult to determine the effect of this survey measurement error,
underreporting of felony records may be more likely. See Bruce
Western et al., “Study Retention as Bias Reduction in a Hard-to-Reach
Population,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 116, no.
20 (2016): 5477–85, https://www.pnas.org/content/113/20/5477.
64 Dobbie, Goldin, and Yang, “The Effects of Pretrial Detention,”
203–4.
65 Christopher Uggen et al., “The Edge of Stigma: An Experimental
Audit of the Effects of Low-Level Criminal Records on Employment,”
Criminology 52, no. 4 (2014): 632–33, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/
doi/10.1111/1745-9125.12051.
66 See Kohler-Hausmann, “Managerial Justice,” 643–49, 668–70.
For the policy ramifications of this “marking” process, see
Kohler-Hausmann, “Managerial Justice,” 690–92. For further
development of this theory and a description of how the misdemeanor
system disrupts lives, see Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Misdemeanorland
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2018).

Conviction, Imprisonment, and Lost Earnings

67 N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law §§ 1192(2) & 1193(1)(b)(i) (prescribing
misdemeanor penalties for driving with a blood alcohol concentration
greater than 0.08); and N.Y. Penal Law § 120.00 (defining simple
assault as a misdemeanor).
68 Mayor’s Office for Economic Opportunity, City of New York, “NYC
Opportunity 2018 Poverty Report,” 2018, 3, https://www1.nyc.gov/
assets/opportunity/pdf/NYCPov-Brochure-2018-Digital.pdf. See
also Mayor’s Office for Economic Opportunity, City of New York, New
York City Government Poverty Measure 2017: An Annual Report, 2019,
3, https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/opportunity/pdf/19_poverty_
measure_report.pdf and https://www1.nyc.gov/site/opportunity/
poverty-in-nyc/poverty-measure.page.
69 Eric M. Johnson, “More than 500,000 People Homeless in the
United States: Report,” Reuters, November 19, 2015, https://www.
reuters.com/article/us-usa-homelessness/500000-people-homeless-in-the-us.
70 National Aeronautics and Space Administration, “NASA FY 2021
Budget Request,” 2020, https://www.nasa.gov/sites/default/files/
atoms/files/fy2021_agency_fact_sheet.pdf; and National Aeronautics and Space Administration, “NASA Administrator Statement on
Moon to Mars Initiative, FY 2021 Budget,” news release no. 20-015,
February 10, 2020, https://www.nasa.gov/press-release/nasa-administrator-statement-on-moon-to-mars-initiative-fy-2021-budget.
71 “Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS): FY 2021 Budget
Request at a Glance,” U.S. Department of Justice, 2020, https://www.
justice.gov/doj/page/file/1246796/download.
72 See Bruce Western and Becky Pettit, “Incarceration and Racial
Inequality in Men’s Employment,” ILR Review 54 (2000): 11–13.
73 Jeff Guo, “America Has Locked Up So Many Black People It Has
Warped Our Sense of Reality,” Washington Post, February 26, 2016,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/america-has-locked-up-so-manyblack-people.
74 Wendy Sawyer, “How Much Do Incarcerated People Earn in Each
State?,” Prison Policy Initiative, April 10, 2017, https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2017/04/10/wages.
75 See Lauren-Brooke Eisen, “Paying for Your Time: How Charging
Inmates Fees Behind Bars May Violate the Excessive Fines Clause,”
Loyola Journal of Public Interest Law 15 (2014): 321–28; and Sawyer,
“How Much Do Incarcerated People Earn in Each State?” Such
deductions are permitted even in better-paying federal programs. See
Prison Industry Enhancement Certification Program Guideline, 64
Fed. Reg. 17000, 17011 (April 7, 1999).
76 See, e.g., Lauren-Brooke Eisen, Inside Private Prisons: An
American Dilemma in the Age of Mass Incarceration (New York:
Columbia University Press, 2018), 73–78.
77 For a recent discussion of this problem, see James M. Byrne, The
Effectiveness of Prison Programming: A Review of the Research
Literature Examining the Impact of Federal, State, and Local Inmate
Programming on Post-Release Recidivism, First Step Act Independent
Review Committee, 2019, 15, https://firststepact-irc.org/wp-content/
uploads/2019/12/IRC-Effectiveness-of-Prison-Programming.pdf.
78 There are two additional data limitations worth mentioning. First,
there is no guarantee that an early-adulthood experience of incarceration or conviction is the only justice involvement an individual might
experience before the prime working years. In this sense, the results
presented in this report should be interpreted as the effects of
early-adult conviction or incarceration on lifetime earnings trajectories, not conditional on future recidivism. Second, because this
analysis studies the effect of a self-reported conviction, it carries a risk
of measurement error. Some survey respondents may have understood the term conviction differently, for example, and either under- or
overreported their experience with the criminal justice system.
79 See James Jacobs, The Eternal Criminal Record (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 2015), 1–8 (“A criminal record is for life;
there is no statute of limitations.”).

37

Brennan Center for Justice

80 Economist Raj Chetty and his colleagues identify five factors
associated with lower intergenerational mobility — “segregation,
income inequality, school quality, social capital, and family structure.”
See Raj Chetty et al., “Where Is the Land of Opportunity? The
Geography of Intergenerational Mobility in the United States,”
Quarterly Journal of Economics 129, no. 4 (2014): 1557, 1603–20.
Chetty has shown that childhood interventions can have a powerful
impact on adult earning potential — suggesting, conversely, that
socioeconomic disadvantage can perpetuate itself. See Raj Chetty,
Nathaniel Hendren, and Lawrence F. Katz, “The Effects of Exposure to
Better Neighborhoods on Children: New Evidence from the Moving to
Opportunity Experiment,” American Economic Review 106, no. 4
(2016): 899–900.
81 Lam Thuy Vo, “Income for Young, Middle-Aged and Elderly
Americans, in Two Graphs,” NPR, October 23 2012, https://www.npr.
org/sections/money/2012/10/11/162744378/average-income-ofyoung-middle-aged-and-elderly-americans-in-two-graphs.
82 Looney and Turner, Work and Opportunity, 1 (finding that 45
percent of formerly incarcerated individuals report zero earnings for
the full first calendar year after their release).
83 Bruce Western, Jeffrey R. Kling, and David F. Weiman, “The Labor
Market Consequences of Incarceration,” Crime & Delinquency 47
(2001): 412–13, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/00111287
01047003007.
84 John Nally et al., “The Marginally Employed Offender: A Unique
Phenomenon Among Released Offenders,” Journal of Correctional
Education 64 (2013): 50–54, https://www.jstor.org/stable/
pdf/26507530.pdf?seq=1.
85 Todd Gabe, Jaison R. Abel, and Richard Florida, Can Low-Wage
Workers Find Better Jobs?, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 2018, 3,
18, https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/
staff_reports/sr846.pdf (finding that only 5.2 percent of people in
low-wage jobs move up the job ladder).
86 Center for Poverty Research, “What Is ‘Deep Poverty’?,”
University of California, Davis, last updated January, 16, 2018, https://
poverty.ucdavis.edu/faq/what-deep-poverty.
87 Based on the 2017 poverty threshold for a family of two with zero
minor children ($16,414). U.S. Census Bureau, “Poverty Thresholds,”
last accessed July 29, 2020, https://www.census.gov/data/tables/
time-series/demo/income-poverty/historical-poverty-thresholds.
html.
88 Based on the 2017 poverty threshold for a one-person household
($12,752). U.S. Census Bureau, “Poverty Thresholds.”
89 Aliprantis and Carroll, What Is Behind the Persistence of the
Racial Wealth Gap?. See also Darity et al., What We Get Wrong About
Closing the Racial Wealth Gap.
90 Serena Lei, “Nine Charts About Wealth Inequality in America,”
Urban Institute, 2017, http://apps.urban.org/features/wealth-inequality-charts (click “Show Median” under the chart “Average Family
Wealth by Race/Ethnicity, 1963–2016”).
91

Lei, “Nine Charts,” 5.

92 Khaing Zaw et al., “Race, Wealth and Incarceration: Results from
the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth,” Race and Social Problems 8
(2016): 111–12, https://www.prisonpolicy.org/scans/wealthraceincarcerationrates.pdf.
93

Pager, “The Mark of a Criminal Record,” 937, 958.

94 A large-scale reclassification effort in California — Proposition 47
— had no effect on violent crime rates, and it reduced recidivism rates;
however, it may have had a weak effect on the larceny rate, which
increased slightly. Mia Bird et al., The Impact of Proposition 47 on
Crime and Recidivism, Public Policy Institute of California, 2018, 3,
https://www.ppic.org/wp-content/uploads/r_0618mbr.pdf. For a
discussion of broader reclassification efforts, see Brian Elderbroom
and Julia Durnan, Reclassified: State Drug Law Reforms to Reduce
Felony Convictions and Increase Second Chances, Urban Institute,

Conviction, Imprisonment, and Lost Earnings

2018, https://www.urban.org/research/publication/reclassified.
95 Many states have begun to decriminalize marijuana, for example.
NORML, “Decriminalization,” accessed February 24, 2020, https://
norml.org/aboutmarijuana/item/states-that-have-decriminalized.
96 Sixty-five percent of agencies that responded to a survey noted
that the jail or correctional facility that processes arrestees had
already restricted the types of arrestees it would receive because of
Covid-19. Cynthia Lum, Carl Maupin, and Megan Stoltz, “The Impact of
COVID-19 on Law Enforcement Agencies (Wave 1),” International
Association of Chiefs of Police and the Center for Evidence-Based
Crime Policy, 2020, 1, https://www.theiacp.org/sites/default/files/
IACP-GMU%20Survey.pdf. For an example, see Fort Worth’s
experience, described in Nichole Manna, “Fort Worth Police Will Give
Citations for Low-Level Crimes Amid Coronavirus Outbreak,” Fort
Worth Star-Telegram, March 18, 2020, https://www.star-telegram.
com/news/coronavirus/article241254951.html.
97 For examples and a discussion of decriminalization, see
Alexandra Natapoff, “Misdemeanor Decriminalization,” Vanderbilt Law
Review 68, no. 4 (2015): 1067–77.
98 For examples, see Law Enforcement Leaders to Reduce Crime &
Incarceration, Ensuring Justice and Public Safety: Federal Criminal
Justice Priorities for 2020 and Beyond, 2020, 8–10, http://lawenforcementleaders.org/ensuring-justice-public-safety-federal-criminal-justice-priorities-for-2020-and-beyond.
99 See Advocates, Advocates Jail Diversion Program: A Step-byStep Toolkit, 8–10, https://mn.gov/dhs/assets/czech-advocates-jds-manual-12_tcm1053-256994.pdf.
100 For one example, see Center for Court Innovation, “Project
Reset,” 2019, https://www.courtinnovation.org/sites/default/files/
media/document/2019/PR_FactSheet_07232019.pdf; and Center
for Court Innovation, “Project Reset,” accessed February 24, 2020,
https://www.courtinnovation.org/programs/project-reset/
more-info.
101

Kohler-Hausmann, “Managerial Justice,” 649, 668–70.

102 Lauren-Brooke Eisen et al., How Many Americans Are Unnecessarily Incarcerated?, Brennan Center for Justice, 2016, 23, https://
www.brennancenter.org/publication/how-many-americans-are-unnecessarily-incarcerated.
103 Shaila Dewan and Andrew W. Lehren, “After a Crime, the Price of
a Second Chance,” New York Times, December 12, 2016, https://www.
nytimes.com/2016/12/12/us/crime-criminal-justice-reform-diversion.html.
104 Brad Hershbein, David Boddy, and Melissa S. Kearney, “Nearly
30 Percent of Workers in the U.S. Need a License to Perform Their Job:
It Is Time to Examine Occupational Licensing Practices,” The
Brookings Institution, January 27, 2015, https://www.brookings.edu/
blog/occupational-licensing-practices; and Morris M. Kleiner, Reforming Occupational Licensing Policies, The Hamilton Project, 2015, 6,
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/THP_
KleinerDiscPaper_final.pdf.
105

Rodriguez and Avery, Unlicensed & Untapped, 1.

106

Rodriguez and Avery, Unlicensed & Untapped, 10–14.

107 Jonathan Haggerty, How Occupational Licensing Laws Harm
Public Safety and the Formerly Incarcerated, R Street Institute, 2018,
https://www.rstreet.org/2018/05/31/how-occupational-licensing-laws-harm-public-safety-and-the-formerly-incarcerated.
108

Rodriguez and Avery, Unlicensed & Untapped, 2.

109 National Employment Law Project, “Fact Sheet: ‘Ban the Box’ Is
a Fair Chance for Workers with Records,” August 2017, https://www.
nelp.org/wp-content/uploads/Ban-the-Box-Fair-Chance-Fact-Sheet.
pdf.
110 Beth Avery, Ban the Box, National Employment Law Project,
2019, 106, https://www.nelp.org/publication/ban-the-box-fairchance-hiring-state-and-local-guide; C. J. Ciaramella, “Trump Will
Sign Federal ‘Ban the Box’ Bill into Law as Part of Massive Spending

38 Brennan Center for Justice

Bill,” Reason, December 20, 2019, https://reason.com/2019/12/20/
trump-will-sign-federal-ban-the-box-bill-into-law-as-part-of-massive-spending-bill; and National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2020, Pub. L. No. 116-92, § 1121-24, 133 Stat. 1605-15 (2020),
https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/senate-bill/1790.
111 Some studies find that ban-the-box rules may have unintended
negative consequences for younger Black job seekers, such as an
apparent increase in racial discrimination in hiring. But research by
other experts — including one of the authors of this report, Terry-Ann
Craigie — casts doubt on those conclusions. See Terry-Ann Craigie,
“Ban the Box, Convictions, and Public Employment,” Economic Inquiry
58 (2020): 442–43, https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/
ecin.12837; and Phil Hernandez, “Ban-the-Box ‘Statistical Discrimination’ Studies Draw the Wrong Conclusions,” National Employment Law
Project, August 29, 2017, https://www.nelp.org/blog/
ban-the-box-statistical-discrimination-studies-draw-the-wrong-conclusions. Indeed, there are several other possible explanations for the
apparent decrease in the hiring of younger Black men. They include an
increase in the hiring of older Black men, who are more likely to have
criminal records, and the focus on private sector ban-the-box policies,
which at the time of these studies were in the early stages of
implementation. See Terry-Ann Craigie et al., letter to Hon. Elijah E.
Cummings and Hon. Jim Jordan, March 25, 2019, Brennan Center for
Justice, https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/letter-supportfair-chance-act; and Daniel Shoag and Stan Veuger, “ ‘Ban the Box’
Measures Help High-Crime Neighborhoods” (American Enterprise
Institute Economics Working Paper #2016-08, 2020), https://www.
aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/Veuger-Shoag-Ban-the-boxWP-updated.pdf. (As of this report’s release date, Shoag and Veuger’s
paper was slated for publication in the Journal of Law and Economics.)
Further, Craigie’s findings show that ban-the-box policies significantly
increase employment for justice-involved people in the public sector.
Craigie, “Ban the Box, Convictions, and Public Employment,” 442–43.
112 These policies already risk colliding with U.S. Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) guidance, which warns that overly
broad rules targeting justice-involved people create a disparate racial
impact and may violate Title VII accordingly. See EEOC, “Enforcement
Guidance on Consideration of Arrest and Conviction Records in
Employment Decisions Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act,” No.
915.002, April 25, 2012, https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/
arrest_conviction.cfm. Retaining state law that conflicts with EEOC
guidance arguably puts employers in an untenable situation in which
they must decide whether to comply with state law and risk an EEOC
lawsuit, or comply with EEOC rules and ignore state law. See Timothy
M. Cary, “A Checkered Past: When Title VII Collides with State Statutes
Mandating Criminal Background Checks,” ABA Journal of Labor &
Employment Law 28 (2013): 499, 499–500, 517–21 (describing the
conflict and seeking to resolve it) and 509–12 (identifying 14 states
where this conflict was present at the time of writing).
113 See N.Y. Correction Law § 752 (prohibiting the denial of
employment or licensure based solely on a criminal conviction); see
also Pickering v. Uptown Comm’s & Elec., 42 Misc.3d 1205(A), 2013
WL 6798521 (Sup. Ct., Queens County Dec. 23, 2013) (summarizing
the state of the law before denying a motion to dismiss claim arguing
that employer terminated employee based on criminal conviction
without weighing statutory factors).
114 See, e.g., Levine v N.Y.C. Taxi & Limousine Comm’n, 136 A.D.3d
1037, 1039 (2d Dep’t 2016) (concluding that the defendant Commission reasonably denied a license to operate a for-hire vehicle to a
person previously convicted of crimes involving fraud, where the
offense was “recent and serious, and bore a direct relationship to how
he dealt with persons who hired him for services,” and reversing a
grant of administrative relief accordingly).
115 See Lynn M. Clark, “Landlord Attitudes Toward Renting to
Released Offenders,” Federal Probation 71, no. 1 (2007), https://www.
uscourts.gov/federal-probation-journal/2007/06/landlord-attitudes-toward-renting-released-offenders; and Lucius Couloute,
Nowhere to Go: Homelessness Among Formerly Incarcerated People,

Conviction, Imprisonment, and Lost Earnings

Prison Policy Initiative, August 2018, https://www.prisonpolicy.org/
reports/housing.html.
116 Seattle Office for Civil Rights, “Fair Chance Housing,” accessed
February 25, 2020, https://www.seattle.gov/civilrights/civil-rights/
fair-housing/fair-chance-housing.
117 John Bae et al., Coming Home: An Evaluation of the New York City
Housing Authority’s Family Reentry Pilot Program, Vera Institute of
Justice, 2016, 7–8, https://www.vera.org/publications/
coming-home-nycha-family-reentry-pilot-program-evaluation. For
more information on this subject, see National Law Housing Project,
An Affordable Home on Reentry: Federally Assisted Housing and
Previously Incarcerated Individuals, 2018, https://www.nhlp.org/
wp-content/uploads/2018/08/Rentry-Manual-2018-FINALne.pdf.
118 Sarah Gonzalez, “New York Eases Rules for Formerly Incarcerated to Visit Public Housing,” WNYC News, April 21, 2017, https://www.
wnyc.org/story/new-york-city-felonies-visit-family-public-housing.
For a formal study of the pilot program and results, see Bae et al.,
Coming Home, 13, 21. The program continues to operate successfully.
Yolanda Johnson-Peterkin, social worker at New York City Housing
Authority, voicemail message to author, December 3, 2019.
119 Katy Reckdahl, “Housing Authority Eliminates Ban of Ex-offenders,” Shelterforce, July 6, 2016, https://shelterforce.org/2016/07/06/
housing-authority-eliminates-ban-of-ex-offenders; and Housing
Authority of New Orleans, “Adding Family Members with Criminal
Backgrounds,” July 2019, http://www.hano.org/attachments/
CBCFlyer2019.pdf.
120 Cloud, On Life Support, 5–10.
121 Antonisse and Garfield, The Relationship Between Work and
Health, 2.
122 The Massachusetts Department of Corrections partners with
MassHealth to provide health insurance to people being released from
prison. “Reentry Planning,” Mass.gov, last accessed February 25,
2020, https://www.mass.gov/service-details/reentry-planning.
123 Martha R. Plotkin and Alex Blandford, Critical Connections:
Getting People Leaving Prison and Jail the Mental Health Care and
Substance Abuse Treatment They Need, Council of State Governments
Justice Center, 2017, 75, https://files.csgjusticecenter.org/critical-connections/Critical-Connections-Full-Report.pdf.

7 C.F.R. § 272.3(c). New York City’s pre-enrollment program operates
under one such waiver. See Elizabeth Wolkomir, “How SNAP Can
Better Serve the Formerly Incarcerated,” Center on Budget and Policy
Priorities, March 16, 2018, 6–8, https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/
files/atoms/files/3-6-18fa.pdf.
130 The estimates of the formerly imprisoned population studied
here most closely also include estimates of the population that has
received a felony conviction. These papers are cited and discussed
together in the following section. For details, see notes 133–135 and
accompanying text.
131 Bureau of Justice Statistics, “Data Collection: National Survey of
Prosecutors (NSP),” last accessed January 22, 2020, https://www.bjs.
gov/index.cfm?ty=dcdetail&iid=265. See also Steven W. Perry and
Duren Banks, “Prosecutors in State Courts, 2007 — Statistical
Tables,” Bureau of Justice Statistics, table 4, https://www.bjs.gov/
content/pub/pdf/psc07st.pdf.
132

Perry and Banks, “Prosecutors in State Courts,” 2.

133

Schmitt and Warner, Ex-offenders and the Labor Market, 3–4.

134

Bucknor and Barber, The Price We Pay, 5.

135 Shannon et al., “The Growth, Scope, and Spatial Distribution,”
1804–5 and table 1; and Sarah Shannon et al., “Growth in the U.S.
Ex-felon and Ex-prisoner Population, 1948 to 2010” (conference paper,
2011), http://paa2011.princeton.edu/papers/111687.
136

Natapoff, Punishment Without Crime, 13.

137 Stevenson and Mayson, “The Scale of Misdemeanor Justice,”
738–39.
138 In a 2009 publication, the National Association of Criminal
Defense Lawyers first estimated that there were 10.5 million
misdemeanor cases filed per year. That study calculated a median
misdemeanor filing rate based on data from a mere 12 states. The
researchers then applied the same rate to the remaining 38 states to
estimate the number of cases filed nationally. Robert C. Boruchowitz,
Malia N. Brink, and Maureen Dimino, Minor Crimes, Massive Waste:
The Terrible Toll of America’s Broken Misdemeanor Courts, National
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, 2009, 11, https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/uploads/9b7f8e10-a118-4c23-8e12-1abcc46404ae/misdemeanor_20090401.pdf.

124 For example, one study indicated that access to government
benefits materially reduced the poverty rate in New York City. See
Sophie Collyer et al., The State of Poverty and Disadvantage in New
York City, Robin Hood, 2020, 15, fig. 2, https://robinhood.org/
uploads/2020/02/PT_2019_ANNUAL_2.21.pdf.

139 Stevenson and Mayson, “The Scale of Misdemeanor Justice,”
741–44.

125 Crystal S. Yang, “Does Public Assistance Reduce Recidivism?,”
American Economic Review 107 (2017): 554, http://www.law.harvard.
edu/programs/olin_center/papers/pdf/Yang_920.pdf.

141

126 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation
Act of 1996 § 115, codified at 21 U.S.C. § 862a(a), (b).
127

States may opt out in whole or in part. 21 U.S.C. § 862a(d)(1)(A).

128 For information on state opt-outs, see Chesterfield Polkey,
“Most States Have Ended SNAP Ban for Convicted Drug Felons,”
National Conference of State Legislatures, July 30, 2019, https://www.
ncsl.org/blog/2019/07/30/most-states-have-ended-snap-ban-forconvicted-drug-felons.aspx; Marc Mauer, A Lifetime of Punishment:
The Impact of the Felony Drug Ban on Welfare Benefits, The Sentencing
Project, 2015, 2, https://sentencingproject.org/wp-content/
uploads/2015/12/A-Lifetime-of-Punishment.pdf; and U.S. Department of Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Service, SNAP State Options
Report, 2018, 21, https://fns-prod.azureedge.net/sites/default/files/
snap/14-State-Options.pdf.
129 Federal SNAP rules specifically exclude people who are in the
care of public institutions and receive a significant portion of their
meals from those facilities. 7 C.F.R. § 273.1(b)(7)(vi). But many
eligibility rules are regulatory rather than statutory, and a separate
federal regulation allows states to seek waivers that relax these rules.

39 Brennan Center for Justice

140 Stevenson and Mayson, “The Scale of Misdemeanor Justice,”
744–45.
Natapoff, Punishment Without Crime, 258.

142 Federal Bureau of Investigation, Crime in the United States
2016, 2017, table 18, https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2016/
crime-in-the-u.s.-2016/topic-pages/tables/table-18; and Federal
Bureau of Investigation, Crime in the United States 2015, 2016, table
29, https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2015/
crime-in-the-u.s.-2015/tables/table-29.
143 Carol J. DeFrances and Greg W. Steadman, Prosecutors in State
Courts, 1996, Bureau of Justice Statistics, 1998, 5, table 5, https://
www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/psc96.pdf; and Carol J. DeFrances,
Prosecutors in State Courts, 2001, Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2002,
6, table 7, https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/psc01.pdf.
144 Nancy J. King and Michael Heise, “Misdemeanor Appeals,” Cornell
Legal Studies Research Paper Series, paper no. 19-14 (2019): appendix B,
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3478284.
145 David A. Anderson, “The Aggregate Burden of Crime,” Journal of
Law and Economics 42, no. 2 (1999): 611–42.
146 Jens Ludwig, “The Costs of Crime,” testimony to U.S. Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, Washington, DC, September 19, 2006,
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/ludwig_testimony_09_19_06.pdf.

Conviction, Imprisonment, and Lost Earnings

147 Michael McLaughlin et al., The Economic Burden of Incarceration in the U.S., Washington University in St. Louis, Concordance
Institute for Advancing Social Justice, 2016, 7, https://joinnia.com/
wp-content/uploads/2017/02/The-Economic-Burden-of-Incarceration-in-the-US-2016.pdf.

https://www.rsfjournal.org/content/rsfjss/5/1/198.full.pdf. See
also Jeffrey Grogger, “The Effect of Arrests on the Employment and
Earnings of Young Men,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 110, no. 1
(1995): 51–71, https://academic.oup.com/qje/article-abstract/110/1/51/1894002.

148 Kathryn E. McCollister et al., “The Cost of Crime to Society: New
Crime-Specific Estimates for Policy and Program Evaluation,” Drug
and Alcohol Dependence 108 (2010): table 3, https://www.ncbi.nlm.
nih.gov/pmc/articles/costofcrime.

170 A draft of the paper was not available for review at the time of
publication. For a discussion of Mueller-Smith’s work, see Jennifer
Doleac, interview with Michael Mueller-Smith, Probable Causation,
podcast audio, August 6, 2019, https://www.probablecausation.com/
podcasts/episode-9-michael-mueller-smith.

149

Pager, “The Mark of a Criminal Record,” 937, 959.

150 Pager, Western, and Sugie, “Sequencing Disadvantage,” 195–213.
151

Sugie, “Finding Work,” iii, 6, 148.

152 John M. Nally et al., “Post-release Recidivism and Employment
Among Different Types of Released Offenders,” International Journal of
Criminal Justice Sciences 9 (2014): 16, 18, http://sascv.org/ijcjs/pdfs/
nallyetalijcjs2014vol9issue1.pdf; and John M. Nally, Susan R.
Lockwood, and Taiping Ho, “Employment of Ex-offenders During the
Recession,” Journal of Correctional Education 62, no. 2 (2011): 117–131.
153 Western et al., “The Labor Market Consequences of Incarceration,” 410–27.
154 Bruce Western, “The Impact of Incarceration on Wage Mobility
and Inequality,” American Sociological Review 67 (2002): 541, https://
scholar.harvard.edu/files/brucewestern/files/western_asr.pdf.
155 Mueller-Smith, “The Criminal and Labor Impacts of Incarceration,” 3.
156 Bruce Western and Katherine Beckett, “How Unregulated Is the
U.S. Labor Market? The Penal System as a Labor Market Institution,”
American Journal of Sociology 104 (1999): 1030–60.
157 Bruce Western, Punishment and Inequality in America (New
York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2006).
158 Amanda Geller, Irwin Garfinkel, and Bruce Western, The Effects
of Incarceration on Employment and Wages, Center for Research on
Child Wellbeing, January 2006, https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/
a748/257cf094a1868ba70514c09098462f2c5dde.pdf.
159 Steven Raphael, “Early Incarceration Spells and the Transition
to Adulthood,” in The Price of Independence: The Economics of Early
Adulthood, eds. Cecilia Elena Rouse and Sheldon Danziger (New York:
Russell Sage Foundation, 2008), 278–305, https://gspp.berkeley.
edu/assets/uploads/research/pdf/P47.pdf.
160 Bruce Western and Becky Pettit, Collateral Costs: Incarceration’s Effect on Economic Mobility, The Pew Charitable Trusts, 2010,
https://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/legacy/uploadedfiles/pcs_
assets/2010/collateralcosts1pdf.pdf.
161 Richard B. Freeman, Crime and the Employment of Disadvantaged Youth, National Bureau of Economic Research, 1991, 11, http://
core.ac.uk/download/pdf/6586657.pdf.
162

Schmitt and Warner, Ex-offenders and the Labor Market, 14.

163

Cherrie Bucknor and Alan Barber, The Price We Pay, 13.

164

Uggen et al., “The Edge of Stigma,” 627–54.

165

Uggen et al., “The Edge of Stigma,” 627–54.

166 Daniel Nagin and Joel Waldfogel, The Effect of Conviction on
Income Through the Life Cycle, National Bureau of Economic
Research, 1993, https://www.nber.org/papers/w4551.pdf.
167

171 Bureau of Justice Statistics, “Data Collection: National Prisoner
Statistics (NPS) Program,” accessed January 22, 2020, https://www.
bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=dcdetail&iid=269; and Margaret Werner
Cahalan, Correctional Populations in the United States, 1850–1984,
Bureau of Justice Statistics, 1986, 182, https://www.bjs.gov/content/
pub/pdf/hcsus5084.pdf.
172 Joshua A. Markman et al., Recidivism of Offenders Placed on
Federal Community Supervision in 2005: Patterns from 2005 to 2010,
Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2014, https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/
pdf/ropfcs05p0510.pdf.
173

Markman et al., Recidivism of Offenders, fig. 1.

174 Bureau of Justice Statistics, “National Corrections Reporting
Program, 1991–2016.”
175 Derek Neal and Armin Rick, “The Prison Boom and Sentencing
Policy,” Journal of Legal Studies 45 (2016): 41.
176 Michael Massoglia et al., “The Relationship Between Incarceration and Premature Adult Mortality: Gender Specific Evidence,” Social
Science Research 46 (2014): 142–54, https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/
pmc/articles/PMC6123019/.
177 Binswanger, “Release from Prison,” 157–65.
178 Elizabeth Arias and Jiaquan Xu, United States Life Tables, 2017,
National Center for Health Statistics, 2019, tables 5–11, https://www.
cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr68/nvsr68_07-508.pdf.
179 Bureau of Justice Statistics, “Publications & Products:
Probation and Parole Populations,” accessed August 26, 2019, https://
www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbse&sid=42.
180

Markman et al., Recidivism of Offenders, table 4.

181 Bureau of Justice Statistics, “Data Collection: National
Corrections Reporting Program (NCRP),” accessed August 26, 2019,
https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=dcdetail&iid=268.
182 Bureau of Justice Statistics, “National Corrections Reporting
Program, 1991–2016.”
183

Arias and Xu, United States Life Tables, 2017, table 8.

184 Bureau of Justice Statistics, “Publications & Products:
Probation and Parole Populations”; and Bureau of Justice Statistics,
“Publications & Products: Correctional Populations in the United
States,” accessed August 26, 2019, https://www.bjs.gov/index.
cfm?ty=pbse&sid=5.
185 Stevenson and Mayson, “The Scale of Misdemeanor Justice,”
737; and Natapoff, Punishment Without Crime, 258.
186 Stevenson and Mayson, “The Scale of Misdemeanor Justice,”
736–37.
187 Stevenson and Mayson, “The Scale of Misdemeanor Justice,”
742–44.

Christopher Uggen et al., “The Edge of Stigma,” 627–54.

188

King and Heise, “Misdemeanor Appeals,” appendix B.

168 Amanda Sheely, “Criminal Justice Involvement and Employment Outcomes Among Women,” Crime and Delinquency 66, no. 6–7
(2020), https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/
abs/10.1177/0011128719860833.

189

Spaulding et al., “HIV/AIDS Among Inmates,” 3.

169 Robert Apel and Kathleen Powell, “Level of Criminal Justice
Contact and Early Adult Wage Inequality,” RSF: Russell Sage
Foundation Journal of the Social Sciences 5, no. 1 (2019): 198–222,

40 Brennan Center for Justice

190 Illinois Sentencing Policy Advisory Council, The High Cost of
Recidivism, 2018, 4, table A, https://tinyurl.com/qp82ost (archive of
deleted page). See also Illinois Sentencing Policy Advisory Council,
Misdemeanor Sentencing: Trends and Analysis, 2018, 18–19, https://
spac.icjia-api.cloud/uploads/SPAC_Misdemeanor_
Report_2018_101818-20191127T15335263.pdf.

Conviction, Imprisonment, and Lost Earnings

191 James J. Heckman, “Sample Selection Bias as a Specification
Error,” Econometrica 47 (1979): 153–61.

194 These proxy variables were all retrieved from the 1979 or 1980
survey year.

192 More explicitly, the report’s initial analysis using FE estimation
showed that incarceration significantly lowered annual earnings by
approximately $10,000 (p <0.05). Evaluating FE estimates over the
lifetime trajectory produced negative estimates that get smaller over
time, potentially signaling that the sample of respondents incarcerated at the time of the interview was too small to produce efficient
lifetime earnings trajectories.

195 Joseph G. Altonji, Todd E. Elder, and Christopher R. Taber,
“Selection on Observed and Unobserved Variables: Assessing the
Effectiveness of Catholic Schools,” Journal of Political Economy 113, no.
1 (2005): 151–84, https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/
abs/10.1086/426036?mobileUi=0&journalCode=jpe.

193 Jeffrey M. Wooldridge, Econometric Analysis of Cross Section
and Panel Data (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2010).

41 Brennan Center for Justice

196 Emily Oster, “Unobservable Selection and Coefficient Stability:
Theory and Evidence,” Journal of Business & Economic Statistics 37,
no. 2 (2019): 187–204, https://amstat.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1
080/07350015.2016.1227711.

Conviction, Imprisonment, and Lost Earnings

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

 Terry-Ann Craigie is the economics fellow in the Brennan Center’s
Justice Program, where she works to document the economic and
social costs of mass incarceration. Craigie is also an associate
professor of economics at Connecticut College, where her research
examines the collateral consequences of mass incarceration and the
impact of ban-the-box policies on the employment of those with
criminal records. Prior to joining the Brennan Center, she was a
visiting fellow at the Urban Institute and a postdoctoral research
associate at Princeton University. She was selected as a Self-Sufficiency
Research Clearinghouse Emerging Scholar in 2013. Craigie has
published in journals such as Eastern Economic Journal, Future of
Children, Journal of Ethnicity in Criminal Justice, Oxford Development
Studies, and Review of Black Political Economy. She has presented her
research at numerous conferences and seminars, most notably at the
White House. She holds a BA magna cum laude in economics from
Stockton University and an MA and a PhD in economics from
Michigan State University.
 Ames Grawert is senior counsel and John L. Neu Justice Counsel
in the Brennan Center’s Justice Program. He leads the program’s
quantitative research team, focusing on trends in crime and policing
and the collateral costs of mass incarceration. Additionally, he
advocates for criminal justice reform policies at the federal level.
Previously, Grawert served as an assistant district attorney in the
Appeals Bureau of the Nassau County District Attorney’s Office, where
he reviewed and litigated claims of actual innocence in addition to his
appellate work. Before entering public service, he was an associate at
Mayer Brown LLP, where he represented criminal defendants pro bono
in post-conviction litigation.
 Cameron Kimble is a senior research and program associate in the
Brennan Center’s Justice Program. As a member of the program’s law
and economics research team, he supports the organization’s work to
end mass incarceration and researches the relationship between mass
incarceration, wages, and economic inequality. Prior to joining the
Brennan Center, he worked as a quantitative analyst at Progressive
Insurance, where he was tasked with evaluating and forecasting auto
insurance industry and consumer trends. Kimble holds a BA in
economics from Miami University.

42 Brennan Center for Justice

Conviction, Imprisonment, and Lost Earnings

AC K N OW L E D G M E N TS

The Brennan Center acknowledges Arnold Ventures’ founders Laura
and John Arnold, Jason Flom, and The Margaret and Daniel Loeb
Foundation for their generous support of our work. This publication
was made possible in part through the support of Robin Hood, for
which we are grateful. This is an independent Brennan Center
publication; the opinions expressed are those of the authors and do
not necessarily reflect the views of our supporters.
The authors thank Steven Durlauf, Stan Veuger, and Bruce Western
for reviewing a draft of this report and for their thoughtful feedback on
its findings and methodology. The authors also thank Alexandra
Natapoff for offering her thoughts on the report’s misdemeanor
findings, and James Austin and John Pfaff for their time discussing the
report’s population models.
This research was conducted with restricted access to Bureau of
Labor Statistics (BLS) data. The views expressed here do not
necessarily reflect the views of the BLS.
The authors thank Lauren-Brooke Eisen for her insightful comments
on and careful revisions to the report; Michael Waldman and John
Kowal for their support of this research; James Cullen for his extensive
work on a previous draft of this report, which continues to underly
several of the report’s conclusions; and Inimai Chettiar for her
conception and early editing of this project. They also thank Peter
Miller for his input on the report’s quantitative analysis; Adureh
Onyekwere for her careful attention to detail in fact-checking the
report; Ruth Sangree for her contributions to the policy
recommendations section; and (in alphabetical order) Jessica Christy,
Aliana Knoepfler, Safeena Mecklai, Lauren Seabrooks, Stacey Strand,
Vienna Thompkins, and Julia Udell for their research and drafting
support. The authors are grateful to Matthew Friedman, Oliver Roeder,
Maria Barrera, and Anamika Das for their work on previous drafts of
this report. Last, the authors are also grateful to Lisa Benenson, Jeanine
Chirlin, Yuliya Bas, Matt Harwood, Zachary Laub, Jeanne Park,
Alexandra Ringe, Derek Rosenfeld, and Alden Wallace for their
thoughtful review of the report, communications assistance, and work
ensuring the report’s successful launch.

43 Brennan Center for Justice

Conviction, Imprisonment, and Lost Earnings

BRENNAN

CENTER
FOR JUSTICE
Brennan Center for Justice at New York University School of Law
120 Broadway // 17th Floor // New York, NY 10271
www.brennancenter.org