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The Intermediate Sanction Programs
Lacked Performance Benchmarks and Were
Plagued With Implementation Problems

R
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B

California State Auditor

California
Department of
Corrections and
Rehabilitation:

November 2005
2005-111

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November 9, 2005

2005-111

The Governor of California
President pro Tempore of the Senate
Speaker of the Assembly
State Capitol
Sacramento, California 95814
Dear Governor and Legislative Leaders:
As requested by the Joint Legislative Audit Committee, the Bureau of State Audits presents its audit report
concerning the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation’s (department) intermediate
sanction programs for parole violators, which the department secretary terminated on April 11, 2005.
This report concludes that the department did not establish performance benchmarks or analyze available
data for the intermediate sanction programs. As a result, the department was unable to determine whether
the benefits it intended to achieve, including saving money, helping parolees integrate into society, and
reducing the Board of Parole Hearings’ parole revocation hearing caseload, outweighed the risk to public
safety the intermediate sanction programs posed. In addition, the department unrealistically assumed that
the programs would be filled to capacity on January 1, 2004, the planned implementation date, and would
continue to operate at full capacity. The department also experienced unanticipated problems that delayed
the programs’ implementation. As a result, we estimate that the total savings related to these programs
was only $14.5 million—an average $1.2 million per month over a 12-month period—far short of the
average $8.4 million per month the department would have had to save to achieve its planned savings
of $50.2 million for fiscal year 2003–04 and $100.5 million for fiscal year 2004–05.
Respectfully submitted,

ELAINE M. HOWLE
State Auditor

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CONTENTS
Summary

1

Introduction

5

Chapter 1
The Department Had No Basis for Determining
Whether the Benefits of Using Intermediate
Sanctions Outweighed the Risk to Public Safety

19

Recommendations

36

Chapter 2
Contracting Problems and Unforeseen Issues
Delayed the Implementation of the Intermediate
Sanction Programs

37

Appendix A
Other States Use Alternatives to Prison That Are
Similar to California’s, but Comparisons of
Recidivism Rates Can Have Little Meaning

47

Appendix B
Status of Parole Violators Placed in Intermediate
Sanction Programs and Their Returns to Custody
Since Entering Those Programs

55

Response to the Audit
The California Department of Corrections
and Rehabilitation

59

SUMMARY
RESULTS IN BRIEF

Audit Highlights . . .
Our review of the California
Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation’s (department)
intermediate sanction programs
for parole violators revealed
the following:

þ Although the department
had data regarding
parole violators in the
programs, it did not
analyze the data or
establish benchmarks
that it could measure the
programs’ results against.

þ The department’s savings
were substantially
less than anticipated
because its savings
estimates were based on
unrealistic expectations
and the programs were
implemented late.

þ To minimize the risk
to public safety, less
dangerous parole
violators were placed in
the intermediate sanction
programs; however, a
small percentage of parole
violators were convicted
of new crimes during the
time they otherwise would
have been in prison.

F

elons on parole from California’s adult correctional
facilities—which on average numbered 128,000 each day
in 2004—are under the supervision of the Division of Adult
Parole Operations (parole division) within the Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation (department).1 Most felons serve
a specific number of years in prison, depending on the nature
of their crime. Most are released to parole supervision for three
years, and they must abide by certain conditions during this
time. A parolee who has violated the law or failed to comply
with a parole condition may be subject to reincarceration,
depending on the seriousness of the parole violation and the
judgment of the parole agent.
According to the former deputy director of the parole division, the
programs that eventually were established under the department’s
New Parole Model were intended primarily to fill perceived gaps
in the department’s parole process. The department hoped to help
parolees reintegrate into communities by implementing prerelease
programs aimed at matching future parolees to the programs and
services they needed and by expanding post-release programs
aimed at improving newly released parolees’ access to those
programs and services, thereby reducing the recidivism rate. The
department also planned to implement three intermediate sanction
programs that could be used as an alternative to prison for low-risk
parolees who commit minor crimes or technical violations of their
parole conditions. For two of the intermediate sanction programs,
the department hoped to help parole violators improve their
behavior and their lives and, in the long term, reduce their chances
of returning to criminal activity. The department also anticipated
that, by using the three intermediate sanction programs, it could
reduce prison costs by reducing the number of parole violators
returned to prison.

continued on next page . . .
1

This function was formerly the responsibility of the Parole and Community Services Division
within the Department of Corrections. On July 1, 2005, the governor reorganized all
departments under the Youth and Adult Correctional Agency, including the Department
of Corrections, into the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. For
convenience, we use the term “department” to refer to either the former Department of
Corrections or the current Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. Similarly, we use
“parole division” to refer to either the current or former parole division.

California State Auditor Report 2005-111

1

þ Although implementation
of the intermediate sanction
programs was planned
for January 1, 2004, the
implementation was
delayed due to state hiring
and contract freezes, a
department leadership
change, and unanticipated
contracting problems.

As part of the fiscal year 2003–04 budget act, the Legislature
approved the department’s use of the Substance Abuse Treatment
Control Units (SATCU), Halfway Back, and Electronic In-Home
Detention (EID) intermediate sanction programs. The parole
division anticipated that the programs would result in savings of
$50.2 million in fiscal year 2003–04 and $100.5 million in fiscal
year 2004–05. These savings were to come about through the
lower cost of maintaining a parolee in one of these programs as
opposed to revoking parole and returning the parolee to prison.
For fiscal year 2003–04, the department spent $4.9 billion to
incarcerate inmates, and in 2003 there were more than 78,000
parolee returns to prison. To reduce the number of parole
violators returned to prison, the parole division would place
eligible parolees who violated the technical conditions of their
parole or committed minor crimes in intermediate sanction
programs rather than returning them to prison.
In April 2005, the department secretary (formerly the secretary
of the Youth and Adult Correctional Agency) terminated the
use of the intermediate sanction programs as alternatives to
prison because he saw no evidence that the programs improved
public safety. Although the department had data regarding
the parole violators in the programs that it could have used to
evaluate whether the benefits it wanted to achieve were worth
the additional risk to public safety, it did not analyze the data
or establish benchmarks such as acceptable failure rates to
measure the programs’ results. The department subsequently
has redesigned the SATCU and EID programs and expects to
implement the new versions in November 2005.
The department did not achieve its savings goals because it
unrealistically assumed that the programs would be filled to
capacity on January 1, 2004, the planned implementation
date, and would continue to operate at full capacity. It also
experienced unanticipated problems that delayed the programs’
implementation. The department’s fiscal year 2003–04 savings
estimates assumed that 12,000 parole violators would be placed
in the programs, but as of December 31, 2004, six months after
the end of the fiscal year, only 5,742 had entered the SATCU
and Halfway Back programs. We estimate that the total savings
related to these participants was only $14.5 million—an average
$1.2 million per month over a 12-month period—far short of
the average $8.4 million per month it would have had to save
to achieve its planned savings of $50.2 million for fiscal year
2003–04 and $100.5 million for fiscal year 2004–05.

2

California State Auditor Report 2005-111

Besides reduced recidivism, the department also hoped to
reduce the workload of revocation hearings before the Board of
Parole Hearings (board).2 As the result of a lawsuit settlement in
November 2003, the board is required to conduct final parole
revocation hearings within 35 days after the first day a parolee is
detained for revocation proceedings. Thus, reducing the board’s
hearing caseload would increase the likelihood that it would
meet the 35-day deadline. Evaluating the board’s compliance
with this settlement is beyond the scope of this audit. However,
as of December 31, 2004, we observed that the board’s hearing
caseload would have been reduced by approximately 5,700—
the number of parole violators who had been placed in the
intermediate sanction programs at least once by that time.
Although the tradeoff may be difficult, achieving the desired benefits
of using intermediate sanctions in lieu of returning eligible parole
violators to prison requires a willingness to accept the additional
risks associated with keeping individuals who are proven to be
uncooperative in the community. The parole division minimized
the risk to public safety by placing less dangerous parole violators
in the programs. Additionally, the intermediate sanction programs
were more restrictive than other parolee programs, providing
supervision of or strict control over the parole violators placed in
them. However, depending on the program, this supervision or
strict control occurred between 30 days and an average of 45 days,
which is significantly less than the average 153 days a parolee would
have stayed in prison for parole violations. Because the parolees
participating in these programs were not incarcerated, they were not
prevented from committing crimes against the public for as long a
period as they were before the programs existed.
Based on our data analysis, of the 2,567 parole violators placed
in the SATCU program and 3,175 parole violators placed in the
Halfway Back program by December 31, 2004, 128 (5 percent)
and 114 (4 percent), respectively, were returned to prison for
new convictions during the time they otherwise would have
been in prison. Notwithstanding the significance of those crimes
to their victims, the percentage of parolees participating in the
two programs who were convicted of new crimes is small. An
additional 1,732 parole violators placed in the Halfway Back and
SATCU programs were returned to prison for committing parole
violations during that time. However, the parole division had no
benchmarks to determine whether these results were acceptable.
2

As a result of the reorganization on July 1, 2005, of the departments under the Youth
and Adult Correctional Agency, the Board of Prison Terms was renamed the Board of
Parole Hearings.

California State Auditor Report 2005-111

3

The department planned to implement the intermediate
sanction programs on January 1, 2004, but contracting problems,
labor negotiations, and unforeseen obstacles delayed their
implementation. The SATCU program implementation, delayed
until May 2004, depended on contracts with county jails to
provide the 30-day in-custody component of the program. Yet the
department found that many county jails were reluctant to contract
with the State at the daily reimbursement rate offered or that
they lacked space. The EID program implementation was delayed
because of contracting problems, including numerous protests of the
awarded contracts. Further, after the EID contract was finalized and
the program implemented in late 2004, parole agents in the field
found numerous equipment problems, and as a result the program
never fully materialized before being terminated in April 2005. In
contrast, the Halfway Back program was implemented relatively
smoothly only one month after the January 1, 2004, deadline, but
it did not reach its occupancy goals before being terminated.

RECOMMENDATIONS
When planning future intermediate sanction programs, the parole
division should decide on appropriate benchmarks for monitoring
performance, identify the data it will need to measure performance
against those benchmarks, and ensure that reliable data collection
mechanisms are in place before a program is implemented. After
implementing a new intermediate sanction program, the parole
division should analyze the data it has collected and, if relevant,
use the data in its existing databases to monitor and evaluate the
program’s effectiveness on an ongoing basis.
The parole division should ensure that the savings estimates
developed during program planning are based on reasonable
assumptions. If those assumptions change, it should update the
savings estimates promptly.
The parole division should consider analyzing the effect programs
have had on parolee behavior and should use the knowledge it
gains from the analyses to make future intermediate sanction
programs more effective. The analysis should include the benefits
of adding features to make these programs more effective.

AGENCY COMMENTS
The department agrees with our recommendations. n

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California State Auditor Report 2005-111

INTRODUCTION
BACKGROUND

F

elons released on parole from California’s adult
correctional facilities are supervised by the Division of
Adult Parole Operations (parole division) within the
California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation
(department). The department’s records indicate that it
supervised an average of 128,000 parolees each day in 2004.3
At the end of the first quarter of 2005, the parole division had
190 parole units within the State’s four parole regions. Those
regions are shown in Figure 1 on the following page. For the
same time period, the parole division had 3,100 staff members
and reported 2,100 authorized parole agent positions as of
June 30, 2005.
The department also reported, for the first quarter of 2005, that
its average annual cost per parolee was $3,364; in contrast, the
average annual cost of incarcerating an inmate was $30,929.
For fiscal year 2003–04, the total cost to incarcerate adult
felons was $4.9 billion, according to the department’s Office of
Budget Management. Based on published department reports,
in 2003 there were more than 78,000 parolee returns to prison.
Of these, 20 percent were returned with a new sentence as the
result of crimes committed while on parole, with the remaining
80 percent returned for violating their parole conditions, as
indicated in Figure 2 on page 7.

3

Parole agents also supervise civil addicts, who are persons convicted of a drug-related
crime but diverted from prison to a drug treatment program. However, our report deals
only with parolees, meaning those who have been released from prison to supervision.

California State Auditor Report 2005-111

5

FIGURE 1
California’s Parole Regions
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Source: Division of Adult Parole Operations, California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.

6

California State Auditor Report 2005-111

FIGURE 2
Returns to Custody in 2003

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Source: Data Analysis Unit, California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.
Note: These numbers represent a count of the number of returns to prison by parole
violators and is a measure of events. A parole violator who returns to prison twice is
counted as two returns to prison.

PAROLE
California is a determinate sentencing state, meaning that most
felons serve a specific number of years in prison, depending on
the nature of their crime, after which they are released. Most
released inmates are placed on parole supervision for three years;
however, the parole period for these parolees may be extended
up to one year to make up for parole time that was lost due to a
parolee’s parole status being suspended or revoked.
Felons released from prison are required to report to an assigned
parole agent and to abide by the conditions of their parole.
The parole agent monitors the parolee’s activities, helps the
parolee access programs and services such as drug treatment
and employment programs, and takes appropriate action if the
parolee presents a danger to the public or to himself or herself.
Parole agents rely on their training and experience when assessing
the services a parolee needs and the level of monitoring and
supervision required. Such factors as severity of current violation,
commitment offense, length and severity of criminal history,
prior parole violation history, and community resources available

California State Auditor Report 2005-111

7

are considered when making recommendations regarding suitable
placement in various programs and appropriate sanctions for a
parolee who violates parole.

Parole Violations
A parolee who has violated the law or failed to comply with a
condition of parole is deemed to have violated parole and may
be subject to reincarceration. Although general conditions of
parole exist that are imposed on all parolees, such as reporting
to a parole agent, additional conditions may be imposed as a
special condition of parole if they are related to the crime for
which the parolee was convicted or if reasonably related to
potential future criminal behavior.
Although some parolees are convicted of new crimes and
returned to prison with a new sentence imposed by a court,
many more parolees commit technical violations of their
parole or minor violations of the law. These technical types of
violations can include failing to report to a parole agent, using
alcohol, participating in or associating with a gang, or possessing
ammunition for a firearm. The parole agent’s response to
technical violations may include continuing the parolee on
parole with additional conditions imposed. For example, a
parole violator might be instructed to begin attending Alcoholics
Anonymous meetings if found to have used alcohol in violation
of parole conditions. Depending on the circumstances, another
response to such a violation might be to place the parole
violator in a residential substance abuse treatment program.
If progressively restrictive parole conditions are not successful
in deterring repeated parole violations, the parole agent may
recommend that the violator’s parole be revoked and the parole
violator be returned to prison.

Parole Revocation Process
The parole revocation process begins when a parole agent or
local law enforcement agency detains a parolee for certain
suspected violations of the law or violations of the conditions
of his or her parole. If the parole agent, the agent’s supervisor,
and the district administrator believe that parole should be
revoked as a result of the parole violation, the case is referred to
the Board of Parole Hearings (board) for review. State law grants

8

California State Auditor Report 2005-111

the board full power to suspend or revoke any parole and to
order a parolee returned to prison. Based on its review, the board
decides whether there is sufficient evidence to revoke parole for
technical violations of parole and, if so, an appropriate sentence.
The board has various options, ranging from dismissing charges
and discharging the parolee to revoking parole and returning
the parole violator to custody for up to 12 months. In fiscal year
2002–03, the most current year reported, the board conducted
more than 43,000 parole revocation hearings.
For the first quarter of 2005, the department reported that
approximately 80 percent of the parole violators returned to
prison had been sent back as a result of a parole revocation
hearing, many of which were for minor or technical parole
violations. The remainder were convicted of new crimes and
sent back to prison to serve new terms. Both groups are included
in the department’s calculation of the State’s recidivism rate—
the rate at which inmates released from prison are returned to
prison, which it calculates at one-, two-, and three-year intervals.
Additional information about California’s and other states’
recidivism rates is presented in Appendix A.

THE NEW PAROLE MODEL
As part of the fiscal year 2003–04 budget act, the Legislature
approved several programs intended to save the State money
by reducing the number of parole revocations. The goal of
these programs, referred to by the department as the New
Parole Model, was to maintain public safety by helping parolees
successfully reintegrate into the community and to help parole
violators change their behavior. According to the former deputy
director of the parole division, the programs that eventually
were established under the department’s New Parole Model were
intended primarily to fill perceived gaps in the department’s
parole process. The department hoped to help parolees
reintegrate into communities and to reduce the recidivism
rate by implementing prerelease programs aimed at matching
future parolees to the programs and services they needed and by
expanding postrelease programs aimed at improving parolees’
access to those programs and services.
The department also implemented three intermediate sanction
programs that offered an alternative to prison for low-risk
parolees who commit minor crimes or technical violations
of their parole conditions. The department anticipated that
by using the three intermediate sanction programs, it could
California State Auditor Report 2005-111

9

reduce prison costs and costs to the State overall by reducing the
number of parole violators returned to prison. Therefore, during
the fiscal year 2003–04 state budget process it proposed using the
intermediate sanction programs as a way to save money.
Components of the New Parole Model included the following:
• Prerelease planning. Begun before the felon was released
from prison, prerelease planning included a comprehensive,
automated risk and needs assessment that matched
parolees to programs, allowing parole officers to have a
better understanding of the types and levels of services and
supervision appropriate for each parolee.
• Expansion of parolee reentry services. In partnership with local
law enforcement and social services agencies, police and
correction teams served as a liaison between field parole staff,
local service agencies, and contractors that provide substance
abuse treatment, transitional living, employment services,
subsistence resources (clothing, meals, and transportation),
educational and vocational training, and other services to
newly released parolees.
• Intermediate sanctions. Intermediate sanctions— the
Substance Abuse Treatment Control Units (SATCU), Halfway
Back, and Electronic In-Home Detention (EID)—were
restrictive programs for parolees who violated the technical
conditions of their parole or committed minor violations of
the law. Parole violators placed in the SATCU and Halfway
Back programs prevented the need for a parole revocation
hearing. In addition, the board had to approve placement in
programs such as the SATCU and Halfway Back because they
were residential. The department originally planned to have
the programs in place on January 1, 2004.

Intermediate Sanctions
The primary subjects of our audit were the three intermediate
sanction programs that the department implemented as part
of the New Parole Model—SATCU, Halfway Back, and EID.
Table 1 summarizes these programs and the eligibility criteria
established for each program.

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California State Auditor Report 2005-111

TABLE 1
Overview of the Intermediate Sanction Programs
Program

Rehabilitation
Benefit

Eligibility

Program Description

EID

Technical parole violator* who was not convicted
or required to register as a sex offender nor
had committed certain violations that must
be reported to the Board of Parole Hearings.
Must have had an operating telephone line and
been willing to disable “call waiting” or “call
forwarding” telephone features or have the
ability to pay for the cost of installing a dedicated
telephone line into the residence.

Parole violators were fitted with an electronic
monitor, worn on the ankle, that alerted a
contractor monitoring service when the parolee
wearing the device was not within a defined
distance from home. Some were allowed to
leave home at set times for work; curfew period
was 45 days and could be renewed. Others
could be detained 24 hours a day until their
revocation hearing.

None

Halfway
Back

Initially, a technical parole violator who had not
been convicted of a serious or violent felony.†
Those who were required to register as a sex
offender, had a conviction for arson, or use or
possession of a firearm, or needed detoxification,
among other conditions, were excluded. By
November 2004, eligibility expanded to those
with serious felony convictions or prior, but not
current, violent felony convictions.

Closely supervised residential program providing
treatment and education programs that focused
on employment needs, substance abuse, stress
management, victim awareness, computersupported literacy, and life skills. Parole violators
had limited ability to leave the facility and if
employed during their stay, were required to
pay 25 percent of salary to the program.

Provided a
transitional
environment and
classes in coping
skills, educational
needs, and
substance abuse.

SATCU

Initially, a technical parole violator who had not
been convicted of a serious or violent felony
and whose primary problem is drug or alcohol
dependency. Those who were required to register
as a sex offender, had committed violent or serious
felonies, or had committed certain violations that
must be reported to the Board of Parole Hearings
were excluded. In August 2004, eligibility was
expanded to include those convicted of serious or
violent felonies who currently committed technical,
nonserious/nonviolent parole violations.

30-day lockdown in jail setting for drug
treatment education. After release from
lockdown, mandatory 90-day aftercare program
provided in the community, which could be in a
residential program or on an outpatient basis.

Substance
abuse education
program

ESATCU

Male parole violator who had not been convicted
of a violent felony or required to register as a sex
offender and whose primary problem is substance
abuse. Additional criteria excluded parole violators
with certain convictions, including assault with a
deadly weapon, kidnapping, escape or attempted
escape, or predatory sexual activities in prison.

90-day lockdown in correctional facility outside
Folsom prison for drug treatment education.
After release from lockdown, voluntary aftercare
program provided in the community, which
could be in a residential program or on an
outpatient basis.

Substance
abuse education
program

Source: Division of Adult Parole Operations, California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.
* Technical parole violator—a parolee who has committed a minor violation of law or has violated a technical condition of parole.
†

Felons who have not been convicted under Penal Code, sections 1192.7(c) and 1192.8 (serious) and/or Penal Code,
Section 667.5(c) (violent) for such crimes as murder, carjacking, or kidnapping.

ESATCU = Enhanced Substance Abuse Treatment Control Unit, discussed on page 12.

In addition to the eligibility criteria shown for the EID program,
parole violators with certain designations within the department’s
correctional case management or enhanced outpatient programs
were excluded from participating in this program unless approved
by specific parole personnel. The parole division initially limited
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11

participation in the SATCU and Halfway Back programs to parole
violators whose convictions were nonserious and nonviolent4,
but expanded the eligibility criteria in August 2004. In addition,
the programs were opened up to allow parole agents to place
parole violators in the programs more than once, based upon
case factors and public safety considerations. The expanded
eligibility criteria for the Halfway Back program were revised in
November 2004.
Although the Enhanced Substance Abuse Treatment Control
Unit (ESATCU) program was similar to the SATCU program, it
was not part of the New Parole Model and was not available
statewide. Therefore, the department did not include the
program in its cost savings estimate for the New Parole Model.
The department established the ESATCU program to make use of
an existing facility that would be partly occupied by inmates in
a similar substance abuse program.

A Broader Range of Options
The addition of intermediate sanctions gave parole agents a
broader range of options for responding to technical parole
violations without having to revoke parole and return violators
to prison. In reviewing the case factors that could determine
whether a parole violator should be placed in an intermediate
sanction program, the parole agent was to consider, in addition
to other factors, the programs and services used by the parolee in
the past. Viewed as a continuum, the various parolee programs
and services ranged from those offered in the least restrictive
environment, such as community Narcotics Anonymous or
Alcoholics Anonymous meetings, to those offered in the most
restrictive environment, such as a SATCU jail. According to
the director of the parole division, the parole agent might first
refer the parole violator to the programs at the less restrictive
end of the continuum and progress to recommending more
restrictive programs if the parolee continued to violate his or her
parole or did not appear to function well in the less restrictive
environment. However, based on the seriousness of the parole
violator’s conduct, the parole agent instead might choose to
begin the parole revocation process.
Figure 3 provides an overview of the range of options a parole
agent might use when determining the course of action to take
in response to a technical parole violation.
4

12

Felons who have not been convicted under Penal Code, sections 1192.7(c) and 1192.8
(serious) and/or Penal Code, Section 667.5(c) (violent) for such crimes as murder, carjacking,
or kidnapping.

California State Auditor Report 2005-111

FIGURE 3
Continuum of Program Options for Parole Violators
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����� �������� ����� ����������� ��� �������������� ������������ �������� ����
��������� ��������� ��� ��� ��������� ���������� ��������� ����� �������� ���
��������� �� �������� ��� ������� ������ ��������� ��� ���������� �� ��� �� ���� ��
��� �������� ��� �� �������� �� � ��������� �� �������
����������� �� ����������� �� �������� ����� ��������� �� ���
���������� �� ������� ��� ���� ��������� ���� ������� �������
��������� ��������� �� ���������� ���� ���������� �������� �� ��������
��� ������ � ���������� ���� ���������� ������� �� ������� � �����
������� ��������� �� ������ ���� ������ �� � ��������������� ����
��������� �������� ����� ��� �� ����������� �� ���������� ������ ���
������� ��� �� �������� ��� ����� �� ��� �������� �� ������ ���������
������� ������ �������� ���� ����� �� ������ ������������ ��
������� ��������� ��� � ������ ������ ��� �� ��������������
��������� �� ��������� �����������
������� ������� ���� ���������� �����������
�������� ������ ��������� ��� ������� ������� ��
����� ��� �������� ��� ���� �� ��� ����
����������� ���� �������� ������
��������� ���� �������� �� �������������
������ ����� ��� �� �����
������ ���������������
������ �� �������� ���
����
������ �������� �� �������� ��
�����������
������ �� ����� ��� ������
���������� ���������

Source: Division of Adult Parole Operations, California Department of Corrections
and Rehabilitation.

ELIMINATION AND SUBSEQUENT IMPLEMENTATION OF
REDESIGNED INTERMEDIATE SANCTION PROGRAMS
The intermediate sanction programs were in effect until
April 11, 2005, when the department secretary (formerly the
secretary of the Youth and Adult Correctional Agency) issued
a memorandum stating that the intermediate sanction programs
would no longer be used as an alternative to parole revocation.
Citing public safety as the number one priority, the secretary
stated that there was no evidence that these sanctions improved
public safety.
After the cancellation of the intermediate sanctions, parolees
already in the SATCU program were allowed to continue in the
program, including aftercare. In addition, the parole division
California State Auditor Report 2005-111

13

issued new guidelines for how the Halfway Back facilities, now
called Parole Service Centers, would be used. These centers are
now open to eligible parolees on a voluntary basis, and parolees
can stay at them for up to one year. Parole violators who were
in the Halfway Back program when the program was terminated
would, according to the guidelines, continue to receive services
until their scheduled release date.
However, the termination of the intermediate sanction programs
as an alternative to prison met with opposition. Plaintiffs in
a previously resolved lawsuit against the State—Valdivia v.
Schwarzenegger—took the State back to court, alleging that
it had violated the previous settlement agreement wherein
intermediate sanctions would be used in place of parole
revocation and imprisonment when it was determined “that
such measures will best benefit both the community and the
parolee.” Although the State contended that the intermediate
sanction programs were not specifically included in the
settlement agreement, the court ruled in June 2005 that the
State violated the agreement when it eliminated the SATCU
and EID programs, the two intermediate sanctions specifically
named in the agreement. The court also found that the Halfway
Back program was not specifically named in the settlement
agreement; therefore its termination as an intermediate sanction
was not a violation of the settlement agreement. According to
the director of the parole division, since then the division has
redesigned the SATCU program, now called the In Custody
Drug Treatment Program, and changed the EID program from
a program used in lieu of parole revocation to one that will
be used in conjunction with other services. He stated that the
department has met with the plaintiffs’ counsel, who approved
the plan, and he indicated that the department hopes to
implement these two programs by the end of November 2005.

SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY
The Joint Legislative Audit Committee (audit committee)
requested that the Bureau of State Audits review how the
department handles parole violators under its New Parole
Model policy. Specifically, the audit committee requested that
we determine how the department classifies parolees in terms
of risk, how those classifications are used to determine the
treatment of parole violators, the types of parole violations and
parolee classifications that qualify for intermediate sanctions,
and the types of treatment options available for parole violators.

14

California State Auditor Report 2005-111

We also were asked to assess the steps used and the extent to
which the department has implemented and monitored its new
parole policy, focusing on the intermediate sanction programs,
including electronic monitoring, substance abuse treatment
control units, and community detention houses. In addition,
the audit committee asked us to determine whether the
department had established performance measures to measure
the efficacy of its parole policy in reducing the recidivism
rate. The audit committee also wanted to know the number of
parolees who successfully completed their parole before and
after the new parole policy changes and the number of parolees
who were sent back to prison for parole violations, as well as the
violations they committed.
Shortly after the audit committee approved the audit, the
department secretary terminated the department’s use of the
intermediate sanction programs as an alternative to parole
revocation and return to prison. The programs we were asked to
audit had been operating for 14 months or less when they were
canceled, so the data available for our analysis were limited.
The audit committee also asked that we determine whether
there is evidence that the new policy resulted in cost shifting
from the State to local governments, and whether parole policies
vary across regions within the State. Finally, we were asked to
compare the State’s policies regarding parole violators and the
use of intermediate sanctions to those of other states.
To determine the types of treatment options available for
parole violators, and the types of parole violations and parolee
classifications that qualify for intermediate sanctions, we
reviewed applicable state laws, the department’s operational
manual, and its policies and procedures for the intermediate
sanctions. For additional clarification on types of parole
violations, we reviewed the laws and regulations pertaining to
the board.
We determined how the department classifies parolee risk, and
how those classifications affect the treatment of parole violators, by
reviewing state regulations and the department’s operations manual
to identify the classification levels of parolee risk and the criteria used
to assign a risk classification level to a parolee. We also interviewed
parole division staff to determine how a parolee’s risk classification
affected placement in an intermediate sanction program.

California State Auditor Report 2005-111

15

To assess the extent to which the department was able to
implement its parole policy and intermediate sanction programs
and whether parole policies varied across regions within the State,
we interviewed parole division staff and reviewed policies for
the intermediate sanction programs, the department’s contracts
with program service providers, and program utilization data.
We also evaluated significant problems that occurred during the
implementation phase of the intermediate sanction programs.
To determine whether performance measures existed for the
intermediate sanction programs, we reviewed department policies
and contracts with program service providers. In addition, we
interviewed certain parole division program administrators to
determine how they would measure the success of each program.
To accomplish the intent of the audit committee to evaluate
the effectiveness of the intermediate sanction programs, we
determined the number of parolees who participated in an
intermediate sanction program and whether they completed
their parole or were sent back to prison for parole violations
or new crimes. We made this determination by analyzing data
as of March 31, 2005 (for the Halfway Back program and the
jail component of the SATCU program), and May 31, 2005
(for the SATCU program aftercare), that the department had
collected from program service providers. We also analyzed as
of May 20, 2005, the most recent available data at the time for
the ESATCU program and data from the department’s OffenderBased Information System as of May 31, 2005—the most recent
full month at the time of our fieldwork. We determined that
the records supporting the status of parole violators contained
in the department’s Offender-Based Information System and
the program data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of
our analysis by first obtaining an understanding of how the
information is compiled and then testing it as necessary.
To determine whether there is evidence that the new policy
resulted in cost shifting from the State to local governments,
we reviewed how programs were funded and whether new
activities were imposed on local governments. We found that the
intermediate sanction programs were totally funded by the State.
For example, the department paid $59 per day per participant to
the local jails that chose to contract with the department for the
30-day jail component of the SATCU program. Therefore, we did
not find evidence that the programs resulted in cost shifting to
local law enforcement.

16

California State Auditor Report 2005-111

Finally, to compare the State’s policy regarding parole violators
and the use of intermediate sanction programs to those of
other states, we selected a sample of eight states—Florida,
Maryland, Michigan, New York, Texas, Vermont, Washington,
and Wisconsin—some of which were cited in the Little Hoover
Commission’s November 2003 report as examples of states
with parole reforms. Using publicly available information and
interviews with correctional officials from those states, we
gathered information specifically related to whether they use
intermediate sanctions for parole violators in lieu of revoking
their parole. We present this information and a comparison of the
factors these states use in calculating their recidivism rates as well
as their most currently reported recidivism rate in Appendix A. n

California State Auditor Report 2005-111

17

Blank page inserted for reproduction purposes only.

18

California State Auditor Report 2005-111

CHAPTER 1
The Department Had No Basis for
Determining Whether the Benefits
of Using Intermediate Sanctions
Outweighed the Risk to Public Safety
CHAPTER SUMMARY

T

he secretary of the California Department of Corrections
and Rehabilitation (department) terminated the use of
the intermediate sanction programs as alternatives to parole
revocation and return to prison because he saw no evidence that
the programs improved public safety. The department’s Division
of Adult Parole Operations (parole division), which oversaw the
intermediate sanction programs, had collected some data on these
programs but had not established performance benchmarks or
analyzed the data. As a result, the parole division did not know
whether the increased risk to public safety associated with allowing
parole violators to stay in communities rather than returning them
to prison was worth the benefits it wanted to achieve.
The parole division believed that implementing the intermediate
sanction programs would result in savings of $50.2 million in
fiscal year 2003–04 and $100.5 million in fiscal year 2004–05.
However, these savings estimates were not fully realized because
the department did not take into account that a ramping-up period
was needed before the programs reached full capacity. Also, for a
number of reasons, none of the programs were implemented on
time, as we discuss further in Chapter 2. Thus, we estimate that for
parole violators placed in the Substance Abuse Treatment Control
Units (SATCU) and Halfway Back programs by December 31, 2004,
the department saved only $14.5 million.
In addition to saving money, the intermediate sanction programs
were intended to help the Board of Parole Hearings (board) comply
with the terms of the Valdivia settlement agreement by reducing
the board’s caseload. A reduced caseload would help the board
meet the 35-day deadline for hearing parole revocation cases that
was established by the agreement. The parole division also hoped
that participating parole violators would benefit from the drug and
alcohol counseling and other services they received while in the

California State Auditor Report 2005-111

19

SATCU and Halfway Back programs, resulting in a reduction in
the State’s recidivism rate—the rate at which inmates released from
prison are returned to prison.
Although the parole violators in the intermediate sanction programs
were subject to heightened supervision, it was for a shorter duration
than the average of 153 days they would have spent in prison had
they been returned. Because the parolees participating in these
programs were not incarcerated, they were not prevented from
committing crimes against the public for as long a period as
they were before the programs existed. In fact, of 3,175 parolees
who entered the Halfway Back program by December 31, 2004,
114—nearly 4 percent—were returned to prison as a result of
new crime convictions during the period they otherwise would
have been in prison. The SATCU program had similar results.
The parole division minimized the risk to public safety by placing
less dangerous parole violators in the programs and by designing
the programs to provide strict control or close monitoring of the
participating parole violators.

THE PAROLE DIVISION DID NOT ESTABLISH BENCHMARKS
TO EVALUATE THE INTERMEDIATE SANCTION PROGRAMS
On April 11, 2005, the
department secretary
terminated the use of the
intermediate sanction
programs explaining that
there was no evidence that
the programs, as originally
designed and implemented,
increased public safety.

Although the parole division had gathered data about the
intermediate sanction programs, it did not analyze the data to
evaluate the programs’ impact on public safety. In addition,
the parole division did not establish benchmarks to evaluate the
programs, such as acceptable return to custody rates for participants.
Therefore, the parole division was unable to evaluate whether the
additional risk to public safety inherent in the intermediate
sanction programs was worth the benefits that it wanted to
achieve—for example, saving the State money.
On April 11, 2005, the department secretary terminated the
use of the intermediate sanction programs as alternatives to
revoking parole and returning parole violators to prison. In
the memo announcing the termination of the programs, the
secretary stated that there were several reasons for the change,
the most important of which was the department’s ongoing
commitment to public safety. The secretary went on to explain
that there was no evidence that the intermediate sanction
programs, as originally designed and implemented, improved
public safety, and he stated that the programs had been beset by
implementation difficulties due to contract award disputes and a
shortage of available beds.

20

California State Auditor Report 2005-111

Although the parole
division had gathered data
about the intermediate
sanction programs, it did
not analyze the data to
evaluate the programs’
impact on public safety.

The secretary also stated that the agency recently had adopted its
first-ever strategic plan, with the stated goal of improving public
safety through evidence-based crime prevention and strategies to
reduce recidivism. To implement its goals, the agency, as part of its
reorganization, planned to establish an office of policy, planning,
and research that would be responsible for gathering evidence-based
best practices from throughout the nation to determine how the
agency can improve public safety by effectively adopting measures
that have proven to be successful supervision tools.

The Parole Division Had Certain Data Available for the
Intermediate Sanction Programs That It Could Have Analyzed
Although the parole division had data available about the
intermediate sanction programs, it did not use these data to
evaluate the programs. The director of the parole division says the
department encourages its program managers to collect program
data that can be used for future research, but it does not conduct its
own research and evaluations of new programs that are funded by
the Legislature; rather, it contracts with outside agencies to perform
such work because the analyses are often complex and long-term
in nature. For example, the parole division had parolee data about
the SATCU program because the contracts required the service
providers to collect detailed data on participating parolees in an
electronic format. These data included identifying information
about each participant, their program entrance and exit dates,
and reasons for exiting. Until December 2004, similar data for the
Halfway Back program existed only as paper copies of individual
contractors’ monthly invoices, rather than in electronic format.
Beginning in December 2004, Halfway Back program contractors
were asked to complete a data collection form that the parole
division had designed. When the programs were terminated, the
parole division had not compiled the data from the earlier invoices
and used them to evaluate the Halfway Back program.
The department also had data in its large database5 of inmate
and parolee information that the parole division could have
used to determine whether parolees who participated in the
intermediate sanction programs committed new crimes or parole
violations. But it did not use the data for this purpose and had
no plans to perform such an analysis. According to the director
of the parole division, the division did not have the mechanisms
in place to provide any meaningful data other than the gross
number of parolees placed in the programs and the rate of
5

The department maintains inmate and parolee information in its Offender-Based
Information System.

California State Auditor Report 2005-111

21

return to custody as of a given point in time. Moreover, the
parole division indicated that it was advised that it was too early
to evaluate the programs.

Monitoring the programs
using established
benchmarks would have
provided information
relevant to the secretary’s
decision to terminate
the programs.

However, as the department secretary stated, the department has an
ongoing commitment to public safety, so it should have established
benchmarks and monitored the programs’ impact on public safety
against them. This monitoring would have provided information
relevant to the secretary’s decision to terminate the programs, such
as whether the percentages of parolees in the programs who were
convicted of new crimes or who committed parole violations when
they otherwise would have been in prison were within acceptable
limits. In addition, had the parole division established benchmarks
for what it considered success, such as a minimum number of parole
violators completing the programs, and analyzed the available
data—similar to what we have done for this report—the secretary
could have used the analyses in deciding whether terminating
the intermediate sanction programs was the best choice. Finally,
by defining benchmarks before implementing the programs, the
parole division could have determined whether it needed additional
data to measure against the established benchmarks. In addition to
the analyses we present later in this chapter, Appendix B presents
the short-term results of parole violators who were placed in the
Halfway Back, SATCU, and Enhanced Substance Abuse Treatment
Control Unit (ESATCU) programs.

A Department Contractor Determined That It Was Too Early
to Evaluate the New Parole Model
In December 2004, the department contracted with the University
of California, Irvine (university) to assess the readiness of the
New Parole Model for evaluation, to determine whether program
outcomes and impacts could be measured, and to identify
short- and long-term outcomes for each program. Among other
tasks, the contract specified that the project was to begin that
month and continue through June 30, 2007, when the university
was to present its findings to the Legislature and the department.
However, according to the director of the parole division, the
university’s researcher advised that such an evaluation was not
feasible because the programs had not yet been implemented fully.
Consequently, according to the university’s researcher responsible
for overseeing the project, at that time, the university and the parole
division agreed to focus on a different program.
At the time the intermediate sanction programs were terminated
in April 2005, the university had not started its assessment of them.
The fiscal year 2004–05 budget act provided $650,000 for the
22

California State Auditor Report 2005-111

department to spend for establishing performance measures and
evaluating the effectiveness of various prison and parole programs.
The department is using the funds to help establish a research
center at the university, where the university will evaluate juvenile
and adult prison programs, including rehabilitation, parole, and
reentry programs, and will provide information that it believes
could help department officials make policy decisions.

LATE IMPLEMENTATION AND UNREALISTIC EXPECTATIONS
PREVENTED THE INTERMEDIATE SANCTION PROGRAMS
FROM ACHIEVING DESIRED SAVINGS
The intermediate sanction programs did not reach anticipated
participation levels because of late implementation and unrealistic
expectations, so the savings were far less than had been projected.
As we discuss in Chapter 2, none of the intermediate sanction
programs were implemented as planned by January 1, 2004, so
parole violators could not be placed in the programs as early as had
been intended. The Halfway Back program began in February 2004;
the SATCU program began in May 2004; and the Electronic
In-Home Detention (EID) program never fully materialized and thus
did not contribute to the savings that the parole division originally
had anticipated it would provide. In addition, the parole division’s
savings estimates for both fiscal years were based on having
900 beds for the Halfway Back program and 1,316 SATCU jail
beds—2,216 total beds. No contracts were made for approximately
one-quarter of those beds.

In calculating its savings
estimates, the parole
division did not take into
account the fact that there
would be a ramping-up
period during which
occupancy in the programs
would increase gradually.

The parole division’s expectation that the programs would
be fully occupied by the first date of implementation was
unrealistic. In calculating its savings estimates, the parole
division did not take into account the fact that there would be
a ramping-up period during which occupancy in the programs
would increase gradually. Instead, the parole division’s estimates
assumed full capacity from the beginning.
The parole division estimated that it would save $50.2 million in
fiscal year 2003–04 by placing 4,000 parole violators in the EID
program or the Halfway Back program and 8,000 in the SATCU
program. For fiscal year 2004–05 the parole division estimated
savings of approximately $100.5 million—twice that of fiscal year
2003–04, based on placing 8,000 parole violators in either the EID
program or the Halfway Back program and 16,000 in the SATCU
program. This was despite the fact that the inmates who occupied
the facilities that the parole division planned to use for the Halfway
Back program would need to be moved out of those facilities

California State Auditor Report 2005-111

23

gradually. Some beds would not be available for the program until
the transition was complete. Additionally, after the program was
available for use, parole agents had to establish a pipeline of eligible
parole violators willing to be placed in the Halfway Back facilities.
As a result, by the end of June 2004, parole violators occupied
473 of the 634 beds available to them, while the remaining beds
in the Halfway Back facilities were still occupied by inmates. The
transition was complete by November 2004, nearly 10 months after
the Halfway Back program was implemented. Although most of the
beds were filled, the program operated at 82 percent to 91 percent
capacity through April 2005. It was impossible for the parole
division to attain its estimated savings goals because the facilities
never reached 100 percent capacity. Figure 4 shows the transitioning
out of inmates and placement of parole violators in the Halfway
Back facilities from February 2004, when they were first available for
use, through April 2005.

FIGURE 4
Beds Occupied by Inmates and Parole Violators in Halfway Back Program Facilities
February 2004 Through April 2005
������� ������ �� ����
������ ������ �� ����
������ �� ���� �������� �� ������ ���������
������ �� ���� �������� �� �������

�����

������ �� ����

���

���

���

���

�
���� ����
����

����

���

����

����

���� ����� ����

���� ����

���� ����
����

����

����

Source: Community Correctional Reentry Centers facility counts and occupancy rates collected by the California Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation.
Note: Occupancy data is for the last reported date in the month.

24

California State Auditor Report 2005-111

The parole division assumed that it would have 900 beds
available for the Halfway Back program; however, only 792 beds
were available between February and June 2004. Because one
contractor terminated its contract on June 30, 2004, this number
was reduced to 747 and stayed at that level until the program
was terminated. In a letter to the parole division to terminate
its contract, the contractor indicated that it was experiencing
financial problems and was concerned about the effect the
facility’s shift from an inmate population to a population of
“unmotivated and incorrigible parolees” would have on staff
and community safety.
The SATCU program got off to a slow start and never reached
full capacity, even though the number of jail beds available
was significantly less than the 1,316 beds the parole division
estimated it would need to reach its savings goal. As we discuss
in Chapter 2, the parole division had difficulty contracting
for SATCU jail beds because some counties were not willing to
accept the daily jail rate offered and others lacked space.
Parole agents began placing parole violators in the SATCU jails
statewide in July 2004, and occupancy gradually increased
over time. However, of the 930 SATCU jail beds available by
March 30, 2005, only 656, or 71 percent, were occupied. Figure 5
on the following page shows the monthly occupancy for the
SATCU jails.
A substantial percentage of the jail beds available for the
SATCU program—70 percent—were located in a large detention
facility in Los Angeles County. According to the director of the
parole division, having a single large facility serve such a large
geographic area was problematic for parole agents wanting to
refer parole violators to the SATCU program because of the need
to transport them long distances to this facility. The department
intended that the facility serve two of its four parole regions,
regions III and IV, and part of region II, which constitutes a
significant portion of the State. A map of the State with the
department’s parole regions is shown in the Introduction on
page 6.

California State Auditor Report 2005-111

25

FIGURE 5
Occupancy of SATCU Jail Beds
July 2004 Through April 2005
������� ������ �� ����
������ ������ �� ����
������ �� ���� �������� �� ������ ���������

�����

������ �� ����

�����

���

���

���

�
����
����

����

�����

����

����

����

����
����

����

����

����

Source: SATCU jail occupancy rate reports from the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.
Note: Occupancy data shown is for the last reported date in the month.

Although the Parole Division Did Not Calculate the Savings
Resulting From the Intermediate Sanction Programs, We
Estimated That They Were Substantially Less Than Anticipated
The low occupancy of the SATCU and Halfway Back programs
occurred despite the fact that the parole division had expanded the
eligibility for both programs to include some serious and violent
offenders, and the Halfway Back program was expanded further to
include parole violators eligible for Proposition 36 programs.6 As a
result of the implementation problems and the gradual utilization
that occurred, only 2,567 parole violators had been placed in the
SATCU program as of December 31, 2004, and only 3,175 had
been placed in the Halfway Back program, far short of the 12,000
the parole division estimated it would need to meet its projected
savings for the second half of fiscal year 2003–04.
6

26

Proposition 36 was passed by voters in 2000. Effective July 1, 2001, its intent is to divert
nonviolent defendants, probationers, and parolees charged with simple drug possession
or drug abuse offenses from incarceration into community-based substance abuse programs.
The SATCU program required participants to spend 30 days in jail, therefore, the eligibility
criteria for the SATCU program excluded parole violators eligible for Proposition 36 services.

California State Auditor Report 2005-111

The parole division did not evaluate the data it had about the
Halfway Back and SATCU programs, so it was unable to calculate
the savings achieved by the programs. It was apparent, however,
that the savings were substantially less than anticipated because of
the delays in implementing the programs and placing parole violators
in them. Using the parole division’s estimates and data about the
programs and the participants, we estimated that for the 5,742 parole
violators placed in the programs by December 31, 2004—2,567 in
the SATCU program and 3,175 in the Halfway Back program—the
department saved $14.5 million—$7.4 million and $7.1 million,
respectively. The savings equates to an average $1.2 million per
month over a 12-month period, far short of the average $8.4 million
per month it would have had to save to achieve its planned savings
of $50.2 million for fiscal year 2003–04 and $100.5 million for fiscal
year 2004–05. Table 2 compares our estimate of the cost of using the
intermediate sanction programs to the parole division’s estimated cost
of returning the parole violators to prison.

TABLE 2
Estimated Savings from Using Intermediate Sanctions
Rather Than Parole Revocation as of December 31, 2004
(Dollars in Millions)
Intermediate
Sanction
Program

Number Placed in
Program by
December 31, 2004

Total Cost of Returning
Participants to Prison

Total Cost of Participants
in an Intermediate
Sanction Program

Savings From Using
Intermediate Sanction Programs
Through December 31, 2004

SATCU

2,567

$19.8

$12.4

$ 7.4

Halfway Back

3,175

24.5

17.4

7.1

Total Savings

$14.5

Sources: Bureau of State Audits’ analysis of California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation data and budget documents.

The costs shown in the table do not account for the additional
costs to local law enforcement agencies associated with locating
and arresting the parole violators who were returned to custody,
obtaining convictions for those returned for new crimes, the costs
to the Board of Parole Hearings (board) for holding revocation
hearings for those who were returned for parole violations, and
the costs to victims of the parole violators who were convicted
of new crimes. Furthermore, the savings figures do not account
for benefits that are not quantifiable, such as the impact that the
Halfway Back and SATCU programs may have had on the future
behavior of participants, which we discuss in the next section.
California State Auditor Report 2005-111

27

THE INTERMEDIATE SANCTION PROGRAMS HAD
OTHER MEANINGFUL BENEFITS

The SATCU and Halfway
Back programs provided
participants with an array
of services, such as drug
and alcohol counseling,
life skills management, and
employment counseling.

In addition to the cost savings, the parole division hoped that
parole violators would benefit from services they received
while in the SATCU and Halfway Back programs to help
them reintegrate into society and complete their parole terms
successfully, resulting in a lower recidivism rate. Although there
was no rehabilitative aspect to the EID program, the SATCU
and Halfway Back programs provided participants with an
array of services, such as drug and alcohol counseling, life skills
management, and employment counseling.
The department believes that the benefits provided by such
services, such as improvement in an individual’s quality of life,
are not measured easily and require analysis of data collected
over a long period of time. It planned to hire a contractor to
study the long-term effects of the New Parole Model and the
individual programs on the behavior of parole violators. The
tables in Appendix B show that for two of the three intermediate
sanction programs, as of May 31, 2005, the percentage of
participants who were reincarcerated was double or more
among those who did not complete the programs, compared
with the percentage among those who completed the programs.
These results suggest that some participants who were successful
may have improved their behavior within the time period we
reviewed. Although these results are short term, the parole
division could use this type of information to establish a
baseline of performance and compare that baseline against
results at future points in time.
In addition, the intermediate sanction programs were seen as a
way to help reduce the workload of parole revocation hearings
before the board. Parolees facing parole revocation have the
right to a hearing before the board. As a result of the settlement
of the Valdivia lawsuit against the State, the board is required
to conduct final revocation hearings within 35 days after the
first day a parolee is detained for parole revocation. According to
court documents detailing the settlement agreement, historically,
parolees had spent up to 45 days or more in jail awaiting a
hearing before the board.
Under the New Parole Model, eligible parole violators could
agree to be placed in an intermediate sanction program in lieu
of continuing with the parole revocation process. As part of their
agreement, the parole violators waived their right to a board
hearing, thereby avoiding the risk that the board would revoke

28

California State Auditor Report 2005-111

Placing parole violators in
the intermediate sanction
programs was not only
a way to save money,
but was also a way to
reduce the Board of Parole
Hearings’ caseload.

their parole. Therefore, placing parole violators in the intermediate
sanction programs was not only a way to save money, but was
also a way to reduce the board’s hearing caseload, increasing the
likelihood that it could meet the 35-day deadline. Evaluating
the effect of the intermediate sanction programs on the board’s
hearing caseload was outside the scope of our audit. However,
because the approximately 5,700 parole violators who entered the
Halfway Back and SATCU programs by December 31, 2004, waived
their right to a parole revocation hearing, the board’s caseload
potentially was reduced by that number.

THE INTERMEDIATE SANCTION PROGRAMS PROVIDED
LESS SUPERVISION THAN PRISON, AND SOME PAROLE
VIOLATORS IN THESE PROGRAMS COMMITTED CRIMES
Inherently, there is an increased risk to public safety by placing
parole violators in programs that are shorter in duration than the
time they otherwise would have spent in prison. The parole division
minimized this risk by limiting placement in the programs to parole
violators who committed minor violations of their parole or the
law—those it believed would be less likely to commit serious crimes.
However, parole violators in the intermediate sanction programs
were supervised closely for fewer than the average 153 days they
would have spent in prison had they been returned, so they could
commit other parole violations and crimes sooner than if they had
been returned to prison.

Parole Violators in the Intermediate Sanction Programs Were
Under Less Supervision Than Prison Would Have Provided
Although the intermediate sanction programs provided
supervision of the parole violators who participated in them,
they allowed participants to remain in communities and thus
provided less supervision than prison would have provided.
Moreover, 1,081 of the 2,567 participants in the SATCU program
did not attend the required aftercare services after being
released from jail. As a result, the additional oversight that the
aftercare services would have provided did not occur for many
SATCU participants, and they may have been unsupervised
until they were located and returned to custody for not
completing the program or placed in the program again. Of the
1,081 participants, 83 were returned to custody for committing
a new crime and 346 were returned to custody for violating their
parole within the 153-day average time frame they would have
otherwise spent in prison if the SATCU program did not exist.
We discuss this in more detail in a subsequent section.
California State Auditor Report 2005-111

29

The SATCU program was designed for parole violators whose
primary problem is drug or alcohol dependency. The department’s
Office of Substance Abuse Programs (OSAP) manager responsible for
the aftercare contracts explained that many of these parole violators
may be in the throes of detoxifying from drugs or alcohol during
the 30 days they spend in jail as the first component of the SATCU
program. She believes the 30-day substance abuse program provided
to them in jail was less effective for participants who are detoxing.
After the parolees participating in the SATCU program were
released from jail, they were ordered to attend the 90-day aftercare
component of the program, which was provided by agencies
in the community. In a letter to the parole division, the chief of
the OSAP indicated that residential care has been demonstrated
to be most effective. It is also more expensive, however, so
most participants were referred to nonresidential aftercare.
Additionally, according to the letter, to improve the success rate
for those referred to nonresidential aftercare, transportation to
the aftercare service providers should be provided. According
to the OSAP’s records, many of those who were referred to
nonresidential aftercare programs did not receive transportation.
Consequently, as Figure B.2 in Appendix B shows, after spending
time in a SATCU jail, 46 percent of these parolees did not participate
in the aftercare portion of the SATCU program. The aftercare
agencies were required to report parolees who were referred to them
but did not show up as scheduled. However, it is reasonable to
believe that many parolees released from SATCU jails resumed their
use of drugs or alcohol and that some may have committed other
crimes before being tracked down by their parole agents.

After completing the
45-day Halfway Back
program, the participants
were released and
returned to regular
parole supervision.

30

Similarly, the Halfway Back program required participants to
reside in a closely supervised halfway house for a specified
number of days; the parole division expected the average stay
to be 45 days. However, after completing the Halfway Back
program, the participants were released and returned to regular
parole supervision. Parolees in the EID program wore electronic
monitoring devices on their ankles as a special condition of
parole; however, they were not supervised as closely as parolees
in either the 30-day jail component of the SATCU program or
the Halfway Back program because they were allowed to remain
in their residences and go to and from their jobs. When they
completed the 45-day program, the ankle devices were removed
and the special condition of parole ended. Table 3 compares
the number of days parole violators were supervised in the
intermediate sanction programs to the average number of days
they would have spent in prison.
California State Auditor Report 2005-111

TABLE 3
Length of Supervision in Intermediate Sanction Programs
Compared With Average Time in Prison for Violating Parole
Intermediate
Sanction Program
SATCU

Days in Intermediate
Sanction Program

Average Days in Custody
for Parole Revocation

Number of Days of Potential Risk to Public
Safety by Using an Intermediate Sanction
Program Instead of Parole Revocation

153

123

30 days in jail
90 days in unsecured
community aftercare programs

EID

45 days in community with
electronic ankle device

153

108

Halfway Back

Average 45 days in closely
supervised residential facility

153

108

Source: California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.

The Parole Division Minimized the Risk to Public Safety by
Placing Less Dangerous Parole Violators in the Intermediate
Sanction Programs
Programs that involve keeping parolees who have histories of
not following the rules of their parole out of prison create the
opportunity for them to commit additional parole violations
or new crimes and thus increase the risk to the public. To limit
this risk, the parole division designed the intermediate sanction
programs to provide supervision or strict control of the parole
violators who participated in them. Although the parole division
later allowed some parole violators with histories of serious and
violent offenses who had committed technical, nonserious,
or nonviolent parole violations to enter the programs, parole
agents considered not only their previous offenses but also their
recent behavior, including the nature of their parole violations,
when deciding whether to recommend placing a parolee in an
intermediate sanction program. Only nonviolent parolees who
had committed minor violations of their parole or the law were
initially considered eligible for an intermediate sanction program.

Although Intermediate Sanction Programs Increase the
Public Safety Risk in the Short Term, This Risk Must Be
Weighed Against the Desired Benefits
In the short term, intermediate sanction programs are less
effective than prison at preventing crimes, but this risk must
be weighed against the benefits of using such programs.
California State Auditor Report 2005-111

31

Approximately one-third of the parole violators placed in the
SATCU or Halfway Back programs were returned to prison as
the result of a new conviction or parole violation during the
153 days they otherwise would have spent in prison. Table 4
shows the number of parolees who were returned to custody
within 153 days of entering these two programs—the average
time the parole division estimates they would have spent in
prison had they been returned to prison rather than placed in an
intermediate sanction program.
However, as the table shows, of the 37 percent of parolees placed
in the Halfway Back program who were returned to prison
within 153 days of entering the program, only 4 percent were
returned because they had committed new crimes. The result
is similar for the SATCU program. Thus, notwithstanding the
significance of those crimes to their victims, the percentage of
parolees participating in the two programs who were convicted
of new crimes is small. In the long term, the parole division
hoped that the SATCU and Halfway Back programs would help
parolees change their behavior for the better.

TABLE 4
Parole Violators Placed in an Intermediate Sanction Program as of December 31, 2004,
and Returned to Custody Within 153 Days of Placement
Intermediate
Sanction
Program

Number Placed
in Program as of
December 31, 2004

Number and Percentage of
Participants Returned to Prison for
New Crimes Committed

Halfway Back

3,175

114

3.6%

SATCU

2,567

128

5.0

Number and Percentage of
Participants Returned to Prison
for Parole Violations
1,048
684

33.0%
26.6

Totals
1,162
812

Sources: Bureau of State Audits’ analysis of program provider data collected by the California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation and data from its Offender-Based Information System.

Although the tradeoff may be difficult, achieving the desired
benefits of using intermediate sanction programs in lieu of
returning eligible parole violators to prison requires a willingness
to accept the additional risks associated with keeping individuals
who are proven to be uncooperative in the community. Also, to
evaluate whether the intermediate sanction programs adequately
protected the public, the parole division would need to know
how many parolees committed parole violations and how many
were convicted of new crimes during the time they otherwise
would have been in prison. The parole division did not establish
32

California State Auditor Report 2005-111

Achieving the desired
benefits of using
intermediate sanction
programs in lieu of
returning eligible parole
violators to prison requires
a willingness to accept the
additional risks associated
with keeping individuals
who are proven to
be uncooperative in
the community.

failure rates in terms of percentages of parole violations and new
crime convictions, such as those shown in Table 4, that it could
use as benchmarks to determine whether the programs were
operating with acceptable risk to the public.
It is reasonable to assume that the department, as well as the
Legislature, which authorized the use of the intermediate
sanction programs, understood that the cost of crime cannot
always be valued, especially the cost of crimes against persons.
However, without knowing the nature and extent of additional
risk associated with keeping parole violators in the community,
the parole division could not evaluate the success of the
intermediate sanction programs appropriately.
In addition to knowing the overall failure rate of the intermediate
sanction programs, knowing the failure rates of those who completed
a program versus those who entered a program but did not complete
it would have been useful information for the parole division to
consider when evaluating the programs. Of 2,766 participants who
left the Halfway Back program by March 31, 2005, the last month
of data before the intermediate sanction programs were suspended,
1,160 completed the program and 1,606 did not complete it. Table 5
shows that 69 percent of the participants who did not complete
the Halfway Back program were returned to custody at least once
from the time they entered the program through May 31, 2005, while
29 percent of those who completed the program had returned
to custody by then. Table B.1 in Appendix B shows the status of all
2,766 Halfway Back program participants who entered the Halfway
Back program for the first time by December 31, 2004, and exited for
the first time by March 31, 2005.

TABLE 5
Halfway Back Participants Placed by December 31, 2004,
Who Were Returned to Custody at Least Once by May 31, 2005
Of 1,160 Parolees
Who Completed the
Halfway Back Program:
Total returned

332

28.6%

Returned for
parole violation

277

23.9

Returned for
new conviction

55

4.7

Of 1,606 Parolees
Who Did Not Complete the
Halfway Back Program:

Totals

68.9%

1,439

903

56.2

1,180

204

12.7

259

1,107

Sources: Bureau of State Audits’ analysis of program provider data collected by the
California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation and data from its Offender-Based
Information System.

California State Auditor Report 2005-111

33

It is interesting to note that of the 1,439 participants who were
returned to custody by May 31, 2005—332 of whom completed
the program and 1,107 of whom did not—1,162, or 81 percent,
were returned to custody within the 153-day average time
frame that they would have spent in prison if the intermediate
sanction programs did not exist.
Table 6 shows that the SATCU program had similar results,
although the results are less dramatic than those for the Halfway
Back program. Specifically, of 2,527 participants who exited the
SATCU jail component by March 31, 2005, and had exited SATCU
aftercare by May 31, 2005, 1,094, or 43 percent, were returned to
custody at least once by May 31, 2005. Of the 1,094 returned to
custody, 812, or 74 percent, are those shown previously in Table 4
as having returned within the 153-day time frame. Table B.2
in Appendix B shows the status of all 2,527 SATCU program
participants who entered the program for the first time by
December 31, 2004, and exited for the first time by May 31, 2005.

TABLE 6
SATCU Participants Placed by December 31, 2004,
Who Were Returned to Custody at Least Once by May 31, 2005
Of 419 Parolees
Who Completed the
SATCU Program

Of 2,108 Parolees Who
Did Not Complete the
SATCU Program
1,033

49.0%

Totals
1,094

Total returned

61

14.6%

Returned for
parole violation

54

12.9

816

38.7

870

Returned for
new conviction

7

1.7

217

10.3

224

Sources: Bureau of State Audits’ analysis of program provider data collected by the
California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation and data from its Offender-Based
Information System.

Because we used May 31, 2005, as the cutoff for our analysis of
the status of participants who exited the Halfway Back or SATCU
programs for the first time, we could not evaluate the effectiveness
of the programs more fully. Specifically, for participants who
completed a program and were not returned to custody by
May 31, 2005, we were unable to determine how long they
successfully continued on parole, or whether they successfully
completed their parole periods. However, using the data it had, the
parole division could have done an analysis similar to ours, and
34

California State Auditor Report 2005-111

then could have measured the results against benchmarks such as
a percentage of participants who did not return to custody within a
specified time period after completing a program.
As we discussed in the Introduction, in addition to the EID, Halfway
Back, and SATCU programs, the department implemented an
intermediate sanction program called the Enhanced Substance Abuse
Treatment Control Unit (ESATCU) program in March 2004. The
department established the ESATCU program for different reasons
than for establishing the other intermediate sanction programs. It
established the ESATCU program to make use of an existing facility
that would be occupied partly by inmates in a similar substance
abuse program. The program was not available statewide, so the
department did not consider it a part of its New Parole Model.
However, the ESATCU program had potential rehabilitation
benefits similar to those for the Halfway Back and SATCU programs,
although it could serve only 800 parolees annually.
Because the ESATCU program was an intermediate sanction
program used as an alternative to prison, it had the same public
safety issues as the other three programs. Participants were
monitored closely in a correctional facility for 90 days and then
released, which meant that, on average, they were released 63 days
sooner than if their parole had been revoked. Table 7 shows that
89 percent of the participants who did not complete the ESATCU
program because they were removed from the program were
returned to custody at least once from the time they entered the
program through May 31, 2005. In contrast, 37 percent of those
who completed the program had returned by then.

TABLE 7
ESATCU Participants Placed by December 31, 2004,
Who Were Returned to Custody at Least Once by May 31, 2005
Of 337 Parolees
Who Completed
the ESATCU Program:

Of 55 Parolees Who
Did Not Complete
the ESATCU Program:

Totals

Total returned

125

37.1%

49

89.1%

174

Returned for
parole violation

110

32.6

40

72.7

150

Returned for
new conviction

15

4.5

9

16.4

24

Sources: Bureau of State Audits’ analysis of program provider data collected by the
California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation and data from its Offender-Based
Information System.

California State Auditor Report 2005-111

35

Of the 174 participants who returned to custody, 75 were returned
within 153 days of entering the program, including 73 participants
who committed parole violations and two who were convicted
of new crimes. Table B.3 in Appendix B shows the status of all
ESATCU participants as of May 31, 2005.

RECOMMENDATIONS
When planning future intermediate sanction programs, the parole
division should decide on appropriate benchmarks for monitoring
performance, identify the data it will need to measure performance
against those benchmarks, and ensure that reliable data collection
mechanisms are in place before a program is implemented. After
implementing a new intermediate sanction program, the parole
division should analyze the data it has collected and, if relevant,
use the data in its existing databases to monitor and evaluate the
program’s effectiveness on an ongoing basis.
The parole division should ensure that the savings estimates
developed during program planning are based on reasonable
assumptions. If those assumptions change, it should update the
savings estimates promptly.
The parole division should consider analyzing the effect
programs have had on parolee behavior and should use
the knowledge it gains from the analyses to make future
intermediate sanction programs more effective. The analysis
should include the benefits of adding features to make these
programs more effective. n

36

California State Auditor Report 2005-111

CHAPTER 2
Contracting Problems and Unforeseen
Issues Delayed the Implementation of
the Intermediate Sanction Programs
CHAPTER SUMMARY

A

fter the signing of the fiscal year 2003–04 budget, the
Division of Adult Parole Operations (parole division) within
the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation
(department) planned to implement the intermediate sanction
programs by January 1, 2004. Although the parole division took
steps to establish each program in the months before January 2004,
unforeseen obstacles, contracting problems, and labor negotiations
caused delays in beginning the Substance Abuse Treatment Control
Units (SATCU) and Electronic In-Home Detention (EID) programs.
As a result, the SATCU program was not implemented until
May 2004, and the EID program was delayed until November 2004.
The EID program also was plagued by equipment problems that,
according to a parole division regional administrator, caused the
program to lose credibility with the department’s field parole agents.
Although the Halfway Back program did not experience contracting
problems, it was delayed until February 2004 due to the need to
reach an agreement with the labor union regarding the Halfway
Back policy. The department also needed time to phase out the
inmate population in the Halfway Back facilities and transition to a
parole violator population. Because of the delays in implementing
these programs, as we discussed in Chapter 1, the department did
not achieve the cost savings it had projected for fiscal year 2003–04.

UNFORESEEN FACTORS HAMPERED EARLY
PLANNING EFFORTS
The parole division began efforts to implement the intermediate
sanction programs shortly after passage of the fiscal year
2003–04 budget, with a goal of implementing the programs in
January 2004. However, during the latter half of 2003, planning
for the implementation of the intermediate sanction programs
was hampered by unforeseen factors, such as a change in

California State Auditor Report 2005-111

37

A change in department
leadership and a hiring and
contracting freeze caused
a degree of uncertainty
to be present during
the planning activities
for the intermediate
sanction programs.

department leadership and a hiring and contracting freeze. These
and other factors caused a degree of uncertainty to be present
during the planning activities that took place during this period.
In particular, shortly after the administration changed with
the new governor in November 2003, the department director
resigned and the parole division’s deputy director was moved
into the position of acting department director and later acting
chief deputy. The loss of the deputy director may have disrupted
the planning process because he had created the programs and
other department staff were left to oversee their implementation
during his five-month absence (he returned in May 2004).
In addition, soon after the administration change, the governor
issued, in November and December 2003, two executive orders
calling for a hiring and contracting freeze. The parole division’s
acting deputy director at the time stated that there initially
was uncertainty about whether the contracting freeze applied
to the department’s efforts to implement the intermediate
sanction programs. Although the parole division later received
exemptions from both freezes, the hiring freeze contributed to
the delay in implementing the SATCU program. We discuss this
further in the next section.
According to the parole division’s acting deputy director at
the time, the department was under pressure to implement the
intermediate sanction programs by January 1, 2004, because
the fiscal year 2003–04 budget act reflected the department’s
estimate of the cost savings the programs would achieve, and
those savings would not be realized if the programs did not
start on time. In addition, the department was under some legal
pressure to get the programs under way because the SATCU
and EID programs were included in the remedial plan of the
Valdivia settlement agreement. These programs were intended
to reduce the Board of Parole Hearings’ caseload and allow it to
conduct the remaining hearings within the shortened time limits
established in the agreement.
The parole division’s acting deputy director at the time indicated
that the division conducted weekly meetings to discuss the
status of implementation and conferred weekly with regional
parole administrators to discuss their efforts, such as negotiating
contracts with county jails for the SATCU program.

38

California State Auditor Report 2005-111

UNANTICIPATED CONTRACTING DELAYS AND
ADMINISTRATIVE OBSTACLES IMPEDED THE TIMELY
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SATCU PROGRAM
In order to implement the SATCU program, which entailed
a 30-day in-custody education component followed by up
to 90 days of aftercare, the parole division first needed to
establish contracts with county jails, which proved to be more
problematic than the parole division had anticipated. The parole
division indicated that it began to solicit county jails as early
as September 2003. As illustrated in Figure 6 on the following
page, the new administration imposed a contracting freeze in
late 2003, but the department learned from the Department of
General Services in mid-December that interagency contracts,
such as those with county jails, were exempt from the freeze.

According to the
department’s acting
director at the time,
the parole division
underestimated other
obstacles associated
with being dependent
on the jails for the
SATCU implementation.

However, according to the department’s acting director at
the time, the parole division underestimated other obstacles
associated with being dependent on the jails for the SATCU
implementation. For example, he stated that some counties were
not willing to contract for the $59 daily rate the parole division
pays. The parole division learned that others were not willing
to contract because they lacked space. In one instance, a parole
division manager indicated that a county jail agreed to contract
with the parole division, but never accepted SATCU parolees
because of a delay in hiring staff and budgetary concerns.
This manager also stated that some jails were too far away
geographically to provide the maximum benefit to the program,
while others wanted to negotiate different terms. As a result of
these obstacles, contracts with county jails were not in place
by the scheduled January 1, 2004, implementation date and, in
fact, were approved at varying times throughout that year. As
shown in the text box on page 41, only two jail contracts had
been approved by March 2004, and the department had six jail
contracts in place for the SATCU program by November 2004.

California State Auditor Report 2005-111

39

40

FIGURE 6
Events Leading to Delays in Implementing the SATCU Program

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��� �� ����������� ������ ��� ������� ��
��������� ��� ����
���� ��� ����������� ���������� ��������
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���� �� ����������� ������ ��� ��������
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Locations and Approval Dates
for SATCU Jail Contracts
Del Norte County—March 9, 2004
Los Angeles County—March 25, 2004
Kern County—April 20, 2004
Santa Clara County—May 7, 2004

The parole division also needed to enter into a
contract for drug education classes for parolees
during their 30-day jail stay. Like the jail contracts,
this contract was exempt from the restrictions
imposed by the contracting freeze because the
contractor was another government agency,
the Contra Costa County Office of Education
(CCCOE). The Department of General Services
approved the contract in April 2004.

San Francisco County—August 19, 2004

In addition to establishing contracts for the in-custody
component of the SATCU program, the parole
division needed to establish providers for the
aftercare component. According to the parole
division’s acting deputy director at the time, the parole division’s
original intention was to obtain a competitively bid contract
with a new provider for aftercare services. However, because
the department was under pressure to implement the programs
quickly and because of the contracting freeze, the department
instead decided to ask Substance Abuse Coordination Agency
(substance abuse agency) providers, with whom it had existing
contracts, to provide aftercare services. These providers were
already under contract with the department’s Office of Substance
Abuse Programs (OSAP) to provide residential and nonresidential
substance abuse services to inmates and parolees through a
variety of department programs.

Tulare County—November 9, 2004

As noted in Figure 6, according to the substance abuse agency’s
program manager at OSAP, the providers were contacted and
verbally authorized to provide aftercare for the SATCU program
in January 2004. The substance abuse agency’s providers
began accepting parolees in May 2004, before the contract
amendments were in place, but the department was not able
to get the necessary contract amendments approved until
May 2005 because it had to prepare a written justification of
its decision not to seek competitive bids that then had to go
through various layers of departmental and Department of
General Services’ review and approval. Therefore, this delay did
not affect the implementation of the SATCU program.
Several other actions also had to occur before parolees could
enter the SATCU program. First, the parole division had to issue
a policy describing how the program was to be used, parolee
eligibility criteria, and specific job duties for parole division staff.
Because the SATCU program would add duties for parole agents,
the parole division could not develop the SATCU policy without
negotiating these job duty changes with the parole agents’ labor
California State Auditor Report 2005-111

41

Because the SATCU
program would add duties
for parole agents, the
parole division could not
develop the SATCU policy
without negotiating these
job duty changes with the
parole agents’ labor union.

union. Thus, as shown previously in Figure 6, the parole division
developed the SATCU program policy memo in December 2003 and
subsequently met with the labor union that represents parole agents
(labor union) to discuss the impact the new policy would have on
the terms and conditions of employment for employees concerned.
By March 2004, the negotiations had reached an impasse, with
the two parties unable to agree on a solution. Once an impasse is
reached, state law allows the department to implement any or all of
its last, best, and final offer. The parole division issued the SATCU
policy memo on May 7, 2004.
Development of the policy also required the parole division
to reach an agreement with OSAP, which was responsible for
oversight of the substance abuse agency’s contract providers. As
shown in Figure 6, OSAP and parole division staff met to discuss
the roles and responsibilities for the SATCU program aftercare in
March 2004 and finalized an agreement on May 1, 2004.
Even after the SATCU policy was issued, it was not until July 2004
that all the regions began to use the SATCU program because,
according to the SATCU program manager, county jails and the
CCCOE needed to hire and train staff. In addition, the SATCU
program required the department to hire additional parole agents
to coordinate and manage the delivery of SATCU services. However,
because the hiring freeze was in place through the end of fiscal
year 2003–04, the parole division could not hire parole agents until
the Department of Finance approved its request for an exemption,
which the department requested in November 2003. Subsequently,
the first SATCU parole agent was hired in May 2004. County jails
needed to hire staff to guard the parole violators during their
30-day jail stay, and the CCCOE needed to hire staff and obtain
security clearance for them to enter the county jails. In addition,
the parole division conducted regional roundtable discussions with
representatives from the parole division, the county jails, substance
abuse agency providers, and the CCCOE representative for each
region, regarding their roles and responsibilities.

THE EID PROGRAM NEVER FULLY MATERIALIZED
Because of contracting delays and equipment problems, the EID
program never fully materialized before the department secretary
terminated it. By late 2003, the department appeared to be on
track to implement the EID program as planned. Specifically,
as shown in Figure 7 on page 44, the parole division drafted a
scope of work for electronic monitoring services in October 2003,
made the invitation for bid (IFB) available to prospective bidders
42

California State Auditor Report 2005-111

on November 24, 2003, and selected the lowest-bidding vendor
on January 12, 2004, pending a demonstration of the vendor’s
electronic monitoring equipment to ensure that it complied with
all the requirements in the contract scope of work, such as having
a proximity tamper—an alarm that would trigger if the electronic
monitoring unit were taken away from the body yet remained
connected. The parole division’s demonstration determined that the
vendor’s equipment did not have a proximity tamper. Subsequently,
in late January 2004, the department informed the vendor that it
had failed the equipment demonstration and, because of that, was
disqualified from the contract. The parole division’s second choice
of vendor for this contract passed the equipment demonstration,
but the department later received two protests to the contract
award. Specifically, the vendor that previously failed the equipment
demonstration claimed that its equipment did meet the contract
requirements. Another vendor also protested the award, claiming
that the second vendor did not use the latest generation of
equipment, as specified in the IFB, and that the bid was not signed
by an individual authorized to execute contracts.
Because of the time it would have taken to defend the two protests
simultaneously, the parole division instead put out a new IFB in
April 2004 and selected a new vendor, which passed the equipment
demonstration in May 2004. However, the second contract award
also was protested, causing further delays. Specifically, another
bidder claimed that the selected vendor did not provide services
to the minimum number of law enforcement agencies required
by the IFB. In July 2004, the Department of General Services ruled
not to uphold the protest. As a result of these protests, as noted in
Figure 7 on the following page, the EID contract was not finalized
until August 2004, and because additional delays occurred after
that, the EID program was not available for use until much later in
the year than planned.

Besides the contracting
delays, the EID program
was not immediately
implemented due to
administrative issues,
such as training field
staff to use the program
and equipment.

Besides the delays in contracting process, the EID program was
not immediately implemented due to administrative issues, such
as the need to develop the program’s policy, negotiate workload
implications with the labor union, and train field staff to use
the program and equipment. Although the parole division
previously had drafted an EID policy, the policy could not be
finalized until after negotiations with the labor union took
place. As noted in Figure 7, negotiations with the labor union
took place between March and May 2004, at which time they
reached an impasse. As we mentioned earlier, this allowed the
department to implement any or all of its last, best, and final

California State Auditor Report 2005-111

43

44

FIGURE 7
Activities That Delayed Implementation of the EID Program

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California State Auditor Report 2005-111

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offer. However, the Department of Industrial Relations, which
mediated the impasse, did not officially declare that no agreement
could be reached between the parties until July 24, 2004.
After the approval of the EID contract in August 2004 and
through November 2004, the parole division and the contractor
worked together to train a certain number of parole agents
from parole units located throughout the State in the use of
the EID equipment, with the expectation that they would train
the remaining parole agents in their units. All training was
completed by November 15, 2004, and the parole division issued
the EID policy on November 29, 2004.

One of the parole
division’s regional
administrators stated
that the EID program
lost credibility with
the parole agents who
were supposed to use it
because they found the
equipment hard to use
and not always accurate.

Although the policy was issued on November 29, 2004, the
contractor’s status reports show that as of January 28, 2005, only
34 of the 1,000 electronic monitoring units that were distributed to
parole units statewide were in use. By April 8, 2005, three days before
the agency secretary terminated the EID program, only 137 units
were in use. One of the parole division’s regional administrators
stated that the EID program lost credibility with parole agents because
they found the equipment hard to use and not always accurate.
The parole division first attempted to resolve the equipment
problems with the contractor in late December 2004, when
only three electronic monitoring units had been activated. To
resolve installation difficulties, the contractor agreed to provide
installation instructions in the form of a sticker that could
be attached to the electronic monitoring equipment, and to
develop tips to help the participants in the program prevent
false alarm signals. Even with these improvements, the parole
division continued to receive the same and other complaints from
parole agents. As a result, in February 2005, the parole division
conducted its own test of the equipment and found that the
alarm signals were unreliable. The equipment problems and the
subsequent perception that had developed among parole agents
that the equipment was unreliable, as well as other concerns, led
the department to formally terminate the contract in May 2005,
by which time the EID program already was terminated.

THE HALFWAY BACK PROGRAM WAS IMPLEMENTED
RELATIVELY SMOOTHLY, BUT DID NOT REACH
OCCUPANCY GOALS
The department was on track to implement the Halfway Back
program by January 2004, but due to the need to finalize
negotiations with the labor union, implementation occurred
California State Auditor Report 2005-111

45

just one month later. The parole division decided to use existing
contracts for the Halfway Back program. These contracts were
with Community Correctional Re-Entry Centers (reentry centers)
that provided services such as job search skills and placement,
substance abuse treatment, and stress control training to
inmates nearing parole in a residential setting outside of prison.
The parole division planned to transition the inmates out of the
reentry centers and gradually replace them with parolees from
the Halfway Back program.
In late 2003, the parole division developed the Halfway Back policy,
which described eligibility criteria and the roles and responsibilities
of parole division staff. The parole division initiated discussions
on the Halfway Back policy with the parole agents’ labor union
in December 2003. Unlike the union negotiations for the SATCU
and EID programs, the negotiations between the parole division
and the labor union were successful, producing an agreement on
the Halfway Back policy. However, the agreement was not finalized
until January 30, 2004, and the policy was issued February 6, 2004.
Despite the relatively smooth implementation of the Halfway Back
program, as we discussed in Chapter 1, the program did not serve
as many parolees as was originally estimated.

We conducted this review under the authority vested in the California State Auditor by
Section 8543 et seq. of the California Government Code and according to generally accepted
government auditing standards. We limited our review to those areas specified in the audit
scope section of this report.
Respectfully submitted,

ELAINE M. HOWLE
State Auditor
Date: November 9, 2005
Staff:

46

John Baier, CPA, Audit Principal
Debra L. Maus, CPA
Jenner Holden
Susie M. Lackie, CPA
Alysha Loumakis-Calderon
Lea Webb

California State Auditor Report 2005-111

APPENDIX A
Other States Use Alternatives to Prison
That Are Similar to California’s, but
Comparisons of Recidivism Rates Can
Have Little Meaning

W

e were asked to look at whether other states use
intermediate sanctions as an alternative to parole
revocation and return to prison when responding to
parole violations. As part of our audit, we selected six states cited
in the Little Hoover Commission’s 2003 report on California’s
parole policies—Back to the Community: Safe & Sound Parole
Policies—as having developed alternatives to prison (Florida,
Maryland, Michigan, Washington, Wisconsin, and Vermont)
and two additional states with large populations (New York
and Texas). For each state, we focused on its policies regarding
parole violations and the various programs and sanctions
available to respond to those violations. Using publicly available
information and interviews with these states’ correctional staff,
we assessed whether each state had programs specifically for
parolees who commit technical violations of their parole that
are used as an alternative to parole revocation and subsequent
return to prison. Based on our assessment, four of the states we
reviewed currently have such a program for parole violators;
Vermont, Washington, and Wisconsin do not.7 In addition,
we found that none of the states that have these programs
formally evaluate or study them to determine effectiveness. We
summarize the states’ programs in Table A.1 on page 49.
In addition, we requested information from these eight states
regarding their recidivism rate, which is the rate at which
released inmates commit another offense within a given time
frame. However, there is no uniform definition of the factors
that should be included when calculating a recidivism rate.
What the state is measuring—for example, how well its parolee
programs are working to provide public safety by rehabilitating
offenders—influences the factors it uses to define recidivism.
Consequently, the factors used to calculate recidivism rates can
7

For one state, Florida, we could not determine whether it had programs it uses as
alternatives to parole revocation and return to prison because it did not respond to our
requests for information.

California State Auditor Report 2005-111

47

vary from state to state, making meaningful comparisons among
states difficult. We display the factors used by California and the
other states we reviewed in Table A.2 on page 53.

DIFFERENT STATES’ INTERMEDIATE SANCTION
PROGRAMS HAVE SIMILAR CHARACTERISTICS
For the states we reviewed, including California, the most
restrictive sanctions are focused on dealing with parolees
who have violations associated with substance abuse. Those
states with specific sanctions for substance abuse—California,
Maryland, New York, and Texas—require participants to spend
time in a jail or secured facility for a set period, during which
they must participate in substance abuse programs. California’s
Substance Abuse Treatment Control Units (SATCU) program
required the shortest amount of time in jail, 30 days; Maryland
and Texas have the longest, with stays of six months. These
states also have an aftercare treatment program, but only
Texas requires that the first part of its aftercare program be in
a residential facility, after which participants continue in an
outpatient treatment program.
None of the states we reviewed had halfway house programs
similar to California’s, but a few states—Michigan, New York,
and Texas—have other residential programs for parole violators.
Each program houses parole violators in a secured facility
and provides them services during their stay. Texas and
Washington have halfway house/work release programs for
parolees, including parole violators, but they are not regarded
as intermediate sanctions because they are not used in lieu of a
return to prison.
Two states—Maryland and Michigan—have electronic monitoring
programs similar to the program California uses. In these two
states, the monitoring period typically is up to three months,
although Michigan can use the sanction for up to the amount of
time remaining in the parole period after the violation occurs.
Vermont plans to pilot an electronic monitoring program
for parole violators soon. Texas, New York, Wisconsin, and
Washington have, or plan to have, an electronic monitoring
program that they use as an additional tool to supervise
parolees, but do not consider the electronic monitoring as
an alternative to parole revocation. Finally, Florida’s Web site
indicates it has an electronic monitoring program, but it did not
respond to our inquiries regarding how the program was used.

48

California State Auditor Report 2005-111

TABLE A.1
Comparison of States’ Alternatives to Prison for Parole Violators
State

Sanction/Program

Program
Evaluated?

Characteristics

California—Intermediate Sanction Programs
Electronic In-Home Detention
(EID)

Parole violators were fitted with an electronic monitor, worn on the ankle, that alerted
a contractor monitoring service when the parolee wearing the device was not within
a defined distance from home. Some were allowed to leave home at set times for
work; curfew period was 45 days and could be renewed. Others could be detained
24-hours-a-day until their revocation hearing.

No

Halfway Back

A closely supervised residential program providing treatment and education programs
that focused on employment needs, substance abuse, stress management, victim
awareness, computer-supported literacy, and life skills. Parole violators had limited ability
to leave the facility and, if employed during their stay, were required to pay 25 percent
of their salary to the program.

No

Substance Abuse Treatment
Control Units (SATCU)

30-day lockdown in a jail setting for drug treatment education. After release from
lockdown, a mandatory 90-day aftercare program, which could be in a residential
program or on an outpatient basis, was provided in the community.

No

These programs were terminated on April 11, 2005. Subsequently, the department issued new guidelines for the Halfway
Back program, now called Parole Service Centers, which are open to eligible parolees. The SATCU and EID programs were
redesigned and the department hopes to implement the new programs by the end of November 2005.
Wisconsin
Wisconsin suspended its Alternative Sanctions program for parole violators in 2001. Currently, it does not have any
programs for parole violators that can be used as alternatives to parole revocation and return to prison.

Not
applicable

Maryland—Correctional Options Program
Substance Abuse
Treatment Program

Intended for nonviolent, substance abusing parole violators, this six-month program
is in a jail setting with a mandatory intensive outpatient aftercare program for three
months. Successful completion allows parole violator to return to parole; unsuccessful
completion usually means a return to prison. A parole violator may be placed in this
program multiple times during the parole period.

No

Electronic Monitoring

Used for parole violators who have not been convicted of a violent crime, the
monitoring period is up to three months as determined by parole agent. This sanction
can be renewed, but if a violation occurs during the monitored period, the parole
violator may be returned to prison.

No

Technical Rule Violation (TRV)
Centers

In a 75-day period of confinement in a leased secured facility, participants work on
completing their education and perform jobs in the facility or as part of public work
crews. Substance abuse treatment is mandatory for all participants. Upon successful
completion of the TRV program, participants are returned to parole supervision. Parole
violators who refuse to participate or do not successfully complete the program are
returned to prison. Technical parole violators who have not been convicted of sex
offenses or are not identified as high risk are eligible for placement and can be placed
in the program multiple times.

No

Electronic Monitoring

The amount of time for this sanction is determined by parole personnel and is usually for
90 days but can be for the remaining parole period. Failure to complete the monitored
period can result in return to prison or placement in a TRV center. This program is used
most often to address violations of a less serious and/or less violent nature.

No

Electronic Monitoring

Based on our review of Florida’s publicly available information, it uses electronic
monitoring. However, Florida did not respond to our requests for additional information.
Therefore, we could not determine if it is used as an alternative to parole revocation and
a return to prison for its parole violators.

Unknown

Michigan

Florida

continued on the next page

California State Auditor Report 2005-111

49

State

Sanction/Program

Characteristics

Program
Evaluated?

New York—Intermediate Sanction Programs
Willard Drug
Treatment Campus

90-day intensive residential substance abuse treatment program conducted in a secured
facility. After graduating the residential program, participants are required to participate
in a six-month intensive treatment program as a condition of parole. Participants who are
unsuccessful in the residential program are usually returned to prison; graduates who
violate the conditions of parole receive sanctions consistent with their violation. The
program can be repeated more than once during parole period. When the program is
used as an intermediate sanction, eligibility is limited to parole violators with an identified
substance abuse history.

No

High Impact Incarceration
Program (HIIP)

The HIIP is a jail-based substance abuse treatment program primarily for technical parole
violators with no record of violent crimes or sex offenses. Operated by local jails under
contract with the state; participants are confined in a local jail setting for 30–60 days
and receive vocational and educational training, substance abuse counseling, and are
required to perform community service. A required outpatient aftercare program provides
counseling support and job placement. Parole violators who successfully complete the
program are released back to parole; unsuccessful parole violators are held for a parole
revocation hearing. A parole violator can be placed in the program more than once.

No

Intermediate Sanction
Facilities

Technical parole violators are detained in local or private jails for 60 days and not
longer than 180 days, and receive such services as education, cognitive restructuring
skills, life skills training, and community service restitution. Any offender with technical
violations is eligible for placement into the intermediate sanction facilities program.
Violators who successfully complete their time in the facility are released back to
parole supervision; violators who are unsuccessful usually have their parole revoked
and are returned to prison.

No

Substance Abuse Felony
Punishment Facility

Intensive substance abuse treatment program for parole violators, other than those
with convictions for sexual offenses, who have a history of substance abuse. Eligible
violators first go through the parole pre-revocation process but are diverted into the
program, which is carried out over an average six-month stay in a secure facility run by
a private vendor. Actual time spent in this initial phase of the program and subsequent
phases is based on offender progress and needs. Violators who successfully complete the
initial program are released to a residential aftercare program for three months before
returning to parole and beginning an aftercare program for an additional 12 months on
an outpatient basis. Violators who are unsuccessful in the initial program complete the
revocation process and return to prison. Violators who are unsuccessful in the aftercare
component of the program may receive additional treatment or return to prison, based
on the seriousness of subsequent violations.

No

Texas—Specialized Programs

Vermont
Currently, Vermont has no programs specifically for parole violators that are regarded as alternatives to parole revocation
and a return to prison. However, as of July 2005, it has plans to provide electronic monitoring in a pilot program that
includes nonviolent offenders who might otherwise be incarcerated for violating the conditions of their parole.

Not
applicable

Washington does not typically return its parole violators to prison for technical violations only. However, it is possible
that an offender convicted of sexual or violent offenses would return to prison for technical violations.

Not
applicable

Washington

50

California State Auditor Report 2005-111

THE LACK OF A UNIFORM DEFINITION FOR RECIDIVISM
MAKES A MEANINGFUL COMPARISON OF THE
RECIDIVISM RATES AMONG STATES DIFFICULT
Although recidivism can be a useful indication of the effectiveness
of a parole program, a comparison of the recidivism rates that
various states report must be viewed with caution. Broadly defined,
recidivism is a return to criminal activity or violation of parole
terms after previous criminal involvement. The recidivism rate is
one of the useful measures state correctional departments employ
to determine how well programs are working to keep offenders
from returning to prison, because it tells how soon after his or her
release from prison the released inmate commits another offense.
What a state chooses to measure with its recidivism rate will
influence the factors a state includes in its rate. For example, if
a state chooses to use its recidivism rate to measure an offender
program’s success in terms of saving money by reducing prison
costs, it might use only those factors that include a return to
prison. Our review of the reported recidivism rates for California
and seven other states (Florida, Maryland, Michigan, New York,
Texas, Vermont, and Washington) found some variation in the
definition of the recidivism rate.8
The calculation of recidivism rates typically uses one or more
factors, including:
• Released inmate/parolee with a new arrest.
• Released inmate/parolee with a new conviction.
• Released inmate/parolee committed to prison for a new offense.
• Released inmate/parolee return to prison for parole violations.
• Released inmate/parolee returned to prison pending a parole
revocation hearing.
The factors used to define recidivism will have an impact on a
state’s reported recidivism rate. These factors can track whether
a new offense occurred and, if so, what kind of offense it was.

8

Wisconsin, the other state we reviewed, does not calculate its recidivism rate, according
to its correctional staff.

California State Auditor Report 2005-111

51

For example, new arrests are a very broad measure of crime, but
an arrest does not confirm that the parolee actually committed
an offense. New convictions indicate that a new offense did
occur but may not indicate the seriousness of the offense.
New commitments to prison, a very narrow measure of crime,
indicate that a relatively serious new offense occurred. For some
states, including California, parole revocations can indicate that
a new crime or criminal activity occurred, but they also can
indicate that a technical violation of the parole process occurred.
California defines recidivism as a return to prison by a parolee
for any reason. We present California’s three-year reported
recidivism rate, as well as the reported recidivism rates of the
seven other states we reviewed and how those rates are defined,
in Table A.2.
To calculate its recidivism rate, a state tracks a group of
individuals released from prison during a specific period over
a period of time. The number of those individuals who meet
the state’s definition of a recidivist within that period of time,
divided by the total number in the group released originally, is
the recidivism rate. In calculating its recidivism rate, California
determines the number of individuals who have been returned
to prison. In California, a parolee can be returned to prison, and
is considered a recidivist, for any of four reasons: (1) placement
in a substance abuse treatment control unit9 in a correctional
facility as a result of parole violation(s) related to substance abuse;
(2) to serve court-ordered time for a new felony conviction; (3)
to await a revocation hearing by the Board of Parole Hearings on
charges of violating the rules or conditions of parole; or (4) to
serve revocation time for parole violations, including technical
violations of the parole process, such as failure to inform the
parole agent of a change of residence or employment, as well
as violations involving criminal activity, such as drug use or
possession. Most California offenders are subject to three years
of parole supervision after release from prison, so California
uses a three-year post-prison follow-up period and calculates a
recidivism rate at the one-year, two-year, and three-year intervals.
The follow-up period ends once an offender completes parole, so
California does not count post-parole offenders who are returned
to prison for a new conviction in its recidivism rate.

9

52

These substance abuse treatment control units referred to here are related to a SATCUlike program that does not include aftercare and is not used in lieu of prison.

California State Auditor Report 2005-111

TABLE A.2
Methods Used to Calculate the Recidivism Rate for Eight States
State
California

Florida

Recidivism
Rate
59.2%

26.7% (Male)
15.5% (Female)

Maryland

Michigan

New York

Texas

Vermont

Washington

25.5%

48.5%

40.1%

28.3%

51.0%§

28.9%

Type of Release Included
in Recidivism Rate

þ
¨

þ
þ

þ
þ

þ
¨

þ
þ

þ
þ

þ
þ

þ
þ

Measurement Period

Inmates released to supervision*

Released: 2001

Inmates discharged† (Not applicable)

Tracked: Three years

Inmates released to supervision
Inmates discharged

Released: July 1995 to
June 2001
Tracked: Three years

Inmates released to supervision

Released: 2001

Inmates discharged

Tracked: Three years

Inmates released to supervision

Released: 1999

Inmates discharged (Not applicable)

Tracked: Through 2003‡

Inmates released to supervision

Released: 2000

Inmates discharged

Tracked: Three years

Inmates released to supervision

Released: 2001

Inmates discharged

Tracked: Three years

Inmates released to supervision

Released: 2000

Inmates discharged

Tracked: Three years

Inmates released to supervision

Released: 2000

Inmates discharged

Tracked: Three years

Type of Return Counted as Recidivism

þ
þ
þ
¨
þ
¨
¨
¨
þ
¨
¨
¨
þ
þ
¨
¨
þ
þ
¨
¨
þ
þ
¨
¨

Return to prison (new sentence)
Return to prison (parole violation)
Return to prison pending hearing
Reconviction
Return to prison (new sentence)
Return to prison (parole violation)
Return to prison pending hearing
Reconviction
Return to prison (new sentence)
Return to prison (parole violation)
Return to prison pending hearing
Reconviction
Return to prison (new sentence)
Return to prison (parole violation)
Return to prison pending hearing
Reconviction
Return to prison (new sentence)
Return to prison (parole violation)
Return to prison pending hearing
Reconviction
Return to prison (new sentence)
Return to prison (parole violation)
Return to prison pending hearing
Reconviction

¨
¨
¨
þ

Return to prison (new sentence)

þ
þ
¨
¨

Return to prison (new sentence)

Return to prison (parole violation)
Return to prison pending hearing
Reconviction

Return to prison (parole violation)
Return to prison pending hearing
Reconviction

Source: Published reports and interviews with department administrators from the states presented in table.
* Released from prison to some type of supervision (parole, community custody, etc.); policies vary among states.
†

Discharged directly from prison without supervision or discharged after completing a supervision period; policies vary among states.

‡

Michigan tracks its parolees up to four years. Therefore, some parolees released to parole in 1999 may have completed their parole before the end of 2003.

§

Vermont uses a recidivism rate that accounts for all reconvictions, regardless of whether or not the conviction resulted in the parolee being returned
to prison.

California State Auditor Report 2005-111

53

In contrast, Florida’s recidivism calculation does not count
offenders returned to prison for parole violations or offenders
returned pending a revocation hearing. Based on this factor
in isolation, we would expect Florida’s reported recidivism
rate to be lower than California’s, because California’s rate
would include a count of offenders returned to prison for
parole violations and returned pending a revocation date. This
difference in the types of offenders included in the calculation
points out one of the many possible factors that make a
meaningful comparison nearly impossible.
Another important factor that makes it difficult to compare
recidivism rates among states is the length of the period tracked,
typically the length of the parole supervision period. The typical
parole period in California is three years; most offenders released
to parole are required to adhere to parole rules and conditions for
three years before they can be discharged from parole supervision.
Another state may have a shorter supervision period, meaning
that the group being tracked for recidivism calculation purposes
is required to follow the rules imposed under supervision for a
shorter period. We believe it is reasonable to assume that this
factor in isolation could cause the recidivism rate to be lower in
states with shorter supervision periods.
Finally, the choice of which of the offenders released to parole
should be included in the calculation can result in differences
in recidivism rates. For example, Florida’s reimprisonment
recidivism rate counts only offenders released to parole from
their original prison term; it does not count an offender who
was in prison for a parole violation, released back to parole,
and subsequently reimprisoned. California counts all offenders
released to parole.

54

California State Auditor Report 2005-111

APPENDIX B
Status of Parole Violators Placed
in Intermediate Sanction Programs
and Their Returns to Custody Since
Entering Those Programs

A

s part of this audit, we were asked to determine the
current status of parole violators placed in intermediate
sanction programs and to determine how many were
returned to prison after entering one of these programs.
Each program began during 2004. At the time of our review,
the latest available data were as of May 31, 2005. Because the
programs lasted for up to 120 days, we decided to track all
participants entering after each program’s opening through
December 31, 2004. For each program, contracted service
providers collected information for the Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation (department) on which parole
violators participated. We then tracked each parole violator’s
status in the department’s database. We present information for
the Halfway Back, Substance Abuse Treatment Control Units
(SATCU), and Enhanced Substance Abuse Treatment Control
Unit (ESATCU) programs. The Electronic In-Home Detention
program was never implemented fully, so we did not include it here.
In each of the following figures, we show the number of parole
violators placed in the program and, of those, the number
who completed the program and the number who did not by
March 31, 2005, the last month of data before the intermediate
sanction programs were suspended. For the SATCU program, we
also show the number who participated in aftercare programs and
the number who did not. In addition, we show the status of all the
parolees who participated in the programs as of May 31, 2005.
The figures show that the programs had consistent results. For
example, the percentages of participants who completed the
programs and were incarcerated on May 31, 2005, were much lower
than the percentage for those who did not complete the programs.

California State Auditor Report 2005-111

55

FIGURE B.1
3,175 Parolees Entered Halfway Back Between February and December 2004

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Sources: Bureau of State Audits’ analysis of program provider data collected by the California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation and data from its Offender-Based Information System (OBIS).
Note: The number of On parole is understated by the number of parolees whose parole status was restored on or before
May 31, 2005, but because there is a lag in recording parole reinstatements, OBIS did not reflect the change on May 31, 2005.
Conversely, the number of On parole is overstated by the number of parolees who absconded from parole on or before
May 31, 2005, but because of a lag in recording parole suspensions, OBIS did not reflect the change on May 31, 2005. Also, as a
result of the lag in recording, the number of Absconded from parole is overstated by the number of parolees whose parole status
was restored on or before May 31, 2005, and understated by the number of parolees who absconded on or before May 31, 2005.
We did not attempt to determine the net effect, if any, of the understatement and overstatement. While the numbers shown in
the figures may change, it is unlikely that the lag would significantly affect the percentages shown.

56

California State Auditor Report 2005-111

FIGURE B.2
2,567 Parolees Entered SATCU Between May and December 2004
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Sources: Bureau of State Audits’ analysis of program provider data collected by the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation and data
from its Offender-Based Information System (OBIS).
Note: The number of On parole is understated by the number of parolees whose parole status was restored on or before May 31, 2005, but because there
is a lag in recording parole reinstatements, OBIS did not reflect the change on May 31, 2005. Conversely, the number of On parole is overstated by the
number of parolees who absconded from parole on or before May 31, 2005, but because of the lag in recording parole suspensions, OBIS did not reflect
the change on May 31, 2005. Also, as a result of a lag in recording, the number of Absconded from parole is overstated by the number of parolees
whose parole status was restored on or before May 31, 2005, and understated by the number of parolees who absconded on or before May 31, 2005. We
did not attempt to determine the net effect, if any, of the understatement and overstatement. While the numbers shown in the figures may change, it is
unlikely that the lag would significantly affect the percentages shown.

California State Auditor Report 2005-111

57

FIGURE B.3
392 Parolees Entered ESATCU Between February and December 2004

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Sources: Bureau of State Audits’ analysis of program provider data collected by the California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation and data from its Offender-Based Information System (OBIS).
Note: The number of On parole is understated by the number of parolees whose parole status was restored on or before
May 31, 2005, but because there is a lag in recording parole reinstatements, OBIS did not reflect the change on May 31, 2005.
Conversely, the number of On parole is overstated by the number of parolees who absconded from parole on or before
May 31, 2005, but because of a lag in recording parole suspensions, OBIS did not reflect the change on May 31, 2005. Also, as a
result of the lag in recording, the number of Absconded from parole is overstated by the number of parolees whose parole status
was restored on or before May 31, 2005, and understated by the number of parolees who absconded on or before May 31, 2005.
We did not attempt to determine the net effect, if any, of the understatement and overstatement. While the numbers shown in
the figures may change, it is unlikely that the lag would significantly affect the percentages shown.

58

California State Auditor Report 2005-111

Agency’s comments provided as text only.

Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation

Memorandum
Date :

October 19, 2005

To:

Elaine M. Howle
State Auditor
Bureau of State Audits
555 Capitol Mall, Suite 300
Sacramento, CA 95814

Subject: RESPONSE TO DRAFT REPORT

The California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) has reviewed your
draft audit report entitled “California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation: The
Intermediate Sanction Programs Lacked Performance Benchmarks and Were Plagued
With Implementation Problems.”
The CDCR concurs with the report’s recommendations.
We appreciate the attention to accuracy and detail that your staff put into the process.
Your staff has been professional and at all times available to discuss the issues. Please
extend our appreciation to those who participated in this review.
The CDCR is committed to making further improvements by addressing the issues
presented in the report. If you have any questions, please contact me at 323-6001.
(Signed by: J. S. Woodford)
J. S. WOODFORD Undersecretary
California Department of Corrections
and Rehabilitation
Attachment

California State Auditor Report 2005-111

59

RESPONSE TO BUREAU OF STATE AUDITS (BSA) DRAFT REPORT
Chapter 1
BSA Recommendation #1: When planning future intermediate sanction programs, the parole
division should decide on appropriate benchmarks for monitoring program performance, identify the
data it will need to measure performance against those benchmarks and ensure that data collection
mechanisms that allow data to be collected in a format that is readily compiled are in place before
a program is implemented. After implementing a new intermediate sanction program the parole
division should analyze the data it has collected and if relevant, use the data in its existing data
bases to monitor and evaluate the program’s effectiveness on an on going basis.
CDCR’s Response: By definition the CDCR does not currently have intermediate sanction
programs. Nor does the CDCR have any foreseeable plans to reinstitute any intermediate
sanction programs. The Division of Adult Parole Operations (DAPO) has designed the new In
Custody Drug Treatment Program and the Electronic In-Home Detention Program to comport
with evidence based research to reduce recidivism. DAPO is currently training parole staff
and plans to implement the use of the new programs upon completion of the training.
The DAPO agrees with this recommendation, and will proceed with its implementation. It
is a basic practice of good program management to decide on appropriate performance
benchmarks and identify, collect, and analyze the data necessary to measure performance
against those benchmarks. The DAPO already utilizes this practice to a great extent in its
programs, and will undertake to ensure that it does so in every applicable instance.
Some of the division’s existing databases are somewhat limited in their ability to provide
and compile relevant information, but to the extent that they have information which can be
useful in analyzing program effectiveness, the DAPO does use them for that purpose, and
will continue to do so in a more systematic manner.
Timeline:
60 day status report due December 31, 2005. The DAPO will coordinate its efforts to begin
identifying performance benchmarks and processes to collect data to measure performance
against those benchmarks.
6 month status report due April 30, 2006. The DAPO will be able to define the benchmark and
will explore a system of collecting data to verify program success.

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California State Auditor Report 2005-111

1 year status report due October 31, 2006. The DAPO will begin reviewing data collected
to determine program effectiveness. The DAPO will work within the confines of the
department’s ability to utilize existing databases or modifying data collection practices to
capture the information needed to measure success.
Responsible person for implementation: DAPO Director

BSA Recommendation #2: The parole division should ensure that the savings estimates
developed during program planning are based on reasonable assumptions, and if those
assumptions change, should promptly update the savings estimates.
CDCR’s Response: The Division of Adult Operations (DAPO) concurs with this recommendation.
It should be noted that DAPO did use reasonable assumptions during the program planning
process and adjustments were made to estimated savings projections during the budget
development (first opportunity) process. In the future, DAPO will ensure that any discussion with
senate budget committee staff or researchers includes reasonable projections or estimates, to
include updating or reassessing projected savings in a timely manner.
This should further ensure that reasonable program planning assumptions will continue and
any changes to those assumptions that impact savings estimates will be promptly updated
and included in the next budget development process.
Responsible person for implementation: DAPO Director

BSA Recommendation #3: The parole division should consider analyzing the effect programs
have had on parolee behavior and should use the knowledge it gains from the analyses to make
future intermediate sanction programs more effective. The analysis should include the benefits of
adding features to make these programs more effective.
CDCR’s Response: The Division of Adult Operations (DAPO) agrees with this recommendation
from the BSA. However, it must be pointed that analyzing the effects that programs have had
on parolee behavior is a lengthy and sophisticated process that requires the expertise of
professionally trained program researchers. Any given program is only one factor in the life
of a parolee, and it may easily be outweighed by other factors, such as participation in other
programs, environmental factors, and background issues. Determining the impact of a specific
program is a process that requires careful study, and cannot be done specifically. Such
evaluations must be specifically funded and must be active beginning with the planning
stage for each program.

California State Auditor Report 2005-111

61

In a similar way, adding features to enhance effectiveness must also be done carefully. The
type of research that is required to analyze the need for specific features may be even more
sophisticated than what is needed for overall program evaluation.
On a more basic level, it is often possible to add features in the early or middle stages of
a program’s life in order to enhance parolee participation or success in the program. For
example, transportation assistance may be added to some programs in an effort to increase
“show” rates. However, adding features to improve effectiveness in terms of outcomes will
require input from professional evaluators.
Timeline:
60 day status report due December 31, 2005. The DAPO will coordinate its efforts to begin
identifying performance benchmarks and processes to collect data to measure performance
against those benchmarks.
6 month status report due April 30, 2006. The DAPO will be able to define the benchmark and
will explore a system of collecting data to verify program success.
1 year status report due October 31, 2006. The DAPO will begin reviewing data collected
to determine program effectiveness. The DAPO will work within the confines of the
department’s ability to utilize existing databases or modifying data collection practices to
capture the information needed to measure success.
Responsible person for implementation: DAPO Director

62

California State Auditor Report 2005-111

cc:

Members of the Legislature
Office of the Lieutenant Governor
Milton Marks Commission on California State
Government Organization and Economy
Department of Finance
Attorney General
State Controller
State Treasurer
Legislative Analyst
Senate Office of Research
California Research Bureau
Capitol Press

California State Auditor Report 2005-111

63