Stop, Question and Frisk:
What the Law Says
About Your Rights

Authored by:
Ira Glasser
May 2011

Drug Policy Alliance
70 West 36th Street
16th Floor
New York, NY 10018
212.613.8020 voice
212.613.8021 fax
www.drugpolicy.org

Executive Summary

Over the last five years, we’ve seen increased media
attention and public debate about the New York City
Police Department practice of “stop-and-frisk”. Often
missing from this debate is the Constitution –
specifically the Fourth Amendment, and what the
Supreme Court has said about how it applies to stops,
frisks and searches.
Between 2005 and 2010, the NYPD made over three
million stops and (if we assume the same frisk-rate for
2010 as took place in previous years) these stops resulted
in about 1.55 million frisks. About 94 percent of the
stops did not result in arrests. Nearly 85 percent of those
stopped were black and Latino. That means that there
were a shade less than three million stops in instances
where there was not enough evidence to support an
arrest or a search warrant -- and the vast majority of
those stopped were people of color.
Are these stops legal? Are the frisks that accompany
about half the stops legal? What are the legal standards
governing a stop? A frisk? Are they the same? What
does the Fourth Amendment say about such practices?
What rights do New Yorkers have when they come into
contact with the police?
The Constitution and subsequent rulings by the
Supreme Court set clear standards governing the police
practices of stopping and frisking a person. But all too
often in media reports and public debates, stops and
frisks, which require different legal thresholds, are
conflated into a single practice of “stop-and-frisk,” as
though legal thresholds governing both are the same.
They are not. It is critically important to understand that
different legal standards govern the practices of stops
and frisks.
A police officer may stop individuals on the street to
question them, and, in general, police may do this to
anyone at any time. Unless there are specific facts
sufficient to justify the officer’s suspicion that a crime is,
has been, or may about to be committed, the person
stopped has a right to ignore the officer’s questions and
walk away. But if the officer does not allow the person
to leave, this is called, as one Supreme Court Justice put
it, a “forcible stop.”
A pat-down frisk is a limited search subject to the
requirements of the Fourth Amendment. It involves a
police officer patting down an individual’s outer
clothing, and only his outer clothing, if and only if,

Stop, Question and Frisk:
What the Law Says About Your Rights

pursuant to a lawful forcible stop, the officer has a
reasonable suspicion that the individual stopped is
armed and dangerous. This is the only legal
justification for a pat-down frisk.
A full search, in which the person stopped is required to
empty his pockets, or where an officer puts his hands in
an individual’s pockets or otherwise goes beyond the
pat-down of outer clothing for the purposes of
determining whether there is a weapon, requires
probable cause – that is, enough evidence to justify an
arrest.
This document seeks to describe these legal standards in
greater detail by providing the reader with the following:
• Historical background of the Fourth
Amendment
• A thorough definition of “stop” and “frisk”
• A summary of Supreme Court cases
establishing and affirming the legal standards
governing stop, question and frisks by the
police
• Critical questions about the legality of NYPD’s
practice of stop-and-frisk
The legal standards described in this issue brief apply
nationwide, regardless of what local city or state laws
may say. However, this inquiry focuses on New York
City due to the fact that over the last ten years, an
astronomical number of New Yorkers have been
stopped and frisked by the NYPD. As the number of
stops and frisks have increased dramatically, so too have
the arrests for marijuana possession. Despite the fact
that marijuana possession was decriminalized in New
York in 1977, marijuana possession is now the number
one arrest in New York City. More than 50,000 people
were arrested for marijuana possession in 2010 alone,
comprising one out of every seven arrests (15 percent).
We contend that many of these arrests are the result of
illegal searches or false charges.
The better New Yorkers – and all Americans –
understand, exercise and defend our rights under the
Constitution, the more effective our democracy and the
more accountable its public servants will be – including
the police. A more effective democracy and more
accountable public servants – especially the police –
would make New York City a better place for all. It is
our hope that this issue brief contributes towards that
end.

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A Little Contextual History

In colonial America, British officers had the legal
authority to search anyone they pleased, whenever they
pleased, under what was called Writs of Assistance.
Such general searches were widespread in the colonies,
perhaps as widespread as the epidemic of stop and frisk
in minority neighborhoods is and for a number of years
has been in New York City.
These general searches were deeply resented by the early
Americans; indeed, some historians believe that the
anger over these searches was the primary factor in
igniting the American Revolution. And our second
President, John Adams, a participant in the Revolution,
certainly thought so. As he wrote looking back nearly six
decades after one of the first, unsuccessful, court
challenges in 1761 to the Writs of Assistance: “Then
and there was the first scene of the First Act of
Opposition to the arbitrary claims of Great Britain.
Then and there the child Independence was born.”
Once the Revolution was won, the new nation moved
swiftly to legally limit the powers of search and seizure,
and establish a Constitutional right, not amendable by
statute, to guarantee that Americans would be free from
unreasonable searches and secure in their persons and in
their homes against the kind of general searches engaged
in by British officers under colonial rule.
The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution was a direct
outgrowth of the resentment most of the early
Americans felt about the practice of general searches,
without specific reasons to justify them. Today, the
value of the Fourth Amendment may seem distant and
abstract to most Americans, but to the early Americans,
intrusive and discretionary general searches were a
matter of frequent and bitter experience – as they are
today in most black and Latino communities.

Searches can only be conducted if there is probable
cause to believe that a crime is, has been, or is about to
be committed, and such belief must be based on specific
facts, not just hunches. And when the police do search
pursuant to a warrant, the warrant must “particularly
[describe] the place to be searched, and the person or
things to be seized.”
In practice, what this means is that in order to get a
warrant, cops must pretty much know what they are
looking for, be able to describe it and where it is, and
under oath say why they know what they know and how
they know it. Moreover, normally, police officers
seeking the authority to search do not get to decide on
the sufficiency of their evidence; that is decided by a
judge who must issue a warrant based on such evidence.
In many cases, however, including street confrontations
between cops and individuals, there is no time to go to
court and seek a warrant; in such cases the same
standard of probable cause – evidence conforming to
what the Fourth Amendment requires – nonetheless
applies. And if the police breach this standard – if they
search someone without sufficient evidence to constitute
probable cause under the Fourth Amendment – then
such evidence cannot be used at trial: it is excluded from
the trial, hence known as the exclusionary rule.
This rule was established by the Supreme Court back in
1914 as the only viable method for remedying illegal
searches, in a case called Weeks v. United States. In this
case, the police entered the home of one Fremont
Weeks, without a warrant, and seized papers which were
then used to convict him of transporting lottery tickets
through the mail. On appeal, the Supreme Court ruled
unanimously that this violated the Fourth Amendment,
and that to permit such illegally seized evidence to be
used as evidence to convict Weeks would mean that the
protection of the Fourth Amendment and the right to
be secure against such searches and seizures would be of
no value.

Here is what the Fourth Amendment says:
“The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.”
What this meant, and still means, is that cops may not,
as the British officers did, search people at will.

Stop, Question and Frisk:
What the Law Says About Your Rights

However, in those days and from its inception, the Bill
of Rights only applied to the actions of federal officials.
Thus for most of our history, the rights and protections
we take for granted today against state and local officials
as well, did not in fact exist as enforceable rights, unless
state laws protected such rights. After the Civil War, the
Fourteenth Amendment seemed to incorporate the Bill
of Rights and apply its protections against state and local
officials, but an 1873 decision by the Supreme Court
undercut that. It was not until the 1960s – less than 50
years ago – that one by one the various elements of the

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Bill of Rights were held, through the Fourteenth
Amendment, to protect people against the actions of
state and local officials. In 1961, in a case called Mapp v.
Ohio, the Supreme Court applied the exclusionary rule,
first established against federal officials in 1914 in the
Weeks case, to state and local officials as well.
But the practice of stop and frisk - where cops didn’t
enter someone’s home but rather confronted people on
the street and engaged in a pat-down of their outer
clothing - became common, and the question of whether
such a frisk was the kind of intrusive search the Fourth
Amendment was intended to limit and if so how,
became unavoidable. In 1968, this question was
addressed and decided by the U.S. Supreme Court in
two cases decided on the same day: Terry v. Ohio and
Sibron v. New York.
Stops, Questions, Pat-Down Frisks and Full
Searches: What Are the Differences?

Before explaining in detail what the Terry and Sibron
cases decided about pat-down frisks, and what
subsequent cases decided about the police power to stop
and question individuals, it may be useful to explain the
meaning of a few terms used in this discussion and to
summarize current law regarding them.
Stops and Questions: “Stops” refers to the practice of
police officers stopping individuals on the street to
question them. In general, police may do this to anyone
at any time. But unless and until the police officer tells
an individual he or she may not leave, a person stopped
is free not to answer questions and to leave. As
Supreme Court Justice Harlan said in his opinion in
Terry, ordinarily and unless there are specific facts
sufficient to justify the officer’s suspicion that a crime is,
has been or may about to be committed, the person
stopped has a right to ignore the officer’s questions and
walk away. But if the individual may not leave, this is
called, as Justice Harlan put it, a “forcible stop.”
This is why, when stopped, it is always advisable to ask
the police officer politely whether you are free to leave
or not. If you are restrained from leaving, you should
not resist. But at some point, if the stop is more than
brief, you should ask whether you are being arrested.
This is because more evidence is required to arrest
someone than to stop them for questioning.
“Reasonable suspicion” of criminal activity, which legally
justifies a forcible stop, requires fewer facts than
“probable cause,” which is necessary to legally justify an

Stop, Question and Frisk:
What the Law Says About Your Rights

arrest. While this difference is difficult to quantify,
reasonable suspicion requires some articulable facts to
support the officer’s suspicion; it is more than an
unarticulated “hunch;” and even if a forcible stop is
legally justified under this standard, it may only be brief
and only for the purpose of asking questions related to
the particular suspicion.
It is therefore important to remember that a police
officer may subject you to a forcible stop only if he has
reasonable suspicion, based on specific facts, that you
are or may be involved in criminal activity. The police
officer may then detain you briefly and ask you
questions related to his particular suspicion.
Pat-Down Frisks and Full Searches: A pat-down frisk is
a limited search subject to the requirements of the
Fourth Amendment. It involves a police officer patting
down an individual’s outer clothing, and only his outer
clothing, if and only if, pursuant to a lawful forcible
stop, the officer has a reasonable suspicion that the
individual stopped is armed and dangerous. This is the
only legal justification for a pat-down frisk.
Reasonable suspicion of any other crime is enough to
stop and question an individual, but it is not enough to
frisk him. For that, reasonable suspicion that the person
is armed and dangerous is required. And again,
reasonable suspicion that the stopped individual is
armed and dangerous must be based on specific,
articulable facts, and not just on an unarticulated hunch.
For example, something like a visible bulge that indicates
a weapon can constitute a fact that justifies a pat-down
frisk, but it doesn’t have to be limited to a visible bulge.
And if during the pat-down of outer clothing, the officer
feels something that reasonably indicates a weapon, he
may reach inside to remove it and see what it is. What
he may not legally do is manipulate something during
the frisk to see if it is pliable, thus generating additional
reason to search more fully for something other than a
weapon. Pat-downs of outer clothing, or a frisk, are
legally justified only upon reasonable suspicion of a
weapon.
A full search, in which the person stopped is required to
empty his pockets, or where an officer puts his hands in
an individual’s pockets or otherwise goes beyond the
pat-down of outer clothing for the purposes of
determining whether there is a weapon, requires
probable cause – that is, enough evidence to justify an
arrest.

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What Terry and Sibron Decided

In street encounters between police officers and
individuals, the police may perceive what they regard as
suspicious behavior, worthy of investigation. At this
juncture, they do not have enough evidence to justify an
arrest or a full search; in other words, there is no
probable cause, under the Fourth Amendment, to
permit them to detain someone or fully search them.
But they may have a reasonable suspicion that
something is going on that warrants further
investigation. (Assume they are not merely engaged in
harassment, whether racially targeted or not; that is
always illegal and unjustified; assume they have
legitimate suspicion, based on specific, articulable facts,
and decide to stop an individual and ask questions.)
What may they do?
Terry v. Ohio: First of all, in Terry, the Court rejected the
idea that a police officer could unreasonably stop an
individual for questioning so long as he didn’t arrest him
and bring him to the station house. “It must be
recognized,” ruled the Court, “that whenever a police
officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to
walk away, he has ‘seized’ that person.” The Fourth
Amendment governs such “seizures,” ruled the Court,
even if a formal arrest does not take place.
What this means is that under Terry, a cop may stop you
and ask you questions, but you are free to walk away
without answering unless he detains you. Once he
detains you, the Fourth Amendment applies, and
imposes evidentiary standards that must be satisfied to
make the stop legal. In other words, there has to be
some specific, articulable reason to justify the intrusion
of stopping and detaining someone for questioning; it
cannot be just a hunch, or even a good faith hunch.
Here is what the Terry Court said on this subject:
“In justifying the particular intrusion the police officer
must be able to point to specific and articulable facts
which, taken together with rational inferences from
those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion....
Anything less would invite intrusions upon
constitutionally guaranteed rights based on nothing
more substantial than inarticulate hunches, a result this
Court has consistently refused to sanction.... And
simple 'good faith on the part of the arresting officer is
not enough.' . . . If subjective good faith alone were the
test, the protections of the Fourth Amendment would
evaporate, and the people would be 'secure in their

Stop, Question and Frisk:
What the Law Says About Your Rights

persons, houses, papers, and effects,' only in the
discretion of the police.”
And that would result in precisely the situation the
colonists faced against the British officers, a situation
that resulted in the Fourth Amendment, which was
specifically designed to avoid such a result. Thus the
Court went on to say:
“This demand for specificity in the information upon
which police action is predicated is the central teaching
of this Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.”
But if a hunch was not enough to stop someone for
questioning, the Court in this case did not say how much
was enough: the question of how much specific
evidence is required for the officer to seize and detain a
person and interrogate him, if there isn’t enough
evidence (probable cause) to justify an arrest was not
explicitly answered in Terry because in that case there
was no “stop and question” that was separable from the
frisk; they occurred virtually simultaneously. So the
Court ruled only on the question of how much evidence
was required to frisk someone on the street, if there
wasn’t enough evidence to warrant a formal arrest or a
full-blown search (contents of pockets, etc.). The legal
basis for a forcible stop, as discussed above, was
developed by the Supreme Court in subsequent cases.
At the time Terry was being litigated, some had suggested
that a pat-down of an individual’s outer clothing – a frisk
– should not be considered a search at all within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The Terry Court
firmly rejected that suggestion:
“...it is nothing less than sheer torture of the English
language to suggest that a careful exploration of the
outer surfaces of a person's clothing all over his or her
body in an attempt to find weapons is not a ‘search.’
Moreover, it is simply fantastic to urge that such a
procedure performed in public by a policeman while the
citizen stands helpless, perhaps facing a wall with his
hands raised, is a ‘petty indignity.’ It is a serious intrusion
upon the sanctity of the person, which may inflict great
indignity and arouse strong resentment, and it is not to
be undertaken lightly.”
At this point, the Court considered how – not whether –
the Fourth Amendment should govern how much of a
search the police officer could conduct if there was not
enough evidence to justify an arrest or a search warrant.
In deciding this question, the Court was mindful of the
police officer’s safety in such situations, as well as the

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right of an individual on the street to avoid police
intrusion in the absence of sufficient specific evidence to
justify it.
In balancing these competing interests, the Court
allowed a very limited search for a very limited reason –
the detection of concealed weapons – even if there
wasn’t enough evidence to justify a search warrant.
Evidence sufficient to justify a search warrant is called
“probable cause.” But the Court in Terry allowed a frisk
– a pat-down of outer clothing – upon less evidence,
upon “reasonable suspicion” that there was a concealed
weapon that might endanger the officer. This
“reasonable suspicion” that the person was carrying a
concealed weapon had to be based on specific,
reasonable facts – such as a tell-tale bulge – and not
merely on a hunch. And the only legitimate purpose for
such a frisk, in the absence of probable cause, was to
protect the officer against a concealed weapon.
The Court said:

has been legally and forcibly stopped, only if the officer
has good and specific reasons to suspect a concealed
weapon. What the officer may not legally do is frisk
someone because he “suspects” a crime other than the
possession of a concealed weapon. And he certainly may
not legally frisk someone, much less search their
pockets, for a small amount of marijuana, which could
not possibly be mistaken for a weapon, and which in any
case is not a crime in New York if it remains concealed
and weighs 25 grams or less.
Sibron v. New York: As if to underscore the limitation
of the legal authority to frisk announced in Terry, the
Supreme Court on the same day decided a similar case,
Sibron v. New York. In that case, a police officer
observed a man, Nelson Sibron, from a distance
speaking to a group of people he knew to be drug
addicts, first on the street and then in a restaurant. The
officer testified that he overheard nothing specific in the
conversation, nor did he see anything pass between
Sibron and the people with whom he was speaking. As
the Court said, for all the officer knew, they might have
been talking about the World Series. Nonetheless, the
officer went into the restaurant, came out with Sibron,
said “You know what I’m after,” and put his hand in
Sibron’s pocket, finding an envelope with heroin in it.
The police officer also testified that he did not
apprehend any danger, nor was his initial search limited
to a frisk of the outer clothing of Sibron due to any
reason to suspect his possession of a weapon. And in
fact there was no weapon.

“...we cannot blind ourselves to the need for law
enforcement officers to protect themselves and other
prospective victims of violence in situations where they
may lack probable cause for an arrest. When an officer is
justified in believing that the individual whose suspicious
behavior he is investigating at close range is armed and
presently dangerous to the officer or to others, it would
appear to be clearly unreasonable to deny the officer the
power to take necessary measures to determine whether
the person is in fact carrying a weapon and to neutralize
the threat of physical harm.... [But] it must be limited to
that which is necessary for the discovery of weapons
which might be used to harm the officer or others
nearby... Our evaluation of the proper balance that has
to be struck in this type of case leads us to conclude that
there must be a narrowly drawn authority to permit a
reasonable search for weapons for the protection of the
police officer, where he has reason to believe that he is
dealing with an armed and dangerous individual,
regardless of whether he has probable cause to arrest the
individual for a crime.... And in determining whether the
officer acted reasonably in such circumstances, due
weight must be given, not to his inchoate and
unparticularized suspicion or "hunch," but to the
specific reasonable inferences which he is entitled to
draw from the facts in light of his experience.”

Sibron was ultimately convicted of the unlawful
possession of heroin, and the conviction was upheld by
The New York Court of Appeals on the basis of a New
York statute that authorized police officers to stop any
person in a public place “whom he reasonably suspects
is committing, has committed or is about to commit a
felony” or other specified offenses “and may demand of
him his name, address and an explanation of his
actions.” The NY statute also provided that, once the
officer has stopped a person for such questioning, if he
“reasonably suspects that he is in danger of life or limb,
he may search such person for a dangerous weapon.”
The statute does not specify whether such a search must
initially be limited to a frisk – an external pat-down of
external clothing – or what evidence must exist to
support the officer’s suspicion.

What Terry means, therefore, is that in the absence of
probable cause – that is, in the absence of enough
evidence to justify an arrest or a search warrant issued by
a court – a police officer may frisk someone, once he

The Supreme Court declined to rule on the
constitutionality in general of the New York statute. It
ruled instead that, even if the search of Sibron was
authorized by the NY statute, the question was whether

Stop, Question and Frisk:
What the Law Says About Your Rights

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it was permissible under the Fourth Amendment. The
Court ruled that it was not, and reversed Sibron’s
conviction.
As in Terry, the Court did not rule on whether the stop
itself violated the Fourth Amendment, because as in
Terry, it did not have sufficient facts to determine what
happened in the restaurant, whether Sibron
accompanied the officer outside voluntarily or under
coercion or whether, therefore, there was a “seizure” by
the officer within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment.
Thus, in both Terry and Sibron, the question of whether
reasonable suspicion of a crime is constitutionally
enough to stop an individual from walking away, or
whether evidence sufficient to constitute probable cause
is required was not decided. This means that the
constitutional authority under Terry and Sibron to stop,
detain and question an individual involuntarily was not
resolved by these cases. (This authority – to forcibly
stop someone and question him upon reasonable
suspicion of a crime – was provided in later cases.)
What was resolved in Terry and Sibron – and has never been
changed – was the constitutionality of the officer’s
authority to search an individual who has been stopped,
when there is less than probable cause – that is, less
evidence than would be required to justify an arrest or a
judicial search warrant.
In Sibron, the Court ruled that probable cause was
required to have searched Sibron; that there was nothing
close to probable cause in that case; and that therefore
the search – the officer thrusting his hand into Sibron’s
pocket and finding heroin – was unconstitutional.
Sibron’s conviction was therefore reversed by the
Supreme Court.
In Terry, on the other hand, where there were articulable
facts to support a reasonable suspicion of a concealed
weapon, a limited pat-down of external clothing for the
limited purpose of protecting the police officer was
permitted upon less than probable cause, that is, upon
less evidence than would be required to arrest a person
or justify a search warrant.
What these two cases, decided by the Supreme Court as
companion cases on the same day, mean is that no
matter what the New York statute (or any other state
statute) may say and authorize, the Fourth Amendment
to the Constitution does not permit full-scale searches –
e.g., the officer putting his hands in an individual’s

Stop, Question and Frisk:
What the Law Says About Your Rights

pockets – unless there is probable cause–enough
evidence to justify an arrest or a judicial search warrant.
The Fourth Amendment does permit a frisk, a limited
pat-down of external clothing, but only to protect the
safety of the police officer in circumstances where the
individual has been subjected to a legal, forcible stop and
where there is articulable, specific facts – like, for
example, a visible bulge – to support a reasonable
suspicion of a concealed weapon. Such frisks are not
constitutionally permitted merely upon reasonable
suspicion of any other crime, much less the concealed
possession of less than 25 grams (7/8 of an ounce) of
marijuana, which in NY state is not even a crime.
Supreme Court Cases after Terry and Sibron

When may a police officer stop an individual and require
him or her to answer questions?: Even though Terry and
Sibron explicitly declined to decide whether a police
officer could constitutionally stop, detain and interrogate
someone briefly, upon less evidence than would justify
an arrest, many subsequent decisions have made it clear
that they can, and that reasonable suspicion (less
evidence than would justify an arrest) that a crime was
being committed, was about to be committed or had
been committed is sufficient for the police to forcibly
stop individuals briefly to ask them questions
specifically related to their reasonable suspicion.
However, even under the doctrine of reasonable
suspicion, cops may not stop, detain and require people
to answer questions, even briefly, without some
articulated, objective reason, some level of evidence to
justify the intrusion, “something more,” as Chief Justice
Rehnquist said, “than an inchoate and unparticularized
suspicion or ‘hunch’.” (U. S. v. Sokolow, 1989)
Other cases have made and established the same point.
In United States v. Brignoni-Ponce (1975), for example, the
Supreme Court ruled that the U.S. Border Patrol could
not stop a vehicle near the Mexican border even just to
question its occupants about their citizenship and
immigration status, when the only ground for suspicion
was the occupants’ apparent Mexican ancestry, or when
the stops were made randomly. They could
constitutionally stop them and ask such questions only if
they were aware of specific articulable facts that could
reasonably warrant their suspicion that the vehicles
contain aliens who may be in the country illegally. And
even then, they could conduct no further searches
without either consent, enough evidence to justify an
arrest or, under Terry, a frisk if there was a basis to
suspect a concealed weapon. The Court has also ruled

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that unless there is specific evidence to justify a
reasonable suspicion, the person stopped can walk away
and need not answer any question. “He may not be
detained even momentarily without reasonable, objective
grounds for doing so; and his refusal to listen or answer
does not, without more, furnish those grounds.” (Florida
v. Royer, 1983).

facts to support a suspicion that the person is involved
in a crime that has been committed, is being committed
or is about to be committed. An inchoate hunch is not
enough. Talking to known drug users or dealers is not
enough. “Hanging out” is not enough. Entering and
exiting a bodega that the cops know to be selling drugs,
without more, is not enough.

Of course, a police officer may approach any individual
and ask anything. But as long as the individual is free to
walk away and not answer, no “seizure” has taken place
within the bounds of the Fourth Amendment. But the
minute the officer, by force or show of authority, detains
the individual and requires an answer, the Fourth
Amendment applies, and requires, even for this limited
purpose, reasonable suspicion of a crime, which is to
say, specific, articulable facts to support the suspicion.
And even under those circumstances, a frisk requires
reasonable suspicion of a concealed weapon.

When may a police officer search someone on the
street?: Under Terry and Sibron, even if police officers
have constitutionally stopped someone to question him
or her, they may not fully search the person – that is
require them to empty their pockets or thrust their own
hands into the individual’s pockets – unless they have
enough evidence to legally arrest them or to justify a
judicial search warrant. That amount of evidence is
called probable cause.

As the Supreme Court said in United States v. Mendenhall
(1980):
“We adhere to the view that a person is ‘seized’ only
when, by means of physical force or a show of authority,
his freedom of movement is restrained. Only when such
restraint is imposed is there any foundation whatever for
invoking constitutional safeguards. The purpose of the
Fourth Amendment is not to eliminate all contact
between the police and the citizenry, but ‘to prevent
arbitrary and oppressive interference by enforcement
officials with the privacy and personal security of
individuals.’ As long as the person to whom questions
are put remains free to disregard the questions and walk
away, there has been no intrusion upon that person's
liberty or privacy as would under the Constitution
require some particularized and objective justification.”
(The catch here is that the cops are not required to tell
individuals this; most young people stopped on the
street don’t know it; and the cops often trick them into
“consenting.” That is why it is advisable for the person
asked to inquire – politely, always politely – whether he
is free to leave or is being detained for questioning. And
it is also advisable when stopped to make it clear, again
politely, not with belligerence, that you do not consent
to a search.)
Thus it is now the law that when a cop stops someone
on less evidence than would justify an arrest, and asks
them a question – and the individual is not free to leave
without answering the question – then the stop is
constitutional only if the officer has specific, articulable

Stop, Question and Frisk:
What the Law Says About Your Rights

If the officer does not have probable cause and even if
he has enough evidence to justify reasonable suspicion
of a crime, and therefore to briefly stop and interrogate
the individual, he can legally frisk him or her, that is, do
a pat-down of external clothing, only if he has good
reason to believe that he is in danger from a concealed
weapon. This means he has to see a bulge or have other
good reason to suspect a weapon that might place him
in danger during the stop – articulable facts to support
his suspicion of a concealed weapon, in order to legally
frisk the individual.
Although there have been many Supreme Court cases
after Terry, none has reduced this standard; indeed, it
has been affirmed and re-affirmed repeatedly.
For example, in Minnesota v. Dickerson, decided in 1993,
25 years after Terry, the Supreme Court reviewed the
legal basis for a frisk under Terry, when there was not
enough evidence to justify an arrest or a search warrant.
Here is what Justice White said in Dickerson, writing for
the Court:
“Terry v. Ohio (1968) ... held that ‘[w]hen an officer is
justified in believing that the individual whose suspicious
behavior he is investigating at close range is armed and
presently dangerous to the officer or to others,’ the
officer may conduct a pat-down search ‘to determine
whether the person is in fact carrying a weapon. The
purpose of this limited search is not to discover evidence
of crime, but to allow the officer to pursue his
investigation without fear of violence . . . .’ Rather, a
protective search – permitted without a warrant and on
the basis of reasonable suspicion less than probable
cause – must be strictly ‘limited to that which is

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necessary for the discovery of weapons which might be
used to harm the officer or others nearby.’ If the
protective search goes beyond what is necessary to
determine if the suspect is armed, it is no longer valid
under Terry and its fruits will be suppressed. Sibron v.
New York (1968). These principles were settled 25 years
ago when, on the same day, the Court announced its
decisions in Terry and Sibron.”
These principles remain settled today, and any police
practice that diverges from these principles is illegal.
Applying These Principles to What We Know
about Stop-and-Frisk in New York City

Are the stops and interrogations apart from the frisks
legal?: In 2005, according to official police reports, there
were nearly 400,000 stops, resulting in 19,000 arrests.
Thus in most of the stops – about 96 percent – the cops
stopped people with not enough evidence to arrest them
or search them, that is, without probable cause. This
pattern continued in 2006, 2007, 2008 and 2009. In
2010, there were a record number of stops – over
600,000. Between 2005 - 2010, there were over three
million stops, with about 94 percent not resulting in a
summons or arrests. That means that there were a
shade less than three million stops in instances where
there was not enough evidence to support an arrest or a
search warrant.
Under the applicable law described above, what
articulable facts supporting the cops “reasonable
suspicion” of a crime justified these stops? The reason
cited most often in the police reports – nearly half – was
“furtive movements.” Without more, it is likely that
such reasons violate the Supreme Court standards
described above. Nearly another 20 percent cited the
reason as “other.” This is clearly not what the Supreme
Court meant when it required “specific, articulated
facts” supporting the officer’s suspicion. Thus in about
two-thirds of all these stops, the police reports
themselves strongly indicate a legally insufficient reason
to justify the stops. In virtually all the rest of the
reported stops – nearly 30 percent – the reason for the
stop is cited as “casing a victim or a location.” But
without more detail – the kind of detail that would
clearly be required if any of these cases got to court – it
is impossible to tell how many of these 30 percent were
legal. It is suggestive, however, to note that only about
six percent of all the stops resulted in arrests, indicating
some huge overestimation by the police of reasonably
suspicious circumstances.

Stop, Question and Frisk:
What the Law Says About Your Rights

But even without this 30 percent, the police reports
themselves call into question the legality of two-thirds of
the reported stops.
Are the frisks that accompany the stops legal?:
According to the official police reports, between 2005 –
2009, about half of the stops also included frisks.
Assuming approximately the same percentage of the
more than 600,000 stops reported in 2010, that’s nearly
one and a half million frisks in the six years span of 2005
- 2010. In 2009, 762 guns were found – about one
quarter of one per cent of the number of frisks.
In one particular minority neighborhood, according to
an analysis by The New York Times based on police
reports, there were 52,000 stops between January 2006
and March 2010; only 25 guns were recovered.
Assuming the same percentage of frisks to stops of
about 50 percent that exists citywide, that means
approximately 26,000 frisks in this neighborhood, with a
yield of only 25 guns --, less than one-tenth of one per
cent!
Whether we are talking about one-quarter of one per
cent or one-tenth of one per cent, it is clear that virtually
none of the frisks are producing guns. Indeed,
somewhere between 99.75 percent and 99.9 percent of
the frisks do not produce guns. But if the law permits
frisks only if the police have specific, articulable reasons
– like a tell-tale bulge or other good reason – to suspect
a concealed weapon, how can virtually 100 percent of all
frisks turn up no weapon? Either the police are
stunningly incompetent, or they are conducting
hundreds of thousands of illegal frisks, 90 percent of
them against Blacks and Latinos. Over a million and a
half frisks in the last four years, most of them illegal and
most of them against people of color.
Conclusion

Stop-and-frisk is a widely used police practice in New
York City, so it’s important to understand that the
factual thresholds for legal stops and legal frisks are not
one and the same. Stops, frisks, and full searches are
governed very clearly by different legal standards. Are
the majority of stops and frisks as currently conducted
by the NYPD, legal? Under the applicable law described
here, the answer to that question should be abundantly
clear.
Where is the Mayor on this scandal? Why isn’t the
Police Commissioner being held accountable for this
epidemic of police lawlessness?

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About Ira Glasser

Ira Glasser is President of the Drug Policy Alliance
Board of Directors. He served as the executive director
of the New York Civil Liberties Union from 1970 until
1978, when he was selected as national executive
director of the NYCLU’s parent group, the American
Civil Liberties Union. He served in that capacity for 23
years until his retirement in mid-2001. Mr. Glasser is the
co-author of Doing Good: The Limits of Benevolence and the
author of Visions of Liberty: The Bill of Rights for All
Americans.
About the Drug Policy Alliance
The Drug Policy Alliance is the leading organization in
the United States promoting alternatives to the drug war.
We envision a just society in which the use and
regulation of drugs are grounded in science, compassion,
health, and human rights; in which people are no longer
punished for what they put into their own bodies but
only for crimes committed against others; and in which
the fears, prejudices and punitive prohibitions of today
are no more. Our mission is to advance those policies
and attitudes that best reduce the harms of both drug
misuse and drug prohibition, and to promote the
sovereignty of individuals over their minds and bodies.
About This Issue Brief
The Drug Policy Alliance published this issue brief as
part of our campaign to end the marijuana arrest crusade
in New York City. Since 1996, the NYPD has made
more than 535,000 arrests for possessing small amounts
of marijuana. In 2010 alone, 50,383 people were arrested
for simple marijuana possession, comprising nearly 15
percent of all arrests in the city, making it the leading
charge for arrest. Most of those arrested are handcuffed,
placed in a police car, booked at the station, held in jail
for up to 24 hours (sometimes longer), and then
arraigned before a judge. Nearly 70 percent of those
arrested are under 30 years old. Nearly 86 percent are
black and Latino, even though government surveys
demonstrate that white people use marijuana at higher
rates. On average, nearly 140 people are arrested every
day for marijuana possession in New York City, making
the Big Apple the “Marijuana Arrest Capital of the
World.”

These arrests are extremely expensive, marked by racial
bias, and more often than not are the result of illegal
searches or mischarging by the police. Additionally,
these arrests violate the spirit and intent of New York’s
marijuana possession laws: In 1977, the New York State
Legislature passed the Marihuana Reform Act of 1977;
possession of 25 grams or less of marijuana was

Stop, Question and Frisk:
What the Law Says About Your Rights

decriminalized – that is, it was made a violation, with the
first offense punishable by a $100 fine, rather than arrest
and jail. The Legislature’s intent was made clear in the
new law: “Arrests, criminal prosecutions, and criminal
penalties are inappropriate for people who possess small
quantities of marihuana (sic) for personal use. Every
year, this process needlessly scars thousands of lives and
waste millions of dollars in law enforcement resources,
while detracting from the prosecution of serious crime.”
A word about “consensual” searches: Most of these
arrests are the result of trickery, illegal searches, or false
charges. Research shows that most people arrested for
marijuana possession are not smoking in public, but
simply have a small amount in their pocket, purse, or
backpack. Possessing a small amount of marijuana in
one’s pocket or bag is a legal violation, but not a
criminal offense. Often, when police stop and question a
person, they do not have legal grounds to search but
they tell the person to “empty your pockets” or “open
your bag.” Many people comply with the officer’s
request – even though they are not legally required to do
so. Sometimes cops also say, or imply, that if the person
stopped empties his pockets it will go easier on him, and
the person may comply when there is no legal basis for
doing so. These may later be called “consensual”
searches because the person emptied his pockets or his
knapsack “voluntarily.” But no one is required to
consent to such a search; if the police have legal grounds
to search, they’ll search; if they do not, it is advisable to
make it clear – politely, always politely – that you do not
consent to a search. This is important because under
New York State law, if a person pulls marijuana from his
pocket or bag, it makes the marijuana “open to public
view,” and therefore a crime. The police then arrest the
person for this offense. If you have a small amount (less
than 25 grams) of marijuana in your pocket or bag, and
the police have no legal grounds to search you, leave it
there; do not take it out.
For additional resources and information about
marijuana arrests in New York City and efforts to
reform our nation’s drug policies, please visit our
website: www.drugpolicy.org.
10 Rules for Dealing with the Police

For more “know your rights” information and materials,
we strongly recommend the short video, 10 Rules for
Dealing with the Police. The video is an excellent resource
and tool for communities, students and parents, schools,
elected officials, and anyone interested in understanding
the law and their rights during a police encounter. Find
the video at www.flexyourrights.org.

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