FINAL REPORT
GUANTANAMO REVIEW
TASKFORCE
January 22, 2010

Department of Justice
Department of Defense
Department of State
Department of Homeland Security
Office of the Director
of National Intelligence
Joint Chiefs of Staff

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
On January 22,2009, the President issued Executive Order 13492, calling for a
prompt and comprehensive interagency review of the status of all individuals currently
detained at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base and requiring the closure of the detention
facilities there. The Executive Order was based on the finding that the appropriate
disposition of all individuals detained at Guantanamo would further the national security
and foreign policy interests of the United States and the interests ofjustice.
One year after the issuance of the Executive Order, the review ordered by the
President is now complete. After evaluating all of the detainees, the review participants
have decided on the proper disposition-transfer, prosecution, or continued detentionof all 240 detainees subject to the review.
Each of these decisions was reached by the unanimous agreement of the agencies
responsible for the review: the Department of Justice, Department of Defense,
Department of State, Department of Homeland Security, Office of the Director of
National Intelligence, and Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Review Process
To implement the President's order, the Attorney General, as the coordinator of
the review, established the Guantanamo Review Task Force and a senior-level Review
Panel. The Task Force was responsible for assembling and examining relevant
information on the Guantanamo detainees and making recommendations on their proper
dispositions. The Review Panel, consisting of officials with delegated authority from
their respective agencies to decide the disposition of each detainee, reviewed the Task
Force's recommendations and made disposition decisions on a rolling basis. Where the
Review Panel did not reach consensus, or where higher-level review was appropriate, the
agency heads ("Principals") named in the Executive Order determined the proper
disposition of the detainee.
Key features of the review process included:

•

Comprehensive Interagency Review. The Task Force consisted of more
than 60 career professionals, including intelligence analysts, law enforcement
agents, and attorneys, drawn from the Department of Justice, Department of
Defense, Department of State, Department of Homeland Security, Central
Intelligence Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and other agencies
within the intelligence community.

•

Rigorous Examination oflnformation. The Task Force assembled large
volumes of information from across the government relevant to determining
the proper disposition of each detainee. Task Force members examined this
information critically, giving careful consideration to the threat posed by the
detainee, the reliability of the underlying information, and the interests of
national security.

•

Unanimous Decision-Making by Senior Officials. Based on the Task
Force's evaluations and recommendations, senior officials representing each
agency responsible for the review reached unanimous determinations on the
appropriate disposition for all detainees. In the large majority of cases, the
Review Panel was able to reach a consensus. Where the Review Panel was
not able to reach a unanimous decision---or when additional review was
appropriate-the Principals met to determine the proper disposition.

Results of the Review
The decisions reached on the 240 detainees subject to the review are as follows:
•

126 detainees were approved for transfer. To date, 44 of these detainees have
been transferred from Guantanamo to countries outside the United States.

•

44 detainees over the course of the review were referred for prosecution
either in federal court or a military commission, and 36 of these detainees
remain the subject of active cases or investigations. The Attorney General has
announced that the government will pursue prosecutions against six of these
detainees in federal court and will pursue prosecutions against six others in
military commissions.

•

48 detainees were determined to be too dangerous to transfer but not feasible
for prosecution. They will remain in detention pursuant to the government's
authority under the Authorization for Use of Military Force passed by
Congress in response to the attacks of September 11, 2001. Detainees may
challenge the legality of their detention in federal court and will periodically
receive further review within the Executive Branch.

•

30 detainees from Yemen were designated for "conditional" detention based
on the current security environment in that country. They are not approved
for repatriation to Yemen at this time, but may be transferred to third
countries, or repatriated to Yemen in the future if the current moratorium on
transfers to Yemen is lifted and other security conditions are met.

Looking Ahead
With the completion of the review, an essential component of the effort to close
the Guantanamo detention facilities has been accomplished. Beyond the review,
additional work remains to be done to implement the review decisions and to resolve
other issues relating to detainees. The Task Force has ensured that its analyses of the
detainees and the information collected in the course of the review are properly preserved
to assist in the resolution of these issues going forward.

11

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.

Introduction

1

II.

Background

1

III.

The President's Executive Order

2

IV.

Implementing the Executive Order: The Guantanamo Review Task Force

3

A. Establishment of the Task Force

3

B. Task Force Structure

3

C. Guantanamo Review Panel

4

D. Task Force Information Collection

5

E. Review Phases

6

Detainee Review Guidelines

7

A. Transfer Guidelines

7

B. Prosecution Guidelines

7

C. Detention Guidelines

8

V.

~

D. Review of Information
VI.

9

Results of the Review

9

A. Overview of Decisions

9

B. Overview of the Guantanamo Detainee Population

13

Transfer Decisions

15

A. Background

15

B. Decisions

16

C. Yemeni Detainees

18

VIII. Prosecution Decisions

19

A. Background

19

B. Decisions

20

C. Detainees Who Cannot Be Prosecuted

22

Detention Decisions

23

A. Background

23

B. Decisions

23

VII.

IX.

C. Continued Reviews

";

25

X.

Conditional Detention Decisions: Yemeni Detainees

25

XI.

Diplomatic Efforts

26

XII.

Conclusion

28
111

I.

Introduction

An essential component of the President's order calling for the closure of the
detention facilities at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base was the initiation of a new and
rigorous interagency review of all individuals detained there. The purpose of the review
was to collect and examine information from across the government to determine which
detainees the United States should transfer or release from custody, prosecute, or
otherwise lawfully detain.
This review is now complete. After carefully considering each case, the agencies
responsible for the review-the Department of Justice, Department of Defense,
Department of State, Department of Homeland Security, Office of the Director of
National Intelligence, and Joint Chiefs of Staff-have unanimously agreed on the proper
disposition of all 240 detainees subject to the review. While there remain other steps
outside the scope of the review that must be taken before the detention facilities at
Guantanamo can be closed, the completion of the review fulfills a central element of the
President's order.
This report describes the process by which the review was conducted over the
past year, the decisions resulting from the review, and the progress made toward
implementing those decisions.
II.

Background

Following the terrorist attacks of September 11,2001, the United States was faced
with the question of what to do with individuals captured in connecticm with military
operations in Afghanistan or in other counterterrorism operations overseas. Starting in
January 2002, the military began transferring a number of these individuals to the
detention facilities at Guantanamo. By the end of 2002, 632 detainees had been brought
to Guantanamo. In 2003, 117 additional detainees were brought to the base, with 10
more detainees added in 2004, 14 detainees in 2006, five detainees in 2007, and one
detainee in 2008. Since 2002, a total of 779 individuals have been detained at
Guantanamo in connection with the war against al-Qaida, the Taliban, and associated
forces.
From 2002 through 2008, most of the individuals detained at Guantanamo were
transferred or released from U.S. custody, with the vast majority being repatriated to their
home countries and others resettled in third countries willing to receive them. Of the 779
individuals detained at Guantanamo, approximately 530-almost 70 percent-were
transferred or released from U.S. custody prior to 2009. The countries to which these
detainees were transferred include Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Australia, Bahrain,
Bangladesh, Belgium, Bosnia, Denmark, Egypt, France, Germany, Iran, Iraq, Jordan,
Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Libya, Maldives, Mauritania, Morocco, Pakistan, Qatar, Russia,
Saudi Arabia, Somalia (Somaliland), Spain, Sudan, Sweden, Tajikistan, Tunisia, Turkey,
Uganda, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, and Yemen.

By January 20, 2009, the population of detainees at Guantanamo had been
reduced to 242. Of the 242 remaining detainees, 59 had been approved for transfer by the
prior administration and were awaiting implementation of their transfers.

III.

The President's Executive Order

On January 22,2009, the President issued an Executive Order requiring the
closure of the detention facilities at Guantanamo within one year. Noting the length of
the detentions and the significant concerns they had raised both within the United States
and internationally, the President determined that the "prompt and appropriate disposition
of the individuals currently detained at Guantanamo and closure of the facilities in which
they are detained would further the national security and foreign policy interests of the
United States and the interests ofjustice."
Accordingly, the President ordered the Executive Branch to conduct a prompt and
comprehensive interagency review of the factual and legal bases for the continued
detention of all individuals remaining at Guantanamo. The President ordered that the
review be coordinated by the Attorney General and conducted with the full cooperation
and participation of the Secretary of Defense, Secretary of State, Secretary of Homeland
Security, Director of National Intelligence, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
The first task given to the review participants under the Executive Order was to
assemble, to the extent reasonably practicable, all information in the possession of the
federal government pertaining to any individual then detained at Guantanamo and
relevant to determining his proper disposition.
The Executive Order then set forth the following framework for the review
participants to follow in determining the disposition of each detainee:
•

First, on a rolling basis and as promptly as possible, determine whether it is
possible to transfer or release the detainee consistent with the national security
and foreign policy interests of the United States and, if so, whether and how
the Secretary of Defense may effect the detainee's transfer or release;

•

Second, with respect to any detainee not approved for transfer or release,
determine whether the federal government should seek to prosecute the
detainee for any offenses he may have committed, including whether it is
feasible to prosecute such individual in a court established pursuant to Article
III of the United States Constitution (i.e., federal court); and

•

Third, with respect to any detainee whose disposition is not achieved through
transfer, release, or prosecution, select other lawful means, consistent with the
national security and foreign policy interests of the United States and the
interests ofjustice, for the disposition of the detainee.

2

The Executive Order further directed that the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary
of State, and other review participants work to effect promptly the release or transfer of
all individuals for whom release or transfer is possible, and that the Secretary of State
expeditiously pursue and direct such negotiations and diplomatic efforts with foreign
governments as are necessary and appropriate to implement the order.
Finally, the Executive Order required that any individuals who remained in
detention at Guantanamo at the time of the closure of the detention facilities be returned
to their home country, released, transferred to a third country, or transferred to another
United States detention facility in a manner consistent with law and the national security
and foreign policy interests of the United States.
'l!

IV.

Implementing the Executive Orde': ' The Guantanamo Review Task Force
A.

Establishment of the Task Force

To implement the Executive Order, the Attorney General established the
Guantanamo Review Task Force and appointed an Executive Director of the Task Force
on February 20, 2009. The Task Force was charged with assembling and reviewing
relevant information on the Guantanamo detainees and making recommendations to
senior-level officials on the proper disposition of each detainee pursuant to the
framework set forth in the Executive Order. To ensure that the expertise and perspectives
of each participating agency were brought to bear on the review process, the Task Force
was established as an interagency entity. Further, to maximize collaboration and
exchange of information among Task Force members, all Task Force staff were located
together in a secure facility, on a single floor devoted to Task Force work, and connected
electronically through a stand-alone classified network.

B.

Task Force Structure

With the assistance of the participating agencies, the Task Force assembled a staff
of over 60 career professionals, drawn from the Department of Justice, Department of
Defense, Department of State, Department of Homeland Security, Federal Bureau of
Investigation, Central Intelligence Agency, and National Counterterrorism Center.
Included in this wide range of representatives were senior military officers, federal
prosecutors, FBI agents, intelligence analysts and officers, military prosecutors and
investigators, national security lawyers, civillitigators, paralegals, and administrative
assistants. During their tenure at the Task Force, these staff members worked full-time
on the Task Force review.
The Task Force staff was initially organized into two review teams. The transfer
team was responsible for evaluating whether detainees could be transferred or released
consistent with the national security and foreign policy interests of the United States. l
1 The term "release" is used to mean release from confinement without the need for continuing
security measures in the receiving country, while the term "transfer" is used to mean release from
confinement subject to appropriate security measures.

3

The team primarily evaluated the degree of threat posed by the detainee to U.S. national
security, whether the threat could be mitigated through appropriate security measures,
and the potential destination countries where it appeared possible to safely transfer the
detainee. The transfer team was composed of representatives from each agency listed in
the Executive Order.
The prosecution team was responsible for recommending whether the government
should seek to prosecute certain detainees in either federal court or the military
commission system. The prosecution team was staffed predominantly by experienced
federal prosecutors, investigative agents, and criminal appellate specialists from the
Department of Justice,2 as well as military commission prosecutors and investigative
agents from the Department of Defense.
The work of the transfer and prosecution teams often overlapped, and the two
teams worked in close coordination over the course of the review. As described below,
after an initial review of all the detainees, the transfer and prosecution teams merged to
conduct a further review of detainees whose cases had been deferred during the initial
review.
The interagency makeup of the review teams was designed to ensure that all
relevant agency viewpoints-including military, intelligence, homeland security,
diplomatic, and law enforcement-were considered in the review process. Thus,
proposed recommendations for transfer or continued detention were drafted, reviewed,
and vigorously discussed ttl group deliberations by representatives of each of the
participating agencies. After these extensive discussions on each detainee, any dissenting
views of the agency representatives were noted in the recommendations or otherwise
made known to the Review Panel.
C.

Guantanamo Review Panel

The Task Force's recommend~tions, which contained detailed classified
assessments of each detainee, were submitted on a rolling basis to the interagency
Guantanamo Review Panel. The Review Panel was established in February 2009 along
with the Task Force and was composed of senior-level officials from each of the agencies
identified in the Executive Order. Review Panel members were delegated authority
from their respective agency heads ("Principals") to decide the disposition of each
detainee. Review Panel members were also responsible for ensuring that their respective
agencies made relevant information in their possession available to the Task Force and
,.~
2 Specifically, federal prosecutors on the Task Force were drawn from United States Attorneys'
Offices in the Southern District of New York, Eastern District of New York, Western District of New
York, District of Columbia, Eastern District of Virginia, Central District of California, Northern District of
California, and District of Maine, and from the Counterterrorism Section ofthe National Security Division
in the Department of Justice.

3 Senior officials from the Central Intelligence Agency and Federal Bureau ofInvestigation also
regularly attended the Review Panel meetings to further inform the decision-making process.

4

provided the Task Force with personnel and other resources necessary for the Task Force
to complete its review within the one-year time frame mandated by the President.
Beginning in March 2009, the Review Panel met on a weekly basis to consider
the recommendations of the Task Force. The "Review Panel made disposition decisions
only by unanimous agreement of the agencies identified in the Executive Order. Thus,
each of the participating agencies had an equal voice in disposition decisions, and no
decisions were made by the Review Panel over the objection of any agency. In the large
majority of cases, the Review Panel was able to achieve consensus and reach decisions
regarding the detainees considered. When Review Panel members did not reach
consensus, or when higher-level review was appropriate, the cases were referred to the
Principals for a decision. All of the cases referred to the Principals also ultimately
garnered the unanimous agreement of the participating agencies.
Once a final decision was made regarding the disposition of a particular detainee,
the decision was passed to the appropriate agencies for implementation. If a detainee was
approved for transfer to a foreign country as a result of the review, the Department of
State and Department of Defense worked together to make appropriate arrangements to
effect the transfer in a manner consistent with the national security and foreign policy
interests of the United States, including U.S. policies concerning humane treatment. If a
decision was made by the Review Panel for prosecution, the case was referred to the
Department of Justice for further investigation and review under a joint protocol
established by the Department of Justice and Department of Defense to determine
whether to pursue prosecution of the case in federal court or a military commission. The
Review Panel was regularly updated on the implementation of transfer decisions and
prosecution referrals, as well as any issues arising out of the implementation of these
decisions requiring further interagency consideration.

D.

Task Force Information Collection

In accordance with the Executive Order, the Task Force's initial responsibility
was to collect all government information, to the extent reasonably practicable, relevant
to determining the proper disposition of each detainee. The government did not have a
preexisting, consolidated repository of such information. Rather, each federal agency
stored information concerning Guantanamo detainees in its own systems, consistent with
its particular mission and operating protocols.
Accordingly, soon after it was formed, the Task Force initiated an effort to collect
detainee information and make it available for review by Task Force members. As a
result of this complex effort, the Task Force consolidated a large volume of information
from the Department of Defense, Central Intelligence Agency, Federal Bureau of
Investigation, Department of Justice, National Security Agency, National
Counterterrorism Center, Department of State, and Department of Homeland Security.
The documents assembled by the Task Force include summaries ofbiographic
and capture information; interrogation reports from custodial interviews of the detainees;

5

records of Department of Defense administrative proceedings involving the detainees,
i.e., Combatant Status Review Tribunals and Administrative Review Board proceedings;
the results of name traces run for detainees in certain intelligence databases maintained
by the Central Intelligence Agency and National Security Agency; the results of name
traces run for detainees in law enforcement databases maintained by the Federal Bureau
of Investigation; investigative records maintained by the Office of Military
Commissions-Prosecution ("OMC") and Criminal Investigative Task Force within the
Department of Defense; records assembled by the Department of Justice for purposes of
defending habeas litigation brought by detainees to challenge their detention; recidivism
assessments concerning former detainees; finished intelligence products on the detainee
population and on general topics of interest to the Task Force's work; and information
concerning potential destination countries for detainees approved for transfer or release.
The Task Force also accepted written submissions made on behalf of individual detainees
by their counselor other representatives.
Additionally, the Task Force had access to a variety of external networks
containing additional information on the detainees, including documentary and physical
evidence recovered through counterterrorism operations, and records concerning the
behavior, disciplinary infractions, and physical and mental health of the detainees during
detention. Over the course of the review, the Task Force also received briefings from the
intelligence community on a number of topics relevant to the review.
The review of all this information was conducted in a classified environment
using secure systems.
E.

~eview

Phases

Following an initial period to stand up the Task Force and collect detainee
information, the Task Force began to review detainees on March 5, 2009. The review
was conducted in two phases. During the first phase, the Task Force reviewed all 240
detainees subject to the review. 4 In accordance with the framework set forth in the
Executive Order, the purpose of the first phase of the review was to identify those
detainees who could be transferred or released consistent with the national security and
foreign policy interests of the United States, those detainees as to whom prosecution
appeared feasible, and those detainees who required further evaluation before a decision
could be made on their appropriate disposition.
The purpose of the second phase of the review was to reevaluate those detainees
who had been deferred during the first phase. Each detainee reviewed in the second
phase was considered for transfer, prosecution, or-in the event that neither of these
dispositions was deemed appropriate---eontinued detention pursuant to the government's
.;.,

4 Although there were 242 detainees at Guantanamo when the Executive Order was issued, one
detainee had already been convicted and sentenced to life in the military commission system in 2008, and
another detainee committed suicide in June 2009. Thus, there were 240 detainees whose dispositions were
reviewed under the Executive Order.

6

authority under the Authorization for Use of Military Force ("AUMF") passed by
Congress in response to the attacks of September 11, 2001.

v.

Detainee Review Guidelines

In conducting its reviews, the Task Force followed detainee review guidelines
("Guidelines") developed specifically for the Executive Order review and approved by
the Review Panel. The Guidelines set forth standards to apply in considering detainees
for transfer, prosecution, or continued detention pursuant to the government's authority
under the AUMF.

A.

Transfer Guidelines

The Guidelines addressed three types of evaluations relevant to determining
whether a detainee should be recommended for transfer or release.
The first evaluation required by the Guidelines was a threat evaluation. The
Guidelines provided that a detainee should be deemed eligible for transfer if any threat he
poses could be sufficiently mitigated through feasible and appropriate security measures. 5
The Guidelines set forth a non-exclusive list of factors to be considered in evaluating the
threat posed by a detainee. In applying those factors, the Task Force was instructed to
consider the totality of available information regarding the detainee, and to give careful
consideration to the credibility and reliability of the available information.
The seco~d evaluation required by the Guidelines was an evaluation of potential
destination (i.e.~· teceiving) countries. The Guidelines left the Task Force with discretion
whether to recommend a detainee for transfer only to specified countries or under 1
specified conditions. As with the threat evaluation, the Guidelines provided a nonexclusive set of factors by which to evaluate potential receiving countries.
The third evaluation required by the Guidelines was a legal evaluation to ensure
that any detainee falling outside the government's lawful detention authority under the
AUMF was recommended for transfer or release.
B.

Prosecution Guidelines

The Guidelines also required cases to be evaluated by Task Force prosecutors to
determine whether a federal court or military commission prosecution should be
recommended for any offenses the detainees may have committed.
For the evaluation of whether a detainee should be prosecuted in federal court, the
Guidelines set forth standards used by federal prosecutors across the country to determine
5 The Guidelines further provided that a detainee should be deemed eligible for release ifhe does
not pose an identifiable threat to the national security of the United States. Other than the 17 Chinese
Uighur detainees, who were approved for "transfer or release," no detainees were approved for "release"
during the course of the review.

7

whether to charge a case, as set forth in the United States Attorneys' Manual. Consistent
r,with these standards, the Guidelines provided that a case should be recommended for
prosecution if the detainee's conduct constitutes a federal offense and the potentially
available admissible evidence will probably be sufficient to obtain and sustain a
,~onviction-unless prosecution should be declined because no substantial federal interest
',:~ould be served by prosecution. Key factors in making this determination includethe
nature and seriousness of the offense; the detainee's culpability in connection with the
offense; the detainee's willingness to cooperate in the investigation or prosecution of
others; and the probable sentence or other consequences if the detainee is convicted.
For the evaluation of whether a detainee should be prosecuted in a"hlilitary
commission, Task Force prosecutors examined the potentially available admissible
evidence and consulted closely with OMC to determine the feasibility of prosecution.
Recognizing the unique nature of these cases, the Guidelines provided that other
factors were also significant in determining whether to recommend prosecution,
including the need to protect classified information, such as intelligence sources and
methods.

C.

Detention Guidelines

In accordance with the Executive Order, the Guidelines provided that every effort
should be made to ensure that all detainees who could be recommended for transfer,
release, or prosecution consistent with national security and foreign policy interests and
the interests of justice were recommended for such dispositions. Thus, the Guidelines
provided that a detainee should be consider~d eligible for continued detention under the
AUMF only if (1) the detainee poses a national security threat that cannot be sufficiently
mitigated through feasible and appropriate security measures; (2) prosecution of the
detainee by the federal government is not feasible in any forum; and (3) continued
detention without criminal charges is lawful.
The Guidelines required the Task Force to consult with the Department of Justice
in conducting a legal evaluation for each detainee considered for continued detention.
This legal evaluation addressed both the legal basis for holding the detainee under the
AUMF and the government's case for defending the detention in any habeas litigation. 6
As the Supreme Court has held, inherent within the authorization of the AUMF to
"use all necessary and appropriate force" is the power to detain any individuals who fall
within the scope of the statute? As the Court observed, "by universal agreement and
6 The AUMF authorizes the President to "use all necessary and appropriate force against those
nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist
attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent
any future attacks of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or
persons." AUMF § 2(a).

7 See Hamdi v. Rums/eld, 542 U.S. 507, 519 (2004) (plurality opinion); id. at 587 (Thomas, J.)
(dissenting).

8

practice," the power to wage war necessarily includes the authority to capture and detain
combatants in order to prevent them from "returning to the field of battle and takingllp
arms once again."g The scope of the AUMF's detention authority extends to those
persons who "planned, authorized or committed or aided" the September 11 attacks,
"harbored those responsible for those attacks," or "were part of, or substantially
supported, Taliban or al Qaeda forces or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities
against the United States or its coalition partners."g Accordingly, only detainees who
satisfied this standard could be designated for continued detention.
D.

Review of Information

Consistent with the Guidelines' requirement that the Task Force undertake a fresh
and comprehensive evaluation of detainee information, the Task Force sought to make
independent evaluations of the facts. In many instances, the Task Force largely agreed
with prior threat assessments of the detainees and sometimes found additional
information that further substantiated such assessments. In other instances, the Task
Force found prior assessments to be overstated. Some assessments, for example,
contained allegations that were not supported by the underlying source document upon
which they relied. Other assessments contained conclusions that were stated
categorically even though derived from uncorroborated statements or raw intelligence
reporting of undetermined or questionable reliability. Conversely, in a few cases, the
Task Force discovered reliable information indicating that a detainee posed a greater
threat in some respects than prior assessments suggested.
Even after careful examination of the intelligence, however, it was not always
possible to draw definitive conclusions regarding a detainee's past conduct. Many of the
detainees were captured in active zones of combat and were not previously the targets of
investigation by U.S. law enforcement authorities or the intelligence community. Much
of what is known about such detainees comes from their own statements or statements
made by other detainees during custodial debriefings. The Task Force sought to ensure
that the Review Panel and Prtncipals were apprised in their decision-making of any
limitations of the available information.
VI.

Results of the Review
A.

Overview of Decisions

By the one-year mark of January 22, 2010, the review participants reached
decisions on the appropriate disposition of all 240 detainees subject to the Executive
Order. In sum, 126 detainees were approved for transfer; 36 detainees were referred for

8

Id. at 518; see also id. at 587 (Thomas, J.) (dissenting) (same).

9 See Gov't Filing, In reo Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litigation, Misc. No. 08-442 (D.D.C. March
13, 2009). The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia recently affirmed that
Guantanamo detainees who meet this standard are detainable. See also AI-Bihani v. Obama, --- F.3d ---,
2010 WL 10411 at *3 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 5,2010).

9

prosecution;1O 48 detainees were approved for continued detention under the AUMF; and
30 detainees from Yemen were approved for "conditional" detention based on present
security conditions in Yemen.
Overview of Decisions

• Transfer
• Prosecution

126

30

o Conditional Detention
• Detention

After careful deliberation, all of these decisions were reached by unanimous
agreement of senior officials from each agency respQi1sible for the review. Thus, each
decision carries the approval of the Department of Justice, Department of Defense,
Department of State, Department of Homeland Security, Office of the Director of
National Intelligence, and Joint Chiefs of Staff. A more detailed breakdown of the
decisions follows.
Detainees Approved for Transfer
•

126 detainees were unanimously approved for transfer subject to appropriate security
measures.
o

63 of the 126 detainees either had been cleared for transfer by the prior
administration, ordered released by a federal district court, or both.

o

44 of the 126 detainees have been transferred to date-24 to their home
countries, 18 to third countries for resettlement, and two to Italy for
prosecution.

o

82 of the 126 detainees remain at Guantanamo. Of these detainees:
•

16 may be repatriated to their home countries (other than Yemen)
consistent with U.S. policies on humane treatment. The State
Department and Department of Defense are working with these
countries concerning the security conditions and timing of the
,.j.•

10 As explained below, 44 cases were initially referred for prosecution; 36 of those cases remain
the subject of active referrals.

10

~

transfers. Some of these detainees have obtained injunctions that
presently bar their repatriation and cannot be repatriated until these
injunctions are lifted; litigation over the injunctions is ongoing.
•

37 cannot be repatriated at this time due to humane treatment or
related concerns associated with their home countries (other than
Yemen). The State Department is seeking to resettle these detainees in
third countries. (A small number of these detainees may be transferred
to third countries for prosecution rather than resettlement.)

•

29 are from Yemen. In light of the moratorium on transfers of
Guantanamo detainees to Yemen announced by the President on
January 5, 20 I0, these detainees cannot be transferred to Yemen at this
time. In the meantime, these detainees are eligible to be transferred to
third countries capable of imposing appropriate security measures.
Detainees Approved for Transfer

• Transferred
• Repatriation Consistent with Humane Treatment Policy
o Repatriation Raises Humane Treatment Concerns
• Yemeni Detainees

16

Detainees Referred for Prosecution
•

Initially, 44 detainees were referred for prosecution. As a result of further evaluation
of these cases (detailed below), there are now 36 detainees who remain the subject of
active cases or investigations.
o

1 detainee (Ahmed Ghailani) has been transferred to the Southern District of
New York and will be tried for his alleged role in the 1998 bombings of the
U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.

o

5 detainees will be tried in the Southern District of New York, for their
alleged roles in the September 11 attacks, as announced by the Attorney
General.

o 6 detainees will be tried for offenses under the laws of war in a reformed
military commission system, as announced by the Attorney General.
o 24 detainees remain under review pursuant to the joint Department of JusticeDepartment of Defense protocol. No final determination has yet been made as
to whether or in what forum these 24 detainees will be charged.

11

o

8 other detainees were initially referred for prosecution but subsequently

designated for other dispositions.
•

1 detainee was transferred pursuant to a court order in his habeas case.

•

7 detainees were referred back to the review participants after
prosecution was deemed not feasible upon further evaluation (6 were
subsequently approved for continued detention under the AUMF, and
1 was approved for transfer).
Detainees Referred for Prosecution

.To be tried in federal court
.To be tried by military commission
DUnder review
.Redesignated for other dispositions

24

Detainees Approved for Detention
•

48 detainees were unanimously approved for continued detention under the AUMF
based on a finding that they pose a national security threat that could not be mitigated
sufficiently at this time if they were to be transferred from U.S. custody.
o

The Task Force concluded as to all of these detainees that prosecution is not
feasible at this time in either federal court or the military commission system.

o

At the same time, the Task Force concluded that there is a lawful basis for
continuing to detain these detainees under the AUMF.

Detainees Approved for Conditional Detention
30 detainees from Yemen were unanimously approved for "conditional" detention
based on current security conditions in Yemen.
o

After carefully considering the intelligence concerning the security situation
in Yemen, and reviewing each detainee on a case-by-case basis, the review
participants selected a group of 30 Yemeni detainees who pose a lower threat
than the 48 detainees designated for continued detention under the AUMF, but
who should not be among the first groups of transfers to Yemen even if the
current moratorium on such transfers is lifted.

o

These 30 detainees were approved for "conditional" detention, meaning that
they
be transferred if one of the following conditions is satisfied: (1) the

rnw
:I~~~;~l~

12

security situation improves in Yemen; (2) an appropriate rehabilitation
program becomes available; or (3) an appropriate third-country resettlement
option becomes available. Should any of these conditions be satisfied,
however, the 29 Yemeni detainees approved for transfer would receive
priority for any transfer options over the 30 Yemeni detainees approved for
conditional detention.

B.

Overview of the Guantanamo Detainee Population

The following section provides an overview of the 240 Guantanamo detainees
reviewed under the Executive Order, including their threat characteristics and more
general background information, including country of origin, point of capture, and date of
arrival at Guantanamo.

Threat Characteristics. As reflected in the decisions made in the review, there is
a substantial degree of variation among the Guantanamo detainees from a security
perspective. Although not all detainees can be neatly characterized, the following
groupings provide a rough overview of the recurring threat profiles seen in the
$"
population.
•.4eaders, operatives, andfacilitators involved in terrorist plots against US. targets.
At the high end of the threat spectrum are leaders, planners, operatives, and
facilitators within al-Qaida or associated groups who are directly implicated in
terrorist plots against U.S. interests. Among the most notorious examples in this
group are Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the alleged mastermind of the September 11
attacks; Ramzi bin al-Shibh, the alleged principal coordinator of the September 11
attacks; Abd aI-Rahim al-Nashiri, the alleged mastermind of the attack on the U.S.S.
Cole; Abu Faraj al-Libi, who allegedly succeeded Khalid Sheikh Mohammed as alQaida's chief planner of terrorist operations; Hambali, the alleged leader of an alQaida affiliate in Indonesia who directed numerous attacks against Western targets in
Southeast Asia; and Ahmed Ghailani, an alleged key participant in the 1998
bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Roughly 10 percent of the
detainees subject to the review appear to have played a direct role in plotting,
executing, or facilitating such attacks.
•

Others with significant organizational roles within al-Qaida or associated terrorist
organizations. Other detainees played significant organizational roles within alQaida or associated terrorist organizations, even if they may not have been directly
involved in terrorist plots against U.S. targets. This group includes, for example,
individuals responsible for overseeing or providing logistical support to al-Qaida's
training operations in Afghanistan; facilitators who helped move money and
personnel for al-Qaida; a cadre of Usarna bin Laden's bodyguards, who held a unique
position of trust within al-Qaida; and well-trained operatives who were being
groomed by al-Qaida leaders for future terrorist operations. Roughly 20 percent of
the detainees subject to the review fall within this category.

13

•

Taliban leaders and members ofanti-Coalition militia groups. The detainee
population also includes a small number of Afghan detainees who occupied
significant positions within the Taliban regime, and a small number of other Afghan
detainees who were involved in local insurgent networks in Afghanistan implicated in
attacks on Coalition forces. Less than 10 percent of the detainees subject to the
review fall within this category.

•

Low-levelforeignfighters. A majority of the detainees reviewed appear to have been
foreign fighters with varying degrees of connection to al-Qaida, the Taliban, or
associated groups, but who lacked a significant leadership or other specialized role.
These detainees were typically captured in combat zones during the early stages of
U.S. military operations in Afghanistan, often by Northern Alliance troops or other
allied forces, without being specifically targeted for capture by (or even known to) the
U.S. military in advance. Many were relatively recent recruits to training camps in
Afghanistan run by al-Qaida or other groups, where they received limited weapons
training, but do not appear to have been among those selected for more advanced
training geared toward terrorist operations abroad.

•

Miscellaneous others. The remaining detainees-roughly 5 percent-do not fit into
any of the above categories.

Country ofOrigin. The Guantanamo detainees reviewed included individuals
from a number of different countries, including Yemen, Afghanistan, China, Saudi
Arabia, Algeria, Tunisia, Syria, Libya, Kuwait, and Pakistan. Approximately 40
percent-97 detainees-were Yemeni, while over 10 percent were Afghan.
Yemen jiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiilliiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiliiiiiiiiiiiiiliiiiiiiii..-nITIT~
Afghan. ~
..
China . _ ..
S. Arabia
__
Algeria
Tunisia
Syria
Libya
Kuwait
Pakistan
Uzbekistan
Egypt
Somalia
Sudan
Others l!!~~ili~

)11_.

o

20

40

60

14

80

100

120

Point ofCapture. The large majority of the detainees in the population
reviewed-approximately 60 percent-were captured inside Afghanistan or in the
Afghanistan-Pakistan border area. Approximately 30 percent of the detainees were
captured inside Pakistan. The remaining 10 percent were captured in countries other than
Afghanistan or Pakistan.

2002liiii~• • • •iiji.iIT-~l
2003
2004

.'

2005
2006
2007
2008

o
VII.

50

100

150

200

Arrival at Guantanamo. Most of the
detainees reviewed-approximately 80
percent-arrived at Guantanamo in 2002,
having been captured during the early
months of operations in Afghanistan. The
remaining detainees arrived in small
numbers over succeeding years.

250

Transfer Decisions
A.

Background

As the first step in the review process, the Executive Order required the review
participants to determine which Guantanamo detainees could be transferred or released
consistent with the national security and foreign policy interests of the United States.
The Executive Order further required the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State,
and other review participants as appropriate, to "work to effect promptly the release or
transfer of all individuals for whom release or transfer is possible."
Prior to the initiation of the review, 59 of the 240 detainees subject to review were
approved for transfer or release by the prior administration but remained at Guantanamo
by the time the Executive Order was issued. One reason for their continued detention
was that more than half of the 59 detainees could not be returned to their home countries
consistent with U.S. policy due to post-transfer treatment concerns. 11 Thus, many of the
59 detainees required resettlement in a third country, a process that takes time and
requires extensive diplomatic efforts.
In addition, 29 of the detainees subject to review were ordered released by a
federal district court as the result of habeas litigation. Of these 29 detainees, 18 were

11 It is the longstanding policy of the United States not to transfer a person to a country if the
United States determines that the person is more likely than not to be tortured upon return or, in appropriate
cases, that the person has a well-founded fear of persecution and is entitled to persecution protection. This
policy is consistent with the approach taken by the United States in implementing the Convention Against
Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT) and the Protocol Relating
to the Status of Refugees. Accordingly, prior to any transfer, the Department of State works closely with
relevant agencies to advise on the likelihood of persecution or torture in the given country and the adequacy
and credibility of assurances obtained from the foreign government.

15

ordered released after the government conceded the case. 12 The remaining 11 detainees
were ordered released after a court reached the merits of the case and ruled, based on a
preponderance of the evidence, that the detainee was not lawfully held because he was
not part of, or did not substantially support, al-Qaida, the Taliban, or associated forces. 13
Of the 29 detainees ordered released, 18 were among the 59 who had been approved by
the prior administration for transfer or release. Thus, a total of 70 detainees subject to the
review were either approved for transfer during the prior administration or ordered
released by a federal court.
B.

Decisions

Based on interagency reviews and case-by-case threat evaluations, 126 of the 240
detainees were approved for transfer by agreement of senior officials from the agencies
named in the Executive O r d e r . '
The 126 detainees unanimously approved for transfer include 44 who have been
transferred to date-24 to their home countries,14 18 to third countries for resettlement,15
and two to Italy for prosecution. Of the 82 detainees who remain at Guantanamo and
who have been approved for transfer, 16 may be repatriated to their home countries
(other than Yemen) consistent with U.S. policies concerning humane treatment, 38
cannot be repatriated due to humane treatment or related concerns in their home countries
(other than Yemen) and thus need to be resettled in a third country, and 29 are from
Yemen. Half of all detainees approved for transfer-63 of the 126-also had been
approved for transfer during the prior administration, ordered released by a federal court,
w.
or both. 16
There were considerable variations among the detainees approved for transfer.
For a small handful of these detainees, there was scant evidence of any involvement with
terrorist groups or hostilities against Coalition forces in Afghanistan. However, for most
of the detainees approved for transfer, there were varying degrees of evidence indicating
that they were low-level foreign fighters affiliated with al-Qaida or other groups
operating in Afghanistan. Thousands of such individuals are believed to have passed
12 Of the 18 cases conceded by the government, 17 were brought by the Uighur detainees and
were conceded by the prior administration. Eleven of the 18 detainees have been transferred to date.
13 A total of 14 detainees have won their habeas cases on the merits in district court. The
government transferred three ofthese detainees in December 2008; thus, they were not subject to the
review. Of the 11 remaining detainees who were reviewed under the Executive Order, seven have been
transferred to date. Ofthe four who have not been transferred, the United States is appealing the district
court's ruling in two ofthe cases, and is still within the time period to appeal the remaining two cases.

14 The 24 detainees transferred to their home countries were repatriated to Afghanistan (5),
Algeria (2), Chad (1), Iraq (1), Kuwait (2), Saudi Arabia (3), Somalia (Somaliland) (2), the United
Kingdom (1), and Yemen (7).
15 T~.J 8 detainees transferred to third countries for resettlement were transferred to Belgium (1),
Bermuda (4), France (2), Hungary (1), Ireland (2), Portugal (2), and Palau (6).

16 The review participants reviewed the detainees who had been approved for transfer by the prior
Administration and designated seven such detainees (all of whom were from Yemen) for conditional
detention instead of transfer.

16

through Afghanistan from the mid-1990s through 2001, recruited through networks in
various countries in the Middle East, North Africa, and Europe. These individuals varied
in their motivations, but they typically sought to obtain military training at one of the
many camps operating in Afghanistan; many subsequently headed to the front lines to
assist the Taliban in their fight against the Northern Alliance. For the most part, these
individuals were uneducated and unskilled. At the camps, they typically received limited
weapons training. While al-Qaida used its camps to vet individuals for more advanced
training geared toward terrorist operations against civilian targets, only a small
percentage of camp attendees were deemed suitable for such operations. The low-level
fighters approved for transfer were typically assessed by the review participants not to
have been selected for such training. Many were relatively recent recruits to the camps,
arriving in Afghanistan in the summer of 200 1. After the camps closed in anticipation of
the arrival of U.S. forces in October 2001, some of these individuals were transported by
camp personnel or otherwise made their way to the Tora Bora mountain range, where
they joined fighting units, but subsequently dispersed in the face of U.S. air attacks.
It is important to emphasize that a decision to approve a detainee for transfer does
not reflect a decision that the detainee poses no threat or no risk of recidivism. Rather,
the decision reflects the best predictive judgment of senior government officials, based on
the available information, that any threat posed by the detainee can be sufficiently
mitigated through feasible and appropriate security measures in the receiving country.
Indeed, all transfer decisions were made subject to the implementation of appropriate
security measures in the receiving country, and extensive discussions are conducted with
the receiving country about such security measures before any transfer is implemented.
Some detainees were approved for transfer only to specific countries or under specific
conditions, and a few were approved for transfer only to countries with pending
prosecutions against the detainee (or an interest in pursuing a future prosecution). Each
decision was made on a case-by-case basis, taking into account all of the information
about the detainee and the receiving country's ability to mitigate any threat posed by the
detainee. For certain detainees, the review participants considered the availability of
rehabilitation programs and mental health treatment in the receiving country. The review
participants also were kept informed of intelligence assessments concerning recidivism
trends among former detainees.
It is also important to emphasize that a decision to approve a detainee for transfer
does not equate to a judgment that the government lacked legal authority to hold the
detainee. To be sure, in some cases the review participants had concerns about the
strength of the evidence against a detainee and the government's ability to defend his
detention in court, and considered those factors, among others, in deciding whether to
approve the detainee for transfer. For many of the detainees approved for transfer,
however, the review participants found there to be reliable evidence that the detainee had
engaged in conduct providing a lawful basis for his detention. The review participants
nonetheless considered these detainees appropriate candidates for transfer from a threat
perspective, in light of their limited skills, minor organizational roles, or other factors.

17

c.

Yemeni Detainees

From the outset of the review, it was clear that the Yemeni detainees posed a
unique challenge: there were 97 Yemenis subject to the review, by far the largest group
in the Guantanamo population, and the security situation in Yemen had deteriorated. AlQaida was gaining strongholds in certain regions of the country, and the government of
Yemen was facing a rebellion in other regions. Potential options for rehabilitation
programs and other security measures were carefully considered throughout the course of
the review, but conditions in Yemen remained a primary concern.
Taking into account the current intelligence regarding conditions in Yemen, and
the individ~l backgrounds of each detainee, the review participants unanimously
approved3'(fofthe 97 Yemeni detainees for transfer subject to appropriate security
measures. The decision to approve these detainees for transfer, however, did not require
immediate implementation. Rather, by making each transfer decision contingent on the
implementation of appropriate security measures, the review participants allowed for
necessary flexibility in the timing of these transfers. Under these transfer decisions,
detainees wOlJ',\d be returned to Yemen only at a time, and only under conditions, deemed
appropriate fro~ a security perspective.
To date, only seven of the 36 Yemeni detainees approved for transfer have been
transferred to Yemen. 17 One was transferred in September 2009 pursuant to a court
.• transferred in December 2009. The six who were repatriated in
order, and six wJe
December 2009 .~ .•. 're selected by the unanimous agreement of high-level officials in the
agencies named i 1:he Executive Order, after further individualized reviews of the
detainees, including consideration of threat-related information, the evidence against the
detainees, and the government's ability to successfully defend the lawfulness of their
detentions in court. This decision involved high-level coordination within the
government and reflected a determination that these six specific detainees should be
returned to Yemen at that time.
There are 29 Yemenis approved for transfer who remain at Guantanamo. The
involvement of AI-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula-the branch of al-Qaida based in
Yemen-in the recent attempted bombing of an airplane headed to Detroit underscored
the continued need for a deliberate approach toward any further effort to repatriate
Yemeni detainees. In the wake of the attempted plot, the President publicly announced a
moratorium on the transfer of detainees to Yemen. Accordingly, none of the 29 Yemeni
detainees remaining at Guantanamo who are approved for transfer will be repatriated to
Yemen until the moratorium is lifted. These detainees may be considered for
resettlement in third countries subject to appropriate security measures, if such options
become available.

17 During the last administration, 14 detainees were returned to Yemen, and an additional 15
Yemeni detainees were among the 59 approved for (but still awaiting) transfer as of January 20, 2009.

18

VIII. Prosecution Decisions
A.

Background

The Executive Order provides that "[i]n accordance with United States law, the
cases of individuals detained at Guantanamo not approved for release or transfer shall be
evaluated to determine whether the Federal Government should seek to prosecute the
detained individuals for any offenses they may have committed, including whether it is
feasible to prosecute such individuals before a court established pursuant to Article III of
the United States Constitution [i.e., federal court]." In a speech at the National Archives
on May 21,2009, the President reiterated that "when feasible, we will try those who have
violated American criminal laws in federal courts." As the President noted in his speech,
federal prosecutors have a long history of successfully prosecuting all manner of
terrorism offenses in the federal courts:
Our courts and juries of our citizens are tough enough to convict terrorists,
and the record makes that clear. Ramzi Yousef tried to blow up the World
Trade Center-he was convicted in our courts, and is serving a life
sentence in U.S. prison. Zacarias Moussaoui has been identified as the
20 th 9/11 hijacker-he was convicted in our courts, and he too is serving a
life sentence in prison. Ifwe can try those terrorists in our courts and hold
them in our prisons, then we can do the same with detainees from
Guantanamo.
The President also stressed that military commissions "have a history in the
United States dating back to George Washington and the Revolutionary War" and
remained "an appropriate venue for trying detainees for violations of the laws of war."
Accordingly, the administration proposed, and Congress has since enacted, reforms to the
military commissions system to ensure that the commissions are fair, legitimate, and
effective.
In accordance with the President's guidance, the Task Force evaluated detainees
for possible prosecution wherever there was any ba"is to conclude that prosecution in
either federal court or a military commission was appropriate and potentially feasible.
The Task Force prosecutors focused their review at first on the 23 detainees who, as of
the issuance of the Executive Order, were facing charges in the military commissions, as
well as several other uncharged detainees whose cases were related to those of charged
detainees. IS The Task Force then evaluated for possible prosecution the approximately
40 additional detainees whom OM,.C had designated for potential prosecution. Finally,
the Task Force reviewed every detainee for prosecutioq, ~ho was deemed ineligible for
~,
transfer.

18 As of January 22, 2009, there were 12 detainees whose cases had been referred to a military
commission, including the defendants in the September 11 prosecution. In compliance with the Executive
Order, their cases were halted.

19

In conducting its reviews, the Task Force worked closely with OMC. Task Force
members had access to OMC files, and OMC prosecutors briefed the Task Force on their
cases. Upon request, Department of Defense investigators and FBI agents who had
worked on investigations met with Task Force members to answer their questions. The
Task Force also reviewed original source information pertaining to the detainees and was
able to identify previously unexploited sources of evidence.
As the Task Force completed its prosecution reviews, it identified those cases that
appeared feasible for prosecution in federal court, or at least potentially feasible, if
certain investigative steps were pursued with success. In this regard, the Task Force
identified a number of aveIRJes for strengthening important cases and developing them
for prosecution. For example, the Task Force determined that there were more than a
thousand pieces of potentially relevant physical evidence (including electronic media)
seized during raids in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks that had not yet been
systematically catalogued and required further evaluation for forensic testing. There
were potential cooperating witnesses who could testify against others at trial, and key fact
witnesses who needed to be interviewed. Finally, certain foreign governments, which
had been reluctant to cooperate with the military commissions, could be approached to
determine whether they would provide cooperation in a federal prosecution. Given the
limited resources of the Task Force to pursue this additional work, the Review Panel
referred cases ~at appeared potentially feasible for federal prosecution to the Department
of Justice for further investigation and prosecutorial review.
The Department of Justice and Department of Defense agreed upon ajoint
protocol to establish a process for determining whether prosecution of a referred case
should be pursued in a federal court or before a military commission. Under the
protocol-titled Determination ofGuantanamo Cases Referredfor Prosecution-there is
a presumption that prosecution will be pursued in a federal court wherever feasible,
unless other compelling factors make it more appropriate to pursue prosecution before a
military commission. The evaluations called for under the protocol are conducted by
teams of both federal and military prosecutors. Among the criteria they apply are: the
nature of the offenses to be charged; the identity of the victims; the location of the clime;
the context !Q, which the defendant was apprehended; and the manner in which the case
was investiglhed and by which investigative agency. The Attorney General, in
consultation' with the Secretary of Defense, makes the ultimate decision as to where a
prosecution will be pursued.
B.

Decisions

As a result of the Task Force's review, the Review Panel referred 44 cases to the
Department of Justice for potential prosecution and a decision regarding the forum for
any prosecution. 19 Decisions to seek prosecution have been announced in 12 of these
cases; 24 remain pending under the protocol; and eight of the detainees initially referred
were subsequently designated for other dispositions.
19 The review participants did not detennine that any additional detainees were potentially
feasible for prosecution solely before a military commission at this time.

20

On May 21, 2009, the Department of Justice announced that Ahmed Ghailani,
who had previously been indicted in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York for his alleged role in the 1998 bombings of the U.S. embassies in
Kenya and Tanzania, would be prosecuted in federal court. 20 On June 9, 2009, Ghailani
was transferred from Guantanamo to the Southern District of New York, where his case
is pending.
On November 13,2009, the Attorney General announced that the government
would pursue prosecution in federal court in the Southern District of New York against
the five detainees who had previously been charged before a military commission for
their roles in the September 11 attacks. They are:
•

Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the alleged mastermind of the September 11 plot;

•

Ramzi bin al-Shibh, the alleged coordinator of the September 11 plot who acted
as intermediary between Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and the hijackers in the
United States;

•

Walid Muhammed Salih Mubarak Bin Attash (a.k.a. Khallad Bin Attash), an
alleged early member of the September 11 plot who tested airline security on ';
United Airlines flights between Bangkok and Hong Kong;

•

Mustafa Ahmed al-Hawsawi, an alleged facilitator of hijackers and money to the
United States from his base in Dubai; and

•

Ali Abdul Aziz Ali (a.k.a. Ammar Baluchi), a second alleged facilitator of
hijackers and money to the United States from his base in Dubai.

#;

On the same day, the Attorney General also announced that the prosecution
against Abd ai-Rahim al-Nashiri, the alleged mastermind of the bombing of the U.S.S.
Cole, would be pursued before a military commission. The Attorney General further
decided that four other detainees whose cases were pending before military commissions
when the Executive Order was issued would remain before the commissions: Ahmed alDarbi, Noor Uthman, Omar Khadr, and Ibrahim al-Qosi. In January 2010, the
Department of Justice announced that Obaidullah, whom OMC had charged but whose
case had not yet been referred to a military commission, will remain in the military
commission system.
Twenty-four of the referred cases remain pending with the Department of Justice
under the protocol. No final decision has been made regarding whether or in what forum
these detainees will be prosecuted.

20 The decision to pursue prosecution against Ghailani in federal court was made before the joint
prosecution protocol was in effect.

21

Eight of the referred detainees are no longer under active consideration for
prosecution. OI'Mt detainee who had been referred for prosecution was transferred
pursuant to a court order in his habeas case. Seven additional detainees who had been
referred for prosecution were ultimately referred back to the Task Force, based on a
determination that the cases were not feasible for prosecution in either federal court or the:
military commission system at this time. Six of these detainees were subsequently
approved for continued detention under the AUMF without criminal charges, and one
was approved for transfer. As a result of these subsequent decisions, there are currently
36 cases with active prosecution referrals.

C.

Detainees Who Cannot Be Prosecuted

The Task Force concluded that for many detainees at Guantanamo, prosecution is
not feasible in either federal court or a military commission. There are several reasons
for these conclusions.
First, the vast majority of the detainees were captured in active zones of combat in
Afghanistan or the Pakistani border regions. The focus at the time of their capture was
the gathering of intelligence and their removal from the fight. They were not the subjects
of formal criminal investigations, and evidence was neither gathered nor preserved with
an eye toward prosecuting them. While the intelligence about them may be accurate and
reliable, that intelligence, for various reasons, may not be admissible evidence or
sufficient to satisfy a criminal burden of proof in either a military commission or federal
court. One common problem is that, for many of the detainees, there are no witnesses
who are available to testify in any proceeding against them.
Second, many of the detainees cannot be prosecuted because ofjurisdictional
limitations. In many cases, even though the Task Force found evidence that a detainee
was lawfully detainable as part of al-Qaida-e,g., based on information that he attended a
training camp, or played some role in the hierarchy of the organization-the Task Force
did not find evidence that the detainee participated in a specific terrorist plot. The lack of
such evidence can pose obstacles to pursuing a prosecution in either federal court or a
military commission. While the federal material support statutes have been used to
convict persons who have merely provided services to a terrorist organization, e.g., by
attending a terrorist training camp, there are potential limitations to pursuing such a
'
2\
. the d
C harge agamst
etamees.
21 Among these limitations: First, the two relevant statutes-18 U.S.c. §§ 2339A and 2339Bwere not amended to expressly apply extraterritorially to non-U.S. persons until October 2001 and
December 2004, respectively. Thus, material support may not be available as a charge in the federal
system unless there is sufficient evidence to prove that a detainee was supporting al-Qaida after October
2001 at the earliest. Second, the statute of limitations for these offenses is typically eight years (see 18
U.S.c. § 3286), which may bar prosecution for offenses that occurred well before the detainee's capture.
Third, because the statutory maximum sentence for material support is 15 years (where death does not
result from the offense), sentencing consider~ns may weigh against pursuing prosecution in certain
cases. Some of these considerations would not apply to material support charges brought in the military
commissions; however, the legal viability of material support as a charge in the military commission
system has been challenged on appeal in commission proceedings.

22

,";

Notably, the principal obstacles to prosecution in the cases deemed infeasible by
the Task Force typically did not stem from concerns over protecting sensitive sources or
methods from disclosure, or concerns that the evidence against the detainee was tainted.
While such concerns were present in some cases, most detainees were deemed infeasible
for prosecution based on more fundamental evidentiary and jurisdictional limitations tied
to the demands of a criminal forum, as described above.
Significantly, the Executive Order does not preclude the government from
prosecuting at a later date someone who is presently designated for continued detention.
Work on these cases continues. Further exploitation of the forensic evidence could
strengthen the prosecution against some detainees. Other detainees may cooperate with
prosecutors. If either the Department of Justice or the Department of Defense concludes
in the future that prosecution of a detainee held without charges has become feasible in
federal court or in a military commission, the detention decisions made in the course of
this review would permit the prosecution to go forward.

IX.

Detention Decisions

A.

Background

Under the Executive Order, the review participants were required first to consider
whether it was possible to transfer, release, or prosecute each detainee. With respect to
any detainees who were not deemed appropriate for transfer, release, or ptbsecution, the
review participants were required to "select lawful means, consistent witH the national
security and foreign policy interests of the United States and the interests of justice, for
the disposition of such individuals."
In accordance with this framework, detainees were first reviewed to determine
whether transfer or release was consistent with the national security and foreign policy
interests of the United States and whether they could be prosecuted. If those options did
not appear feasible, the review participants then considered whether the detainee's
national security threat justified continued detention under the AUMF without criminal
charges, and, if so, whether the detainee met the legal requirements for detention.
B.

Decisions

As the result of this review, 48 detainees were unanimously approved for
continued detention under the AUMF.
Although each detainee presented unique issues, all of the detainees ultimately
designated for continued detention satisfied three core criteria: First, the totality of
available information-including credible information that might not be admissible in a
criminal prosecution-indicated that the detainee poses a high level of threat that cannot
be mitigated sufficiently except through continued detention; second, prosecution of the
detainee in a federal criminal court or a military commission did not appear feasible; and
third, notwithstanding the infeasibility of criminal prosecution, there is a lawful basis for
the detainee's detention under the AUMF.

23

Broadly speaking, the detainees designated for continued detention were
characterized by one or more of the following factors:
•

Significant organizational role within al-Qaida, the Taliban, or associated
forces. In contrast to the majority of detainees held at Guantanamo, many of
the detainees approved for detention held a leadership or other specialized role
within al-Qaida, the Taliban, or associated forces. Some provided operational,
logistical, financial, or fundraising support for al-Qaida. Others were al-Qaida
members who were selected to serve as bodyguards for Usama bin Laden
based on their loyalty to the organization. Others were Taliban military
commanders or senior officials, or played significant roles in insurgent groups
in Afghanistan allied with the Taliban, such as Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin.

•

Advanced training or experience. The detainees approved for detention
tended to have more, extensive training or combat experience than those
approved for transfer. Some of these detainees were veteranjihadists with
lengthy involvement in the training camps in Afghanistan. Several had
expertise in explosives or other tactics geared toward terrorist operations.

•

Expressed recidivist intent. Some detainees designated for detention have,
while at Guantanamo, expressly stated or otherwise exhibited an intent to
reengage in extremist activity upon release.

•

History of associations with extremist activity. Some of the detainees
approved for detention have a history of engaging in extremist activities or
particularly strong ties (either directly or through family members) to
extremist organizations.

Lawful basis for detention. Under the Executive Order, every detainee's
disposition must be lawful. Accordingly, the Task Force consulted closely with the
Department of Justice regarding every detainee approved for continued detention to
ensure that the detainee fell within the bounds of the Government's detention authority
under the AUMF, as described above.
Prosecution not currently feasible. Although dangerous and lawfully held, the
detainees designated for detention currently cannot be prosecuted in either a federal court
or a military commission. While the reasons vary from detainee to detainee, generally
these detainees cannot be prosecuted because either there is presently insufficient
admissible evidence to establish the detainee's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt in either a
federal court or military commission, or the detainee's conduct does not constitute a
chargeable offense in either a federal court or military commission. Though prosecution
currently is not feasible for these detainees, designating a detainee for detention does not
preclude future prosecution in either a federal court or a military commission should new
evidence or other developments make a prosecution viable.
Transfer or release not currently feasible. Finally, none of the detainees
approved for detention can be safely transferred to a third country at this time. This does

24

$'

not mean that the detainee could never be safely transferred to a third country. Rather,
designating the detainee for continued detention at this time indicates only that given the
detainee's current threat and the current willingness or ability of potential destination
countries to mitigate the threat, the detainee is not currently eligible for transfer or
release. Should circumstances change (e.g., should potential receiving countries
implement appropriate security measures), transfer might be appropriate in the future.

C.

Continued Reviews

Detainees approved for continued detention under the AUMF will be subject to
further reviews. First, in accordance with the Supreme Court's decision in Boumediene v.
Bush,22 each detainee has the opportunity to seek judicial review of their detention by
filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal court. In such cases, the court
reviews whether the detainee falls within the government's lawful detention authority. In
cases where courts have concluded that the detainee is not lawfully held, the courts have
issued orders requiring the government to take diplomatic steps to achieve the detainee's
release. Thus far, federal district courts have ruled on cases brought by four of the 48
detainees approved for continued detention. In each of the four cases, the district court
denied the habeas petition and upheld the lawfulness of the detention. Many other cases
are pending in district court, and some are pending on appeal.
Second, as the President stated in his speech at the National Archives, "a thorough
process of peri.odi~ review" is n~eded ~~ ensure th.at ':a~y pro~onged detentiq£\ is carefully
evaluated and JustIfied." Thus, In addItIOn to the JudIcial reVIew afforded tllrough habeas
litigation, each detainee approved for continued detention will be subject to periodic
Executive Branch review.

X.

Conditional Detention Decisions: Yemeni Detainees

As discussed above, the review of the 97 Yemeni detainees posed particular
challenges from the outset given the security situation in Yemen. After conducting a
case-by-case review of the Yemeni detainees, the review participants unanimously agreed
that 36 Yemenis (29 of whom remain at Guantanamo) are appropriate for transfer, subject
to security measures, and that 26 Yemenis should continue to be detained under the
AUMF in light of their individual threat. In addition, there are currently five Yemenis
with active prosecution referrals, two of whom the Attorney General announced will be
prosecuted in federal court for their roles in the September 11 attacks (Ramzi bin alShibh and Walid Muhammed Salih Mubarak Bin Attash).
The remaining 30 Yemeni detainees were determined to pose a lower threat than
the group of detainees designated for continued detention under the AUMF. Nonetheless,
the review participants determined, based on a number of factors, that these 30 detainees
should not be transferred to Yemen in the near future and should not be among the first
groups of transfers to Yemen even if the current moratorium on such transfers is lifted.

22

122 S. Ct. 2229 (2008).

25

'~~~

Thus, these 30 detainees were approved for "conditional" detention, meaning that
they may be transferred if one of the following conditions is satisfied: (I) the security
situation improves in Yemen; (2) an appropriate rehabilitation program becomes
available; or (3) an appropriate third-country resettlement option becomes available.
Should any of these conditions be satisfied, however, the remaining 29 Yemeni detainees
approved for transfer would receive priority for any transfer options over the 30 Yemeni
detainees approved for conditional detention. 23
At the time of the closure of the detention facilities at Guantanamo, the status of
detainees approved for conditional detention will be reconsidered for possible transfer to
Yemen, a third country, or a detention facility in the United States.

XI.

Diplomatic Efforts

The President's Executive Order recognized that diplomatic efforts would be
essential to the review and appropriate disposition of individuals detained at
Guantanamo. To implement the review decisions approving the transfer of detainees, the
order provides that the "Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, and, as appropriate,
other Review participants shall work to effect promptly the release or transfer of all
individuals for whom release or transfer is possible." The President emphasized this
point during his speech at the National Archives, stating that for cases involving
"detainees who we have determined can be transferred safely to another country ... my
Administration is in ongoing discussions with a number of other countries about the
transfer of detainees to their soil."
To fulfill this mission, the Secretary of State created an office to lead the
diplomatic efforts to transfer detainees and appointed an experienced career diplomat to
serve as the Special Envoy for the Closure of the Guantanamo Bay Detention Facilities.
The highest levels in the administration supported these efforts. The President, Vice
President, and Cabinet members-including the Secretary of State, Attorney General, and
Secretary for Homeland Security-have discussed the closure of the Guantanamo
detention facilities and the transfer of detainees outside the United States with their
foreign government counterparts. To assist these diplomatic efforts, the National
Counterterrorism Center facilitated the sharing of information about the detainees with
foreign governments considering whether to accept them. In addition, the government
arranged meetings between officials from interested countries and detainees at
Guantanamo to facilitate resettlement and repatriation discussions.
From the outset of the review, the State Department developed a diplomatic
strategy for Guantanamo, focusing on efforts to resettle detainees who could not be sent
to their home countries because of post-transfer treatment concerns. In June 2009, the
United States and European Union concluded ajoint statement in support of the
23 Ten of the detainees approved for conditional detention had initially been approved for transfer
by the review participants. Because the specific conditions placed on the transfer approvals of these 10
detainees were the equivalent of those used for the conditional detention category, the 10 detainees were
later redesignated for conditional detention.

26

resettlement of a number of detainees in Europe, expressing the readiness of certain
member states to resettle former Guantanamo detainees on a case-by-case basis.
Following this joint statement, a number of European governments-such as Spain, Italy,
Portugal, and Ireland-announced that they were prepared to work out arrangements to
accept some detainees. In addition, the Government of Palau also announced its
readiness to accept a number of Uighur detainees. Following these initial successes, the
State Department intensified efforts to implement resettlements. The public offers by
some European governments to resettle detainees encouraged other governments to make
similar offers.
To date, the diplomatic efforts taken under the Executive Order have led to the
resettlement of 18 detainees in the following seven locations: Belgium, Bermuda,
France, Hungary, Ireland, Palau, and Portugal. 24 Resettlement negotiations are ongoing
with a number of countries, e.g., Spain, Switzerland, and Slovakia. In addition, Italy
accepted two detainees for criminal prosecution on charges stemming from pre-9lll
activities. All efforts to resettle detainees include discussions with receiving
governments about post-transfer security measures, as well as other issues such as the
integration and humane treatment of resettled detainees.
The process for engaging a country on resettlement issues can be lengthy and
complicated. The State Department has engaged in discussions with dozens of countries
across the globe to initiate or further resettlement negotiations once it has been
determined that a government is open to discussions. When this process is successful,
initial receptiveness leads to discussions regarding individual detainees, foreign
government interagency review, foreign government interviews of prospective
resettlement candidates, the foreign government's formal decision-making process,
integration plans, and, ultimately, resettlement. The length of the effort often has been
influenced by political and other issues in potential rese~lement countries (e.g., public
perceptions of current '\Jld past U.S. detention policies), third-country views (and
sometimes pressure) with respect to detainee resettlement, and public views of the
Guantanamo detention facility generally. Depending on how these factors affect
individual cases, the process can be very lengthy.
Once a resettlement has occurred, the State.Department and other agencies remain
in contact with host governments following transfer on these issues. The State
Department is engaged in ongoing discussions for the remaining detainees who cannot be
repatriated due to post-transfer treatment concerns and is on track to find resettlement
countries for most if not all of the detainees in this category.
The State Department also has worked to repatriate detainees to their home
countries, in coordination with other agencies and with the National Security Council.
Thus far, 24 detainees have been repatriated since last January to nine different
locations-Afghanistan, Algeria, Chad, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Somaliland, the
United Kingdom, and Yemen. All decisions to repatriate detainees have been made in

24

From 2002-2008, a total of eight Guantanamo detainees were resettled, all in Albania.

27

light of the latest intelligence information and with the consent of all relevant agencies.
In light of such information, and following the attempted terrorist attack on December 25,
2009, the President announced that repatriations to Yemen would be suspended for the
foreseeable future. In addition, the government has adopted enhanced procedures for the
implementation of repatriation decisions, requiring a cabinet-level review prior to going
forward with any repatriation.

XII.

Conclusion

The review process established pursuant to the Executive Order is now complete.
The participating agencies have reviewed and unanimously agreed on dispositions for
each of the 240 detainees subject to the review. The agencies responsible for the review
will continue to handle operational issues involving detainees, including the
implementation of the review determinations, and the National Security Council will
coordinate the resolution of policy issues pertaining to Guantanamo. The Task Force has
ensured that its analyses of the detainees and the information collected in the course of
the review are properly preserved to assist in the resolution of these issues going forward.

•,l'-

28