ADVANCE UNEDITED
VERSION

Distr.
GENERAL
A/HRC/13/42
26 January 2010
Original: ENGLISH

HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL
Thirteenth session
Agenda item 3

Joint study on global practices in relation to secret detention in the context of
countering terrorism of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of
human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism, the Special
Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment, the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention and the Working Group
on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances

A/HRC/13/42
Page 2
CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION
II. SECRET DETENTION UNDER INTERNATIONAL

Paragraph
1-7

LAW
A. Terminology
B. Secret detention and international human rights law and

8-56
8-16

international humanitarian law
1. Secret detention and the right to liberty of the person
2. Secret detention and the right to a fair trial
3. Secret detention and enforced disappearance
4. Secret detention and the absolute prohibition on torture and

17-56
18-23
24-27
28-30

other forms of ill-treatment
5. State responsibility through secret detention by proxy
6. Secret detention and derogations from international human

31-35
36-43

rights
7. Secret detention and international humanitarian law
III. SECRET DETENTION PRACTICES IN PAST

44-53
54-56

CONTEXTS
A.
The emergence of the recent practice of secret

57-97

detention
B.
The recent practice of secret detention
1.
Secret detention in Latin America
2.
Secret detention in Africa
3.
Secret detention in Northern Africa and the Middle

57-59
60-86
60-70
71-74

East
4.
5.
C.

75-78
79-83
84-86

Secret detention in Asia
Secret detention in Europe
The United Nations and regional responses towards

outlawing the practice of secret detention
IV. SECRET DETENTION PRACTICES IN THE GLOBAL

87-97

“WAR ON TERROR” SINCE 11 SEPTEMBER 2001
A.
The “high-value detainee” program and the CIA’s own

98-162

secret detention facilities
B.
CIA detention facilities or facilities operated jointly

103-129

with US military in battlefield zones
1. Afghanistan
2. Iraq
C.
Proxy detention sites
1. Jordan

130-139
131-135
136-139
140-156
143-144

Page

A/HRC/13/42
Page 3
2. Egypt
3. The Syrian Arab Republic
4. Morocco
5. Pakistan
6. Ethiopia
7. Djibouti
8. Uzbekistan
D.
Complicity in the practice of secret detention
E.
Secret detention and the United States administration

145
146-148
149
150-151
152-154
155
156
157

of President Obama
V. THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF SECRET DETENTION

158-165

PRACTICES IN RELATION TO CONTEMPORARY
REGIONAL OR DOMESTIC COUNTER-TERRORIST
EFFORTS
A.
Asia
B.
Central Asia
C.
Europe
D.
Middle East and North Africa
E.
Sub-Saharan Africa
V. CONCLUSIONS
Annex I
SUMMARY OF GOVERNMENT REPLIES TO
QUESTIONNAIRE
Annex II
CASE SUMMARIES

165-281
167-201
202-206
207-214
215-250
251-281
282-292

A/HRC/13/42
Page 4
I. INTRODUCTION
1.

The present joint study on global practices in relation to secret detention in

the context of countering terrorism was prepared by the Special Rapporteur on the
promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering
terrorism, the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment, the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention (represented by its
Vice Chairperson), and the Working Group on Enforced and Involuntary Disappearances
(represented by its Chairperson).
2.

The study was prepared within the mandates of the above-mentioned special

procedures. In particular, the Human Rights Council, in its resolution 6/28, requested the
Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental
freedoms while countering terrorism to make concrete recommendations on the promotion

and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism,
and to work in close coordination with other relevant bodies and mechanisms of the United
Nations, in particular with other special procedures of the Council, in order to strengthen the
work for the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while
avoiding unnecessary duplication of efforts.

3.

In its resolution 8/8, the Council requested the Special Rapporteur on torture and

other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment to study, in a comprehensive
manner, trends, developments and challenges in relation to combating and preventing torture
and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, and to make
recommendations and observations concerning appropriate measures to prevent and eradicate
such practices.

4.

In its resolution 6/4, the Council requested the Working Group on Arbitrary

Detention to seek and receive information from Governments and intergovernmental and
non-governmental organizations, and receive information from the individuals concerned,
their families or their representatives relevant to its mandate, and to formulate deliberations

on issues of a general nature in order to assist States to prevent and guard against the

A/HRC/13/42
Page 5
practice of arbitrary deprivation of liberty. Like other mandates, it was asked to work in
coordination with other mechanisms of the Human Rights Council.

5.

In its resolution 7/12, the Council requested the Working Group on Enforced or

Involuntary Disappearances to consider the question of impunity in the light of the relevant
provisions of the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced
Disappearances, having in mind the set of principles for the protection and promotion of
human rights through action to combat impunity (E/CN.4/Sub.2/1997/20/Rev.1, annex II, and
E/CN.4/2005/102/Add.1), and to provide appropriate assistance in the implementation by
States of the Declaration and existing international rules.

6.

In the above context, the four mandates endeavoured to address global

practices in relation to secret detention in counter-terrorism. In the joint study, they
describe the international legal framework applicable to secret detention and provide a
historical overview of the use of secret detention. The study addresses the use of secret
detention in the context of the “global war on terror” in the post 11 September 2001 era.
To the extent possible, in order to demonstrate that the practice of secret detention is
regrettably not an uncommon one, it also highlights a number of cases where it has been
utilized in and by States from various geographical regions. Owing to its global nature,
the present study cannot be exhaustive but rather aims to highlight and illustrate by
examples the wide spread practice of secret detention and related impunity. Finally, the
study concludes with concrete recommendations regarding these practices, aimed at
curbing the use of secret detention and the unlawful treatment or punishment of detainees
in the context of counter-terrorism.
7.

Owing to the secrecy of the practice of secret detention, it was often difficult

to gather first hand information; nevertheless, a wide array of national, regional and
international sources was consulted. While United Nations sources have been drawn
upon, primary sources include responses to a questionnaire sent to all Member States
(annex I) and interviews with current or former detainees (summaries of which are given
in annex II). In some cases, secondary sources such as media and other sources were

A/HRC/13/42
Page 6
used. Such accounts, while not always verifiable are utilized when regarded by the
mandate holders as credible. Responses to the questionnaire were received from 44
States. A number of interviews had been held with people who were held in secret
detention, family members of those held captive, as well as legal representatives of
individuals held. The mandate holders conducted face to face interviews in Germany and
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Other interviews were
conducted by telephone. Formal meetings at the level of capitals were held with officials
in Berlin, London and Washington, D.C. The mandate holders thank those States that
cooperated with them and facilitated their joint work. They also wish to thank the Office
of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) as well as others
who provided valuable research and other assistance to the study.

II. SECRET DETENTION UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW

A. Terminology

8.

For the purpose of the present report, a person is kept in secret detention if

State authorities acting in their official capacity, or persons acting under the orders
thereof, with the authorization, consent, support or acquiescence of the State, or in any
other situation where the action or omission of the detaining person is attributable to the
State,1 deprive persons of their liberty; where the person is not permitted any contact with
the outside world (“incommunicado detention”); and when the detaining or otherwise
competent authority denies, refuses to confirm or deny or actively conceals the fact that
the person is deprived of his/her liberty hidden from the outside world, including, for
example family, independent lawyers or non-governmental organizations, or refuses to
provide or actively conceals information about the fate or whereabouts of the detainee. In
the present report, the term “detention” is used synonymously with “deprivation of
liberty”, “keeping in custody” or “holding in custody”. The distinction drawn between
1

Article 2 (a) of the Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, adopted by the
International Law Commission at its fifty-third session, in 2001, taken note of by the General Assembly in
its resolution 56/83, and applied by the International Court of Justice, Application of the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro,
judgment, 26 February 2007.

A/HRC/13/42
Page 7
“detention” and “imprisonment” in the preamble to the Body of Principles for the
Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment, adopted by the
General Assembly in its resolution 43/173, in the section entitled “Use of Terms”, does
not purport to provide a general definition.2
9.

Secret detention does not require deprivation of liberty in a secret place of

detention; in other words, secret detention within the scope of the present report may take
place not only in a place that is not an officially recognized place of detention, or at an
officially recognized place of detention, but in a hidden section or wing, which is itself
not officially recognized; but also in an officially recognized site. Whether or not
detention is secret is determined by its incommunicado character and by the fact that
State authorities, as described in paragraph 1 above, do not disclose the place of detention
or information about the fate of the detainee.
10.

Any detention facility may fall within the scope of the present study. It can be

a prison, police station, governmental building, military base or camp, but also for
example a private residence, hotel, car, ship or plane.
11.

Incommunicado detention, where the detainees may only have contact with

their captors, guards or co-inmates, would amount to secret detention also if the
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is granted access by the authorities, but
is not permitted to register the case, or, if it is allowed to register the case, is not
permitted by the State to, or does not, for whatever reason, notify the next of kin of the
detainee on his or her whereabouts. In other words, access by ICRC alone, without it
being able to notify others of the persons’ whereabouts, would not be sufficient to qualify
the deprivation of liberty as not being secret. However, it is understood that ICRC, in
principle, would not accept access to a detention facility without the possibility of
exercising its mandate, which includes notification of the family about the whereabouts

2

E/CN.4/1997/4, paras. 69-85

A/HRC/13/42
Page 8
and fate of the detainee3. If ICRC access is granted within a week,4 it has been deemed
sufficient to leave the case outside the scope of the present study. ICRC access to certain
detainees may only be exceptionally and temporarily restricted for reasons of imperative
military necessity in an armed conflict.5
12.

A case falls within the scope of the present study on secret detention in the

name of counter-terrorism only if State authorities or persons acting under the orders, or
with the authorization, consent, support or acquiescence of the State, or in any other way
attributable to the State, detain secretly persons:
(a) Who have committed, or are suspected of planning, aiding or abetting,
terrorist offences, irrespective of what classification of these offences is used
by a Government;
(b) In any situation where terrorism or related notions (such as extremism or
separatism)6 are used to describe or justify the context in, or basis upon, which
a person has been detained;
(c) In any situation where extraordinary detention powers or procedures are
triggered (under notions such as anti-terrorism acts, states of emergency or
national security acts).
13.

The qualification by States of certain acts as “terrorist acts” is often aimed at

applying a special regime with limited legal and procedural safeguards in place. The
Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental
freedoms while countering terrorism has expressed concern that the absence of a
3

This policy was apparently not strictly followed at the detention facility at the United States airbase at
Kandahar, Afghanistan, according to the testimony of Murat Kurnaz, see annex, infra at XXX.
4
Compare, for instance, article 70 of the Third Geneva Convention: “Immediately upon capture, or not
more than one week after arrival at a camp, even if it is a transit camp, likewise in case of sickness or
transfer to hospital or to another camp, every prisoner of war shall be enabled to write directly to his
family.”
5
Article 126, para.2 of the Third Geneva Convention;, article 143, para. 3, of the Fourth Geneva
Convention.
6
See, for instance, the Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism, agreed
upon in 2001 by Kazakhstan, China, Kyrgyzstan, the Russian Federation, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. The
parties agree to "reciprocally recognize acts of terrorism, separatism and extremism irrespective of whether
their own national legislations include the corresponding acts in the same category of crimes or whether
they use the same terms to describe them".

A/HRC/13/42
Page 9
universal and comprehensive definition of the term of “terrorism”, leaving it to individual
States to define it carries the potential for unintended human rights abuses and even
deliberate misuse of the term. He added that “it was essential to ensure that the term
“terrorism” is confined in its use to conduct that is of a genuinely terrorist nature.”7 The
Working Group on Arbitrary Detention also noted with concern the frequent attempts by
Governments to use normal legislation or to have recourse to emergency or special laws
and procedures to combat terrorism and thereby permit, or at least increase, the risk of
arbitrary detention. It added that such laws, either per se or in their application, by using
an extremely vague and broad definition of terrorism, bring within their fold the innocent
and the suspect alike, and thereby increase the risk of arbitrary detention,
disproportionately reducing the level of guarantees enjoyed by ordinary persons in
normal circumstances. Legitimate democratic opposition, as distinct from violent
opposition, becomes a victim in the application of such laws.”8 Examples of such a type
of criminal offence couched in broad terms relate to the subversion of State powers or
simply anti-subversion laws”9. Such attempts to circumvent the guarantees of applicable
international human rights law inform a broad approach as to the scope of the present
study of what constitutes secret detention in the context of countering terrorism.
14.

Organized crimes, such as drug or human trafficking, are not covered by the

study unless anti-terrorism legislation is invoked. Whether the State has conferred on the
case a link to terrorism may have to be inferred from elements uttered by State officials
or if the person is later prosecuted on terrorism-related charges.
15.

Detention by non-State actors, when not attributable to the State, will not be

addressed in the present study. Hence, hostage-taking, kidnapping or comparable conduct
7

E/CN.4/2006/98, paras, 27 and 42. see also para. 42; Security Council resolution 1566 (2004) and General
Assembly resolution 61/267, paras. 43- 44, on the characteristics of recognizable genuine “terrorist acts”..
8
E/CN.4/1995/31, para. 25 (d).
9
See also the following opinions and decisions of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, opinion No.
36/2006 (A/HRC/7/4/Add.1), opinion No. 26/2003 (E/CN.4/2005/6/Add.1), opinion No. 15/2004
(E/CN.4/2005/6/Add.1), opinion No. 6/2003 (E/CN.4/2004/3/Add.1), opinion No. 1/1999
(E/CN.4/2000/4/Add.1), opinion No. 21/1999 (E/CN.4/2000/4/Add.1), opinion No. 12/1998
(E/CN.4/1999/63/Add.1), decision No. 36/1996 (E/CN.4/1997/4/Add.1), decision No. 1/1993
(E/CN.4/1994/27), decision No. 5/1993 (E/CN.4/1994/27), decision No. 30/1993 (E/CN.4/1994/27), and
decision No. 36/1993 (E/CN.4/1994/27).

A/HRC/13/42
Page 10
by terrorists, criminals, rebels, insurgents, paramilitary forces or other non-State actors do
not fall within the ambit of the report, which focuses on secret detention by or attributable
to States and is addressed to the Human Rights Council as an intergovernmental body.
16.

Victims of the human rights violation of secret detention are not only the

detainees themselves, but also their families who are not informed of the fate of their
loved ones deprived of their rights and held solely at the mercy of their captors.

B. Secret detention and international human rights law and international
humanitarian law
17.

Secret detention is irreconcilable with international human rights law and

international humanitarian law. It amounts to a manifold human rights violation that
cannot be justified under any circumstances, including during states of emergency.

1. Secret detention and the right to liberty of the person
18.

Secret detention violates the right to liberty and security of the person and the

prohibition of arbitrary arrest or detention. Article 9, paragraph 1, of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights affirms that everyone has the right to liberty and
security of person, that no one should be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention nor be
deprived of his or her liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such
procedure as are established by law. Furthermore, article 9, paragraph 4 of the Covenant
stipulates that anyone deprived of their liberty by arrest or detention should be entitled to
take proceedings before a court, in order that that court may decide, without delay, on the
lawfulness of their detention and order their release if the detention is not lawful. The
Human Rights Committee, in its general comment No. 8, highlighted that article 9, paras.
1 and 4, and para. 3, ICCPR as far as the right to be informed, at the time of the arrest,
about the reasons therefore, are applicable to all deprivations of liberty, “whether in

A/HRC/13/42
Page 11
criminal cases or in other cases such as, for example, mental illness, vagrancy, drug
addiction, educational purposes, immigration control, etc.”10
19.

The practice of secret detention in itself violates the above-mentioned

guarantees, or in most cases, automatically or inherently entails such consequences that
amount to a violation. As secret detainees are held outside the reach of the law, no
procedure established by law is being applied to them as required by article 9 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Even if a State authorized
in its domestic laws the practice of secret detention, such laws would in themselves be in
violation of the right to liberty and security and would therefore not stand. Secret
detention without contact with the outside world entails de facto that the detainees do not
enjoy the right enshrined in article 9, paragraph 4 of the Covenant, namely the possibility
to institute habeas corpus, amparo, or similar proceedings, personally or on their behalf,
challenging the lawfulness of detention before a court of law that is competent to order
their release in the event that the detention is found to be unlawful.
20.

The Working Group on Arbitrary Detention has classified secret detention as

being per se arbitrary, falling within category I of the categories of arbitrary detention
that it has developed. The Working Group qualifies deprivation of liberty as arbitrary in
terms of category I when it is clearly impossible to invoke any legal basis justifying the
deprivation of liberty.11 In its opinion No. 14/200912 concerning a case of detention
unacknowledged by the Government at an undisclosed place of custody, the Working
Group held that no jurisdiction could allow for incommunicado detention where no
access to counsel or relatives was granted and no judicial control over the deprivation of
liberty was exercised; in short, where no legal procedure established by law whatsoever
was followed.13

10

HRI/GEN/1/Rev.6, para.1.
E/CN.4/1998/44, para. 8 (a)
12
A/HRC/13/30/Add.1.
13
Opinion No. 12/2006 (Saudi Arabia), (A/HRC/4/40/Add.1), page 63.
11

A/HRC/13/42
Page 12
21.

In its opinion No. 12/2006,14 the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention

considered the deprivation of liberty of two individuals, one of whom was held at a secret
place of detention, to be arbitrary under category I, as both had not been formally charged
with any offence, informed of the duration of their custodial orders, brought before a
judicial officer, allowed to name a lawyer to act on their behalf, nor otherwise been
provided the possibility to challenge the legality of their detention.15
22.

Opinion No. 29/2006 of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention16

concerned 26 individuals who were alleged to have been captured in various countries,
partly handed over into the custody of the United States of America under its secret
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) rendition programme in the context of the so called
“global war on terror”. They were held incommunicado at various “black sites” under the
jurisdiction of the United States for prolonged periods of time, without charge or trial,
access to courts of law, and without their families being informed or aware of their fate or
whereabouts. In spite of the absence of a response by the Government of the United
States to these allegations, the Working Group considered itself in a position to render an
opinion on the cases of these 26 individuals, many of whom suspected of having been
involved in serious crimes, and held that their detention clearly fell within category I of
arbitrary detention.
23.

In most cases, secret detention, as it is outside any international or national

legal regime, also implies that the duration of detention is not known to the detainee; it
rests at the sole discretion of the authorities ordering the detention. Hence, the very nature
of secret detention may result in potentially, or actually, indefinite periods of detention,
which render this type of detention arbitrary on this additional ground.17

14

opinion No. 12/2006 (Saudi Arabia)(A/HRC/4/40/Add.1).
See also opinion No. 47/2006 (A/HRC/7/4/Add.1); opinion No. 9/2006 in a case of arbitrary detention
under category I, involving eight months of incommunicado detention, solitary confinement, ill-treatment
and failure to inform the relatives about their detention and opinion No. 47/2005 (A/HRC/4/40/Add.1) and
opinion No. 8/1998 (Israel) (E/CN.4/1999/63/Add.1).
16
A/HRC/4/40/Add.1.
17
For example, see opinion No. 22/2004 (E/CN.4/2006/7/Add.1), on the arbitrary character of detention for
an unspecified period of time.
15

A/HRC/13/42
Page 13

2. Secret detention and the right to a fair trial
24.

Secret detention outside the protection of the law is often resorted to with the

purpose of depriving the detainee of the rights that he or she would otherwise enjoy as a
person charged with a criminal offence, namely the right to a fair trial, as enunciated in
article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the
complementary guarantees contained in article 9, paragraphs 2 and 3. Article 9,
paragraph 2 of the Covenant stipulates that anyone who is arrested should be promptly
informed of any charges against him. Paragraph 3 of the same article requires that anyone
arrested or detained on a criminal charge be brought promptly before a judge or other
officer authorized by law to exercise judicial power.
25.

The above mentioned provisions presuppose that anyone suspected of having

committed a recognizable criminal offence and arrested on these grounds must be
informed about the underlying charges if the interest of justice requires the prosecution of
such a crime. Otherwise, the State could circumvent the additional rights extended to
suspects of a crime spelled out in articles 9 and 14 of the Covenant. Equally, if someone
suspected of a crime and detained on the basis of article 9 of the Covenant is charged
with an offence but not brought to trial, the prohibitions of unduly delaying trials as
provided for by article 9, paragraph 3, and article14, paragraph 3 (c) of the Covenant may
be violated at the same time.18
26.

As will be shown in the present study, in the majority of cases, State

authorities who arrest and detain people incommunicado in a secret location often do not
intend to charge the detainee with any crime, or even to inform him or her about any
charges or to put the person on trial without undue delay before a competent, independent
and impartial tribunal established by law where the guilt or innocence of the accused
could be established, in violation of article 14, paragraphs 1, cl. 2, 2, 3 (a) and (c) of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights . Such detainees do not have
18

Human Rights Committee, general comment No. 32 (CCPR/C/GC/32), para. 61.

A/HRC/13/42
Page 14
adequate time and facilities for the preparation of their defence, and cannot communicate
freely with counsel of their own choosing as required by article 14, paragraph 3 (c) of the
Covenant.
27.

Consequently, the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention has considered

secret detention a violation of the right to fair trial.19 Certain practices inherent in secret
detention, such as the use of secrecy and insecurity caused by denial of contact to the
outside world and the family’s lack of knowledge of the whereabouts and fate of the
detainee to exert pressure to confess to a crime, also infringe the right not to be
compelled to testify against oneself or to confess guilt derived from the principle of
presumption of innocence.20 . Secret detention is furthermore conducive to confessions
obtained under torture and other forms of ill-treatment.

3. Secret detention and enforced disappearance
28.

Every instance of secret detention also amounts to a case of enforced

disappearance. Article 2 of the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons
from Enforced Disappearance defines “enforced disappearance” as:
the arrest, detention, abduction or any other form of deprivation of liberty by
agents of the State or by persons or groups of persons acting with the
authorization, support or acquiescence of the State, followed by a refusal to
acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by concealment of the fate or
whereabouts of the disappeared person, which place such a person outside the
protection of the law.
This definition does not require intent to put the person concerned outside the protection
of the law as a defining element, but rather refers to it as an objective consequence of the
denial, refusal or concealment of the whereabouts and fate of the person.21 The
International Convention, in its article 17, paragraph 1, explicitly prohibits secret
19

Opinions No. 5/2001 (E/CN.4/2002/77/Add.1), para. 10 (iii) and opinion No. 14/2009,
(A/HRC/13/30/Add.1)
20
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 14, para. 2.
21
See also the preamble to the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance.

A/HRC/13/42
Page 15
detention. The Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances confirmed in
its general comment on article 10 of the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons
from Enforced Disappearance that under no circumstances, including states of war or
public emergency, can any State interest be invoked to justify or legitimize secret centres
or places of detention which, by definition, would violate the Declaration, without
exception.”22
29.

Article 24, paragraph 1, of the International Convention explicitly includes in

the definition of “victim” of enforced disappearances not only the disappeared person,
but also any individual who has suffered harm as the direct result of an enforced
disappearance.” When exercising its mandate to monitor the implementation by Member
States to the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance,
the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances has always adopted the
perspective that families of the disappeared are to be considered victims themselves.
According to article 1.2 of the Declaration, any act of enforced disappearance places the
persons subjected thereto outside the protection of the law and inflicts severe suffering on
them and their families.”
30.

Since secret detention amounts to an enforced disappearance, if resorted to in

a widespread or systematic manner, such aggravated form of enforced disappearance can
reach the threshold of a crime against humanity. In its article 7, the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court labels the “enforced disappearance of persons” as a crime
against humanity if it is committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed
against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack.23 Article 5 of the
International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance,
states that the widespread or systematic practice of enforced disappearance constitutes a
crime against humanity as defined in applicable international law, and should attract the
consequences provided for under such applicable international law, thus confirming this
approach.
22

E/CN.4/1997/34.
See also Prosecutor v. Kupreskic et al, IT-95-16-A, judgement of trial chamber of the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, para. 566 (14 January 2000).
23

A/HRC/13/42
Page 16

4. Secret detention and the absolute prohibition of torture and other forms of illtreatment
31.

Every instance of secret detention is by definition incommunicado detention.

According to the Human Rights Committee, even comparably short periods of
incommunicado detention may violate the obligation of States, as contained in article 10,
paragraph 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights to treat all persons
deprived of their liberty with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the
human person. The Committee confirmed that “prisoners should be allowed under
necessary supervision to communicate with their family and reputable friends at regular
intervals, by correspondence as well as by receiving mail.”24 Although shorter time
periods may also be prohibited incommunicado detention of 15 days constitutes a
violation of article 10 of the Covenant.25 Incommunicado detention includes situations
where a detainee's family is informed that the person is “safe”, without disclosure of the
location or nature of the person’s detention.
32.

The ill-treatment threshold may be reached when the period of

incommunicado detention is prolonged and additional circumstances prevail. For
example, in the case of Polay Campos v. Peru26 the Human Rights Committee found a
violation of both articles 727 and 10 of the Covenant as the detained submitter of the
complaint had not been allowed to speak or to write to anyone, including legal
representatives, for nine months, and had been kept in an unlit cell for 23 and a half hours
a day in freezing temperatures. It held that the incommunicado detention to which the
author was subjected for longer than eight months constituted inhuman and degrading
treatment28. Similarly, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has stated that
24

Miguel Angel Estrella v. Uruguay, communication No. 74/1980 (CCPR/C/OP/2).
Lucía Arzuaga Gilboa v. Uruguay, communication No. 147/1983 (CCPR/C/OP/2)para. 14.
26
Polay Campos v. Peru, communication No 577/1994(CCPR/C/61/D/577/1994), para. 8.4.
27
“No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”
28
Steve Shaw v. Jamaica, communication No. 704/1996 (CCPR/C/62/D/704/1996), paras. 2.5 and 7.1,
taking into account that the prisoner during his period of pre-trial detention was further confined to a cell
25

A/HRC/13/42
Page 17
prolonged isolation and deprivation of communications are in themselves cruel and
inhuman treatment, even if it is not known what has actually happened during the
prolonged isolation of the particular individual.29 In El-Megreisi v. Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya,30 the Human Rights Committee found that the Government of the Libyan
Arab Jamahiriya had violated articles 10, paragraphs 1 and 7 of the Covenant by
detaining an individual for six years, the last three of which incommunicado and in an
unknown location, which in the view of the Committee reached the torture threshold.
33.

The practice of secret detention as reflected by the cases covered in the

present study, also confirms that incommunicado detention, including secret detention,
facilitates the commission of acts of torture.
34.

The General Assembly, in its resolution 60/148, and the Human Rights

Council have both stated that prolonged incommunicado detention or detention in secret
places may facilitate the perpetration of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment, and could in itself constitute a form of such treatment.31 Hence,
the link between secret detention and torture and other forms of ill-treatment is twofold:
secret detention as such may constitute torture or cruel, inhuman and degrading
treatment; and secret detention may be used to facilitate torture or cruel, inhuman and
degrading treatment.
35.

In addition, secret detention not only violates the prohibition against torture

and other forms of ill-treatment as defined above with regard to the victim of secret
detention. The suffering caused to family members of a disappeared person may also
amount to torture or other forms of ill-treatment,32 and also violates the right to family in
which was grossly overcrowded, and had to sleep on a wet concrete floor.
29
Velasquez Rodriguez case, judgement of 29July 1988, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, (Ser. C);
No. 4 (1988), para.187.
30
Communication No. 440/1990 (CCPR/C/50/D/440/1990), para. 5.4.
31
See also Commission on Human Rights resolution 2005/39, para. 9 and Human Rights Chamber for
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Decision on Admissibility and Merits, Case no. CH/99/3196, Avdo and Esma
Palić v. The Republika Srpska, para. 74.
32
See, for example., Human Rights Committee, Quinteros v. Uruguay, communication No. 107/1981
(CCPR/C/OP/2), para. 14; European Court of Human Rights, Varnava and others v. Turkey, 18 September
2009, paras. 200 – 202; Tanis and others v. Turkey, 2 August 2005, para. 219; Cyprus v. Turkey, 10 May,

A/HRC/13/42
Page 18
terms of article 17, paragraph 1, and article 23, paragraph 1 of the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights.

5. State responsibility through secret detention by proxy
36.

Secret detention, involving the denial or concealment of a person’s detention,

whereabouts or fate has the inherent consequence of placing the person outside the
protection of the law. The practice of “proxy detention”, where persons are transferred
from one State to another outside the realm of any international or national legal
procedure (“rendition” or “extraordinary rendition”) for the specific purpose of secretly
detaining them, or to exclude the possibility of review by the domestic courts of the State
having custody of the detainee, or otherwise in violation of the well-entrenched principle
of non-refoulement, entails exactly the same consequence. The practice of “proxy
detention” involves the responsibility of both the State that is detaining the victim and the
State on whose behalf or at whose behest the detention takes place.
37.

According to article 2, clause 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and

Political Rights, each State party undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals
within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the Covenant,
without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or
other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. The Human Rights
Committee clarified in its general comment No. 31 that a State party must respect and
ensure the rights laid down in the Covenant to anyone within the power or effective
control of that State party, even if not situated within the territory of the State party.”33
Similarly, the International Court of Justice, in its advisory opinion on the Legal
Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territories,
recognized that the jurisdiction of States is primarily territorial, but concluded that the
2001, paras. 155-158; and Kurt v. Turkey, 25 May 1998, para 134 as well as Human Rights Chamber for
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Decision on Admissability and Merits, Case no. CH/99/3196, Avdo and Esma
Palić v. The Republika Srpska, paras. 79 and 80.
33
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13, para. 10. See also for instance the concluding observations of the Committee
on the second and third periodic report of the United States of America (CCPR/C/USA/CO/3/Rev.1), para.
10; and the concluding observations of the Convention against Torture on the second periodic report of the
United States of America (CAT/C/USA/CO/2), paras. 14 and 15.

A/HRC/13/42
Page 19
Covenant extends to “acts done by a State in the exercise of its jurisdiction outside of its
own territory”.34 An excessively literal reading of article 2, paragraph 1 of the Covenant
would defeat the very purpose of the Covenant.35 As far as the Convention against Torture
is concerned, article 2, paragraph 1 and article16, paragraph 1, refer to each State party’s
obligation to prevent acts of torture “in any territory under its jurisdiction”.
38.

The removal of a person to a State for the purpose of holding that person in

secret detention, or the exclusion of the possibility of review by domestic courts of the
sending State, can never be considered compatible with the obligation laid down in article
2, paragraph 2 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The Working
Group on Arbitrary Detention has dismissed this practice of “reverse diplomatic
assurances”, in which the sending Government seeks assurances that the person handed
over will be deprived of liberty, even though there are no criminal charges against him
and no other recognizable legal basis for detention, as being at variance with international
law.36 In its opinion No. 11/2007,37 the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention,
concurring with the view of the Human Rights Committee expressed in its general
comment No. 31, declared the Government of Afghanistan responsible for the arbitrary
detention of an individual who was being detained at Baghram Air Base, under the
control of the United States of America, but on Afghan soil with the knowledge of
Afghan authorities.
39.

Similarly, the Convention against Torture and other cruel, inhuman or

degrading treatment or punishment not only expressly bans torture, but in its article 4,
paragraph 1, it also implicitly prohibits complicity in acts of torture as it requires each
State party to ensure that all acts of torture, including those acts by any person that
constitute complicity or participation in torture, are criminal offences under its criminal
law. This approach has been supported by the Committee against Torture in its
34

Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 2004 (9 July 2004), para. 111.
Manfred Nowak, United Nations Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. CCPR Commentary, 2nd
revised ed.. 2005, pp 43-44.
36
A/HRC/4/40, para. 57.
37
A/HRC/7/4/Add.1.
35

A/HRC/13/42
Page 20
jurisprudence.38 In particular, the Committee considered complicity to include acts that
amount to instigation, incitement, superior order and instruction, consent, acquiescence
and concealment.39
40.

A State would thus also be responsible when it was aware of the risk of

torture and ill-treatment, or ought to have been aware of the risk, inherently associated
with the establishment or operation of such a facility or a given transfer to the facility,
and did not take reasonable steps to prevent it; or when the State received claims that
someone had been subjected to torture or other ill-treatment, or an enforced
disappearance, or otherwise received information suggesting that such acts may have
taken place but failed to have the claims impartially investigated.40
41.

A transferring State could also be internationally responsible under general

rules of attribution of State responsibility for internationally wrongful acts. Recognizing
that internationally wrongful conduct is often the results of the collaboration of more than
one State, rather than one State acting alone - particularly found to be the case in the
phenomenon of secret detention practices of the so called “global war on terror” - the
general principles of State responsibility under international law establish the
unlawfulness of the complicity of States in wrongful acts.41 In particular, a State that aids
or assists another State in the commission of an internationally wrongful act is
internationally responsible if it does so knowing the circumstances and if the wrongful
act would have been wrongful if it had been committed by the assisting State. The real or
probable conduct by another State may be decisive in assessing whether the first State has
breached its own international obligations. Article 16 of the Articles on Responsibility of
the Status for Internationally Wrongful Acts, reflecting a rule of customary international
law,42 provides that:
38

CAT/C/SR.105
Ibid; see also Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-eight Session, supplement No. 44
(A/48/44).
40
Supra at note 3.
41
See, for example, the rules codified in articles 16, 17, 40 and 41 of the Articles on Responsibility of
States for Internationally Wrongful Acts.
42
International Court of Justice, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), judgement of 26 February 2007,
39

A/HRC/13/42
Page 21

A State which aids or assists another State in the commission of an internationally
wrongful act by the latter is internationally responsible for doing so if: (a) that State does
so with knowledge of the circumstances of the internationally wrongful act; and (b) the
act would be internationally wrongful if committed by that State.”
42.

Additionally, under the rules of State responsibility, where one State is in

“serious breach” of its obligations under peremptory norms of international law – as
would be the case if a State were to be torturing detainees –other States have a duty to
cooperate to bring such a serious breach of the prohibition against torture to an end, and
are required not to give any aid or assistance to its continuation.
43.

Furthermore, the practice of “proxy detention” by a State in circumstances

where there is a risk of torture in the hands of the receiving State could amount to a
violation of the State’s obligation under customary international law on non-refoulement
– that is, not to transfer a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for
believing that the person would be in danger of being subjected to torture.43 The
Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance and the
International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance
state that the principle of non-refoulement applies to the risk of enforced disappearances.
Article 17, paragraph 1, of the International Convention provides that: “no State party
shall expel, return (‘refouler’), surrender or extradite a person to another State where
there are substantial grounds for believing that he or she would be in danger of being
subjected to enforced disappearance.” The Working Group on Arbitrary Detention has
argued that the risk of arbitrary detention in the country of destination, which includes
secret detention, should prohibit the transfer of a person into the jurisdiction of the
receiving State as well.44 Diplomatic assurances from the receiving State for the purpose
of overcoming the obstacle of the non-refoulement principle do not release States from
para. 420.
43
Convention against Torture, article 3. See also the comments of the Special Rapporteur on torture and
other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, (A/59/324).
44
A/HRC/4/40, para. 47.

A/HRC/13/42
Page 22
their obligations under international human rights, humanitarian and refugee law, in
particular the principle of non-refoulement.45

6. Secret detention and derogations from international human rights
44.

Article 4, paragraph 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political

Rights permits States to derogate from certain rights contained therein “in times of public
emergency which threatens the life of the nation”. However, this provision subjects such
measures to a number of procedural and substantive safeguards regarding derogation
measures: the State must have officially proclaimed a state of emergency; the derogation
measures must be limited to those strictly required by the exigencies of the situation; they
must not be inconsistent with other international obligations of the State; and they must
not be discriminatory. In its general comment No. 29,46 the Human Rights Committee
highlighted the exceptional and temporary character of derogations, stating that the
Covenant required that, even during an armed conflict, measures derogating from the
Covenant were allowed only if and to the extent that the situation constituted a threat to
the life of the nation. Derogation measures must be lifted as soon as the public emergency
or armed conflict ceases to exist. Most importantly, derogation measures must be “strictly
required” by the emergency situation. This requirement of proportionality implies that
derogations cannot be justified when the same aim could be achieved through less
intrusive means.
45.

Article 4, paragraph 2 of the Covenant lists certain rights that cannot be

derogated from, including the prohibition of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment (art. 7).
46.

Although articles 9 and 14 of the Covenant are not among the non-derogable

rights enumerated in article 4, paragraph 2, the Human Rights Committee confirmed in
its general comment No. 29 that the prohibitions against taking of hostages, abductions or
45

General Assembly resolution 63/166, para. 15; Human Rights Council resolution 8/8, para. 6 (d). See
also A/HRC/4/40, paras. 52-56and HRC, E/CN.4/2006/6.
46
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11, para. 3.

A/HRC/13/42
Page 23
unacknowledged detention were not subject to derogation.47. It also considered that it was
inherent in the protection of rights explicitly recognized as non-derogable in article 4,
paragraph 2, that they must be secured by procedural guarantees, including, often,
judicial guarantees. The provisions of the Covenant relating to procedural safeguards
could never be made subject to measures that would circumvent the protection of nonderogable rights. Article 4 may not be resorted to in a way that would result in derogation
from non-derogable rights. Safeguards related to derogation, as embodied in article 4 of
the Covenant, were based on the principles of legality and the rule of law inherent in the
Covenant as a whole. As certain elements of the right to a fair trial are explicitly
guaranteed under international humanitarian law during armed conflict, the Committee
found no justification for derogation from these guarantees during other emergency
situations, and was of the opinion that the principles of legality and the rule of law
required that fundamental requirements of fair trial be respected during a state of
emergency. Only a court of law could try and convict a person for a criminal offence. The
presumption of innocence has to be respected. In order to protect non-derogable rights,
the right to take proceedings before a court to enable the court to decide without delay on
the lawfulness of detention should not be diminished by a State party’s decision to
derogate from the Covenant.”48
47.

In short, the main elements of articles 9 and 14 of the Covenant, namely the

right to habeas corpus, the presumption of innocence and minimum fair trial guarantees,
as well as the prohibition of unacknowledged detention, must be respected even in times
of emergency, including armed conflict.
48.

The Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, in its opinions No. 43/2006,

2/2009 and 3/2009,49 concurred with the view of the Human Rights Committee that the
right to habeas corpus must prevail even in states of emergency. The Working Group

47

CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11
Ibid.
49
A/HRC/7/4/Add.1, para. 36, A/HRC/13/30/Add.1, para.33 and A/HRC/13/Add.1/, para. 36.
48

A/HRC/13/42
Page 24
similarly stated that the right not to be detained incommunicado over prolonged periods
of time could not be derogated from, even where a threat to the life of the nation existed50
49.

The Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances confirmed in

its general comment on article 10 of the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons
from Enforced Disappearance that under no circumstances, including states of war or
public emergency, could any State interest be invoked to justify or legitimize secret
centres or places of detention which, by definition, would violate the Declaration, without
exception.51
50.

As the disappearance of persons is inseparably linked to treatment that

amounts to a violation of article 7 of the Covenant, according to the jurisprudence of the
Human Rights Committee,52 the prohibition against enforced disappearance must not be
derogated from, either. Similarly, article 1, paragraph 2, of the International Convention
for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance stipulates:
No exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of
war, internal political instability or any other public emergency, may be invoked
as a justification for enforced disappearance.
51.

Even if one were (wrongfully)53 classify the global struggle against

international terrorism in its entirety as a “war” for the purpose of applying the Third and
50

E/CN.4/2005/6, para. 75.
E/CN.4/1997/34.
52
Human Rights Committee, Mojica v. Dominican Republic (449/1991), and Celis Laureano v. Peru
(540/1993), para. 8.5. See also European Court of Human Rights, Kurt v. Turkey, judgment of 25 May
1998, paras. 122 et seq.
53
Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, opinions No. 2/2009 and 3/2009 (A/HRC/13/30/Add.1). See also
E/CN.4/2003/8, paras. 64 et seq.; the report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of
human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism, Mission to the United States of
America (A/HRC/6/17/Add.3), paras. 6-9; The report on the situation of detainees at Guantánamo Bay of
the Chairperson-Rapporteur of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, the Special Rapporteur on the
independence of judges and lawyers, the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment, the Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief and the Special
Rapporteur on the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and
mental health (E/CN.4/2006/120), para.21 and the official statement of ICRC dated 21 July 2005 on the
relevance of International Humanitarian Law in the context of terrorism, available from the ICRC website /
(www.icrc.org)
51

A/HRC/13/42
Page 25
Fourth Geneva Conventions, international human rights law continues to apply: The
Covenant applies also in situations of armed conflict to which the rules of international
humanitarian law are applicable. While, in respect of certain Covenant rights, more
specific rules of international humanitarian law may be specially relevant for the
purposes of the interpretation of those rights, both spheres of law are complementary, not
mutually exclusive.54
52. In its advisory opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, the
International Court of Justice clearly affirmed the applicability of the Covenant during
armed conflicts, stating that “the right not arbitrarily to be deprived of one’s life applies
also in hostilities. The test of what constitutes an arbitrary deprivation of life, however,
then must be determined by the applicable lex specialis, namely, the law applicable in
armed conflict.”55 The Court further developed its view in its advisory opinion on the
Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian
Territories:
the protection offered by human rights conventions does not cease in case of
armed conflict, save through the effect of provisions for derogation of the kind to
be found in article 4 of the [ICCPR]. As regards the relationship between
international humanitarian law and human rights law, there are thus three possible
situations: some rights may be exclusively matters of international humanitarian
law; others may be exclusively matters of human rights law; yet others may be
matters of both these branches of international law.”56
53. In its judgment in the Case concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the
Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), the Court already applied
54

Human Rights Committee, general comment No. 31 (CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13), para. 11. See also
Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, opinions No. 44/2005 (A/HRC/4/40/Add.1), para. 13, No. 2/2009
and 3/2009 (A/HRC/13/30/Add.1), paras. 27 and 30.
55
I.C.J. Reports 1996, p. 226, at p. 240 (8 July 1996), para. 25. See also Working Group on Arbitrary
Detention, opinion No. 44/2005 (A/HRC/4/40/Add.1), para. 13, in which the Working Group stated that in
the case of a conflict between the provisions of the two legal regimes [international humanitarian law and
international human rights law] with regard to a specific situation, the lex specialis will have to be
identified and applied.
56
I.C.J. Reports 2004 (9 July 2004), para. 106.

A/HRC/13/42
Page 26
international humanitarian law and international human rights law in parallel, without as
a first step identifying the lex specialis or the exclusive matter.57 In their report on the
mission to Lebanon and Israel from 7 to 14 September 2006, the Special Rapporteur on
extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, the Special Rapporteur on the right of
everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental
health, the Representative of the Secretary-General on the human rights of internally
displaced persons and the Special Rapporteur on adequate housing as a component of the
right to an adequate standard of living stated that human rights law and international
humanitarian law were not mutually exclusive, but existed in a complementary
relationship during armed conflict; a full legal analysis required consideration of both
bodies of law. In respect of certain human rights, more specific rules of international
humanitarian law might be relevant for the purposes of their interpretation.58 A
complementary approach forming the basis of the present study is also supported by the
principle of systemic integration contained in article 31, paragraph 3 (c) of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, which provides that, in interpreting an international
treaty there shall be taken into account, together with the context … any relevant rules of
international law applicable in the relations between the parties [of the treaty].”59

7. Secret detention and international humanitarian law
54.

International humanitarian law prohibits secret detention as clearly as

international human rights law does. Under the Geneva Conventions, which apply to all
armed conflicts, there are situations in which persons falling into two categories may be
detained: prisoners of war and civilians. Generally, prisoners of war are to be released at
the end of active hostilities. Civilians may be detained by an occupying power under very
strict conditions namely (a) if such detention is “necessary for imperative reasons of
security”60 and (b) for penal prosecutions. The use of novel status designations to avoid
57

I.C.J. Reports 2005, p. 168, paras. 216 et seq.
A/HRC/2/7, para. 16.
59
Report of the study group of the International Law Commission entitled “Fragmentation of international
law: difficulties arising from the diversification and expansion of international law” (A/CN.4/L.682/Add.1),
paras. 17 et seq.
60
Fourth Geneva Convention, art. 42 and 78.
58

A/HRC/13/42
Page 27
Geneva Convention protections, such as “unlawful enemy combatants,” is irrelevant in
this context from a legal point of view, as “it does not constitute a category recognized
and defined under international law”.61 This is true also for non-international armed
conflicts, albeit the notion of prisoners of war is not directly applicable.62
55.

Notwithstanding the capacity to detain individuals, the entire system of

detention provided for by the Geneva Conventions is founded on the notion that detainees
must be registered and held in officially recognized places of detention. According to
article 70 of the Third Geneva Convention, prisoners of war are to be documented, and
their whereabouts and health conditions made available to family members and to the
country of origin of the prisoner within one week. Article 106 of the Fourth Geneva
Convention governing the treatment of civilians establishes virtually identical procedures
for the documentation and disclosure of information concerning civilian detainees.
According to ICRC, these procedures are meant to ensure that internment is not a
measure of punishment; interned persons must therefore not be held incommunicado.63
The prohibition of enforced disappearance is a rule of customary international
humanitarian law applicable in all situations of armed conflict.64
56.

As incommunicado detention is also prohibited under international

humanitarian law applicable to all armed conflicts65 and to all persons who no longer take

61

See the report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and
fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism, Mission to the United States of America
(A/HRC/6/17/Add.3), paras. 11-12, the r Report on the situation of detainees at Guantánamo Bay of the
Chairperson-Rapporteur of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, the Special Rapporteur on the
independence of judges and lawyers, the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment, the Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief and the Special
Rapporteur on the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and
mental health (E/CN.4/2006/120), paras. 20 et seq; and Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, opinion
No. 43/2006 (A/HRC/7/4/Add.1), para. 31.
62
Interpretive guidance on the notion of direct participation in hostilities under international humanitarian
law, ICRC, Geneva 2009, in particular pp. 27-36.
63
ICRC Commentary to the Fourth Geneva Convention, art. 106, available at the ICRC website
(www.icrc.org). See also Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law,
Volume I: Rules, (ICRC, 2005), at pp. 439-449, regarding mandatory recording of personal details of
detainees, the right to communicate with families and the right to receive visitors.
64
Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, ap. Cit. pp. 340-343.
65
Ibid, pp. 344-352.

A/HRC/13/42
Page 28
direct part in hostilities,66, detainees must be registered, provided an effective opportunity
to immediately inform their family and a centralized information bureau of their
detention and any subsequent transfer, and must be permitted ongoing contact with
family members and others outside the place of detention.67 Article 5 of the Fourth
Geneva Convention permits the detaining power to deny to persons these rights and
privileges “where absolute military security so requires” when an individual found
physically in the State’s own territory is “definitely suspected of or engaged in activities
hostile to the security of the State”, or when an individual in occupied territory is
“detained as a spy or saboteur, or as a person under definite suspicion of activity hostile
to the security of the Occupying Power”. While the article states that these persons “shall
also be granted the full rights and privileges of a protected person under the present
Convention at the earliest date consistent with the security of the State or Occupying
Power”, ICRC stresses that article 5 may only be applied in individual cases of an
exceptional nature, when the existence of specific charges makes it almost certain that
penal proceedings will follow. Bare suspicion of hostile activities would not suffice;
instead, it would have to be a definite suspicion of such activities. The burden of definite
suspicion is a high burden that must be individualized and must not be of a general
nature.68

III. SECRET DETENTION PRACTICES IN PAST CONTEXTS

A. The emergence of the recent practice of secret detention
57.

The phenomenon of secret detention, closely intertwined with enforced

disappearances, can be traced at least to the Nacht und Nebel Erlaß of the Nazi Germany,
the night and fog decree, according to which suspected resistance movement members
could be arrested in occupied Europe and secretly transferred to Germany “under cover
66

Ibid, p. 299.
Third Geneva Convention art. 48, 70 and 122. Fourth Geneva Convention art. 25, 26, 41, 78, 79, 106,
107, 116, 128 and 136.
68
Commentary to Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Geneva,
12 August 1949, art. 5, available at www.icrc.org
67

A/HRC/13/42
Page 29
of night”.69 These measures were intended to have a deterrent effect because detainees
would vanish without leaving a trace and no information would be given as to their
whereabouts or fate.70
58.

An incipient form of these practices was, however, already well known in the

former Soviet Union, with its Gulag71 system of forced-labour camps, first established
under Vladimir Lenin during the early Bolshevik years. The Gulag system ultimately
resulted in a vast penal network, including hundreds of camp complexes, which
functioned throughout the State, many in Siberia and the Soviet Far East. The system was
enhanced after 1928 under Joseph Stalin.
59.

Even though the above-mentioned practices were encompassed in a broader

context of war or perpetuation of a state of terror, secret detention in the context of
counter-terrorism is not a new phenomenon. Striking similarities can be identified
between security measures in the 1970s and 1980s in the context of Latin America, but
also other regions, such as northern Africa and South-East Asia, on the one hand, and the
counter-terrorism measures adopted worldwide since 11 September 2001, on the other.
The methods used then, as now, consist of, inter alia, broad emergency laws, the
enhanced role of military and special courts, the practice of torture and/or ill-treatment,
kidnappings (renditions), enforced disappearances and notably secret detention.

B. The recent practice of secret detention

1. Secret detention in Latin America
60.

Secret detention in Latin America was closely linked to the widespread

pattern of enforced disappearances. On the basis of the reports produced by various
national truth and reconciliation commissions, in the 1970s and 1980s, patterns of secret
69

Christopher K. Hall, “Enforced disappearance of persons”, in Otto Triffterer (ed.), Commentary on the
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Baden-Baden 1999, p. 151, with further related
references.
70
Whilhelm Gorlitz (ed.), The Memoirs of Field Marshal Keitel, W. Kimber, London, 1965, pp. 254-6.
71
Russian acronym for the “Main Directorate of Corrective Labour Camps”.

A/HRC/13/42
Page 30
detention were identified in, inter alia, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, El Salvador, Paraguay,
Peru and Uruguay.72 Thousands of Latin Americans were secretly kidnapped, tortured and
killed by national security services. When these dictatorial regimes came to an end, some
of the countries, on the basis of their archives, decided to prosecute former Government
officials, as well as police and military officers. In other countries these attempts have
long been hampered by impunity created as a result of, inter alia, amnesty laws or
pardons.
61.

Latin American Governments justified practices of secret detention, among

other exceptional measures, referring to the national security doctrine, which provided
fertile ground for the creation of a repressive system by the military in which, in the name
of security, human rights and fundamental freedoms were violated on a massive scale,
and the rule of law and the democratic system damaged. The model was formulated in the
1940s, on the basis of French counter-insurgency concepts used in Algeria and Indochina.
It was spread by the United States through the training of Latin American armies in “the
school of the Americas”, located in Panama. Politically, the doctrine was strongly
influenced by the bipolar cold war paradigm. It extended the notion of the alleged
internal war against communism, which soon acquired a regional dimension. Practices of
secret detention were first used against armed movements, later against left-wing groups,
Marxist and non-Marxist, and ultimately against all groups suspected of political
opposition. The latter were labelled as “subversives”, “terrorists” or “communists”.
62.

Practices of secret detention ran in parallel, at the national and regional levels.

They were carried out by several governmental entities, which worked with little
regulation and wide authority to interpret the few rules and regulations that did exist.

72

See, inter alia, Argentine National Commission on the Disappearance of Persons (CONADEP) “Nunca
Más” (Never Again), Buenos Aires, 1984; (Brasil Nunca Mais) (1985) (the report documented 125 cases of
enforced disappearances carried out for political reasons by the military regimes between 1964 and 1979);
Comité de Iglesias para Ayudas de Emergencias (the final report was released in May 1990 and
documented more than 360,000 illegal arrests and at least 200 disappearances during the dictatorship of
General Stroessner); final report of the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission,
http://www.cverdad.org.pe/ingles/ifinal/index.php; Informe Final de La Comisión Para La Paz, 10April
2003 (Uruguay), available at the address
www.usip.org/files/file/resources/collections/commissions/Uruguay-Report_Informal.pdf.

A/HRC/13/42
Page 31
Each entity had its own staff and facilities. Each organization worked in secrecy.73 The
prime example of the regional scope of these practices is the Condor Operation, involving
the exchange of intelligence information, and relying upon inter-state programmes of
renditions.74 The operation was endorsed by the Chilean National Intelligence Directorate
(DINA), which operated as the main intelligence service engaged in political repression
between 1974 and 1977. Among its different functions, it was responsible for running
secret detention centres, where victims were interrogated and tortured.75 DINA soon
began to work in Argentina, and later in other Latin American countries, the United
States and Europe.76 Similar intelligence services were established in Argentina, Paraguay
and Uruguay, and integrated into a coordination network, closely linked to the United
States.77
63.

In Argentina, for instance, there were close to 500 secret detention centres,

operating mainly on military or police premises.78 Others were located in such diverse
settings as hospitals, Government offices, automobile repair shops, schools, farms and
even the basement of the upscale Galerias Pacifico in downtown Buenos Aires.79 The
largest secret detention centres were the Navy Mechanics School (Escuela de Mecanica
de la Armada) and the Club Atlético, a federal police facility, both in very visible Buenos
Aires locations; the Campo de Mayo army base and Vesubio, a former summer residence,
both in the province of Buenos Aires; La Perla, a military base in Córdoba Province; and

73

Memorandum of conversation, unclassified, 7 August 1979, Embassy of the United States of America,
Buenos Aires.
74
See for example, Operation Condor, which operated through an exchange of intelligence information
between States, identification of “subversive” or “terrorist” persons, as well as torture, execution, detention
(…). See International Commission of Jurists, “Assessing damage, urging action”, report of the eminent
jurists panel on terrorism, counter-terrorism and human rights, p. 32.
75
Report of the Chilean National Commission on Truth and Reconciliation (Notre Dame, Indiana:
University of Notre Dame Press, 1993), p. 22.
76
Ibid., p. 617.
77
See for example the references in the document entitled “Declassified documents relating to the military
coup, 1970-1976”.
78
See, inter alia, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.49, Doc. 19 corr.1, 11 April 1980. During its on-site observation, the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) interviewed several persons in prison who
claimed to have been kept in places they could not identify.
79
According to the information provided by the Government, there are no records indicating that Galerias
Pacifico was used as a secret detention center.

A/HRC/13/42
Page 32
La Cacha, located within the offices of the Penitentiary.80 Notwithstanding the fact that it
was estimated that these facilities held some 14,500 detainees, the military authorities
repeatedly denied the existence of secret detention centres.81
64.

In Chile, torture methods were routinely practiced on all detainees held in

secret facilities. Some of the secret detention facilities mentioned in the report of the
Chilean National Commission on Truth and Reconciliation were Tejas Verdes, Cuatro
Alamos, Londres No. 38, José Domingo Cañas, Villa Grimaldi, The Discotheques or La
Venda Sexy, Casa Cajón del Maipo, la Firma, Simón Bolívar con la calle Ossandón, Nido
20 y Cuartel Venecia. According to information provided by the Government, the report
of the National Commission on Political Prison and Torture of 2004 indicated that there
were 1.132 places used for purposes of detention throughout the country. 82 The sites
themselves were equipped with permanent installations for applying enhanced methods
of interrogation and special personnel trained to use them. The guards were not the same
as the officers who were in charge of interrogations, although the latter could take part in
inflicting torture and indeed did so directly.83 For years there were secret detention sites
to which officials of the judicial branch had no access. The courts did not act to remedy
this unlawful situation or even to condemn it, despite continuous claims made in habeas
corpus appeals.84 This was compounded by the fact that, during the Pinochet regime, the
authority to “arrest” included the authority to order solitary confinement. This, together
with the lack of provisions requiring the disclosure of the place where a person was being
held, facilitated the use of secret detention.85

80

See also the reports on clandestine detention centres in the annual report of the Working Group on
Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances, E/CN.4/1492, paras. 48-50. See also E/CN.4/1985/15, paras 97108.
81
CONADEP “Nunca Más”, in reference to orders from file No. 4210; and legal deposition made by
CONADEP on 17 May 1984 (file No. 4317).
82
Report of the Chilean National Commission on Truth and Reconciliation (Notre Dame, Indiana:
University of Notre Dame Press, 1993), p. 22.
83
Ibid, p. 652.
84
Ibid, pp. 142-143.
85
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1997/19, para. 165

A/HRC/13/42
Page 33
65.

In the late 1970s, during an on-site observation in El Salvador, a special

commission86 verified the existence of a group of cells in which, according to claimants,
several people were being detained in secret and tortured.87 The Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights received reports alleging that the authorities of El
Salvador were holding individuals arbitrarily in secret places of the National Guard, the
National Police and the Treasury Police.88
66.

In Peru, the vast majority of more than 3,000 cases of disappearances reported

to the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances occurred between
1983 and 1992 in the context of the Government’s fight against terrorist organizations,
especially the Communist Party of Peru (Sendero Luminoso).89 A number of cases of
secret detention were examined by the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission.90
67.

In Uruguay, many disappeared persons were reported to be held in clandestine

detention centres, allegedly run by Argentine and Uruguayan military personnel.91 The
Inter-American Commission also received consistent reports of prolonged
incommunicado detentions in the country during the 1970s and 1980s.92 These and other
allegations of clandestine detention centres were later confirmed by the final report of the
Peace Commission.93
68.

More generally, during the 1970s and 1980s, Latin American Governments

adopted legislation concentrating all powers in the executive branch, including decisions
on detentions, their form and place. The legislation itself was in most cases extremely

86

Established by Decree No. 9 of 6 November 1979.
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.46, doc. 23 rev. 1, 17 November 1978. See also E/CN.4/1984/21, para. 163.
88
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.46, doc. 23 rev. 1.
89
E/CN.4/1998/43,para. 296.
90
Final report of the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission, V. VI, Chap. 1, sect. 1.2 and 1.4,
available at the address www.cverdad.org.pe/ingles/ifinal/index.php,
91
E/CN.4/1985/15, para. 233.
92
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.43, doc. 19, corr.1, 31 January 1978.
93
Informe Final de La Comisión Para La Paz, 10 April 2003 (Uruguay), available at the address
www.usip.org/files/file/resources/collections/commissions/Uruguay-Report_Informal.pdf.
87

A/HRC/13/42
Page 34
broad, providing for a vague definition of terrorism-related crimes, treated as political or
ideological offences, and subject to disproportionate sanctions.94
69.

The practice of secret detentions was also facilitated by the introduction of

states of emergency, followed by repeated renewals or extensions and, in some cases by
straightforward perpetuations.95 States of emergency gave more powers to the military
and provided room for discretion in the repressive measures against terrorism. In
Uruguay, a state of emergency was declared in 1968 and extended until the end of the
dictatorial period in 1985. In Paraguay, the state of siege lasted for 35 years, although the
Constitution stipulated that it could only be declared for limited periods and subject to
exceptional circumstances.96 In most of these countries, the practice of secret detention
was compounded by derogations from or modifications of national constitutions, while in
others they were subordinated to the regulations of military Governments.
70.

Many Governments in regions other than Latin America have also resorted to

secret detention in the context of counter-terrorism-related activities. Although on
numerous occasions terrorism as such was not invoked as the basis of detention,
accusations such as disruption of public order, involvement in a coup d’état or allegedly
unlawful activities of the opposition, were recurrently used by Governments.

2. Secret detention in Africa
71.

In the 1990s, allegations of more than 200 secret detention centres in

Kinshasa were brought to the attention of the Special Rapporteur on torture. These were
allegedly run by the police or the armed forces of the Zaire.97 In its concluding
observations on the country in 2006, the Committee against Torture took note of the
outlawing of unlawful places of detention beyond the control of the Public Prosecutor’s
94

See for example, Law. 20.840 and 21.264 in Argentina; Decree Law No. 5 in Chile; and the National
Security and Public Order Law (July 1972) in Uruguay.
95
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1997/19, para. 127.
96
Ibid., para 148.
97
E/CN.4/1996/35, para. 195

A/HRC/13/42
Page 35
Office, such as prison cells run by the security services and the Special Presidential
Security Group, where persons had been subjected to torture.98
72.

In the 1994, serious concerns were expressed by the Working Group on

Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances regarding increasing patterns of disappearances
of suspected opponents of the Transitional Government of Ethiopia, in particular
regarding allegations of detainees being held in secret interrogation or detention centres
in Addis Ababa and other locations.99 A number of people detained in Hararge province
on suspicion of supporting the Oromo Liberation Front were allegedly held in, inter alia,
23 secret detention centres in Deder district.100 The existence of secret detention centres in
Deder district was denied by the authorities.101
73.

In South Africa, during states of emergency in the 1980s, at least 40,000

people were detained, many of them charged with representing a danger to public
peace.102 Under the Internal Security Act, administrative detention in South Africa in
some instances effectively amounted to secret detention. In most cases, no one was
allowed access to the detainee or to information about him or her, and the name of the
detainee could only be disclosed by the Minister for Law and Order or a person
authorized by him.103
74.

In the Sudan, the use of secret detention facilities, or “ghost houses”, has for

years been the subject of attention of both the United Nations human rights bodies and
civil society.104 These were used mainly in the northern part of the country, but also in
98

CAT/C/DRC/CO/1,para. 7.
E/CN.4/1995/36.
100
E/CN.4/1997/7/Add.1, Report of the Special Rapporteur on torture, para 156. See also the extrajudicial,
summary or arbitrary executions report of the Special Rapporteur, E/CN.4/1998/68/Add.1, para. 165.
101
.E/CN.4/1998/68/Add.1, para 168. See also the report of the Special Rapporteur on torture, summary of
cases transmitted to the Governments and replies received (E/CN.4/1998/38/Add.1), para. 133.
102
D. Webster and F. Friedman, “Repression and the State of Emergency, June 87-March 89”, South
African Review, vol. 21, 1989.
103
Internal Security Act, section 50A (3). See also, J. Sarkin, “Chapter XII – South Africa”, in Preventive
detention and security law: a comparative survey, ed. by Andrew Harding and John Hatchard, Dordrecht;
Boston [etc.]: M. Nijhoff, cop. 1993.
104
See, inter alia, the report of the Special Rapporteur on torture (E/CN.4/1995/34), the joint statement
submitted to the Sub Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities
99

A/HRC/13/42
Page 36
Darfur and in Khartoum.105 One of the most notorious and well-known secret detention
centres was the “City Bank” or al-Waha (“the Oasis”).106 The common pattern of
detentions consisted of security officers arresting individuals on suspicion of opposition
activities, blindfolding them on the way to the detention centres, and then subjecting
them to severe torture for periods ranging from a few weeks to several months,
completely cutting them off from the outside world.107 Amnesty International and others
v. Sudan, a case before the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights,
concerned, among others, the allegation that torture and ill-treatment were widespread in
prisons and ghost houses in the Sudan.108

3. Secret detention in Northern Africa and the Middle East
75.

In Algeria, in the context of internal strife during the 1990s, and in particular

between 1993 and 1998, the security forces and State-armed militias arrested thousands
of men on suspicion of involvement in terrorist activities, in circumstances leaving the
relatives of those arrested men with no knowledge of their whereabouts.109 As a result, the
relatives were often forced to request the issuance of a declaration of absence from judges
and officials, who were in most cases denying or concealing the whereabouts of the
arrested men.110 A number of the disappeared persons are reported to have been members
or sympathizers of the Islamic Salvation Front.111

E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/NGO/22, para. 7 and the Report of the Special Rapporteur on torture
(E/CN.4/1993/26),para. 417.
105
Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, E/CN.4/1994/27.
106
Report of the Special Rapporteur on Torture (E/CN.4/1997/7), para. 185.
107
, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Sudan (E/CN.4/1994/48).
108
Amnesty International, Comité Loosli Bachelard, Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Association of
Members of the Episcopal Conference of East Africa v. Sudan, Communications 48/1990, 50/1991,
52/1991 and 89/1993, 13th activity report (1999-2000), AHG/222 (XXXVI), annex V, para. 5. Reference
taken from Nigel Rodley and Matt Pollard, The Treatment of Prisoners under International Law, Third ed.,
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009, p. 472. See also, the report of the Special Rapporteur on Torture
(E/CN.4/1994/31), paras. 512-527.
109
See, inter alia, the report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, opinion No. 28/2001
(E/CN.4/2003/8/Add.1).
110
HRC, Bouroual v. Algeria, Communication No. 992/2001, 24 April 2006, and Boucherf v. Algeria,
Communication No. 1196/2003, 27 April 2006.
111
E/CN.4/1998/43, para. 81.

A/HRC/13/42
Page 37
76.

Patterns of enforced disappearances and secret detentions facilities were also

identified in Morocco as of the early 1960s.112 In most cases, the victims were human
rights activists, trade unionists or involved in activities of political opposition.113 Since
Morocco took control of Western Sahara at the end of 1975, hundreds of Sahrawi men
and women known or suspected of pro-independence activities had disappeared after
having been arrested by Moroccan security forces. Many of the victims were reported to
have been confined in secret detention centres, such as El Ayun, Qal’at M’gouna, Agdz,
Derb Moulay Cherif in Casablanca, and Tazmamart. The Moroccan authorities had
continuously denied any knowledge of such detention centres. For instance, in response
to a question by the Human Rights Committee in November 1990 about the secret
detention centres of Qal’at M’Gouna and Tazmamart, the Moroccan delegation replied
that “these prisons are not on any list held in the prison administration division at the
Ministry of the Interior”.114 Cells in some police stations or military barracks, as well as
secret villas in the Rabat suburbs, were also allegedly used to hide the disappeared.115
Until 1991, the Government of Morocco not only denied any knowledge of these
disappeared and their whereabouts, but also their existence.116 The Equity and
Reconciliation Commission considered some of the cases of secret detention occurring
between 1936 and 1999.117 In its submission concerning this report, the Government of
Morocco stated that all cases of enforced disappearances registered in Morocco were
considered by the ERC and that in most of these cases compensation was granted.

112

Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities
(E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/SR.17), para. 59. See also the report of the Working Group Enforced or Involuntary
Disappearances (E/CN.4/1987/15), paras. 150-108; and the report of the Working Group on Arbitrary
Detention (E/CN.4/1993/24), dec. No. 38/1992.
113
Tulio Scovazzi and Gabriella Citroni, The Struggle against Enforced Disappearance and the 2007
United Nations Convention, Leiden, Boston, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2007, p.70. See also Amnesty
International report “The disappeared in Morocco”, MDE 29/01/93.
114
Written statement submitted by Amnesty International 8E/CN.4/1996/NGO/26).
115
Report of the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances (E/CN.4/1995/36).
116
In its 2009 visit to Morocco, the Working Group met with people who had been held in secret detention;
see A/HRC/31/Add.1.
117
Equity and Reconciliation Commission, summary of its findings, available a t the address
www.ictj.org/static/MENA/Morocco/IERreport.findingssummary.eng.pdf.

A/HRC/13/42
Page 38
77.

In its opinion No. 8/1998, adopted in 1998, the Working Group on Arbitrary

Detention addressed several cases of individuals suspected of acts of terrorism being held
in secret detention facilities run by Israeli forces since the late 1980s.118
78.

In 1998, the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances

received and transmitted to the Government of Yemen numerous cases of secret
detentions and enforced disappearances in the context of counter-terrorism operations in
from the country since the period between January and April 1986. Other sporadic cases
of secret detention were brought to the attention of the United Nations human rights
bodies and mechanisms with regard to Egypt119, Saudi Arabia120, the Syrian Arab
Republic121 and Tunisia.122

4. Secret detention in Asia
79.

In Cambodia, secret detention facilities were used by the Communist Party of

Kampuchea during the Khmer Rouge Regime both to persecute political opposition and
to intimidate the civilian population. While those individuals who were sent to Tuol
Sleng prison (S-21) were regarded as established “enemies” of the Party, those sent to the
so-called re-education camp (S-24) were considered to be “elements”, because it was
unclear whether they were enemies or friends.123 The S-24 facility was used primarily for
the purposes of forced labour. The Government of Cambodia denies the occurrence of
secret detention after the fall of the Khmer Rouge Regime. However, in the 1990s,
reports were made regarding to involvement of senior regional and provincial military
officers and their units in the continuing use of secret detention facilities in Battambang

118

E/CN.4/1999/63/Add.1.
Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, opinion No. 15/1999, (E/CN.4/2000/4/Add.1).
120
Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, decisions No. 40/1992 ((E/CN.3/1993/24), No. 60/1993
(E/CN.4/1995/31/Add.1 and E/CN.4/1995/31/Add.2) and No. 48/1995 (E/CN.4/1997/4/Add.1).
121
Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, decisions No.1/1994, (E/CN.4/1995/31/Add.1 and
E/CN.4/1995/31/Add.2), No. 2/1997, (E/CN.4/1998/44/Add.1).
122
Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, opinion No. 5/1999, (E/CN.4/2000/4/Add.1).
123
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, Trial Proceedings, transcript of trial proceedings,
Kaing Guek Eav “Duch” Public, case file Nº 001/18-07-2007-ECCC/TC.
119

A/HRC/13/42
Page 39
province for the purposes of detaining abducted civilians, extorting money, asserting
illegal power and executing those detained.124
80.

In India, no fewer than 1 million people were detained under preventive

detention laws during the 1975/77 state of emergency. Many were alleged to be held in
secret places of detention, for instance in Punjab. Others were abducted and made to
disappear by members of the police and State security forces, especially in Punjab,
Jammu and Kashmir, as well as in the North-eastern states. 125 Most of them were legally
precluded from an enforceable right to compensation for unlawful detention. While the
Constitution, the Penal Code and the Criminal Procedure Code prohibited secret
detention and stipulated prompt access to a judicial authority, relatives, lawyers and
medical assistance, such guarantees were not included in other relevant laws, such as the
Terrorism and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, which was in force in the States of
Jammu, Kashmir and Punjab. According to a number of allegations, in the State of
Jammu and Kashmir, arrests were often not recorded by, or even reported to, the local
police so that legal remedies, including applications for habeas corpus, were
ineffective.126 In the late 1990s, the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary
Disappearances received consistent allegations according to which more than 2,000
people were being held in long-term unacknowledged detention in interrogation centres
and transit camps in the north-east of the country and in Jammu and Kashmir.127
81.

In Nepal, a number of suspected members of the Maoist Communist Party,

which had declared a “people’s war” in February 1996, were held in secret detention.128 In
the late 1990s, the increasing pattern of disappearances and secret detentions was
124

Recommendations of the Special Representative for human rights in Cambodia and the role of the
United Nations Centre for Human Rights in assisting the Government and people of Cambodia in the
promotion and protection of human rights (A/49/635), para. 24. In the same report, reference is made to the
case of Voat Cheu Kmau.
125
See the official Shah Commission of Inquiry report of 1978.
126
See the summary record of the second part (public) of the 11th meeting of the Sub-commission on
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Forty-fifth session
(e/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/SR.11/Add.1), para. 28.
127
E/CN.4/200/64.
128
See, inter alia, the report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, ppinion No. 5/2001
(E/CN.4/2002/77/Add.1).

A/HRC/13/42
Page 40
communicated to the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances by
numerous non-governmental organizations. It was reported that police officers in civilian
clothes were forcing people into vehicles and taking them to unofficial places of
detentions, such as the Maharajgunj Police Training Centre.129
82.

In Sri Lanka, the protracted conflict between the Government and the

Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) has perpetuated the use of secret detention.130
In general, Sri Lankan army officials, dressed either in military uniform or civilian
clothes, would arrest ethnic Tamils and hold them in secret places of detention for a week
or longer. One such location mentioned in the report of the Special Rapporteur on torture
was an army camp located off Galle Road, Kollupitiya, Colombo. The detainees were
often interrogated under torture, the purpose of which was to make them confess their
involvement with the LTTE.131 In 1992, the Government adopted a law giving more
power to the armed forces and authorizing the use of secret detention camps.132 Although
the emergency regulations issued subsequently in June 1993 outlawed secret detention,
there were reliable reports indicating that people continued to be held in undisclosed
places where torture was practised, and no action was taken against the perpetrators.133
83.

In the Philippines, the practice of secret detention or “safe houses” was not

formally banned until the establishment of the Presidential Committee in 1986.134 These
practices were not uncommon in the preceding years during the presidency of Ferdinand
Marcos, especially when martial law was in force.

5. Secret detention in Europe

129

E/CN.4/2001/68.
E/CN.4/1992/18/Add.1.
131
E/CN.4/1995/34, paras. 668-673.
132
Tulio Scovazzi and Gabriella Citroni, The Struggle against Enforced Disappearance and the 2007
United Nations Convention, Leiden, Boston, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2007, p. 69.
133
Statement by Mr. Bhagwati, Human Rights Committee, fifty-fourth session, summary record of the
1436th meeting, (CCPR/C/SR.1436).
134
Report of the Special Rapporteur on Torture (E/CN.4/1987/13). See also the report of the Working
Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances, (E/CN.4/1987/15), para. 77.
130

A/HRC/13/42
Page 41
84.

In Cyprus, enforced disappearances occurred during the inter-communal

clashes of 1963/64 and the military intervention of 1974. Enforced disappearance as a
phenomenon affected both communities living on the island, Greek and Turkish Cypriots
alike. The United Nations has long been engaged in the various processes for the solution
of both the Cyprus problem135 and the question of missing persons.136 In 1975, the
Commission on Human Rights called for the intensification of efforts aimed at tracing
and accounting for missing persons,137 a call echoed by the General Assembly in its
resolution 3450 (XXX), in which it further requested the Secretary-General to make
every effort for the accomplishment of the same objective through close co-operation
with the ICRC.
85.

Notwithstanding these calls and the urge for the establishment of an

investigatory body under the chairmanship of ICRC,138 the question of missing persons
remained at a deadlock until 1981. In its first report, the Working Group on Enforced or
Involuntary Disappearances included Cyprus in its country survey, but decided not to
provide an analysis of the situation because of the delicate and complex nature of the
question.139 In 1981, an agreement between the two communities was reached under the
auspices of the United Nations, by which the Committee on Missing Persons was
created.140 Its mandate is solely to establish the fate of the missing persons. In this regard,
502 cases of Turkish Cypriots and 1493 of Greek Cypriots have been officially reported
to it as missing. Despite the position of Working Group that its role was to assist the
Committee,141 the Committee’s function remained at a standstill. A 31 July 1997
agreement between the leaders of the two communities to provide each other all
information at their disposal on the location of graves did not yield any practical result.142
Finally, following a change of political stance by both communities, the Committee
135

General Assembly resolution 3212 (XXIX).
See for example General Assembly resolutions 3450 (XXX), 32/128, 33/172, 34/164 and 37/181.
137
Commission on Human Rights resolution 4 (XXXI).
138
General Assembly resolutions 32/128 and 33/172.
139
E/CN.4/1435, para. 79.
140
See the statement of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Cyprus, (E/CN.4/1492), para.
65.
141
E/CN.4/1983/14, para. 46.
142
Committee on Missing Persons, press release, www.cmp-cyprus.org/nqcontent.cfm?a_id=1353.
136

A/HRC/13/42
Page 42
resumed its work in 2004. To date, 585 exhumations and 196 identifications have been
made.143
86.

The question of missing persons arising out of the Cyprus context has reached

the European Court of Human Rights in various instances. The cases of the disappearance
of two Turkish Cypriots were declared inadmissible in 2002.144 In cases of Cyprus v.
Turkey145 and Varnava v. Turkey146 the Court found continuing violations of Court articles
2, 3 and 5 with regard to Greek Cypriot missing persons.

B. The United Nations and regional responses with regard to outlawing the
practice of secret detention
87.

The United Nations has paid increasing attention to the issue of secret

detention and its relation to enforced disappearances since 1978, in the context of
denunciations by numerous non-governmental organizations and widespread concerns
with human rights situations in Chile, Cyprus and Argentina. The Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights was one of the first international human rights bodies to
respond to the phenomenon of enforced disappearances and secret detentions during the
1970s, both in general terms and with regard to specific cases in Chile since the military
coup d’état of 11 September 1973.147
88.

In 1978, the General Assembly, deeply concerned by reports from various

parts of the world relating to enforced or involuntary disappearances of persons as a
result of excesses on the part of law enforcement or security authorities or similar
organizations, adopted a resolution dealing specifically with disappeared persons and
143

Committee on Missing Persons, www.cmp-cyprus.org/media/attachments/Quick
%20Statistics/Quick_Statistics_30.12.09.pdf.
144
European Court of Human Rights, Lütfi Celul Karabardak and others v. Cyprus, Application no.
76575/01 and Baybora and Others v. Cyprus, Application no. 77116/01, admissibility decisions of
22 October 2002.
145
European Court of Human Rights, Cyprus v. Turkey, Application 25781/94, judgment of 10 May 2001.
146
European Court of Human Rights, Varnava v. Cyprus, Applications nos. 16064/90, 16065/90, 16066/90,
16068/90, 16069/90, 16070/90, 16071/90, 16072/90 and 16073/90, judgement of 18 September 2009.
147
Wilder Tayler, “Background to the elaboration of the draft international convention for the protection of
all persons from forced disappearance”, ICJ Review No. 62-63, September 2001, p. 63.

A/HRC/13/42
Page 43
requested the Commission on Human Rights to make appropriate recommendations.148
On 6 March 1979, the Commission established a mandate for experts to study the
question of the fate of missing and disappeared persons in Chile. In his report, Felix
Ermacora, the expert in charge of the study, proposed, inter alia, a number of preventive
measures, such as the prohibition of secret places of detention, the maintenance of a
central register of arrest and detention, the right of civilian judges to visit all places of
detention.149
89.

Subsequently, the Economic and Social Council, in its resolution 1979/38,

requested the Commission on Human Rights to consider as a matter of priority the
question of disappeared persons, with a view to making appropriate recommendations at
its Thirty-sixth session. It also requested the Sub-Commission on Prevention of
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities to consider the subject with a view to making
general recommendations to the Commission at its intervening session
90.

In its resolution 5 B (XXXII), the Sub-Commission pointed out that the

danger involved for such [disappeared] person warrants urgent reaction on the part of all
individuals and institutions as well as of the Governments.150 It considered the question of
enforced and involuntary disappearances at its thirty-fourth session; on 10 September
1981, it adopted resolution 15 (XXXIV) in which it reiterated, inter alia, the right of
families to know the fate of their relatives, and strongly appealed for the reappearance of
all detainees who were held in secret detention.151
91.

In 1980, the Commission on Human Rights, in its resolution 20 (XXXVI),

created a working group to examine questions relevant to enforced or involuntary
disappearances of persons. The same year, the General Assembly, in its resolution
35/193, welcomed the establishment of the Group and appealed to all Governments to
cooperate with it.
148

General Assembly res. 33/173.
A/34/583/Add.1, paras. 193-197.
150
See E/CN.4/1350.
151
Official Records of the Economic and Social Council, Supplement No. 3 (E/1982/12).
149

A/HRC/13/42
Page 44
92.

The Sub-Commission decided, in its resolution 1983/23, that, at its next

session, it would prepare a first draft of a declaration against unacknowledged detention
of persons, whatever their condition.152 In 1984, a first draft was discussed in the SubCommission’s Working Group on Detention, as a result of which the Sub-Commission,
in its resolution 1984/3, requested the Working Group to submit a revised draft
declaration to the Sub-Commission at its thirty-eight session.153 The purpose of the draft
was to provide for a commitment that Governments (a) disclose the identity, location and
condition of all persons detained by members of their police, military or security
authorities acting with their knowledge, together with the cause of such detention, and (b)
seek to locate all other persons who have disappeared. In countries where legislation does
not exist to this effect, steps should be taken to enact such legislation as soon as possible.
However, the resolution was not adopted by the Commission on Human Rights in 1985,
and was referred back to the Sub-Commission for reconsideration.154
93.

Following the 1988 session of the Sub-Commission‘s Working Group on

Detention, a draft declaration on the protection of all persons from enforced or
involuntary disappearances was proposed, and following amendments by the
intersessional working group, was adopted first by the Commission on Human Rights in
its resolution 1992/29, then in the same year by the General Assembly in its resolution
47/133.
94.

Ever since, the Commission continuously called upon its special rapporteurs

and working groups to give special attention to question relating to the effective
protection of human rights in the administration of justice, in particular with regard to
unacknowledged detention of persons, and to provide, wherever appropriate, specific

152

E.CN.4/1984/3.
Res. 1984/13 (29 August 1984), Sub-Commission Report, 37th Session (UN Doc. E/CN.4/1985/3;
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1984/43), Chapter XVIII A.
154
Commission on Human Rights decision 1986/106.
153

A/HRC/13/42
Page 45
recommendation in this regard, including proposals for possible concrete measures under
advisory services programmes.155
95.

In 1988, in its resolution 43/173, the General Assembly adopted the Body of

Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or
Imprisonment. This was a result of a long-standing process of ascertaining detainees’
rights that began with the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and
Protection of Minorities.156 This instrument provides for the application of a set of
safeguards while in detention, compliance with which in principle would avoid or
substantially decrease the likelihood of threat to life and limb of detainees.157 The
adoption of this document served as an incentive for the elaboration of complementary
regional instruments, such as the Guidelines and Measures for the Prohibition and
Prevention of Torture, Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment in
Africa,158 adopted by the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights in its
resolution 61 (XXXII) 02 (2002), or the Principles and Best Practices on the Protection of
Persons Deprived of Liberty in the Americas159, of the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights.
96.

Other instances have contributed to outlawing practices of secret detention.

As early as 1978, the Human Rights Committee received the first communication under
the Optional Protocol relating to a disappearance and secret detention case in Uruguay.
The case concerned a Mr. Bleier, suspected of being connected with the subversive
activities of the banned Communist Party, who had been arrested by that country’s
155

See for example Commission resolution 1992/31, on human rights in the administration of justice. See
also the report of the report of the Special Rapporteur on torture (E/CN.4/1993/26).
156
Since 1973, the Sub-Commission had an item on its agenda entitled “Question of the human rights of
persons subjected to any form of detention or imprisonment”. See E/CN.4/Sub. 2/SR.677, pp. 123-129. See
generally Kathryn Jean Burke, “New United Nations procedure to protect prisoners and other detainees”
California Law Review California Law Review, vol. 64, No. 1 (January 1976), p. 205; Daniel Prémont,
“United Nations procedures for the protection of all persons subjected to any form of detention or
imprisonment” Santa Clara Law Review, vol. 20, No. 3 (1980), p. 603.
157
Nigel Rodley and Matt Pollard, The Treatment of Prisoners under International Law, Third ed., Oxford
University Press, 2009, p. 451.
158
Also known as Robben Island Guidelines.
159
OEA/Ser/L/V/II.131, doc. 26 (March 2008).

A/HRC/13/42
Page 46
authorities without a court order in October 1975 and was being held incommunicado at
an unknown place of detention.160 The Committee found that the Government of Uruguay
was in breach of articles 7, 9 and 10.1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights.
97.

In conclusion, a decisive moment in the long-standing process of outlawing

practices of secret detention was the adoption of the International Convention on the
Protection of All Persons from Forced Disappearance, which has been open for signature
and ratification since 6 February 2007.161 This process started in 2001 when the former
Commission on Human Rights requested a study to identify any gaps in the existing
international criminal and human rights framework with a view to drafting a legallybinding normative instrument for the protection of all persons from enforced
disappearance.162 On the basis of the study prepared by an independent expert on the
existing international criminal and human rights framework for the protection of persons
from enforced or involuntary disappearances,163 and with his assistance, the Commission
drafted the International Convention on the Protection of All Persons from Forced
Disappearance, the final text of which was adopted by the Human Rights Council in its
resolution 2006/1. The Convention contains elements necessary for filling the gaps in the
framework of the current protection against enforced disappearances and secret
detentions.

IV. SECRET DETENTION PRACTICES IN THE GLOBAL “WAR ON
TERROR” SINCE 11 SEPTEMBER 2001
98.

In spite of the strong historical role of the United States of America in the

development of international human rights and humanitarian law and its position as a
global leader in the protection of human rights at home and abroad before 2001,
following the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington D.C. on 11 September 2001,
160

Bleier v. Uruguay, communication No. 30/1978, final views of 21 July 1983.
A/RES/61/177
162
Commission on Human Rights resolution 2001/46
163
E/CN.4/2002/71.
161

A/HRC/13/42
Page 47
the United States embarked on a process of reducing and removing various human rights
and other protection mechanisms through various laws and administrative acts including
the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) 164, the USA Patriot Act of 2001, the
Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, the Military Commissions Act of 2006, which sought to
remove habeas corpus rights, as well as various Executive Orders and memoranda issued
by the Office of Legal Counsel that interpreted the USA’s position on a number of issues,
including torture. It also sanctioned the establishment of various classified programmes
much more narrowly than previously.165
99.

The United States Government declared a global “war on terror”, in which

individuals captured around the world were to be held neither as criminal suspects, put
forward for federal court trials in the United States, nor treated as prisoners of war
protected by the Geneva Conventions, irrespective of whether they had been captured on
the battlefield of what could be qualified as an armed conflict in terms of international
humanitarian law. Rather, they were to be treated indiscriminately as “unlawful enemy
combatants,” who could be held indefinitely without charge or trial or the possibility to
challenge the legality of their detention before a court or other judicial authority.
100.

On 7 February 2002, the United States’ President issued a memorandum

declaring that “common Article 3 of Geneva does not apply to either al-Qaeda or Taliban
detainees”; and that Taliban detainees are unlawful combatants and, therefore, do not
qualify as prisoners of war under Article 4 of Geneva”; and that, “because Geneva does
not apply to our conflict with al-Qaeda, al-Qaeda detainees also do not qualify as
prisoners of war”. This unprecedented departure from the Geneva Conventions was to be
offset by a promise that, “As a matter of policy, the United States Armed Forces shall
continue to treat detainees humanely and, to the extent appropriate and consistent with
164

“Joint Resolution: To authorize the use of United States Armed Forces against those responsible for the
recent attacks launched against the United States”, 17 September 2001. This authorized the President “to
use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines
planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on 11 September 2001, or
harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against
the United States by such nations, organizations or persons.
165
A/HRC/6/17/Add.3, para. 3.

A/HRC/13/42
Page 48
military necessity, in a manner consistent with the principles of Geneva”.166 This
detention policy was defended by the United States Government in various submissions
to the United Nations167, including on 10 October 2007, when the U.S. Government stated
that the law of war, and not the ICCPR, was the applicable legal framework governing
the detentions of “enemy combatants”, 168 and therefore such detentions did not fall within
the mandate of the special procedure mandate holders.169
101.

By using this war paradigm, the United States purported to limit the

applicable legal framework of the law of war (International Humanitarian Law) and
exclude any application of human rights law. Even if and when human rights law would
apply, the United States Government was of the view that it was not bound by human
rights law outside the territory of the United States. Therefore, by establishing detention
centres in Guantanamo Bay and other places in the world, the United States was of the
view that human rights law would not be applicable there. Guantanamo and other places
of detention outside the United States territory were intended to be outside the reach of
domestic courts for habeas corpus applications by those held in custody in those places.170
One of the consequences of this policy was that many detainees were kept secretly and
without access to the protection accorded to those in custody, namely the protection of
the Geneva Conventions, international human rights law, the United States Constitution,
and various other domestic laws.
102.

The secret detention policy took many forms. The CIA established its own

secret detention facilities to interrogate so-called ‘High Value Detainees.’ It asked
partners with poor human rights records to secretly detain and interrogate persons on its
behalf. When the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq started, the United States secretly held
persons in battlefield detention sites for prolonged periods of time. This chapter focuses
166

“Memorandum from the President, Subject: Humane Treatment of Taliban and al-Qaeda detainees”, 7
February 2002, http://www.pegc.us/archive/White_House/bush_memo_20020207_ed.pdf.
167
CCPR/C/USA/CO/3/Rev.1/Add.1, p.3; A/HRC/4/41, pars. 453 – 455, A/HRC/4/40, para. 12.
168
CCPR/C/USA/CO/3/Rev.1/Add.1, p.3.
169
CCPR/C/USA/3., par.456 and, similarly, A/HRC/4/40, para. 12.
170
In its October 2007 submission to the HRC, the US Government stated: “The United States takes this
opportunity to reaffirm its long-standing position that the Covenant does not apply extraterritorially”.
CCPR/C/USA/CO/3/Rev.1/Add.1, p.2.

A/HRC/13/42
Page 49
therefore primarily on various secret detention sites and those held there, and it also
highlights examples of complicity of other States.

A.

The “high-value detainee” programme and the CIA’s own secret detention

facilities
103.

On 17 September 2001, President Bush sent a 12-page memorandum to the

Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) through the National Security Council
(NSC) which authorized the Agency to detain terrorists and set up detention facilities
outside the United States.171 Until 2005, when the U.N. sent its first of many
communications regarding this programme to the U.S. Government, little was known
about the extent and the details of the secret detention programme. Only in May 2009 a
definitive number of detainees in the programme could be established. In a released, yet
still redacted, memo then Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General Stephen G.
Bradbury stated that to date the CIA has taken custody of 94 detainees [redacted] and has
employed enhanced techniques to varying degrees in the interrogations of 28 of these
detainees”.172
104.

In his 2007 report on the country visit to the United States, the Special

Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms
while countering terrorism, described what was known at that time of these “enhanced
techniques” and how they were regarded:
As a result of an apparent internal leak from the CIA, the media in the United States
learned and published information about “enhanced interrogation techniques” used
by the CIA in its interrogation of terrorist suspects and possibly other persons held
because of their links with such suspects. Various sources have spoken of
techniques involving physical and psychological means of coercion, including
171

“Sixth Declaration of Marilyn A. Dorn, Information Review Officer, Central Intelligence Agency”, 5
January 2007, http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/safefree/20070110/cia_dorn_declaration_items_1_29_61.pdf.
172
Stephen G. Bradbury, “Memorandum Re: Application of United States Obligations Under Article 16 of
the Convention Against Torture to Certain techniques that May Be Used in the Interrogation of High Value
al-Qaeda Detainees”, 30 May 2005 (footnote, p.5),
http://luxmedia.vo.llnwd.net/o10/clients/aclu/olc_05302005_bradbury.pdf.

A/HRC/13/42
Page 50
stress positions, extreme temperature changes, sleep deprivation, and
“waterboarding” (means by which an interrogated person is made to feel as if
drowning). With reference to the well-established practice of bodies such as the
Human Rights Committee and the Committee against Torture, the Special
Rapporteur concludes that these techniques involve conduct that amounts to a
breach of the prohibition against torture and any form of cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment.173
105.

Several of the 28 detainees who according to Stephen G. Bradbury were

subjected to “enhanced techniques to varying degrees”, were also “High Value
Detainees”. Fourteen persons were transferred from secret CIA custody in an undisclosed
location to confinement at the Defense Department’s detention facility in Guantanamo
Bay, as announced by President Bush on 6 September 2006.174 They were:


Abu Zubaydah (Palestinian), captured in Faisalabad, Pakistan, 28 March 2002.



Ramzi bin al-Shibh (Yemeni), captured in Karachi, Pakistan, 11 September 2002.



Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri (Saudi), captured in the United Arab Emirates, October or
November 2002.



Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (Pakistani), captured in Rawalpindi, Pakistan, 1 March
2003.



Mustafa al-Hawsawi (Saudi), captured with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed in
Rawalpindi, 1 March 2003.



Majid Khan (Pakistani), captured in Karachi, Pakistan, 5 March 2003.



Waleed Mohammed bin Attash (Yemeni), also known as Khallad, captured in
Karachi, Pakistan, 29 April 2003.



Ali Abd al-Aziz Ali (Pakistani) also known as Ammar al-Baluchi, captured with
Waleed bin Attash in Karachi, 29 April 2003.



Mohammed Farik bin Amin (Malaysian), aka Zubair, captured in Bangkok, Thailand,
8 June 2003.

173

A/HRC/6/17/Add.3, para. 33.
“President Discusses Creation of Military Commissions to Try Suspected Terrorists”, 6 September 2006,
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2006/09/20060906-3.html.

174

A/HRC/13/42
Page 51


Riduan Isamuddin (Indonesian), aka Hambali, aka Encep Nuraman, captured in
Ayutthaya, Thailand, 11 August 2003.



Mohammed Nazir bin Lep (Malaysian), aka Lillie, captured in Bangkok, Thailand, 11
August 2003.



Gouled Hassan Dourad (Somali), aka Haned Hassan Ahmad Guleed, captured in
Djibouti, 4 March 2004.



Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani (Tanzanian), captured in Gujrat, Pakistan, 25 July 2004.



Abu Faraj al-Libi (Libyan), aka Mustafa Faraj al-Azibi, captured in Mardan, Pakistan,
2 May 2005.175

106.

However, beyond the transcripts of their Combatant Status Review Tribunals,

held in 2007,176 and the facts reported in Opinion No. 29/2006 (United States of
America), adopted by the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention on 1 September
2006177, the only available source on the conditions in these facilities is a report by the
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) leaked to the media by United States
Government officials178. In spite of the fact that the ICRC report was never officially
published, the Experts have decided to refer to it since information on the fourteen is
scarce and the United States of America, in spite of requests to be allowed to speak to
Guantanamo detainees179, did not authorize them to do so. That report details the
treatment that most of the fourteen described to them during individual interviews and
concluded that: beatings, kicking, confinement in a box, forcible shaving, threats, sleep
deprivation, deprivation/restriction on food provision, stress positions, exposure to cold
temperatures/cold water, suffocation by water, etc. occurred. It stresses that for the entire
detention periods, which ranged from 16 months to more than 3 and a half years, all these
175

Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Opinion No. 29/2006 (United States of America),
A/HRC/4/40/Add.1, p. 103. Pentagon biographies are available here:
http://www.defenselink.mil/pdf/detaineebiographies1.pdf.
176
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Combatant_Tribunals.html.
177
A/HRC/4/40/Add.1, p. 103.
178
ICRC report on the treatment of fourteen “High Value Detainees” in CIA custody transmitted on 14
February 2007.http://www.nybooks.com/icrc-report.pdf.
179
E.g. letters sent by the four Experts of 5 and 28 August 2009; see also letters sent by the Special
Rapporteur on human rights and counter-terrorism dated 20 March 2007, 13 July 2007, and 18 May 2009;
and letter of the Special Rapporteur on torture’s predecessor of 30 January 2004 and several reminders, of
which the latest was dated 1 July 2009;

A/HRC/13/42
Page 52
persons were held in solitary confinement and incommunicado detention. It noted that
“They had no knowledge of where they were being held, no contact with persons other
than their interrogators or guards.”180 The ICRC concluded that
“twelve of the fourteen alleged that they were subjected to systematic physical
and/or psychological ill-treatment. This was a consequence of both the treatment
and the material conditions which formed part of the interrogation regime, as well
as the overall detention regime. This regime was clearly designed to undermine
human dignity and to create a sense of futility by inducing, in many cases, severe
physical and mental pain and suffering, with the aim of obtaining compliance and
extracting information, resulting in exhaustion, depersonalization and
dehumanization. The allegations of ill-treatment of the detainees indicate that, in
many cases, the ill-treatment to which they were subjected while held in the CIA
program, either singly, or in combination, constituted torture. In addition, many
other elements of the Ill-treatment, either singly or in combination, constituted
cruel inhuman or degrading treatment.”181
107.

Despite the September 2006 acknowledgement by President Bush of the

existence of secret CIA detention facilities, the United States Government and the
Governments of the States that hosted these facilities have generally refused to disclose
their location or even existence. The specifics of the secret sites have, for the most part,
been revealed through off-the-record disclosures.
108.

In November 2005, for example, the Washington Post referred to “current and

former intelligence officers and two other US Government officials” as sources for the
contention that there had been a secret CIA black site or safe house in Thailand, “which
included underground interrogation cells”. 182 One month later ABC news reported on the
basis of testimonies from “current and former CIA officers” that Abu Zubaydah was
“whisked by the CIA to Thailand where he was housed in a small, disused warehouse on
180

ICRC report on the treatment of fourteen “High Value Detainees” in CIA custody transmitted on 14
February 2007, pp 7, 8 http://www.nybooks.com/icrc-report.pdf
181
ibid. p. 26;
182
Dana Priest, “CIA Holds Terror Suspects In Secret Prisons”, Washington Post, 2 November 2005,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/11/01/AR2005110101644.html.

A/HRC/13/42
Page 53
an active airbase. There, his cell was kept under 24-hour closed circuit TV surveillance
and his life-threatening wounds were tended to by a CIA doctor specially sent from
Langley headquarters to assure Abu Zubaydah was given proper care, sources said. Once
healthy, he was slapped, grabbed, made to stand long hours in a cold cell, and finally
handcuffed and strapped feet up to a water board until after 0.31 seconds he begged for
mercy and began to cooperate.”183 The details of Abu Zubaydah’s treatment have been
confirmed by his initial FBI-interrogator, who has not confirmed or denied that the
location where Abu Zubaydah was held was in Thailand.184 The Washington Post also
reported that the officials had stated that Ramzi Binalshibh had been flown to Thailand
after his capture.185 “According to accounts from five former and current government
officials who were briefed on the case”, the New York Times again said in 2006 that Abu
Zubaydah was held in Thailand.186In January 2008, Asia Times reported that political
analysts and diplomats in Thailand suspected that the detention facility was “situated at a
military base in the northeastern province of Udon Thani.”187
109.

The sources of the Washington Post stated that after “published reports

revealed the existence of the site in June 2003, Thai officials insisted the CIA shut it
down”.188 The New York Times alleged later that local officials were said to be growing
uneasy about “a black site outside Bangkok code-named Cat’s Eye” and that this was a
reason for the CIA to want “its own, more permanent detention centers”.189

183

Brian Ross and Richard Esposito, Exclusive: Sources tell ABC news top al Qaeda figures held in secret
CIA Prisons, 5 December 2005, http://abcnews.go.com/WNT/Investigation/story?id=1375123
184
"Former FBI Agent: Enhanced Interrogation Techniques 'Ineffective, Harmful'". ABC news 13 April
2009; http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/story?id=7577631&page=1
185
Dana Priest, “CIA Holds Terror Suspects In Secret Prisons”, Washington Post, 2 November 2005,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/11/01/AR2005110101644.html.
186
David Johnston, At a secret interrogation, dispute flared over tactics, in The New York Times, 10
September 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/10/washington/10detain.html
187
Shawn W. Crispin, “US and Thailand: Allies in Torture”, Asia Times, 25 January 2008,
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/JA25Ae01.html.
188
Dana Priest, “CIA Holds Terror Suspects In Secret Prisons”, Washington Post, 2 November 2005,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/11/01/AR2005110101644.html.
189
David Johnston and Mark Mazzetti, Interrogation inc: A window into CIA's embrace of secret jails, in
The New York Times, 12 August 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/13/world/13foggo.html?
_r=2&ref=global-home

A/HRC/13/42
Page 54
110.

In 2008, the Washington Post described on the basis of interviews with “more

than two dozen current and former U.S. officials” how a 'classified cable' was sent
between the CIA station chief in Bangkok and his superiors “asking if he could destroy
videotapes recorded at a secret CIA prison in Thailand (…) from August to December
2002 to demonstrate that interrogators were following the detailed rules set by lawyers
and medical experts in Washington, and were not causing a detainee's death.” The Post
said further that “several of the inspector general's deputies traveled to Bangkok to view
the tapes.” 190The Office of the Inspector General (OIG) reviewed 92 videotapes in May
2003, 12 of which included “enhanced interrogation techniques” and identified 83
waterboarding sessions on Abu Zubaydah at a ‘foreign site’. From the OIG report it
seems that Abu Zubaydah and Abd al-Rahim Al-Nashiri were detained and interrogated
at the same place. 191 This information cannot be verified as the location of the
interrogation is redacted in the report of the CIA officer general, although independent
sources informed the Experts that the facility was indeed in Thailand, and that it was
known as "the Cat's Eye”. The videotapes were however destroyed in November 2005 by
the CIA and, according to the New York Times, the tapes had been held "in a safe at the
C.I.A. station in Thailand, the country where two detainees — Abu Zubaydah and Abd
al-Rahim al-Nashiri — were interrogated."192
111.

In its submission for this study the Government of Thailand denies the

existence of a secret detention facility in Thailand in 2002-2003, stating that international
and local media have visited the suspected places and found no evidence of that such a
facility existed on Thai soil. In light of the detailed nature of the allegations, however, the
Experts take it as credible that a CIA black site existed in Thailand, and calls for the
domestic authorities to launch an independent investigation into the matter.

Joby Warrick and Walter Pincus, Station chief made appeal to destroy CIA tapes', at the Washington
Post, 16 January 2008, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2008/01/15/AR2008011504090.html
191
CIA Inspector General, SPECIAL REVIEW; “Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities
(September 2001 – October 2003), (2003-7123-IG), 7 May 2004, unclassified version released 24 August
2009, par.74 and 91.
192
Mark Mazzetti, “US Says CIA Destroyed 92 Tapes of Interrogations”, New York Times, 2 March 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/03/washington/03web-intel.html.
190

A/HRC/13/42
Page 55
112.

In June 2007, in a report for the Council of Europe, rapporteur Dick Marty

stated that he had enough “evidence to state that secret detention facilities run by the CIA
did exist in Europe from 2003 to 2005, in particular in Poland and Romania.”193 His
report drew on testimony from over 30 current and former members of intelligence
services in the US and Europe. According to Marty the Romanian “black site” was
allegedly in force between 2003 and the second half of 2005. Marty also noted that “the
majority of the detainees brought to Romania were, according to our sources, extracted
‘out of [the] theater of conflict’. This phrase is understood as a reference to detainee
transfers originating from Afghanistan and, later, Iraq”.194 Former US intelligence
officials disclosed to the New York Times in August 2009, that Kyle D. Foggo, at that
time head of the CIA's main European supply base in Frankfurt, oversaw the construction
of three CIA detention centers, "each built to house about a half-dozen detainees” and.
they added that "one jail was a renovated building on a busy street in Bucharest,
Romania."195
113.

While the identities of many detainees who were held in these facilities have

not been revealed yet, it is known that on or about April 24, 2004, Mr. Mohammad alAsad (see para. 132) was transferred with at least two other persons from Afghanistan to
an unknown, modern facility apparently run by U.S. officials, which was carefully
designed to induce maximum disorientation, dependence and stress in the detainees.
Descriptions of the facility and its detention regime were given by Mr. al-Asad to
Amnesty International, which established that he was held at the same place as two other
Yemeni men, Mr. Salah‘Ali and Mr. Mohamed Farag Ahmad Bashmilah.196 Based on
research into flight durations and the observations of Mr. al-Asad, Mr. Salah‘Ali, and Mr.
Bashmilah, this facility was likely located in Eastern Europe. Mr. al-Asad was held in a
193

Dick Marty, “Secret detentions and illegal transfers of detainees involving Council of Europe member
states: second report”, Council of Europe, Doc. 11302 rev., 11 June 2007,
http://assembly.coe.int/Documents/WorkingDocs/Doc07/edoc11302.pdf.
194
Idem.
195
David Johnston and Mark Mazzetti, Interrogation inc: A window into CIA's embrace of secret jails, in
The New York Times, 12 August 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/13/world/13foggo.html?
_r=2&ref=global-home
196
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AMR51/177/2005/en/3bbac635-d493-11dd-8a23d58a49c0d652/amr511772005en.html,

A/HRC/13/42
Page 56
rectangular cell approximately 3.5 meters by 2.5 meters in which he was chained to the
floor in the corner of the cell. The first night, Mr. al-Asad was kept naked in his cell.
The cell included one speaker, which played noise similar to an engine or machine, and
two cameras. For most of his time in this facility, the light in the cell in which he was
held was kept on all night. At one point in this facility, Mr. al-Asad met with a man who
identified himself as the prison director and said he had just flown in from Washington.
Similary, Mr. Bashmilah described how the facility where he was hold was much more
modern than the one in Afghanistan. White noise was blasted into his cell, the light was
kept on constantly, and he was kept shackled. The guards in this facility were dressed
completely in black, including black face masks, and communicated to one another only
with hand gestures. The interrogators spoke to each other in English and referred to
information arriving from Washington.197 On March 5, 2005, the United States informed
Yemen that Mr. Bashmilah was in American custody. On May 5, 2005, Mr. Bashmilah
was transferred to Yemen, along with two other Yemeni nationals: Mohammed Abdullah
Saleh al-Asad and Salah Naser Salem Ali Darwish.
114.

In Poland, eight HVDs were allegedly held between 2003 and 2005 in the

village of Stare Kiejkuty, including Abu Zubaydah, Khalid Sheikh Mohamed, Ramzi bin
al-Shibh, Tawfiq [Waleed] bin Attash and Ahmed Khalfan [al-] Ghailani.198 In the leaked
ICRC report Khalid Sheik Mohamed described that he knew he was in Poland when he
received a bottle of water with a Polish label.199 According to ABC news200 Hassan Gul201
197

Declaration of Mohamed Farag Ahmad Bashmilah in support of plaintiffs' opposition to the United
States' motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment, Civil Action No. 5:07-cv-02798 in
the US District Court for the Northern District of California, San Jose Division. See also
http://www.chrgj.org/projects/docs/survivingthedarkness.pdf pp. 34-35.
198
Dick Marty, “Secret detentions and illegal transfers of detainees involving
Council of Europe member states: second report”, Council of Europe, 11 June 2007, available at: p. 25.
Marty also noted, “a single CIA source told us that there were ‘up to a dozen’ HVDs in Poland in 2005, but
we were unable to confirm this number”.
199
ICRC report on the treatment of fourteen “High Value Detainees” in CIA custody transmitted on 14
February 2007, pp.34-35., http://www.nybooks.com/icrc-report.pdf.
200
Brian Ross and Richard Esposito, “EXCLUSIVE: Sources Tell ABC News Top Al Qaeda Figures Held
in Secret CIA Prisons”, 5 December 2005, http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/Investigation/story?id=1375123.
201
Stephen G. Bradbury, “Memorandum Re: Application of United States Obligations Under Article 16 of
the Convention Against Torture to Certain techniques that May Be Used in the Interrogation of High Value
al-Qaeda Detainees”, 30 May 2005, p. 7,
http://luxmedia.vo.llnwd.net/o10/clients/aclu/olc_05302005_bradbury.pdf. Ghul was reportedly transferred
to Pakistani custody in 2006

A/HRC/13/42
Page 57
and Mohammed Omar Abdel-Rahman202, were in 2005 also detained in the facility in
Poland. Later the Polish press said that the Polish authorities – during the term of office
of President Aleksander Kwaśniewski and Prime Minister Leszek Miller – had assigned
a team of 'around a dozen' intelligence officers to cooperate with the US on Polish soil
thereby putting them under exclusive US control and had permitted US ‘special purpose
planes’ to land on the territory of Poland.203 The existence of the facility has always been
denied by the Polish government and press reports have indicated that it is unclear what
Polish authorities knew about the facility.
115.

While denying that any terrorists had been detained in Poland, the landing of

CIA flights was confirmed by Zbigniew Siemiątkowski, head of the Polish Intelligence
Agency (AW) in the period 2002-2004.204 Earlier the Marty report did include
information from civil aviation records revealing how CIA-operated planes used for
detainee transfers landed at Szymany airport, near the town of Szczytno, in WarmiaMazuria province in north eastern Poland, and to the Mihail Kogalniceanu military
airfield in Romania between 2003 and 2005. The report also explained how flights to
Poland were disguised using fake flight plans.205
116.

In research undertaken for this study, complex aeronautical data, including

“data strings”,206 retrieved and analyzed, have added further to this picture of flights
202

Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Opinion No. 29/2006 (United States of America),
A/HRC/4/40/Add.1, p. 103, at para. 15; “Two Other Top Al-Qaeda Operatives Nabbed”, Associated Press,
4 March 2003, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,80170,00.html.
203
Edyta Żemła, Mariusz Kowalewski, 'Polski wywiad w służbie CIA' in Rzeczpospolita, 15 April 2009.
204
Adam Krzykowski , Mariusz Kowalewski, 'Politycy przeczą'
in Rzeczpospolita, 15 April 2009.
205
Dick Marty, “Secret detentions and illegal transfers of detainees involving
Council of Europe member states: second report”, Council of Europe, 11 June 2007,
http://assembly.coe.int/Documents/WorkingDocs/Doc07/edoc11302.pdf.
206
“Data strings” are exchanges of messages or digital data (mostly in the form of coded text and numbers)
between different entities around the world on aeronautical telecommunications networks. “Data strings”
record all communications filed in relation to each particular aircraft as its flights are planned in advance,
and as it flies between different international locations. The filings of initial flight plans come from diverse
entities, including aviation service providers, ANS (Air Navigation Services) authorities, airport authorities
and government agencies. Specialist operators of the Integrated Initial Flight Plan Processing System
(IFPS) process each message, circulate it to relevant “third parties” and reply to the entity that sent it, in the
form of an “Operational Reply”. The messages sent by these “IFPS operators” are also recorded in “data
strings”.

A/HRC/13/42
Page 58
disguised using fake flight plans (and also using front companies). For example, a flight
from Bangkok, Thailand to Szymany, Poland on 5 December 2002 (stopping at Dubai)
was identified, which was disguised under multiple layers of secrecy, including charter
and sub-contracting arrangements that would avoid there being any discernible
“fingerprints” of a US Government operation, as well as the filing of “dummy” flight
plans. The Experts were made aware of the role of the CIA’s chief aviation contractor
through sources in the United States. The modus operandi was to charter private aircraft
from among a wide variety of companies across the US, on short-term leases to match the
specific needs of the CIA’s Air Branch. Through retrieval and analysis of aeronautical
data, including data strings, it is possible to connect the aircraft N63MU with three
named US corporations, each of which provided cover in a different set of aviation
records for the December 2002 operation. The aircraft’s owner was and remains
“International Group LLC”; its registered operator for the period in question was “First
Flight Management”; and its registered user in the records of Eurocontrol's Central Route
Charges Office (CRCO), which handles the payment of bills, was “Universal Weather”.
Nowhere in the aviation records generated by this aircraft is there any explicit recognition
that it carried out a mission associated with the CIA. Research for this study also made
clear that the aviation services provider Universal Trip Support Services filed multiple
“dummy” flight plans for the aircraft N63MU in the period from 3 to 6 December
2002.The CIA Inspector General's report discussed the interrogations of Abu Zubaydah
and Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri. Two US sources with knowledge of the HVD programme
informed the Experts that a passage revealing that "[e]nhanced interrogation of AlNashiri continued through 4 December 2002" and another, partially redacted, which
stated, "However, after being moved [redacted] Al-Nashiri was thought to have been
withholding information", indicate that it was at this time that he was rendered to Poland.
The passages are partially redacted because they explicitly state the facts of Al-Nashiri’s
rendition – details which remain classified as “Top Secret”. 207

207

CIA Inspector General, SPECIAL REVIEW; “Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities
(September 2001 – October 2003), (2003-7123-IG), 7 May 2004, unclassified version released 24 August
2009, par. 76 and 224.

A/HRC/13/42
Page 59
117.

Using a similar analysis of complex aeronautical data, including “data

strings”, the research was further able to demonstrate that a Boeing 737 aircraft,
registered with the FAA as N313P, flew to Romania in September 2003. The aircraft
embarked from Dulles Airport in Washington, DC on Saturday 20 September 2003 and
undertook a four-day flight “circuit”, during which it landed in and departed from six
different foreign territories – the Czech Republic, Uzbekistan, Afghanistan, Poland,
Romania and Morocco – as well as Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Focus was also placed on a
flight between the two listed European “black site” locations – i.e. from Szymany, Poland
to Bucharest, Romania – on the night of 22 September 2003, although it was conceivable
that as many as five consecutive individual routes on this circuit – beginning in Tashkent,
concluding in Guantanamo – may have involved transfers of detainees in the custody of
the CIA. The Experts were not able to identify any definitive evidence of a detainee
transfer into Romania that took place prior to this flight circuit.
118.

In its response to the questionnaire sent by the Experts, Poland stated that “on

11 March 2008 the District Prosecutor’s Office in Warsaw instituted proceedings on the
alleged existence of so-called secret CIA detention facilities in Poland as well as the
illegal transport and detention of persons suspected of terrorism. On 1 April 2009, as
result of the reorganization of the Public Prosecutor’s Office the investigation was
referred to the Appellate Prosecutor Office in Warsaw. In the course of investigation the
prosecutors gathered evidence which is considered as classified or secret. In order to
secure the proper course of proceedings the prosecutors who conduct the investigation are
bound by the confidentiality of the case. In this connection it is impossible to present any
information regarding the findings of the investigation. Once the proceedings are
completed and its results and findings are made public the Government of Poland will
present and submit all necessary or requested information to any international body.”
While the Experts appreciate the fact that an investigation has started into the existence of
secret detentions in Poland, they are concerned about the lack of transparency into this
investigation. After 18 months still nothing is known about the exact scope of the
investigation, but the Experts expect that any such investigation would not be limited to

A/HRC/13/42
Page 60
the question whether Polish officials created an ‘extraterritorial zone’ in Poland but also
whether officials were aware that ‘enhanced interrogation techniques’ were applied there.
119.

In its response to the questionnaire sent by the Experts, Romania provided a

copy of the report of the Inquiring Committee of the Romanian Parliament concerning
the investigation of the statements regarding the existence of some CIA imprisonment
centers or of some flights of aircrafts hired by CIA on the territory of Romania. The
conclusions of the inquiry are:
- “The suppositions of Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International are not
confirmed; the same for those of American and European Officials as regard
organization and working of CIA secret detention centers in Bucharest and Timisoara,
where it is supposed the prisoners were subject to savage treatments or tortures;
- All the foreigners, including the military personnel getting off aircraft on the
Romanian territory were checked-in by authorities with duties in the field of human
rights watch, having in view the legal border crossing;
- A supposition cannot be completely excluded: that of air transfer of prisoners
suspected of terrorism, when, after landing, they did not leave the foreign aircraft that
were in transit and are subject to non-national regulations and law.”
120.

Concerning Europe, most recently, ABC news broke the story that Lithuanian

officials provided the CIA with a building where as many as eight terrorist suspects were
held for more than a year, until late 2005 when they were moved because of public
disclosures about the program. 208 More details emerged in November 2009 when ABC
News reported that the facility was built inside an exclusive riding academy in Antaviliai.
209

Research for this study including “data strings” relating to Lithuania, appears to

confirm that Lithuania was incorporated into the secret detention programme in
2004.Two flights from Afghanistan to Vilnius could be identified. The first, from
208

Matthew Cole, Officials: Lithuania Hosted Secret CIA Prison To Get "Our Ear", in ABC News, 20
August 2009, http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/story?id=8373807. See also Dick Marty: time for Europe to
come clean once and for all over secret detentions, 21 August 2009,
http://assembly.coe.int/ASP/NewsManager/EMB_NewsManagerView.asp?ID=4859&L=2
209
Matthew Cole and Brian Ross: CIA Secret 'Torture' Prison Found at Fancy Horseback Riding Academy.
In ABC News Finds the Location of a "Black Site" for Alleged Terrorists in Lithuania; Nov. 18, 2009;
http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/cia-secret-prison-found/story?id=9115978

A/HRC/13/42
Page 61
Bagram, took place on 20 September 2004, the same date that ten detainees previously
held in secret detention, in a variety of countries, were flown to Guantanamo, and the
second, from Kabul, took place on 28 July 2005. The “dummy” flight plans filed in
respect of flights into Vilnius customarily used airports of destination in different
countries altogether, excluding any mention of a Lithuanian airport as an alternate or
back-up landing point.
121.

On 25 August 2009, the President of Lithuania announced that her

Government will investigate allegations that Lithuania hosted a secret detention facility.
On 5 November 2009, the Lithuanian Parliament started an investigation into the
allegation of the existence of a CIA secret detention on Lithuanian territory. In its
submission for this study, the Government of Lithuania provided the then draft findings
of this investigation, which in the meantime were adopted by the full Parliament. In its
findings, the Seimas Committee on National Security and Defence stated that the
Lithuanian State Security Department (SSD) had received requests to “equip facilities in
Lithuania suitable for holding detainees.” In relation to the first facility, the Committee
found that “conditions were created for holding detainees in Lithuania”. The Committee
could not conclude however that the premises were also used for that purpose.” In
relation to the second facility, the Committee found that “the persons who gave testimony
to the Committee deny any preconditions for and possibilities of holding and
interrogating detainees […] however, the layout of the building, its enclosed nature and
protection of the perimeter as well as fragmented presence of the SSD staff in the
premises allowed for the performance of actions by officers of the partners without the
control of the SSD and use of the infrastructure at their discretion.” The report further
stated that there was no evidence that the State Security Department had informed the
President, Prime Minister or other political leaders of the purposes and contents of its
cooperation with the CIA regarding these two premises.
122.

While the Experts welcome the work of the Seimas committee as an

important starting point in the quest for truth about what role Lithuania played in the
secret detention and rendition programme, they stress that its findings can in no way

A/HRC/13/42
Page 62
constitute the final word on Lithuania’s role in the programme. Rightly, on 14 January
2010, the country’s President Dalia Grybauskaite has urged Lithuanian prosecutors to
launch a deeper investigation into secret CIA black sites held on the country’s territory
without parliamentary approval.210
123.

The Experts stress that all European governments are obliged under the

European Convention of Human Rights to investigate effectively allegations of torture or
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.211 The failure to effectively
investigate might lead to a situation of grave impunity and is injurious to the victims,
their next of kin and society as a whole, and fosters chronic recidivism of the human
rights violations involved. The experts also note that the European Court of Human
Rights has applied the test of whether “the authorities reacted effectively to the
complaints at the relevant time.”212A thorough investigation should be capable of leading
to the identification and punishment of those responsible for any ill treatment; it “must be
‘effective’ in practice as well as in law, in particular in the sense that its exercise must not
be unjustifiably hindered by the acts or the omissions of the authorities”.213 Furthermore,
according to the European Court, authorities must always make a serious attempt to find
out what happened214 and “should not rely on hasty or ill-founded conclusions to close
their investigation or as the basis of their decisions.”215
124.

According to two top government officials at the time, revelations about the

existence of detention facilities in Eastern Europe in late 2005 by the Washington Post
and ABC News led the CIA to close its facilities in Lithuania and Romania and move the
al Qaeda detainees out of Europe. It is not known where these persons were transferred;
they could have been moved into ‘war zone facilities’ in Iraq and Afghanistan216, or to
another black site, potentially in Africa. The experts were not able to find the exact
210

See, http://en.rian.ru/exsoviet/20100114/157539192.html.
See for example, Assenov et al v. Bulgaria (1999) 28 E.H.R.R. 652.
212
Labita v Italy, Application no. 26772/95 (Judgment of 6 April 2000), para. 131
213
Aksoy v. Turkey, Judgement of December 1996, para 95; Kaya v. Turkey, Judgment of 19 February
1998, para 106.
214
Timurtas v. Turkey (2001) 33 E.H.R.R. 6 ECHR, para.88.
215
Assenov v. Bulgaria, Judgement of 28 October 1998, para. 104.
216
Idem.
211

A/HRC/13/42
Page 63
destination of the 16 ‘High Value Detainees’ between December 2005 and their move to
Guantanamo in September 2006. No other explanation has been provided for the
whereabouts of the “high-value detainees” before they were moved to Guantanamo in
September 2006.
125.

Other locations have been mentioned as the venues for secret detention

facilities outside territories under US control (or operated jointly with US military). The
first is Guantanamo, which was mentioned by the US officials who spoke to the
Washington Post in 2005, when it was reported that the detention facility had existed “on
the grounds of the military prison at Guantanamo Bay”, but that “sometime in 2004 the
CIA decided it had to give [it] up … The CIA had planned to convert it into a state-ofthe-art facility, operated independently of the military [but] pulled out when US courts
began to exercise greater control over the military detainees, and agency officials feared
judges would soon extend the same type of supervision over their detainees”.217 Most
recently former Guantanamo Bay guards have described "an unnamed and officially
unacknowledged” compound nestled out of sight from the main road between two
plateaus about a mile north of Camp Delta, just outside Camp America’s perimeter with
the access road chained off. The unacknowledged "Camp No" is described as having had
no guard towers and being surrounded with concertina wire, with one part of the
compound having "the same appearance as the interrogation centers at other prison
camps." At this point it is unclear whether this facility was run by the CIA or the Joint
Special Operations Command. The Experts are very concerned about the possibility that
three Guantanamo detainees (Salah Ahmed Al-Salami, Mani Shaman Al-Utaybi and
Yasser Talal Al-Zahrani) might have died during interrogations at this facility, instead of
in their own cells, on 9 June 2006.218
126.

There have also been claims that the United States used two military bases in

the Balkans for secret detention: Camp Bondsteel in Kosovo and Eagle Base in Tuzla,
217

Dana Priest, “CIA Holds Terror Suspects In Secret Prisons”, Washington Post, 2 November 2005,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/11/01/AR2005110101644.html.
218
Scott Horton, The Guantánamo “Suicides”: A Camp Delta sergeant blows the whistle, Harper's
Magazine, 18 January 2010, available at http://www.harpers.org/archive/2010/01/hbc-90006368

A/HRC/13/42
Page 64
Bosnia. In November 2005, Council of Europe Human Rights Commissioner Alvaro GilRobles told Le Monde that the US military ran a Guantanamo-type detention centre in
Camp Bondsteel. He said he had been "shocked" by conditions at the centre, which he
witnessed in 2002, and which, he said, resembled "a smaller version of Guantanamo”219.
In December 2005, the UN Ombudsman in Kosovo, Marek Antoni Nowicki, also spoke
about Camp Bondsteel, "There can be no doubt that for years there has been a prison in
the Bondsteel base with no external civilian or judicial oversight. The prison looks like
the pictures we have seen of Guantanamo Bay". Nowicki said that he visited Camp
Bondsteel in late 2000 and early 2001 when it was the main detention center for KFOR,
the NATO-led peace-keeping force, but explained that he had had no access to the base
since 2001220. The U.S. base in Tuzla, was allegedly used to ‘process’ 8 detainees,
including Nihad Karsic and Almin Hardaus. Around the 25th of September 2001 Nihad
Karsic and Almin Hardaus were arrested at work and taken to Butmir Base and then to
Eagle Base, Tuzla, where they allegedly have been held in secret detention. The men say
they were held in solitary confinement, forcibly stripped naked, forcibly kept awake,
repeatedly beaten, being verbally harassed, deprived of food and photographed.221
127.

There were further developments in 2009. In October 2009, three of the

Experts sent a letter to the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom222,
Pakistan and the Syrian Arab Republic regarding Mr. Mustafa Setmariam Nassar, aged
42, a Spanish citizen of Syrian origin and author of a number of books and other
publications on Islam and “jihad”. They pointed to allegations received that “On an
unknown date in October 2005, [he] was apprehended in Pakistan by forces of the
Pakistani intelligence on suspicion of having been involved in a number of terrorist
attacks, including the 11 September 2001 attacks against the United States and the 11
March 2004 bombings in Madrid. He was detained in Pakistan for a certain period of
219

“Une « prison secrète » américaine a existé dans un camp de l'OTAN au Kosovo”, Le monde, 26
novembre 2005.
220
“Questions Arise Over US Base in Kosovo”, Deutsche Welle, 10 December 2005, http://www.dwworld.de/dw/article/0,,1810615,00.html”
221
Cageprisoners, 'Citizens no More - War on terror abuses in Bosnia and Herzegovina', July 2007,
available at http://www.cageprisoners.com/citizensnomore.pdf
222

UK response included in A/HRC/13/39/Add.1

A/HRC/13/42
Page 65
time accused of involvement in both incidents. He was then handed over to authorities of
the United States of America. While no official news of Mr. Nassar’s whereabouts has
been received since his apprehension in October 2005, it is alleged that in November
2005, he was held for some time at a military base facility under United States of
America authority in Diego Garcia. It is now assumed that he is currently being held in
secret detention in the Syrian Arab Republic. […] Official United States of America
documents and web postings, as well as media reports, indicate that the United States of
America authorities had been interested in Mr. Mustafa Setmariam Nassar before his
disappearance in 2005.[…] In June 2009, in response to a request made through Interpol
by a Spanish Judge for information relating to Mr. Mustafa Setmariam Nassar’s
whereabouts, the FBI informed that Mr. Nassar was not in the United States of America
at that time. The FBI did not, however, address whether Mr. Nassar may be held in
United States of America custody elsewhere or whether it knew where he was then held.
Following queries by non-governmental organizations as to the whereabouts of Mr.
Mustafa Setmariam Nassar, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) responded on 10 June
2009 stating that “the CIA can neither confirm nor deny the existence or nonexistence of
records responsive to your request” and that even if the CIA was in a position to answer
the request that the records would be classified and protected from disclosure by United
States laws.223 According to Reprieve, Mr. Nassar may have been transferred to Syrian
custody.224 According to the Government of the United Kingdom, it has received
assurances from the United States that it has not interrogated any terrorist suspect or
terrorism-related detainee in Diego Garcia in any case since 11 September 2001, and that
the allegations of a CIA holding facility on the island are false. The Government of the
United Kingdom is therefore confident that the allegations that Mr. Nassar was held on
Diego Garcia are inaccurate.
128.

Following the transfer of the 14 “high-value detainees” from CIA custody to

Guantanamo, President Bush announced the closure of the CIA’s “high-value detainee
223

Joint Urgent Appeal sent on 2 October 2009 to be reflected in the forthcoming communications reports
of the Special Rapporteurs on Torture and Counter-terrorism;
224
Letters of 3 August 2009 addressed to the Special Rapporteurs on torture and on human rights and
counter-terrorism and to the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances from Reprieve,
American Civil Liberties Union and Alkarama;

A/HRC/13/42
Page 66
programme” in a major speech on 6 September 2006. He immediately stressed that “as
more high-ranking terrorists are captured, the need to obtain intelligence from them will
remain critical – and having a CIA program for questioning terrorists will continue to be
crucial to getting life-saving information”.225 Later in 2006 and 2007 he further indicated
that ‘the CIA interrogation and detention program’ would continue.226 Subsequent events
support this claim as the Defense Department announced in 2007 and 2008 the transfer of
high value detainees from CIA custody to Guantanamo.
129.

The US Defense Department announced on 27 April 2007, that another “high-

value detainee”, Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi, described as “a high-level member of al-Qaeda”,
had been transferred to Guantanamo.227 On the same day, Bryan Whitman, a Pentagon
spokesman, said that he “was transferred to Defense Department custody this week from
the CIA”, although he “would not say where or when al-Iraqi was captured or by whom”.
However, a US intelligence official stated that al-Iraqi “had been captured late last year
in an operation that involved many people in more than one country”.228 Another “highvalue detainee”, Muhammad Rahim, an Afghan described as “a close associate of Osama
bin Laden”, was transferred to Guantanamo on 14 March 2008. In a press release, the
Defense Department stated, “Prior to his arrival at Guantanamo Bay, he was held in CIA
custody.”229 According to reports in Pakistani newspapers, he was captured in Lahore in
August 2007.230

225

“President Discusses Creation of Military Commissions to Try Suspected Terrorists”, 6 September 2006,
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2006/09/20060906-3.html.
226
“President Bush Signs Military Commissions Act of 2006”, 17 October 2006, http://georgewbushwhitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2006/10/20061017-1.html. Executive Order 13440: Interpretation
of the Geneva Conventions Common Article 3 as Applied to a Program of Detention and Interrogation
Operated by the Central Intelligence Agency”, July 20, 2007, http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/2007/pdf/073656.pdf.
227
“Defense Department Takes Custody of a High-Value Detainee”, 27 April 2007,:
http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=10792.
228
“Pentagon: Senior Al-Qaeda Operative Caught”, USA Today, 27 April 2007,
http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2007-04-27-alqaeda-capture_N.htm.
229
“Defense Department Takes Custody Of A High-Value Detainee”, 14 March 2008,
http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=11758.
230
Mark Mazzetti, “CIA Secretly Held Qaeda Suspect, Officials Say”, New York Times, 15 March 2008,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/15/washington/15detain.html.

A/HRC/13/42
Page 67
130.

The United States Government provided no further details about where these

men had been held before their transfer to Guantanamo, but although it is probable that
Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi was held in another country, in a prison to which the CIA had access
(it was reported in March 2009 that he “was captured by a foreign security service in
2006” and then handed over to the CIA231), the Defense Department itself made it clear
that the CIA had been holding Muhammad Rahim, indicating that some sort of CIA
“black site” was still operating.

B.

CIA detention facilities or facilities operated jointly with US military in

battlefield zones
131.

Although it is still not possible to identify all 28 of the CIA’s acknowledged

“high-value detainees”, it appears, from the figures quoted in the OLC memo of 30 May
2005 written by Stephen G. Bradbury,232 that the other 66 prisoners in the CIA
programme were regarded as less significant. Some of these prisoners were subsequently
handed over to the US military, and were transferred to Guantanamo, while others were
rendered to the custody of their home countries or other countries. In very few cases, they
were released.

1. Afghanistan
132.

Outside of the specific “high-value detainee” programme, most detainees

were held in a variety of prisons in Afghanistan. Three of these are well-known: a secret
prison within Bagram airbase, reportedly identified as “The Hangar”233; and two secret
prisons near Kabul, known as the “Dark Prison” and the “Salt Pit.” During an interview

231

Eric Schmitt and Mark Mazzetti, “US Relies More on Aid of Allies in Terror Cases”, New York Times,
23 May 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/24/world/24intel.html.
232
Stephen G. Bradbury, “Memorandum Re: Application of United States Obligations Under Article 16 of
the Convention Against Torture to Certain techniques that May Be Used in the Interrogation of High Value
al-Qaeda Detainees”, 30 May 2005 (footnote, p.5),
http://luxmedia.vo.llnwd.net/o10/clients/aclu/olc_05302005_bradbury.pdf.
233
“CIA Rendition: The Smoking Gun Cable”, ABC News, 6 November 2007,
http://blogs.abcnews.com/theblotter/2007/11/cia-rendition-t.html. See, also, interview with Murat Kurnaz.

A/HRC/13/42
Page 68
held with the experts, Bisher al-Rawi 234 indicated that in the Dark Prison there were no
lights, heating or decoration. His cell was about 5x9 feet with a solid steel door and a
hatch towards the bottom of it. He only had a bucket to use as a toilet, an old piece of
carpet, and a rusty steel bar across the width of the cell to hang people from. All the
guards wore hoods with small eye holes and they never spoke. Very loud music was
played continuously. He also indicated that he was subjected to sleep deprivation for up
to three days and received threats. Binyam Mohamed provided a similar account to the
experts, as well as the lawyer of Mr. Khaled El-Masri and Mr. Suleiman Abdallah.235.
The Experts heard allegations about three lesser-known prisons including a prison in the
Panjshir valley, north of Kabul, and two other prisons identified as Rissat and Rissat 2,
but it was not yet possible to verify these allegations. Of the prisoners identified as
having been held in secret CIA custody (in addition to the “high-value detainees”
mentioned above), seven were eventually released, four escaped from Bagram in July
2005, namely Abu Yahya al-Libi, a Libyan; Omar al-Faruq, a Kuwaiti, captured in
Bogor, Indonesia in 2002; Muhammad Jafar Jamal al-Kahtani, a Saudi, who was
reportedly captured in Khost province, Afghanistan in November 2006; and Abdullah
Hashimi, a Syrian, aka Abu Abdullah al-Shami,236 and five were reportedly returned to
the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya in 2006 (Ibn al-Sheikh al-Libi237, Hassan Raba’i and Khaled
al-Sharif, both captured in Peshawar, Pakistan in 2003 who “spent time in a CIA prison
in Afghanistan,” Abdallah al-Sadeq, seized in a covert CIA operation in Thailand in the
spring of 2004, and Abu Munder al-Saadi, both held briefly before being rendered to the
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya.238 In May 2009, Human Rights Watch reported that its
representatives briefly met Ibn al-Sheikh al-Libi on a visit to Abu Salim prison in Tripoli,
although he refused to be interviewed. Human Rights Watch interviewed four other men,
who “claimed that before they were sent to the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, US forces had
tortured them in detention centers in Afghanistan, and supervised their torture in Pakistan
and Thailand”. One of the four was Hassan Raba’i, aka Mohamed Ahmad Mohamed Al
234

Interview with Bisher al-Rawi.
Interviews with Suleiman Abdalla, Binyam Mohamed and the lawyer of Khaled El-Masri
236
Eric Schmitt and Tim Golden, “Details Emerge on a Brazen Escape in Afghanistan”, New York Times, 4
December 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/04/international/asia/04escape.html.
237
described in the section below on “Proxy detention centres”.
238
Craig Whitlock, “From CIA Jails, Inmates fade Into Obscurity”, Washington Post, 27 October 2007,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/10/26/AR2007102602326_pf.html.
235

A/HRC/13/42
Page 69
Shoroeiya, who said that in mid-2003, in a place he believed was Bagram prison in
Afghanistan: “The interpreters who directed the questions to us did it with beatings and
insults. They used cold water, ice water. They put us in a tub with cold water. We were
forced [to go] for months without clothes. They brought a doctor at the beginning. He put
my leg in a plaster. One of the methods of interrogation was to take the plaster off and
stand on my leg”239.

133.


The released detainees are:
Laid Saidi, an Algerian seized in Tanzania on 10 May 2003, was handed over to
Malawians in plain clothes who were accompanied by two middle-aged
Caucasian men wearing jeans and T-shirts. Shortly after the expulsion, a lawyer
representing Mr. Saidi's wife filed an affidavit in the Tanzanian court saying that
immigration documents showed Mr. Saidi was deported through the border
between Kasumulu, Tanzania, and Malawi. He was held for a week in a detention
facility in the mountains of Malawi, and was then rendered to Afghanistan, where
he was held in the “Dark Prison,” the “Salt Pit” and another unidentified prison.
About a year after he was seized, he was flown to Tunisia, where he was detained
for another 75 days, before being returned to Algeria, where he was released.240



Three Yemenis, Salah Nasser Salim Ali, seized in Indonesia in October 2003,
Mohammed Al-asad and Mohammed Farag Ahmad Bashmillah, were held in a
number of CIA detention facilities until their return to Yemen in May 2005,
where they continued to be held, apparently at the request of the US authorities.
Mohamed Farag Ahmad Bashmillah was detained by Jordanian intelligence
agents in October 2003, when he was in Jordan to assist his mother who was
having an operation. From 21 October 2003 to 26 October 2003, Mr. Bashmilah
was detained without charge and subjected to torture and cruel, inhuman and

239

“Libya/US: Investigate Death of Former CIA Prisoner”, Human Rights Watch news release, 11 May
2009, http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/05/11/libyaus-investigate-death-former-cia-prisoner.
240
Craig S. Smith and Souad Mekhennet, “Algerian Tells of Dark Term in US Hands”, New York Times, 7
July 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/07/world/africa/07algeria.html.

A/HRC/13/42
Page 70
degrading treatment, including prolonged beatings and being threatened with
electric shocks and with the rape of his mother and wife.241 A communication was
sent by the Special Rapporteurs on Torture and Counter-terrorism to the
Governments of the United States, Indonesia, Yemen and Jordan on the cases of
Messrs. Bashmillah and Salim Ali, who were both detained and tortured in Jordan
242

. Only the latter responded by saying that “no record showing that the two men

had been arrested for the violations of either the penal, disciplinary or
administrative codes. They do not have documented files indicating they pose a
security concern, eliminating the possibility of their arrest for what may be
described as terrorism”243. The Working Group on Arbitrary Detention adopted its
Opinion No. 47/2005 (Yemen) on the case on 30 November 2005, declaring their
detention to be arbitrary as being devoid of any legal basis. In its reply to the
allegations, the Yemeni Government confirmed that Messrs. Muhammad Farah
Ahmed Bashmilah and Salah Nasser Salim ‘Ali were handed over to Yemen by
the United States. According to the Government, they were held in a security
police facility because of their alleged involvement in terrorist activities related to
Al-Qaida. The Government added that the “competent authorities are still dealing
with the case pending receipt of their [the persons’] files from the United States of
America authorities in order to transfer them to the Prosecutor”.244


Khaled El-Masri, a German seized on the border of the former Yugoslav Republic
of Macedonia on 31 December 2003, was held in a hotel room by agents of the
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia for 23 days, and then rendered by the
CIA to the “Salt Pit”. He was released in Albania on 29 May 2004.245

241

Declaration of Mohamed Farag Ahmad Bashmilah in support of plaintiffs' opposition to the United
States' motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment, Civil Action No. 5:07-cv-02798 in
the US District Court for the Northern District of California, San Jose Division.
242
E/CN.4/2006/6/Add.1, paras 93, 126, 525, 550;
243
A/HRC/4/33/Add.1, para. 123;
244
Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Opinion No. 47/2005, A/HRC/4/40/Add.1, p. 41, at para. 15.
245
Interview with the lawyer of Khaled El-Masri in the annex; see also “Statement: Khaled El-Masri”,
ACLU, http://www.aclu.org/safefree/extraordinaryrendition/22201res20051206.html.

A/HRC/13/42
Page 71


Khaled al-Maqtari, a Yemeni seized in Iraq in January 2004, was initially held in
Abu Ghraib, and was then transferred to a secret CIA detention facility in
Afghanistan. In April 2004, he was moved to a second secret detention facility,
which was possibly in Eastern Europe, where he remained in complete isolation
for 28 months, until he was returned to Yemen and released in May 2007.246



Marwan Jabour, a Jordanian-born Palestinian, was seized in Lahore, Pakistan on 9
May 2004, and held in a CIA detention facility in Afghanistan for 25 months. He
was then transferred to Jordan, where he was held for six weeks, and to Israel,
where he was held for another six weeks, before being freed in Gaza.247



Murat Kurnaz, a Turkish national residing in Germany, interviewed by the
Experts for this study, was arrested in Pakistan in November or December 2001
and initially held by Pakistani police officers and officers of the United States of
America. He was then transferred into the custody of the United States at the US
airbase in Kandahar, Afghanistan, before he was taken to the naval base at
Guantánamo Bay on 1 February 2002. He was held secretly until May 2002 and
released on 24 August 2006.248

134.

23 detainees who ended up in Guantanamo were also held in CIA detention

facilities in Afghanistan. They include:


Six men seized in the Islamic Republic of Iran in late 2001:

-

Wassam al-Ourdoni, a Jordanian, who was released from Guantanamo in April
2004. In 2006, he told Reprieve, that he was seized by the Iranian authorities
while returning from a religious visit to Pakistan with his wife and newborn child
in December 2001, and was then handed over to the Afghan authorities, who
handed him on to the CIA. He said that the Americans “asked me about my

Amnesty International, “United States of America: A case to answer. From Abu Ghraib to secret CIA
custody: The case of Khaled al-Maqtari”, 14 March 2008,
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/AMR51/013/2008/en.
247
Human Rights Watch, “Ghost Prisoner: Two Years in Secret CIA Detention”, 26 February 2007,
http://www.hrw.org/en/node/11021/.
248
Interview with Murat Kurnaz.
246

A/HRC/13/42
Page 72
relationship with al-Qaeda. I told them I had nothing to do with al-Qaeda. They
then put me in jail under circumstances that I can only recall with dread. I lived
under unimaginable conditions that cannot be tolerated in a civilised society.” He
said that he was first placed in an underground prison for 77 days, and stated,
“This room was so dark that we couldn’t distinguish nights and days. There was
no window, and we didn’t see the sun once during the whole time.” He said that
he was then moved to “Prison Number Three,” where the food was so bad that his
weight dropped substantially. He was then held in Bagram for 40 days before
being flown to Guantanamo;249
-

Aminullah Tukhi, an Afghan who was transferred to Afghan custody from
Guantanamo in December 2007. He alleged that he had fled from Herat to the
Islamic Republic of Iran to escape the Taliban, and was working as a taxi driver
when the Iranians began rounding up illegal immigrants towards the end of
2001;250

-

Hussein Almerfedi, a Yemeni, still at Guantanamo. He alleged that he was
‘kidnapped' in Iran and held for a total of 14 months in three prisons in
Afghanistan – “two under Afghani control and one under US control
[Bagram];”251

-

Tawfiq al-Bihani, a Yemeni, still at Guantanamo. Allegedly, after deciding to flee
Pakistan after the 9/11 attacks, he was “arrested by Iranian Police in Zahedan,
Iran for entering the country without a visa” and held “in various prisons in Iran
and Afghanistan, for approximately one year in total;252

-

Rafiq Alhami, a Tunisian still held at Guantanamo, who alleged that “I was in an
Afghan prison but the interrogation was done by Americans. I was there for about
a one-year period, transferring from one place to another. I was tortured for about

249

Clive Stafford Smith, “Abandoned to their fate in Guantánamo”, Index on Censorship, 2006.
Combatant Status Review Tribunal Set 42, pp. 71-77,
http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/detainees/csrt_arb/Set_42_2728-2810.pdf.
251
Combatant Status Review Tribunal Set 28, pp. 31-40,
http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/detainees/csrt_arb/Set_28_1949-2000.pdf.
252
Administrative Review Board Round 2 Factors 799-899. pp. 66-9,
http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/detainees/csrt_arb/ARB_Round_2_Factors_799-899.pdf.
250

A/HRC/13/42
Page 73
three months in a prison called the Prison of Darkness or the Dark Prison”.253 And
further: “Back in Afghanistan I would be tortured. I was threatened. I was left out
all night in the cold. It was different here. I spent 2 months with no water, no
shoes, in darkness and in the cold. There was darkness and loud music for 2
months. I was not allowed to pray. I was not allowed to fast during Ramadan.
These things are documented. You have them;”254
-

and Walid al-Qadasi255, who was rendered to the “Dark Prison”, and held in other
prisons in Afghanistan, along with four other men whose whereabouts are
unknown.256 An allegation letter was sent in November 2005 by the Special
Rapporteur on Torture in relation to Walid Muhammad Shahir Muhammad AlQadasi, a Yemeni citizen indicating that the following allegations had been
received “He was arrested in Iran in late 2001. He was held there for about three
months before being handed over to the authorities in Afghanistan who in turn
handed him over to the custody of the US. He was held in a prison in Kabul.
During US custody, officials cut his clothes with scissors, left him naked and took
photos of him before giving him Afghan clothes to wear. They then handcuffed
his hands behind his back, blindfolded him and started interrogating him. The
apparently Egyptian interrogator, accusing him of belonging to Al-Qaeda,
threatened him with death. He was put in an underground cell measuring
approximately two metres by three metres with very small windows. He shared
the cell with ten inmates. They had to sleep in shifts due to lack of space and
received food only once a day. He spent three months there without ever leaving
the cell. After three months Walid Al-Qadasi was transferred to Bagram, where he
was interrogated for one month. His head was shaved, he was blindfolded, made

253

Administrative Review Board Set 3, pp. 147-61,
http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/detainees/csrt_arb/ARB_Transcript_Set_1_395-584.pdf.
254
Combatant Status Review Tribunal Set 34, pp. 20-22,
http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/detainees/csrt_arb/Set_34_2426-2457.pdf
255
E/CN.4/2006/6/Add.1, paras. 1, 527.and the response from the United States Government,
A/HRC/10/44/Add.4, para. 252; Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Opinion No. 47/2005,
A/HRC/4/40/Add.1, p. 41.
256
In addition, Aminullah Tukhi explained that ten prisoners in total – six Arabs, two Afghans, an Uzbek
and a Tajik – were delivered to the Americans. Although six of these men are accounted for above, it is not
known what happened to the other four – an Arab, an Afghan, the Uzbek and the Tajik. Combatant Status
Review Tribunal Set 42, pp. 71-77, http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/detainees/csrt_arb/Set_42_2728-2810.pdf.

A/HRC/13/42
Page 74
to wear ear muffs and a mouth mask, handcuffed, shackled, loaded on to a plane
and flown out to Guantanamo, where he was held in solitary confinement for one
more month. In April 2004, after having been detained for two years, he was
transferred to Sana’a prison in Yemen.” In its response, the United States
Government reiterated its earlier announcements that no Government agency is
allowed to engage in torture and that its actions comply with the non-refoulement
principle.257 Opinion No. 47/2005 of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention
also concerns Mr. Al-Qadasi258.


Two men seized in Georgia in early 2002 and sold to US forces (Soufian alHuwari, an Algerian, transferred to Algerian custody from Guantanamo in
November 2008, and Zakaria al-Baidany, , aka Omar al-Rammah, a Yemeni, still
held at Guantanamo. According to Mr. al-Huwari, both were rendered to the
“Dark Prison”, and were also held in other detention facilities in Afghanistan.
“The Americans didn't capture me. The Mafia captured me. They sold me to the
Americans”. He added, “When I was captured, a car came around and people
inside were talking Russian and Georgian. I also heard a little Chechnya[n]. We
were delivered to another group who spoke perfect Russian. They sold us to the
dogs. The Americans came two days later with a briefcase full of money. They
took us to a forest, then a private plane to Kabul, Afghanistan”.259



Bisher al-Rawi, an Iraqi national and British resident, was seized in the Gambia in
November 2002, and rendered to the “Dark Prison” in the beginning of December
2002. He was kept shackled in complete isolation and darkness for two weeks. On
or around 22 December 2002 he was transferred to Bagram, and then to
Guantanamo on February 7, 2003. He was finally released on 30 March 2007. At

257

E/CN.4/2006/6/Add.1, paras. 1, 527.and the response from the United States Government,
A/HRC/10/44/Add.4, para. 252;
258
A/HRC/4/40/Add.1, p. 41.
259
Combatant Status Review Tribunal Set 21, pp. 15-23,
http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/detainees/csrt_arb/Set_21_1645-1688_Revised.pdf.

A/HRC/13/42
Page 75
Bagram, he was reportedly threatened, subjected to ill-treatment and to sleep
deprivation for up to three days.260


Jamil El-Banna, a Jordanian national and British resident, was also seized in the
Gambia in November 2002 and rendered to the “Dark Prison” and later to
Guantanamo. He was released from Guantanamo in December 2007.



Six other detainees who were flown to Guantanamo on 20 September 2004 after
between one and three years in custody: Abdul Rahim Ghulam Rabbani and
Mohammed Ahmad Ghulam Rabbani, Pakistani brothers seized in Karachi, who
were held in the “Salt Pit”261; Abdulsalam al-Hela, a Yemeni colonel and
businessman who was seized in Egypt262; Adil al-Jazeeri, an Algerian seized in
Pakistan263; Sanad al-Kazimi, a Yemeni seized in the United Arab Emirates264; and
Saifullah Paracha, a Pakistani businessman seized in Thailand, who was held in
isolation in Bagram for a year265; and Sanad al-Kazimi, a Yemeni seized in the
UAE266. Mr. Al-Kazimi was apprehended in Dubai in January 2003 and held at an
undisclosed location in or near Dubai for two months. He was then transferred to
a different place about two hours away. He was kept naked for 22 days, at times
shackled, and subjected to extreme climatic conditions and simulated drowning.
After six months, he was then transferred to United States custody, allegedly

260

Interview with Bisher al-Rawi.
Both Laid Saidi and Khaled El-Masri spoke about getting to know the Rabbani brothers in the “Salt Pit”.
See: Craig S. Smith and Souad Mekhennet, “Algerian Tells of Dark Term in US Hands”, New York Times,
7 July 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/07/world/africa/07algeria.html.
262
Amnesty International, “USA: Who are the Guantanamo detainees: Case Sheet No. 15: Yemeni national:
Abdulsalam al-Hela”, 11 January 2006, http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/AMR51/012/2006.
263
ARB Set 11, pp. 315-334,
http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/detainees/csrt_arb/ARB_Transcript_Set_11_21662-22010.pdf.
264
“In re: Guantanamo Bay Litigation: Status report for petitioners Mohammed al-Shimrani (ISN 195) and
Sanad al-Kazimi (ISN 1453)”, 18 July 2008, http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/district-ofcolumbia/dcdce/1:2008mc00442/131990/100/0.pdf.
Also on the flight that took these men to Guantanamo were Ali al-Hajj al-Sharqawi, Hassan bin Attash and
Binyam Mohamed, who are discussed below, in “Proxy detention centres”.
265
http://www.reprieve.org.uk/saifullahparacha.
266
“In re: Guantanamo Bay Litigation: Status report for petitioners Mohammed al-Shimrani (ISN 195) and
Sanad al-Kazimi (ISN 1453)”, 18 July 2008, http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/district-ofcolumbia/dcdce/1:2008mc00442/131990/100/0.pdf.
Also on the flight that took these men to Guantanamo were Ali al-Hajj al-Sharqawi, Hassan bin Attash and
Binyam Mohamed, who are discussed below, in “Other detention centres”.
261

A/HRC/13/42
Page 76
pursuant to the CIA rendition program. He was taken to Kabul and held in the
“Dark Prison” for nine months. In this prison, he suffered severe physical and
psychological torture by unidentified persons. He was then transferred to Bagram
Airbase where he was held for a further four months in United States custody.
Again, he was allegedly subjected to severe physical and psychological torture by
what he believed were the same unidentified persons he encountered in the “Dark
Prison”.267
135.

Four others, held in Bagram, are known because lawyers established contact

with their families and filed habeas corpus petitions on their behalf:


Redha al-Najar, a Tunisian who was seized in Karachi in May 2002.



Amine Mohammad al-Bakri, a Yemeni who was seized in Bangkok on 28
December 2002 by agents of the intelligence services of the United States or of
Thailand. During the whole year 2003, his whereabouts were unknown. The Thai
authorities confirmed to Mr. Al-Bakry’s relatives that he had entered Thailand’s
territory but denied knowing his whereabouts. In January 2004, Mr. Al-Bakry’s
relatives received a letter from him through the ICRC, informing them that he was
kept in detention at the United States Air Force Base of Bagram. It was reported
that Mr. Al-Bakry was detained due to his commercial connections with Mr.
Khalifa, a cousin of Osama bin Laden, who was later assassinated in
Madagascar.268



Fadi al-Maqaleh, a Yemeni seized in 2004, who was sent to Abu Ghraib before
Bagram.



Haji Wazir, an Afghan who was seized in the United Arab Emirates in late
2002.269

136.

The whereabouts of 12 others are unknown, and the others remain to be

identified. It is probable that some of these men have been returned to their home
267

Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Opinion No. 3/2009 (United States of America),
A/HRC/13/30/Add.1, p. XXX
268
Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Opinion No. 11/2007 (Afghanistan/United States of America),
A/HRC/7/4/Add.1, p. 85.
269
https://ecf.dcd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/show_public_doc?2006cv1697-31.

A/HRC/13/42
Page 77
countries, and that others are still held in Bagram. The Experts received allegations that
the following men were also held:: Issa al-Tanzani (Tanzanian), also identified as
Soulayman al-Tanzani, captured in Mogadishu, Somalia; Abu Naseem (Libyan), captured
in Peshawar, Pakistan, at the start of 2003; Abou Hudeifa (Tunisian), captured in
Peshawar, Pakistan, at the end of 2002; and Salah Din al-Bakistani, captured in Baghdad.
Also, Marwan Jabour mentioned eight other prisoners. One was Yassir al-Jazeeri
(Algerian), seized in Lahore, March 2003 (whom he met), and he heard about seven
others: Ayoub al-Libi (Libyan), seized in Peshawar, January 2004; Mohammed (Afghan,
born Saudi), seized in Peshawar, May 2004; Abdul Basit (Saudi or Yemeni), seized
before June 2004; Adnan (nationality unknown), seized before June 2004; an unidentified
Somali (possibly Shoeab as-Somali or Rethwan as-Somali); another unidentified Somali;
and Marwan al-Adeni (Yemeni), seized on or around May 2003.

2. Iraq
137.

In Iraq, although the US Government stated that the Geneva Conventions

applied to detainees seized during the occupation, an unknown number of persons were
deliberately held “off the books” and denied ICRC access. In Abu Ghraib, for example,
the abuse scandal that erupted with the publication of photos in April 2004 involved
military personnel who were not only holding supposedly significant detainees delivered
by the US military, but others delivered by the CIA or by US Special Forces units. The
existence of the “ghost detainees,” who were clearly held incommunicado in secret
detention, was later exposed in two US investigations.
138.

In August 2004, a report into detainee detentions in Iraq (chaired by former

Defense Secretary James R. Schlesinger) noted that “Other Government Agencies”
brought a number of “ghost detainees” to detention facilities including Abu Ghraib
“without accounting for them, knowing their identities, or even the reason for their

A/HRC/13/42
Page 78
detention”, and that on one occasion a “handful” of these detainees were “moved around
the facility to hide them from a visiting ICRC team”.270
139.

In another report in August 2004, Lieutenant General Anthony R. Jones and

Major General George R. Fay noted that eight prisoners in Abu Ghraib had been denied
access to ICRC delegates by Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez, the Commander of the
Coalition Joint Task Force in Iraq: “Detainee-14 was detained in a totally darkened cell
measuring about 2 metres long and less than a metre across, devoid of any window,
latrine or water tap, or bedding. On the door the delegates noticed the inscription ‘the
Gollum’, and a picture of the said character from the film trilogy ‘The Lord of the
Rings’.”271
140.

Although the Schlesinger report noted the use of other facilities for “ghost

detainees”, the locations of these other prisons, and the numbers of detainees held, have
not yet been thoroughly investigated. In June 2004, then US defense secretary Donald
Rumsfeld admitted that a suspected leader of Ansar al-Aslam was held for more than
seven months without the International Committee of the Red Cross being notified of his
detention, and also stated, “He was not at Abu Ghraib. He is not there now. He has never
been there to my knowledge”272 According to another report, the prisoner was known as
“Triple X”, and his secret detention was authorized by Lieutenant General Ricardo
Sanchez, who issued a classified order in November 2003 “directing military guards to
hide [him] from Red Cross inspectors and keep his name off official rosters”.273 In
addition, some locations may well be those in which prisoners died in US custody. In
2006, Human Rights First published a report identifying 98 deaths in US custody in Iraq,
describing five deaths in CIA custody, including Manadel al-Jamadi, who died in Abu
270

“Final Report of the Independent Panel To Review DoD Detention Operations”,
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Aug2004/d20040824finalreport.pdf.
271
“AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade”,
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Aug2004/d20040825fay.pdf.
272
“Rumsfeld admits secret detention of suspect in Iraq”, MSNBC News Services, 17 June 2004,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/5232981. Eric Schmitt and Carolyn Marshall, “In Secret Unit's ‘Black
Room,’ a Grim Portrait of US Abuse”, New York Times, 19 March 2006,
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/19/international/middleeast/19abuse.html.
273
Edward T. Pound, “Hiding a bad guy named Triple X”, US News & World Report, 13 June 2004,
http://www.usnews.com/usnews/news/articles/040621/21abughraib.htm.

A/HRC/13/42
Page 79
Ghraib, and others at locations including Forward Operating Base Tiger, in Anbar
province, a forward operating base near Al-Asad, a base outside Mosul, a temporary
holding camp near Nasiriyah, and a forward operating base in Tikrit.274

C. Proxy detention sites
141.

From 2005 onwards details emerged of how the U.S. was not only secretly

capturing, transferring and detaining people itself, but also transferring persons to other
states for the purpose of interrogation or detention without charge. The practice
apparently had started almost simultaneously with the High Value Detainee Programme.
The United Kingdom Government275 transmitted to the Experts the “Summary of
Conclusions and Recommendations of the Intelligence and Security Committee – Report
on Rendition” (2007), which noted: “The Security Service and SIS were … slow to detect
the emerging pattern of “Renditions to Detention” that occurred during 2002.” The CIA’s
appears to generally have been involved in the capture and transfer of prisoners, as well
as in providing questions for those held in foreign prisons. Beyond that, a clear pattern is
difficult to discern: some prisoners were subsequently rendered back to CIA custody (and
were generally sent on to Guantanamo), while others were sent back to their home
countries, or remained in the custody of the authorities in these third countries.
142.

The Government of the United States of America acknowledged that “some

enemy combatants have been transferred to their countries of nationality for continued
detention276”. In its report to the Committee Against Torture on 13 January 2006, the US
Government attempted to deflect criticism of its policy of sending detainees to countries
with poor human rights records, including those where they might face the risk of torture,
saying that “The United States does not transfer persons to countries where the United
States believes it is “more likely than not” that they will be tortured. “The United States
274

Human Rights First, “Command’s Responsibility: Detainee Deaths in US Custody in Iraq and
Afghanistan”, February 2006, http://www.humanrightsfirst.info/pdf/06221-etn-hrf-dic-rep-web.pdf.
Eric Schmitt and Carolyn Marshall, “In Secret Unit's ‘Black Room,’ a Grim Portrait of US Abuse”, New
York Times, 19 March 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/19/international/middleeast/19abuse.html.
275
In response to a questionnaire on allegations of rendition and detention sent by the Working Group on
Enforced and Involuntary Disappearances dated 8 July 2009
276
E/CN.4/2004/3, para. 69.

A/HRC/13/42
Page 80
obtains assurances, as appropriate, from the foreign government to which a detainee is
transferred that it will not torture the individual being transferred”.

277

Various United

Nations bodies, including the Experts278 and the Committee Against Torture,279 have
heavily criticized this policy of ‘extraordinary rendition’ in a detailed way in the past,
dismissing it as a clear violation of international law. They also expressed concern about
the use of assurances280.
143.

Given the prevailing secrecy regarding the CIA’s rendition programme, exact

figures regarding the numbers of prisoners transferred to the custody of other
governments by the CIA without spending any time in CIA facilities are difficult to
ascertain. Equally, little is known about the amount of detainees who have been held at
the request of other States such as the United Kingdom and Canada. While several of
these allegations cannot be backed up by other sources, the Experts wish to underscore
that the consistency of many of the detailed allegations provided separately by the
detainees adds weight to the inclusion of Jordan, Egypt, Morocco, the Syrian Arab
Republic, Pakistan, Ethiopia and Djibouti as proxy detention facilities where detainees
have been held on behalf of the CIA. Serious concerns also exist about the role of
Uzbekistan as a proxy detention site.

1. Jordan
144.

At least 15 prisoners – mostly seized in Karachi, Pakistan, or in the Pankisi

Gorge in Georgia – claim to have been rendered by the CIA to the main headquarters of
Jordan's General Intelligence Department (GID, or Da'irat al-Mukhabarat al-'Amma) in

277

CAT/C/48/Add.3/Rev.1, para. 30. See also the reply of the US Government to a General Allegation
regarding the Government’s involvement in one case of extraordinary rendition transmitted by the Working
Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances, in which it affirmed: “… the United States does not
transport individuals from one country to another for the purpose of interrogation using torture.
Furthermore, the United States has not transported individuals, and will no transport individuals to a
country where the Government believes they will be tortured” (A/HRC/10/9, par. 426).
278
A/HRC/6/17/Add.3, para. 36; A/HRC/4/40, paras. 43 and 50; E/CN.4/2004/3, para. 69; A/HRC/4/14,
par. 458; A/60/316, para. 45;
279
CAT/C/USA/CO/2, paras. 20, 21.
280
A/60/316; E/CN.4/2006/6; A/HRC/4/40, paras. 52-56;

A/HRC/13/42
Page 81
Amman, Jordan, between September 2001 and 2004.281 They include three men and one
juvenile who were subsequently transferred to Guantanamo via Afghanistan:


Jamal Mar’i, a Yemeni, and the first known victim of rendition in the wake of the
9/11 attacks. Seized from his house in Karachi, Pakistan, on 23 September 2001,
he was held for four months in Jordan before being flown to Guantanamo, where
he remains at the time of writing.282



Mohamedou Ould Slahi, a Mauritanian, was rendered to Jordan after handing
himself to Mauritanian authorities on 28 November 2001. Slahi was held in
Jordan for eight months, and described what happened to him as “beyond
description”. He was then transferred to Afghanistan, where he spent two weeks,
and arrived in Guantanamo, where he remains, on 4 August 2002.283



Ali al-Hajj al-Sharqawi, a Yemeni, was rendered to Jordan after his capture in
Karachi on 7 February 2002. Flown to Afghanistan on 8 January 2004, he was
held there for eight months, and was flown to Guantanamo on 20 September
2004. Still held at Guantanamo, he has stated that he was continuously tortured
throughout his 23 months in Jordan.284



Hassan bin Attash, a Saudi-born Yemeni, was 17 years old when he was seized in
Karachi on 11 September 2002 with Ramzi bin al-Shibh. He was held in Jordan
until 8 January 2004, when he was flown to Afghanistan with Ali al-Hajj alSharqawi. He was then delivered to Guantanamo with al-Sharqawi on 20

281

Human Rights Watch, “Double Jeopardy: CIA Renditions to Jordan”, 7 April 2008,
http://www.hrw.org/en/node/62264.
282
Combatant Status Review Tribunal Set 4, pp. 130-144,
http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/detainees/csrt_arb/Set_4_0320-0464.pdf.
283
Combatant Status Review Tribunal Set 41, pp. 28-38,
http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/detainees/csrt_arb/Set_41_2665-2727.pdf.
Administrative Review Board Set 8, pp. 184-218,
http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/detainees/csrt_arb/ARB_Transcript_Set_8_20751-21016.pdf.
284
Human Rights Watch, “Double Jeopardy: CIA Renditions to Jordan”, 7 April 2008,
http://www.hrw.org/en/node/62264.

A/HRC/13/42
Page 82
September 2004. Still held at Guantanamo, he has stated that he was tortured
throughout his time in Jordan.285
145.

Also held were Abu Hamza al-Tabuki, a Saudi seized by US agents in

Afghanistan in December 2001, who was released in Saudi Arabia in late 2002 or early
2003,286 and Samer Helmi al-Barq, seized in Pakistan on 15 July 2003, who was “kept for
three months in a secret prison outside Pakistan, before being transferred to Jordan” on
26 October 2003. He was released on bail in January 2008.287

2. Egypt
146.

At least seven men were rendered to Egypt by the CIA between September

2001 and February 2003, and another was rendered to Egypt from the Syrian Arab
Republic, where he had been seized at the request of the Canadian authorities:


Abdel Hakim Khafargy, an Egyptian-born, Munich-based publisher, was
allegedly seized in Bosnia-Herzegovina on 24 September 2001, and rendered to
Egypt a few weeks later, after being held by US forces in the US base at Tuzla.
He was returned to Germany two months later.288



Mamdouh Habib, an Australian seized in Pakistan in November 2001, was
rendered to Egypt three weeks later, and held for six months. Transferred to

285

Ibid.
Ibid. Others reportedly held in Jordan are: Jamil Qasim Saeed Mohammed, a Yemeni student rendered
from Karachi on 23 October 2001, who has not been heard of since; Ibrahim al-Jeddawi, a Saudi seized in
Yemen (or Kuwait) in the first half of 2002, who was reportedly transferred to Saudi custody; at least five
other men (three Algerians, a Syrian and a Chechen), seized in Georgia in 2002; an Iraq Kurd, possibly
seized in Yemen; and a Tunisian, seized in Iraq. The current whereabouts of all these men unknown.
According to former prisoners interviewed by Human Rights Watch, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, seized with
Hassan bin Attash and one of 14 “high-value detainees” transferred to Guantanamo in September 2006,
was also held in Jordan for an unspecified amount of time, as was Ibn al-Sheikh al-Libi, seized in
Afghanistan in late 2001, who was subjected to multiple renditions (see Egypt, below).
287
Amnesty International, “Submission to the UN Universal Periodic Review”, February 2009,
http://lib.ohchr.org/HRBodies/UPR/Documents/Session4/JO/AI_JOR_UPR_S4_2009_AmnestyInternation
al_upr.pdf.
288
Cageprisoners, “Citizens No More: ‘War on Terror’ Abuses in Bosnia and Herzegovina”, July 2007,
http://www.cageprisoners.com/citizensnomore.pdf.
286

A/HRC/13/42
Page 83
Guantanamo in June 2002, he was released in January 2005, and has explained
that he was tortured throughout his time in Egypt.289


Muhammad Saad Iqbal Madni, a Pakistani-Egyptian national, was seized by the
Indonesian authorities in Jakarta on 9 January 2002, flown first to Egypt and then
to Bagram, where he was held for eleven months. He arrived in Guantanamo on
23 March 2003 and was released in August 2008. Mr. Madni indicated that during
his detention in Cairo he was subjected to ill-treatment, including electroshocks
applied to his head and knees and, on several occasions, he was hung from metal
hooks and beaten. Furthermore, he reported that was denied medical treatment for
the blood in his urine.290



As confirmed by the Government of Sweden in its response to a letter sent by the
Experts, following a decision made by the Swedish Government to refuse asylum
in Sweden to the Egyptian citizens Mohammed Alzery and Ahmed Agiza and to
expel them, they were deported to Egypt by the Swedish Security Police with the
assistance of United States authorities (CIA). Both have said that they were
tortured in Egyptian custody291. Alzery was released on 12 October 2003 without
charge or trial, but was placed under police surveillance. Ahmed Agiza had
already been tried and sentenced in absentia by an Egyptian Military Court at the
time of the Swedish Governments’ decision to deport him. In April 2004, the
Court’s decision was confirmed and Agiza was convicted on terrorism charges
following a trial monitored by Human Rights Watch, which was described as
“flagrantly unfair”.

289

Megan Stack and Bob Drogin, “The torment of a terror suspect”, The Age, 15 January 2005, available at:
http://www.theage.com.au/news/War-on-Terror/The-torment-of-a-terrorsuspect/2005/01/14/1105582713578.html; for recent developments, see also: Habib case raises complex
issues, in: The Sydney Morning Herald, 14 September 2009, http://news.smh.com.au/breaking-newsnational/habib-case-raises-complex-issues-20090914-fnrt.html
290
Interview with Mr. Madni.
291
Agiza v Sweden, communication 233/2003, CAT/C/34/D/233/2003 (2005); and Alzery v Sweden,
communication 1416/2006, CCPR/C/88/D/1416/2005;

A/HRC/13/42
Page 84


Ibn al-Sheikh al-Libi, a Libyan, and the emir of the Khaldan training camp in
Afghanistan, was seized by Pakistani officials in late 2001, while fleeing
Afghanistan, and was rendered to Egypt, where, under torture, he claimed links
between al-Qaeda and Saddam Hussein, which were used by the United States
administration to justify the invasion of Iraq. Also held in secret CIA detention
sites in Afghanistan, and possibly in other countries, he was returned to Libya in
2006, where he reportedly died by committing suicide in May 2009.292



Hassan Mustafa Osama Nasr (aka Abu Omar), an Egyptian, was kidnapped in
Milan on 17 February 2003, and rendered to Egypt, where he was held for four
years (including 14 months in secret detention) before being released.293
Allegations of ill-treatment in Egyptian detention include being hung upside down
and having had electric shocks applied to his testicles.294



The eighth man, Ahmad Abou El-Maati, a Canadian-Egyptian national, was
seized at Damascus airport on his arrival from Toronto on 11 November 2001, he
was held in the Syrian Arab Republic’s Far Falestin prison until 25 January 2002,
when he was transferred to Egyptian custody, where he remained, in various
detention sites (including in secret detention until August 2002) until 7 March
2004, when he was released. During the initial period of his detention in Egypt, he
was subjected to heavy beatings and threats of rape against his sister. At a later
stage still during the secret detention phase, he was handcuffed with his hands
behind his back practically continuously for 45 days in a solitary confinement
cell, which he perceived as being very painful and which made it hard to use the
toilet and wash. He was also subjected to sleep-deprivation.295

292

“Libya/US: Investigate Death of Former CIA Prisoner”, Human Rights Watch news release, 11 May
2009, http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/05/11/libyaus-investigate-death-former-cia-prisoner.
293
For more details on this case, in particular with regard to the abduction of Abu Omar in Milan and the
ensuing judicial proceedings in Italy, see below the section on Italian complicity in the renditions
programme.
294
Amnesty International, Italy: A briefing to the UN Committee against torture, April 2007, p. 4,
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/EUR30/003/2007/en/dbf2cdec-d3a5-11dd-a3292f46302a8cc6/eur300032007en.pdf.
295
Internal inquiry into the actions of Canadian officials in relation to Abdullah Almalki. Ahmad AbouElmaati and Muayyed Nureddin pursuant to an Order in Council dated 11 December 2006;

A/HRC/13/42
Page 85

3. The Syrian Arab Republic
147.

At least nine detainees were rendered by the CIA to the Syrian Arab Republic

between December 2001 and October 2002, and held in Far Falestin, run by the Syrian
Military Intelligence or Shu'bat al-Mukhabarat al-Askariyya. All who have been able to
speak about their experiences have explained that they were tortured. As with Egypt
(above), other men were seized at the request of the Canadian authorities:


Muhammad Haydar Zammar, a German national, was seized in Morocco on 8
December 2001, and rendered by the CIA to Far Falestin on 22 December 2001.
In October 2004 he was moved to an “unknown location”, and in February 2007
he received a 12-year sentence from the Higher State Security Court. He was
convicted of being a member of the banned Muslim Brotherhood, a crime that is
punishable by death in Syria.296 In its reply for this study, the Government of
Morocco indicated that the Moroccan police had arrested Mr. Zammar following
information that he had been implicated in the 11 September 2001 events. The
Government of Morocco further stated that Mr. Zammar was not subjected to
secret or arbitrary detention in Morocco and that he was transferred to the Syrian
Arab Republic on 30 December 2001, in the presence of the Syrian Ambassador
accredited to Morocco.



Three detainees were rendered to the Syrian Arab Republic on 14 May 2002:
Abdul Halim Dalak, a student seized in Pakistan in November 2001, and Omar
Ghramesh and an unnamed teenager, who were seized with Abu Zubaydah in

http://www.iacobucciinquiry.ca/pdfs/documents/final-report-copy-en.pdf , paras 42-82; see also:
Commission of inquiry into the actions of Canadian officials in relation to Maher Arar, Report of the fact
finder of 14 October 2005;
296
Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Opinion No. 8/2007 (Syrian Arab Republic),
A/HRC/7/4/Add.1, p. 74. “Unfair trial and sentencing of Muhammad Haydar Zammar”, Amnesty
International appeal case, 22 March 2007, http://www.amnestyusa.org/document.php?
lang=e&id=ENGMDE240162007; see also: Germany’s report to the Committee Against Torture
CAT/C/49/Add.4 paras 86-88;

A/HRC/13/42
Page 86
Faisalabad, Pakistan on 28 March 2002.297 Their current whereabouts are
unknown.


Noor al-Deen, a Syrian teenager, was also captured with Abu Zubaydah, and was
rendered to Morocco before the Syrian Arab Republic.298 His current whereabouts
are unknown.



According to Abdullah Almalki (see below), two other prisoners, Barah Abdul
Latif and Bahaa Mustafa Jaghel, were also transferred from Pakistan to the Syrian
Arab Republic in May 2002.299 Their current whereabouts are unknown.



Yasser Tinawi, a Syrian national seized in Somalia on 17 July 2002, was flown to
Ethiopia by US agents, who interrogated him for three months. On 26 October he
was flown to Egypt, and on 29 October he arrived in the Syrian Arab Republic.300
In March 2003, he received a two-year sentence from a military court.301



Maher Arar302, a Canadian-Syrian national, was seized at New York’s JFK airport
on 26 September 2002, held for eleven days in the Metropolitan Detention Centre
in Manhattan, and then rendered to the Syrian Arab Republic on 8 October, via
Jordan303 where he was held in secret detention at Far Falestin until later that
month. Jordan alleged that Mr. Maher Arar arrived in Amman as an ordinary
passenger, but was asked to leave the country as his name was on a list of wanted
terrorists, and given a choice of destination. It further alleges that he asked to be

297

Stephen Grey, Ghost Plane: The Inside Story of the CIA’s Rendition Programme (Hurst & Co., 2006),
pp. 4, 54, 284.
298
Peter Finn and Joby Warrick, “Detainee's Harsh Treatment Foiled No Plots”, Washington Post, 29
March 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/03/28/AR2009032802066.html.
299
Grey, Ghost Plane, p. 251.
300
Ibid., p. 252.
301
“Syrian Authorities Release Some Detainees”, Syrian Human Rights Committee news release, 18
February 2005, http://www.shrc.org/data/aspx/d1/2061.aspx.
302
Interview of Mr. Lorne Waldman, Senior Counsel of the Inquiry Legal Team representing Mr. Maher
Arar (18 October 2009).See also: Commission of inquiry into the actions of Canadian officials in relation to
Maher Arar, http://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/206/301/pco-bcp/commissions/maher_arar/07-0913/www.ararcommission.ca/eng/17.htm
303
A/HRC/4/33/Add.3, paras 33, 43-45,.FN 11;

A/HRC/13/42
Page 87
voluntarily taken by car to the Syrian Arab Republic.304 During the period at Far
Falestin, he was severely beaten with a black cable: and threatened with electric
shocks. “The pattern was for Mr. Arar to receive three or four lashes with the
cable, then to be questioned, and then for the beating to begin again.”305 The
torture allegations were found completely consistent with the results of the
forensic examinations conducted in Canada. On 14 August 2003 Maher Arar was
moved to Sednaya prison, and was released on 29 September. The official inquiry
in the Arar case also stressed the catastrophic impact of the described events in
terms of his and his family’s economic situation and his family life in general.306
148.

When Ahmad Abou El-Maati (mentioned above) was held in Far Falestin in

the Syrian Arab Republic, he was held in solitary confinement in poor conditions and
subjected to ill treatment, including blindfolded, forced to remove almost all his clothes,
beaten with cables, forcible shaving and had ice-cold water poured on him307. Abdullah
Almalki, a Canadian-Syrian national, also spent some time in detention in Syria. Almalki
was held in secret detention in Far Falestin from 3 May 2002 until until 7 July 2002,
when he received a family visit. On 25 August 2003, he was sent to Sednaya prison. He
was released on 10 March 2004. He returned to Canada on 25 July 2004 after being
acquitted of all charges by the Syrian State Supreme Security court.308
149.

Another Canadian, Muayyed Nureddin, an Iraqi-born geologist, was detained

on the border of the Syrian Arab Republic and Iraq on 11 December 2002 when he
returned from a family visit in northern Iraq. He was secretly detained for a month in Far
Falestin, and was released on 13 January 2003.309
304

Ibid.
Commission of inquiry into the actions of Canadian officials in relation to Maher Arar, Report of the fact
finder of 14 October 2005, p. 14;
306
Ibid. pp. 21-23;
307
Internal inquiry into the actions of Canadian officials in relation to Abdullah Almalki. Ahmad AbouElmaati and Muayyed Nureddin pursuant to an Order in Council dated 11 December 2006;
http://www.iacobucciinquiry.ca/pdfs/documents/final-report-copy-en.pdf, paras 10-38;
308
Internal inquiry into the actions of Canadian officials in relation to Abdullah Almalki. Ahmad AbouElmaati and Muayyed Nureddin pursuant to an Order in Council dated 11 December 2006;
http://www.iacobucciinquiry.ca/pdfs/documents/final-report-copy-en.pdf .
309
Ibid.
305

A/HRC/13/42
Page 88
150.

In its response to the questionnaire sent by the Experts, the Government of the

Syrian Arab Republic stated that there are no secret prisons or detention centres in Syria.
There are no cases of secret detention and no individuals are arrested without the
knowledge of the competent authorities. No authorization has been granted to the security
service of any foreign state to establish secret detention facilities in Syria. A number of
foreign individuals were arrested in Syria at the request of other States, who were
informed of the legal basis for the arrests and their places of detention. These States were
also informed whether the individuals concerned were brought before the Courts or
transferred outside of Syria. Individuals belonging to different terrorist groups have been
prosecuted and detained in public prisons, in compliance with the relevant international
standards. They will be judged by the competent judicial authorities. Court proceedings
will be public and will take place in the presence of defense lawyers, families, human
rights activists and foreign diplomats. Some will be publicized through the media. The
Interpol branch within the Security Service of the Ministry of Interior cooperates with
international Interpol branches with regard to suspected terrorist and other criminal
activities.

4. Morocco
151.

At least three detainees were rendered to Morocco by the CIA between May

and July 2002, and held in Temara prison, including310:


Abou Elkassim Britel, an Italian citizen through marriage and naturalization of
Moroccan origin, was seized in Lahore, Pakistan on 10 March 2002, and has
stated that he was tortured in Pakistani custody. On 23 May 2002, he was
rendered by the CIA to Morocco, where he was held in secret detention until
February 2003, and where he has stated that he was also tortured. He was released
in February 2003, but in May 2003 was seized again, held for another four months
in Temara, and then convicted to 15 years in prison, which was reduced to nine

310

The third prisoner is Noor al-Deen (mentioned above), who was moved to Syria in 2003.

A/HRC/13/42
Page 89
years on appeal.311 In its submission to the study, the Government of Morocco
stated that Mr. Britel had not been subjected to "arbitrary detention or torture"
between May 2002 and February 2003 or between May 2003 and September
2003.


Binyam Mohamed, an Ethiopian national and British resident, was seized in
Karachi, Pakistan, on 10 April 2002. He was held approximately for three months
where he was subjected to torture. On 21 July 2002, he was rendered by the CIA
to Morocco, where he was held for 18 months in three different unknown
facilities. During this period, he was allegedly threatened, subjected to
particularly severe torture and other ill-treatments; he was deprived from sleep for
up to 48 hours; and his prayers were interrupted by turning up the volume of porn
movies. In January 2004, he was flown to the CIA’s “Dark Prison” in Kabul, and
in May he was moved to Bagram. He was flown to Guantanamo on 20 September
2004, and was released in February 2009.312

5. Pakistan
152.

From December 2001 until the summer of 2002, when the majority of the

detainees who ended up in Guantanamo were seized, detention facilities in Pakistan,
where several hundred detainees were held before being transferred to Kandahar or
Bagram, were a crucial component of what was then, exclusively, a secret detention
programme. Many of these men, seized near the Pakistani border, or while crossing from
Afghanistan to Pakistan, were held in prisons in Kohat and Peshawar, but others were
held in what appeared to be impromptu facilities, which were established across the
country in numerous locations. Pakistan’s president at that time President Pervez
Musharraf stated that

311

UN interview of Ms. Khadija Anna L. Pighizzini (the wife of Abou Elkassim Britel), 8 September 2009.
Interview with Binyam Mohamed; see also:
http://www.reprieve.org.uk/static/downloads/2009_11_19_BM_High_Court_Media_Case_Judgment_6_.pd
f , where two UK High Court judges found that the treatment to which he was subjected presents an
"arguable case of torture, or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment”.
312

A/HRC/13/42
Page 90
Since shortly after 9/11, when many al-Qaeda members fled Afghanistan and
crossed the border into Pakistan – we have played multiple games of cat and
mouse with them. The biggest of them all, Osama bin Laden, is still at large at the
time of this writing, but we have caught many, many others. Some are known to
the world, some are not. We have captured 672 and handed over 369 to the United
States. We have earned bounties totaling millions of dollars …313
153.

Two former prisoners, Moazzam Begg and Omar Deghayes, described their

experiences of secret detention in Pakistan to the Experts:


Omar Deghayes, a Libyan national and British resident, was arrested in April
2002 at his home in Lahore after a hundred people in black tracksuits surrounded
the house. In the presence of an American officer, he was then taken, handcuffed
and hooded, to a police station and, shortly afterwards, to an old fortress outside
Lahore, where he was held with other men from Palestine, Tunisia, Libya and
Egypt, and where he was beaten and kicked, and heard electroshocks and people
screaming. According to his account, “The place was run by Pakistanis and
appeared to be a maximum security prison for extremist opponents that were
traded with different States such as Libya and the United States.”. He also said
that he was tortured for a month without any contact with the external world, and
that the ill-treatment included punching, beating, kicking, stripping, being hit in
the back with wooden sticks, and stress positions for up to three days and three
nights. In mid-May, two Americans in civil clothes visited, took pictures and
asked a few questions. He was then moved to a place in Islamabad, which looked
like a barracks, where he was held incommunicado for one month without access
to a lawyer or the ICRC, and was interrogated in a nearby house by American
officers, who identified themselves as CIA, and on one occasion by a British
agent from MI6. He said that torture took place in the barracks but not during the
interrogations, and that he was subjected to drowning and stress positions, and
recalled a room full of caged snakes that guards threatened to open if he did not
speak about what he did in Afghanistan. He then met with British and American

313

Pervez Musharraf, In The Line Of Fire: A Memoir (Free Press, 2006).

A/HRC/13/42
Page 91
officers, who finally “acquired” him with other detainees, and took him to
Bagram, where he was heavily tortured and sexually abused by American
soldiers. He was flown to Guantanamo in August 2002, and released in December
2007..314


Moazzam Begg, a British citizen, moved to Kabul, Afghanistan, with his wife and
three children to become a teacher and a charity worker in 2001. After leaving
Afghanistan in the wake of the US-led invasion, he was abducted from a house in
Islamabad, where he was living with his family, on 31 January 2002, and was
taken to a place in Islamabad (not an official detention facility), where those who
held him were not uniformed officers and there were people held in isolation.
Held for three weeks, he was moved to a different venue for interviews with
American and British Intelligence officers, but his wife did not know where he
had been taken, and he was denied access to a lawyer or consular services. He
was then taken to a military airport near Islamabad and passed over to American
officers. He was held in Afghanistan and Guantanamo for three years, and was
released in January 2005.315

6. Ethiopia
154.

The Ethiopian government served as the detaining authority for foreign

nationals of interest to United States and possibly other foreign intelligence officers
between 30 December 2006 and February 2007.316 On 2 May 2007, a number of Special
Procedures addressed the Government of Ethiopia adding the following details:
“In December 2006, the conflict between the militias of the Council of Somali
Islamic Courts and the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia, supported by
armed forces of Ethiopia, caused a large flow of refugees seeking to cross the
314

Interview with Omar Deghayes
Interview with Moazzam Begg
316
For allegations of interviews conducted by Federal Bureau of Investigation officers see e.g. case of
Meshal vs Higgenbotham; http://www.aclu.org/national-security/meshal-v-higgenbotham-complaint; see
also: Human Rights Watch, “Why Am I Still Here?”: The 2007 Horn of Africa Renditions and the Fate of
Those Still Missing”, 22 September 2008, http://www.hrw.org/en/node/75257/.
315

A/HRC/13/42
Page 92
border from Somalia into Kenya. On 2 January 2007, Kenyan authorities
announced the closure of the border for security reasons. Since then, it is reported
that the Kenyan security forces have been patrolling the border and have arrested
a number of those seeking to cross it. Kenya has deported at least 84 of those
arrested back to Somalia, from where they were taken to Ethiopia.”317
155.

The Experts interviewed two of those captured between December 2006 and

February 2007: Bashir Ahmed Makhtal (mentioned in the Special Rapporteur’s
communication) and Mohamed Ezzoueck. The latter, a British national, was detained on
20 January 2007 in Kiunga village, Kenya, after crossing the Somali-Kenyan border and
then transferred to Nairobi, where he was held in three different locations. Mr. Ezzoueck
reported having been detained in Kenya for about three weeks and then transferred to
Somalia where he was held for a few days before being transferred, via Nairobi, back to
London. According to his testimony, he was interrogated by a Kenyan Army Major and
Kenyan Intelligence Service officers, FBI officers and UK Security Services officers and
repeatedly asked about his involvement with terrorist groups including Al Quaida.318 Mr.
Makhtal, Ethiopia born Canadian, was arrested on the border of Kenya/Somalia on 30
December 2006 by intelligence and held at a police detention centre. He was
subsequently transferred by car to a prison cell in Gigiri police station, Nairobi, Kenya.
On 21 January 2007 the Kenyan authorities sent him to Mogadishu, Somalia. On the
following day, he was taken to Addis Ababa, Ethiopia by an Ethiopian military plane. He
then was held for about 18 months incommunicado in Mekalawi Federal Prison, often in
solitary confinement and in poor conditions and finally sentenced to life imprisonment by
the High Court of Ethiopia319.
156.

By letter dated 23 May 2007, the Ethiopian Government informed the

relevant Special Procedures mandate holders that “the Transitional Federal Government
of Somalia handed over to Ethiopia 41 individuals captured in the course of the conflict
in Somalia. Most of these detainees have now been released. Only eight of the detainees
317

Ibid., para. 71.
Interview with Mohamed Ezzouek;
319
Interview with Bashir Makhtal;
318

A/HRC/13/42
Page 93
now remain in custody by the order of the court”. The Ethiopian Government also noted
that “the allegation that there are more than seventy others in addition to those named in
the communication is false, as are the allegations that the detainees are held
incommunicado, and that they might be at risk of torture”.320 However, in September
2008 Human Rights Watch published a report321, stating that at least ten detainees were
still in Ethiopian custody, and the whereabouts of others were unknown.

7. Djibouti
157.

The Experts have received information which proves that a detainee in the

CIA’s secret detention programme, Mohammed Al-asad, was transferred by Tanzanian
officials by plane to Djibouti on 27 December 2003.322 In Djibouti, Mr. al-Asad was
detained for two weeks in secret detention, where he was interrogated by a white Englishspeaking woman and a male interpreter, mostly on his connections to the Al-Haramain
foundation. The woman identified herself as American. Mr. al-Asad’s own recollection is
consistent with his having been held in Djibouti. One of his guards told him that he was
in Djibouti and there was a photograph of President Guelleh on the wall of the detention
facility. After approximately two weeks in Djibouti, Mr. al-Asad was taken to an airport
in Djibouti, where a team of individuals dressed entirely in black stripped him, inserted
an object in his rectum, diapered and photographed him, and strapped him down in a
plane. The detention site may have been in Camp Lemonier, Djibouti, which allegedly
has been used on a short-term or ‘transitory’ basis for several detainees being transferred
to secret detention elsewhere.

8. Uzbekistan

320

Ibid., para. 71.
Human Rights Watch, “’Why Am I Still Here?’: The 2007 Horn of Africa Renditions and the Fate of
Those Still Missing”, 22 September 2008, http://www.hrw.org/en/node/75257/.
322
High Court of Tanzania at Dar es Salaam, Criminal Application NO. 23 of 2004, Abdullah Salehe
Mohsen Al-Asaad vs. Director of Immigration Services exparte Mohamed Abdullah Salehe Mohsen AlAsaad Counter Affidavit. 30 June 2004.
321

A/HRC/13/42
Page 94
158.

No confirmation has ever been provided by either the US or Uzbek

Governments that detainees were rendered to proxy prisons in Uzbekistan, but in May
2005 the New York Times spoke to “a half-dozen current and former intelligence officials
working in Europe, the Middle East and the United States”, who stated that the US had
“sent terror suspects to Uzbekistan for detention and interrogation”. A US intelligence
official said that he “estimated that the number of terrorism suspects sent by the United
States to Tashkent was in the dozens”. The New York Times also obtained flight logs,
showing that “at least seven flights were made to Uzbekistan … from early 2002 to late
2003” by two planes associated with the CIA’s rendition programme (a Gulfstream jet
and a Boeing 737), and noted that, on 21 September 2003, both planes arrived at
Tashkent. The New York Times added that flight logs showed that “the Gulfstream had
taken off from Baghdad, while the 737 had departed from the Czech Republic”.323 On 14
August 2009, the BBC interviewed Ikrom Yakubov, an Uzbek intelligence officer who
has been granted political asylum in the UK, who stated that the US rendered terrorist
suspects for questioning to Uzbekistan, but added, “I don’t want to talk about it as there
might be serious concerns for my life in the future to discuss renditions”. 324 On 22
August 2009, the story resurfaced once more, when Der Spiegel reported that, in an
arrangement between the private security firm Blackwater and the CIA, Blackwater and
its subsidiaries had been commissioned “to transport terror suspects from Guantanamo to
interrogations at secret prison camps in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Uzbekistan”.325

D. Complicity in the practice of secret detention
159.

After September 2006 the direct role of the CIA in secret detentions seemed

to have shrunk significantly with “current and former American Government officials”
explaining in May 2009 to the New York Times that the U.S. Government started in the
last two years of the Bush administration to rely heavily on the foreign intelligence
323

Don Van Natta Jr., “US Recruits a Rough Ally to Be a Jailer”, New York Times, 1 May 2005,
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/05/01/international/01renditions.html.
324
“Confessions of an Uzbek KGB officer”, BBC Newsnight, 11 August 2009,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/newsnight/8195906.stm.
325

“Death Squad: Blackwater Accused of Creating ‘Killing Program’”, Spiegel Online, 22 August 2009,
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,644405,00.html.

A/HRC/13/42
Page 95
services to capture, interrogate and detain all but the highest-level terrorist suspects
seized outside the battlefields of Iraq and Afghanistan”. The article stated that “in the past
10 months, for example, about a half-dozen midlevel financiers and logistics experts
working with al-Qaeda have been captured and are being held by intelligence services in
four Middle Eastern countries after the United States provided information that led to
their arrests by local security services”.326 Instead of actively detaining persons in secret,
the U.S. – and many other countries – became complicit in the practice of secret
detention. For purposes of this study the Experts state that a country is complicit in the
secret detention of a person in the following cases:
a) When a State has asked another State to secretly detain a person. This covers
all cases which were mentioned in previous section C.
b) When a State knowingly is taking advantage of the situation of secret detention
by sending questions to the State which detains the person or by soliciting or receiving
information from persons who are being kept in secret detention. This includes at least
the following States:
-

The United Kingdom in the cases of several individuals, including Binyam
Mohamed327, Salahuddin Amin, Zeeshan Siddiqui, Rangzieb Ahmed and Rashid
Rauf.328 In its submission for this study the United Kingdom Government referred
to ongoing and concluded judicial assessment of the cases329 and stressed the work
of the parliamentary Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC), as well as its
policy of clear opposition to secret detention.

-

Germany in the case of Muhammad Haydar Zammar, who was reportedly
interrogated on at least one occasion, on 20 November 2002, by agents of German

326

Ibid
327

Interview with Binyam Mohamed.
See Human Rights Watch, Cruel Britannia, 24 November 2009, available at address:
www.hrw.org/en/node/86690.
329
According to the Government of the United Kingdom, The judge in Mr Ahmed’s case stated “I
specifically reject the allegations that the British authorities were outsourcing torture”. In Mr Amin’s case
the judge examined his allegations and found that there was no evidence to suggest that the UK authorities
were complicit in the unlawful detention or ill-treatment of Mr Amin in Pakistan.
328

A/HRC/13/42
Page 96
security agencies while he was secretly held in Syria.330 The German Government
reported having been “informed about four cases of renditions or enforced
disappearances concerning the Federal Republic of Germany: the cases of Khaled
El-Masri, Murat Kurnaz, Muhammad Haydar Zammar and Abdel Halim Khafagy,
which occurred between September 2001 and the end of 2005. However, the
German authorities did not directly or indirectly participate in arresting these
persons or in rendering them for imprisonment. In the cases of El- Masri and
Khafagy, the German missions responsible for consular assistance had no
knowledge of their imprisonment and were therefore unable to ensure that their
rights were observed or guarantee consular protection; in the cases of Zammar
and Kurnaz the German authorities worked intensively to guarantee consular
protection. However, they were denied access to the detainees and were thereby
prevented from effectively exercising consular protection.”331 By letter dated 9
December 2009, the German Federal Ministry of Justice further reported that it
became aware of the case of Mr. Murat Kurnaz on 26 February 2002 when the
Chief Federal Prosecutor informed the Ministry that it would not take over a
preliminary investigation pending before the Prosecution of the Land of Bremen.
The Office of the Chief Federal Prosecutor had received a report from the Federal
Criminal Police Office on 31 January 2002 that, according to information by the
Federal Intelligence Service, Mr. Murat Kurnaz had been arrested by United
States officials in Afghanistan or Pakistan. In the case of Mr. Khaled El-Masri, on
8 June 2004, the Federal Chancellery and the Federal Foreign Office received a
letter from his lawyer that Mr. El-Masri had been abducted in the former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia on 31 December 2003, presumably transferred
to Afghanistan and kept there against his will until his return to Germany on 29
May 2004. The Federal Ministry of Justice was informed about these facts on 18
June 2004, according to. The Experts note, however, that, according to the final
report of a Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry the Federal Government was
aware of the case of Mr. El-Masri on 31 May 2004 when the Ambassador of the
330

See “Kanzleramt dealte mit Syriens Geheimdienst”, Spiegel online. 19 November 2005.
Response to a questionnaire on allegations of rendition and detention sent by the Working Group on
Enforced and Involuntary Disappearances of 30 September 2009;

331

A/HRC/13/42
Page 97
United States of America informed the Federal Minister of the Interior of
Germany.332
-

Canada for providing intelligence to the Syrian Arab Republic in the cases of
Maher Arar, Ahmad El Maati, Abdullah Almaki and Muayyed Nureddin333. In its
submission for this study the Government denied that any of the named
individuals was detained or seized by a State at the request of Canada. The
Experts welcome that all the above mentioned cases have been the subject of
extensive independent inquiry processes within Canada and that in the case of
Maher Arar, provided substantive reparations to the victims.

-

Australia for providing intelligence to interrogators in the case of the secret
detention of Mamdouh Habib. Mr Habib also alleges that an Australian official
was present during at least one of his interrogation sessions in Egypt. The Experts
understand that Mr. Habib is currently suing the Australian Federal Government,
arguing it was complicit in his kidnapping and subsequent transfer to Egypt. In its
submission for this study the Government of Australia denies that any Australian
officer, servant and/or agent was involved in any dealings with or mistreatment of
Mr. Habib and refers to ongoing litigation.
c) When a State has actively participated in the arrest and/or transfer of a

person, when it knew or ought to have known that this person would disappear in a
secret detention facility or otherwise be detained outside the legally regulated
detention system. This includes at least the following States:
-

Italy for its role in the abduction and rendition of Hassan Mustafa Osama Nasr
(aka Abu Omar), an Egyptian who was kidnapped by CIA agents on a street in
Milan in broad daylight on 17 February 2003. He was transferred from Milan to

332

Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 16/13400, 18 June 2009, p. 119.available at
http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/16/134/1613400.pdf.
333
See Internal Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Abdullah Almalki, Ahmed
Abou-Elmaati and Muayyed Nureddin (Iacobucci enquiry) and Arar Commission of Enquiry.

A/HRC/13/42
Page 98
the NATO military base of Aviano by car, and then flown, via the NATO military
base of Ramstein in Germany, to Egypt334, where he was held for four years
(including 14 months in secret detention) before being released. The European
Parliament considered it “very likely, in view of the involvement of its secret
services, that the Italian Government of the day was aware of the extraordinary
rendition of Abu Omar from within its territory”335 Prosecutors opened an
investigation and charged 26 US citizens (mostly CIA agents) with the abduction,
as well as members of the Italian military secret services (SISMI) with complicity
in the abduction, among them the head of SISMI.336 The Italian Ministry of
Justice, however, refused to forward the judiciary’s requests for extradition of the
CIA agents to the United States Government. As a result, the US citizens were
tried in absentia. On 4 November 2009, the court found 23 of them guilty. The
court also convicted two SISMI agents and sentenced them to three years
imprisonment for their involvement in the abduction.337 The then commander of
SISMI and his deputy, however, were not convicted, as the court dismissed the
cases against them on the ground that the relevant evidence was covered by State
secrets.338 In its submission for this study, the Italian Government notes that the
case is continuing at the appeal level which prevents it from drawing any
conclusions prior to a definitive verdict.
-

Kenya, for detaining 84 persons in various secret locations in Nairobi before
transferring them on three charter flights between 20 January and 10 February
2007 to Somalia. Once in Somalia they were transferred to Ethiopia where they
were kept in secret detention. They were not provided with an opportunity to
challenge their forcible physical removal at any stage”.339

334

European Parliament Committee report, para. 50
European Parliament Committee report, para. 53
336
Reply of the Government of Italy to the joint request for relevant information by the four Experts, 15
July 2009.
337
Tribunale penale di Milano, judgment of 4 November 2009 (on record with the Experts).
338
The executive branch of the Italian Government successfully raised the issue of State secrets before the
Constitutional Court. See Reply of the Government of Italy to the joint request for relevant information by
the four Experts, 15 July 2009.
339
See Ethiopia section above, the case of Meshal vs Higgenbotham; at: http://www.aclu.org/nationalsecurity/meshal-v-higgenbotham-complaint; Redress and Reprieve: Kenya and counter terrorism. A “time
for change”. February 2009, available at: http://www.redress.org/publications/Kenya%20and%20Counter335

A/HRC/13/42
Page 99

d) A specific form of complicity in this context are these cases where a State
holds a person shortly in secret detention before handing them over to another State
where that person will be put for a longer period in secret detention. This includes at least
the following countries:
-

The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia for its role in the cases of Khaled
El-Masri340;

-

Malawi for allegedly holding Laid Saidi in secret detention for a week;

-

During the interview held with the experts, Bisher al-Rawi reported that on 8
November 2002, he was arrested upon arrival at Banjul’s airport by the Gambian
Intelligence Agency, then taken to an office and later to a house located in a
Banjul residential place before he was handed over to the CIA and rendered to
Afghanistan.
e) When a State failed to take measures to identify persons or airplanes that were

passing through its airports or airspace after information of the CIA programme involving
secret detention had already been revealed. The issue of rendition flights was, and still is,
subject of many separate investigations at the national or regional level341. Therefore, the
Experts decided to refrain from going into the details of this issue.

E. Secret detention and the United States administration of President Obama

Terrorism%205%20Feb%2009.pdf; and Human Rights Watch, “Why Am I Still Here?”: The 2007 Horn of
Africa Renditions and the Fate of Those Still Missing”, 22 September 2008, available at:
http://www.hrw.org/en/node/75257/. ; the Experts have received allegations of cooperation with United
States intelligence that dates back to 2003; see interview with Suleiman Abdallah;
340
Interview of Khaled El-Masri.
341
See inter alia European Parliament Committee report; Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 16/13400, 18
June 2009,available at http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/16/134/1613400.pdf.; Foreign Secretary’s
statement to the House of Commons on US rendition flights of 21 February 2008,
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/cmhansrd/cm080221/debtext/80221-0008.htm; Dick
Marty,“Secret detentions and illegal transfers of detainees involving Council of Europe member states:
second report“, http://assembly.coe.int/Documents/WorkingDocs/Doc07/edoc11302.pdf.

A/HRC/13/42
Page 100
160.

In its response to the questionnaire sent by the Experts, the United States of

America stated that :
“The Obama Administration has adopted the following specific measures:
-

Instructed the CIA to close as expeditiously as possible any detention facilities
that it currently operated as of January 22, 2009 and ordered that the CIA shall not
operate any such detention facility in the future.

-

Ordered that the Guantanamo Bay detention facility be closed as soon as
practicable.

-

Required the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to be given notice
and timely access to any individual detained in any armed conflict in the custody
or under the effective control of the United States Government, consistent with
Department of Defense regulations and policies.

-

Ordered a comprehensive review of the lawful options available to the Federal
Government with respect to detention of individuals captured or apprehended in
connection with armed conflicts and counterterrorism operations.

-

Reaffirmed that all persons in U.S. custody must be treated humanely as a matter
of law.

-

Mandated that detention at Guantanamo conform to all applicable laws governing
conditions of confinement, including Common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions, and directed a review of detention conditions at Guantanamo to
ensure such compliance.

-

Ordered a review of U.S. transfer policies to ensure that they do not result in the
transfer of individuals to other nations to face torture or otherwise for the purpose,
or with the effect, of undermining or circumventing the commitments or
obligations of the United States to ensure the humane treatment of individuals in

A/HRC/13/42
Page 101
its custody or control. The resulting Task Force on transfer practices
recommended to the President in August that (1) the State Department be
involved in evaluating all diplomatic assurances; (2) the Inspectors General of the
Departments of State, Defense, and Homeland Security prepare an annual report
on all transfers relying on assurances; and (3) mechanisms for monitoring
treatment in the receiving country be incorporated into assurances.
-

Announced the transfer of at least 7 detainees from military custody to U.S.
criminal law enforcement proceedings, and transferred 25 detainees to date to
third-countries for repatriation or resettlement.

-

Worked with Congress to revise U.S. laws governing military commissions to
enhance their procedural protections, including prohibiting introduction of
evidence obtained as a result of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment.

-

Expanded the review procedures for detainees held by the Department of Defense
in Afghanistan in order to enhance the transparency and fairness of U.S. detention
practices. Detainees are permitted an opportunity to challenge the evidence that is
the basis for their detention, to call reasonably available witnesses, and to have
the assistance of personal representatives who have access to all reasonably
available relevant information (including classified information). Proceedings
generally shall be open, including to representatives of the ICRC, and possibly to
non-governmental organizations.

-

Established more tailored standards and rigorous procedures for evaluating
assertions of the State secrets privilege, including establishing an internal
accountability mechanism, ensuring that the privilege is never asserted to avoid
embarrassment or conceal violations of law, and creating a referral mechanism to
the Office of Inspector General where the privilege is asserted but there is
credible evidence of a violation of law. These standards and procedures were

A/HRC/13/42
Page 102
established in order to strike a better balance between open government and the
need to protect vital national security information.
-

The Department of Justice initiated a preliminary criminal investigation into the
interrogation of certain detainees.

-

These measures cumulatively seek to reaffirm the importance of compliance with
the rule of law in U.S. detention practices, to ensure U.S. adherence to its
international legal obligations, and to promote accountability and transparency in
this important area of national security policy.”

161.

The Experts welcome these commitments. They believe however that

clarification is required as to whether detainees were held in CIA “black sites” in Iraq and
Afghanistan or elsewhere when President Obama took office, and, if so, what happened
to the detainees who were held at that time. Also, the Experts are concerned that the
Executive Order which instructed the CIA “to close any detention facilities that it
currently operates” does not extend to the facilities where the CIA detains individuals on
“a short-term transitory basis”.342 The Order also does not seem to extend to detention
facilities operated by the Joint Special Operation Command.
162.

The Experts also welcome in particular the new policy which was

implemented in August 2009, under which the military must notify the ICRC of the
detainees’ names and identification number within two weeks of capture. 343 Nevertheless,
there is no legal justification for this two-week period of secret detention. According to
the Third Geneva Convention, prisoners of war are to be documented, and their
whereabouts and health conditions made available to family members and to the country
of origin of the prisoner within one week.344 The Fourth Geneva Convention (governing
342

Executive Order: Ensuring Lawful Interrogations”, 22 January 2009, available at:
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/EnsuringLawfulInterrogations/. See also, CIA, “Message
from the Director: Interrogation Policy and Contracts”, 9 April 2009, available at:
https://www.cia.gov/news-information/press-releases-statements/directors-statement-interrogation-policycontracts.html.
343
Ibid. These requests clearly dated back to the time of Camp Nama, noted above, where allegations of
abuse were widespread.
344
GC III, article 70.

A/HRC/13/42
Page 103
the treatment of civilians) establishes virtually identical procedures for the documentation
and disclosure of information concerning civilian detainees.345 Furthermore, it is obvious
that this unacknowledged detention for one week can only be applied to persons that have
been captured on the battlefield in a situation of armed conflict. This is an important
remark, as the Experts noted with concern news reports which quoted current government
officials saying that “the importance of Bagram as a holding site for terrorism suspects
captured outside Afghanistan and Iraq has risen under the Obama administration, which
barred the Central Intelligence Agency from using its secret prisons for long-term
detention”.346
163.

The situation at Bagram (the Bagram Theater Internment Facility) remains of

great concern. In March 2009, US District Court Judge John D. Bates ruled that the
habeas corpus rights granted to the Guantanamo detainees by the US Supreme Court in
June 2008 extended to non-Afghan detainees who had been seized in other countries and
rendered to Bagram, because “the detainees themselves as well as the rationale for
detention are essentially the same”, and because the review process established at the
prison “falls well short of what the Supreme Court found inadequate at Guantánamo”.
The four petitioners were among the 94 prisoners that Assistant Attorney General
Stephen G. Bradbury admitted were held in CIA custody between 2001 and 2005. Judge
Bates found that, in holding detainees at Bagram not as prisoners of war, but as “unlawful
enemy combatants,” the Bush administration had put in place a review process, the
Unlawful Enemy Combatant Review Board (UECRB), in which “Detainees cannot even
speak for themselves; they are only permitted to submit a written statement. But in
submitting that statement, detainees do not know what evidence the United States relies
upon to justify an ‘enemy combatant’ designation – so they lack a meaningful
opportunity to rebut that evidence”.347

345

GC IV, article 106.
Eric Schmitt, “US to Expand Detainee Review in Afghan Prison”, New York Times, 12 September 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/13/world/asia/13detain.html.
347
https://ecf.dcd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/show_public_doc?2006cv1697-31.
346

A/HRC/13/42
Page 104
164.

This ruling has been appealed by the current United States administration,

even though Judge Bates conceded that habeas rights did not extend to Afghan detainees
held at Bagram, nor to Afghans seized in other countries and rendered to Bagram. In its
appeal against Judge Bates’ ruling, the United States administration notified the court that
it was introducing a new review process at Bagram, “modifying the procedures for
reviewing the status of aliens held by the Department of Defense at the Bagram Theater
Internment Facility”.348 However, the Experts are concerned that the new review system
fails to address the fact that detainees in an active war zone should be held according to
the Geneva Conventions, screened close to the time and place of capture if there is any
doubt about their status, and not be subjected to reviews at some point after their capture
to determine whether they should continue to be held. The Experts are also concerned
that the system appears to specifically aim to prevent US courts from having access to
foreign detainees captured in other countries and rendered to Bagram. While the Experts
welcome that the names of 645 detainees at Bagram are now known, they urge the United
States Government to provide information on the citizenship, length of detention and
place of capture of all detainees currently held within Bagram Air Base.
V. THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF SECRET DETENTION PRACTICES IN
RELATION TO CONTEMPORARY REGIONAL OR DOMESTIC COUNTERTERRORIST EFFORTS
165.

On a global scale, secret detention in connection with counter-terrorist

policies remains a serious problem, either through the use of secret detention facilities
similar to those described in the previous section; through declarations of a state of
emergency, which allow prolonged secret detention; or through forms of “administrative
detention,” which also allow prolonged secret detention.
166.

The principal objective of this section is to illustrate the extent to which the

use of secret detention in the context of the fight against terrorism has been a global
practice. The cases and situations referred to in this section are therefore not exhaustive
348

Addendum here: http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/2009/09/US-Bagram-brief-9-1409.pdf.

A/HRC/13/42
Page 105
but serve the purpose of substantiating the existence of secret detention in all regions of
the world within the confines of the definition presented earlier. Notwithstanding this, the
Experts have also been made aware of practices of secret detention which are beyond the
scope of the present report.

A. Asia
167.

In Asia, the Experts have gathered information about secret detention in

China, India, Islamic Republic of Iran, Nepal, Pakistan, the Philippines and Sri Lanka
where anti-terrorist rhetoric is invoked to justify detention.
China
168.

The Working Group on Arbitrary Detention and other Special Procedures

mandates addressed several urgent communications to the Government of China in
particular in cases of alleged secret detention of Tibetans accused of separatism and other
state security offences and of secret detention in the aftermath of unrest in the Xinjiang
Autonomous Region in July 2009:
169.

Jamyang Gyatso349, a monk in Xiahe, in North Western Gansu province, was

arrested by security officials on 8 January 2007 and detained at an undisclosed
location350. The Government informed the Special Procedures mandates that the State
security authorities investigated him on suspicion of having conducted unlawful acts,
which endangered State security, and that he had confessed to having committed the
offence of incitement to separatism. On 3 February 2007, the Chinese security authorities
ordered that he be placed under restricted freedom of movement, pending trial. Ms.
Jamyang Kyi, a Tibetan writer and musician, was reportedly taken away from her office
at the Qinghai Provincial Television Station in Xining City by plainclothes state security
349

He had reportedly encouraged local Tibetans to listen to foreign radio broadcasts and had worked on
making copies of a book written by a Tibetan poet living abroad, Hortsang Jigme.
350
Urgent appeal of 31 January 2007 by the Chairperson-Rapporteur of the Working Group on Arbitrary
Detention and the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion
and expression, and Government reply of 23 March 2007, A/HRC/7/3/Add.1, page 51.

A/HRC/13/42
Page 106
officers on 1 April 2008, and taken to an undisclosed location on 4 or 5 April 2008,
where she was held incommunicado until her release on 21 April 2008.351According to
the information provided by the Government, Mrs. Jamyang was not arrested but was
placed in criminal detention and held at the Xining municipal detention facility. She was
later released on humanitarian grounds352. Washu Rangjung353, was arrested at his home
by Chinese military police officers on 11 September 2008, and taken to an undisclosed
location. According to the Government, he was issued a criminal detention order by the
Sichuan judicial authorities on suspicion of having engaged in separatist acts and acts
harmful to State security. After assessed as expressing genuine repentance, he was
reprimanded, and released on 20 September 2008.354
170.

The Experts also take note of reports of secret detention in the aftermath of

unrest in the Xinjiang Autonomous Region in July 2009. A report notes that “Official
figures suggest that the number of people detained by the security forces in connection
with the protests has reached well over a thousand people.” 355 Chinese police, the
People's Armed Police, and the military reportedly conducted numerous large-scale
sweep operations in two predominantly Uighur areas of Urumqi, Erdaoqiao, and
Saimachang, in the immediate aftermath of the uprising on 6 and 7 July. Similar
operations continued on a smaller scale until at least mid-August.356 The report also
alleges that the majority of those detained were being held incommunicado, and adds
that, when family members attempted to inquire about their relatives, “Police and other
351

Urgent appeal of 7 May 2008 by the Chairperson-Rapporteur of the Working Group on Arbitrary
Detention, Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and
expression, Special Rapporteur on the question of torture and Special Rapporteur on violence against
women, its causes and consequences, A/HRC/11/4/Add.1, and Government reply of 7 August 2008, paras.
502-507.
352
A/HRC/13/39/Add.1
353
Washu Rangjung is an author of two books on Tibetan history and culture, singer and news presenter for
a local television company in the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR).
354
Urgent appeal of 16 October 2008 by the Chairperson-Rapporteur of the Working Group on Arbitrary
Detention and the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion
and expression, and Government reply of 13 February 2009, A/HRC/11/4/Add.1, paras. 614-617.
355
Human Rights Watch, “’We Are Afraid to Even Look for Them’: Enforced Disappearances in the Wake
of Xinjiang’s Protests”, 20 October 2009, http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2009/10/22/we-are-afraid-evenlook-them-0.
356
“China: Detainees ‘Disappeared’ After Xinjiang Protests”, Human Rights Watch news release, 21
October 2009, http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/10/20/china-detainees-disappeared-after-xinjiangprotests.

A/HRC/13/42
Page 107
law enforcement agencies denied having knowledge of the arrests, or simply chased the
families away.”357
India
171.

Arbitrary detentions and disappearances have been a longstanding concern in

India, particularly in the States in which the Armed Forces Special Powers Act, 1958
(AFSPA) applies. In its 2007 report to the Human Rights Council, the Working Group on
Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances noted that, as at the end of 2006, there were 325
outstanding cases of disappearances and that most of the cases reported occurred between
1983 and 2004, in the context of ethnic and religious disturbances in the Punjab and
Kashmir regions. It added that “the disappearances allegedly relate to wide powers
granted to the security forces under emergency legislation”.358 In the context of India’s
examination under the Universal Periodic Review, numerous civil society organizations
alleged that the “chronic use of antiterrorist laws, preventive detention laws and the
Armed Forces Special Powers Act, 1958 (AFSPA) have created a situation where the
normal methods of 'investigation' have been replaced by disappearances, illegal
detention, custodial torture.”359
172.

In the wake of the 9/11 attacks, India enacted new counter-terrorism

legislation, including the Prevention of Terrorist Activities Act, 2002.360 In 2005, the
Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion drew the Government’s attention to
allegations that “numerous Muslim men ha[d] been illegally detained since March 2003
in the Gayakwad Haveli Police Station in Ahmedabad.” Although it was reported that
many were subsequently charged, a large number of illegal detainees allegedly remained
in custody. There were also reports of a “climate of fear” in the Muslim community in
Gujarat, which meant that “most were too afraid to make official complaints about illegal
357

Ibid.
A/HRC/4/41, para. 216.
359
A/HRC/WG.6/1/IND/3, Summary of stakeholder submissions (6 March 2008), paras. 12, 14, 17, 18.
360
The Prevention of Terrorist Activities Act 2002, preceded by a Prevention of Terrorist Activities
Ordinance in 2001, was repealed in October 2004. In 2008, new counter-terrorism legislation was enacted
by Parliament.
358

A/HRC/13/42
Page 108
detention or about torture and ill-treatment.”361 The Government rejected these
allegations.362
173.

However, in July 2009, the leading Indian magazine The Week reported that

there are at least 15, and perhaps as many as 40 secret detention sites in India, which are
used to detain, interrogate and torture suspected terrorists. A former Government official
reportedly confirmed the prisons’ existence, telling The Week that they were not run
directly by the Ministry of Home Affairs, but by security agencies including the Research
and Analysis Wing (RAW, India’s Foreign Intelligence Agency) and the Intelligence
Bureau (IB). An officer who had worked in one of the detention centres reportedly
admitted that torture techniques were used, based loosely on those used in Guantanamo
and elsewhere in the “war on terror” of the Government of the United States of America ,
including the use of loud and incessant music, sleep deprivation, keeping prisoners naked
to degrade and humiliate them, and forcibly administering drugs through the rectum to
further break down their dignity.363
174.

United Nations human rights mechanisms, which could carry out independent

investigation of these allegations, have found it very difficult to engage with India. The
Working Group on Arbitrary Detention requested an invitation to carry out a country visit
in 2004, and again in 2005 and 2006. A request for an invitation to visit India by the
Special Rapporteur on torture has been outstanding since 1993 despite several reminders.
The Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions sought an
invitation in 2000 and reiterated that request in 2005, 2006 and 2008. None of these
requests received a positive response. In 1997, India reported to the Human Rights
Committee364 and signed the Convention Against Torture (CAT). However, the Indian
Government has not reported to, nor been examined by the Human Rights Committee

361

E/CN.4/2005/61/Add.1, para. 129.
Ibid., paras. 130-131.
363
“India’s secret torture chambers”, The Week, 12 July 2009.
364
Third Periodic Report submitted in July 1997, concluding observations adopted on 4 August 1997
(CCPR/C/79/Add.81).
362

A/HRC/13/42
Page 109
since365, and has not ratified CAT. As a result, United Nations human rights mechanisms
have not been able to examine allegations of secret detention in India for over a decade.
Islamic Republic of Iran
175.

Reports from the Islamic Republic of Iran indicate a pattern of

incommunicado detention of political prisoners at secret, or at least unofficial, detention
facilities. In a case typical of this pattern, according to information brought to the
attention of the Government in a Special Procedures urgent communication of 15 April
2008, Majid Pourabdollah was “arrested on 29 March 2008 in Tabriz; he was hospitalized
three days after his arrest and transferred two days later from the hospital to an
undisclosed location by the authorities.” Two weeks later his whereabouts were still not
known.366 In its response to the communication, sent after more than a year, the
Government stated that Majid Pourabdollah was a member of an extremist Marxist group
which pursued “the objective of disturbing the security of the country”.367 The
Government added that he had been brought before a court and had in the meantime been
released on bail, and that he had not been tortured in detention. The allegations regarding
his secret detention were not challenged.
176.

In the period 2000 to 2003, a Parliamentary Commission established under

Article 90 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran (which allows individuals to
address rights complaints to Parliament) investigated the establishment of secret prisons
by authorities other than the National Prisons Office. The Article 90 Parliamentary
Commission found that a number of authorities had established such unofficial, often
secret, places of detention: the Ministry of Information, the Army and Military Police
Counter-Intelligence Service, the Law Enforcement and General Inspectorate Protection

365

The next periodic report would have been due on 31 December 2001.
Communication of 15 April 2008 by the Chairperson-Rapporteur of the Working Group on Arbitrary
Detention, Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers, Special Rapporteur on the
promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, Special Rapporteur on the
situation of human rights defenders, and Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment, A/HRC/10/44/Add.4, p. 146.
367
Communication of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, dated 28 April 2009.
366

A/HRC/13/42
Page 110
Service, the Pasdaran Counter-Intelligence Service and Military Police, the Bassidj and
the Ministry of Defence Counter-Intelligence Service.368
177.

In addition to the secret detention places run by the militias, intelligence

services and other agencies, there are also concerns about sector 209 at Evin Prison on
the outskirts of Teheran. It is considered a “prison within a prison”, where political
prisoners in particular are held, often in prolonged, solitary and incommunicado
confinement.369 When the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention visited Evin Prison in
2003, it “was able to visually verify the existence of this ‘prison within a prison’,” but its
attempts to visit sector 209 were cut short by secret service agents.370
178.

Following the presidential elections, on 12 June 2009, tens of thousands of

opposition supporters have taken to the streets of Tehran and other cities throughout the
country to call for annulment of the election results. It has been alleged that while
protests have been largely peaceful, violent clashes with security forces resulted in
numerous deaths and detentions.371 These allegations were transmitted to the Government
by several mandate-holders on different occasions.372
179.

In this connection, on 10 July 2009, the Working Group on Arbitrary

Detention, the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to
freedom of opinion and expression, the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human
rights defenders and the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment, sent a joint urgent appeal to the Government of the
Islamic Republic of Iran concerning more than one hundred protesters arrested by public
368

Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention on its visit to the Islamic Republic of Iran,
E/CN.4/2004/3/Add.2, para. 36.
369
Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention on its visit to the Islamic Republic of Iran,
E/CN.4/2004/3/Add.2, paras. 32 and 54.
370
Ibid., para. 32.
371
“Iran: Detained political leaders at risk of torture, possibly to force ‘confessions’”, Amnesty
International news release, 29 June 2009, available at: http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-andupdates/news/detained-political-leaders-at-risk-of-torture-20090629.
372
See, inter alia, Joint Urgent Appeals sent by the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, the Special
Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, the Special
Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders and the Special Rapporteur on torture and other
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment on 18 June and 11 August 2009 (Report of Special
Rapporteur on torture (A/HRC/13/39/Add.1).

A/HRC/13/42
Page 111
authorities in Tehran and other Iranian cities during the protests, or at their homes. The
vast majority of those arrested was allegedly deprived of any contact with members of
their family, and did not have access to legal counsel. 373 On 14 October 2009, the
Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances sent a communication
regarding many of the persons concerned by the above mentioned joint urgent appeal, as
well as other people, whose fate and whereabouts were unknown.374
Nepal
180.

The practice of secret detention by the Royal Nepalese Army (RNA) during

the conflict with the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) (CPN-M) has been the object of
in-depth documentation, both by Nepalese civil society and by UN bodies. The
Government has accepted visits by several Special Procedures, in particular the Working
Group on Enforced and Involuntary Disappearances375 and the Special Rapporteur on
torture,376 and the OHCHR Office in Nepal has published two reports documenting
conflict-related disappearances in specific districts.377
181.

In January 2005, the Working Group on Enforced and Involuntary

Disappearances observed that the “phenomenon of disappearance in Nepal today is
widespread”, with both the Maoist insurgents and the Nepalese security forces as
perpetrators.378 The practice of secret detention, however, related primarily to the RNA,
as “the Maoists [reportedly] are more likely to kill perceived opponents outright”.379 A
year later, the Special Rapporteur on torture reported that he “received a large number of

373

Report of Special Rapporteur on torture (A/HRC/13/39/Add.1).
A/HRC/13/31, para. 289.
375
Report of the Working Group on Enforced and Involuntary Disappearances, Mission to Nepal,
E/CN.4/2005/65/Add.1 (28 January 2005).
376
Report of the Special Rapporteur on torture, Mission to Nepal, E/CN.4/2006/6/Add.5 (9 January 2006).
377
OHCHR, Nepal, Report of investigation into arbitrary detention, torture and disappearance at
Maharajgunj RNA barracks, Kathmandu, in 2003-2004 (May 2006), and OHCHR, Nepal, Conflict-related
Disappearances in Bardiya District (December 2008).
378
Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances (E/CN.4/2005/65/Add.1), para. 25.
379
Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances (E/CN.4/2005/65/Add.1), para. 29..
374

A/HRC/13/42
Page 112
allegations relating to persons taken involuntarily by security forces and who are being
held incommunicado at unknown locations”.380
182.

In many of the cases attributed to the RNA a clear pattern was documented. A

person suspected of Maoist sympathies, or simply of having contact with Maoists, was
seized by a large group of known military personnel out on patrol. He or she was
blindfolded and his or her hands tied behind the back. The victim was put into a military
vehicle and taken away. The security forces often appeared in plain clothes, so that no
personal names or unit names were visible. In almost all cases, the victim was held
incommunicado in army barracks, with no access to family or legal counsel, and
subjected to physical abuse and torture.381 Two OHCHR reports, in 2006 and 2008,
documented the treatment of detainees in two secret detention sites within RNA barracks,
the Maharajgunj barracks in Kathmandu and Chisapani barracks in Bardiya District.382
The reports, based on interviews with former detainees, families of the disappeared and
other witnesses, describe how all the detainees in Maharajgunj barracks were
continuously blindfolded during their, often months long, periods of detention by the
RNA383, subjected to deliberate and systematic torture during interrogation, including
beating, electric shocks, submersion in water, and in some cases sexual humiliation. In
2004, it was also applied to induce some detainees to renounce their CPN-M
allegiance.384 Despite the general climate of fear and insecurity, many relatives of those
arrested went to the RNA barracks to inquire after their family. They were denied access
and told that their relatives had not been arrested by the RNA and were not held inside.385
183.

Some families, assisted by non-governmental organizations, petitioned to the

courts for the writ of habeas corpus. Such petitions were effective in some cases where
the authorities acknowledged detention, but when the RNA denied detention, the

380

Report of the Special Rapporteur on torture, Mission to Nepal, para. 22.
Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances (E/CN.4/2005/65/Add.1), para. 29.
382
OHCHR, Nepal, Maharajgunj RNA barracks report, and OHCHR, Nepal, Conflict-related
Disappearances in Bardiya District.
383
OHCHR, Nepal, Maharajgunj RNA barracks report, pp. 61-62.
384
OHCHR, Nepal, Maharajgunj RNA barracks report, pp. 54-55.
385
OHCHR, Nepal, Conflict-related Disappearances in Bardiya District, p. 54.
381

A/HRC/13/42
Page 113
Supreme Court normally denied the petition.386 In a number of cases the army flatly
denied before the Supreme Court that a particular person was in detention, only to reverse
that position later when forced to do so by revelations in the media, in political debate,
and even in official documents issued by other branches of the public authority.387 The
WGEID explained that one central difficulty in these habeas corpus cases was that under
Nepalese law Government officials could not be charged with perjury for failing to tell
the truth in habeas corpus proceedings.388
184.

In its January 2005 report, the Working Group on Enforced and Involuntary

Disappearances drew attention to the impact of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities
(Control and Punishment) Act of 2002 (TADA) and the Ordinance of the same name of
2004 (TADO) on the security forces’ instigation of secret detentions and disappearances,
noting that the Act’s establishment of “special powers to check” terrorist and disruptive
acts included preventive detention “upon appropriate grounds for believing that a person
has to be stopped from doing anything that may cause a terrorist and disruptive act.”
Although the preventive detention was limited to 90 days under the Act, it was extended
to up to one year under the Ordinance, and lawyers and human rights activists argued
that, because detentions could be ordered for a full year without any judicial scrutiny, and
because in practice there was no effective civilian control over the issuance of the orders,
the free reign of the security personnel to judge who was “a terrorist” was
unquestionable.389
185.

In June 2007, the Supreme Court of Nepal issued a ground-breaking ruling in

response to petitions for the writ of habeas corpus in dozens of cases. It ordered the
Government to establish a commission of inquiry into disappearances complying with
international standards, to enact a law to criminalise enforced disappearances, to

386

OHCHR, Nepal, Conflict-related Disappearances in Bardiya District, p. 58. E/CN.4/2005/65/Add.1,
para. 41
387
E/CN.4/2005/65/Add.1, para. 42.
388
E/CN.4/2005/65/Add.1 para. 42.
389
E/CN.4/2005/65/Add.1, paras. 42-48.

A/HRC/13/42
Page 114
prosecute those responsible for past disappearances and to compensate the families of
victims.390
186.

However, in February 2008, the Special Rapporteur on torture noted that

“[w]hile the systematic practice of holding political detainees incommunicado ended
since the April 2006 ceasefire, in 2007 OHCHR documented several cases of detainees
accused of belonging to armed groups being held for short periods in unacknowledged,
incommunicado detention, in the worst case for eleven days”. 391
Pakistan
187.

The full extent of secret detention in Pakistan is not yet known, but in its

report in 2008 to the UN Human Rights Council, the Working Group on Enforced and
Involuntary Disappearances (WGEID) referred to allegations that the Supreme Court was
investigating some 600 cases of “disappearances” and that, “while some of these cases
reportedly concerned terrorism suspects, many involved political opponents of the
Government. The Supreme Court, headed by Chief Justice Iftikhar Mohammad
Chaudhry, publicly stated that it had overwhelming evidence that Pakistan’s intelligence
agencies were detaining terror suspects and other opponents. The retroactive application
of the Army Act will allegedly allow substantial impunity of those tried for having terror
suspects disappear”.392
188.

The Working Group on Enforced and Involuntary Disappearances also took

up the cases of Masood Janjua and Faisal Farz, two of those who had disappeared.393 It
was a newspaper report about these men that first prompted the Pakistani Supreme Court,
in December 2005, to demand answers from the Government about the whereabouts of
those who had disappeared. In August 2006, Masood Janjua’s wife, Amina Masood
Janjua, and the mother of Faisal Farz, Zainab Khatoon, founded the organization,
390

Follow-up report of the Special Rapporteur on torture, A/HRC/7/3/Add. 2, para. 446.
Ibid., para. 428.
392
A/HRC/10/9, paras 300-302.
393
Ibid., para. 297.
391

A/HRC/13/42
Page 115
Defence of Human Rights394 and filed a petition in the Supreme Court seeking
information about 16 people they believed had been subjected to enforced disappearance.
By July 2008 they were representing 563 people who had disappeared.395 Special
procedures have sent communications on a number of cases of alleged secret detention.396
189.

In a report published in February 2009, the Eminent Jurists Panel on

Terrorism, Counter-terrorism and Human Rights reported that, at a hearing in Pakistan,
“repeated reference was made to torture, prolonged arbitrary and incommunicado
detention and disappearances allegedly committed by the Pakistani Inter-Services
Intelligence (ISI). The Panel heard directly from family members of disappeared people,
and the trauma that they are living through was all too apparent. It was claimed that
persons are held in unacknowledged or secret detention, that individuals have been
rendered to other States (often for financial gain), and that individuals have been
interrogated by foreign intelligence personnel while in incommunicado detention. The
Panel heard that the ISI is operating to a large extent beyond either civilian or judicial
control”.397
190.

The authorities’ resistance to investigations into those held in secret detention

reached a low point on 3 November 2007, when President Musharraf suspended the
constitution, imposed a state of emergency, dismissed the entire Supreme Court and
imprisoned the judges in their homes along with their families, although there was some
improvement in 2008. In May, after Law Minister Farooq Naik promised that the
Government would trace all of the people subjected to enforced disappearance, two
committees were established to trace them. In June, the Government stated that 43
disappeared people had been traced in Balochistan, and had either been released or were

394

http://www.dhrpk.org/.
Amnesty International, “Pakistan: Denying the Undeniable: Enforced Disappearances in Pakistan,” 23
July 2008, http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/ASA33/018/2008/en.
396
A/HRC/10/44/Add.4, para. 168
397
“Assessing Damage: Urging Action: Report of the Eminent Jurists Panel on Terrorism, Counterterrorism and Human Rights”, February 2009, page 76, http://icj.org/IMG/EJP-report.pdf.
395

A/HRC/13/42
Page 116
being held in official detention sites, even though, according to the Government’s own
figures, 1,102 people had disappeared in Balochistan province alone.398
191.

Following the election of Asif Ali Zardari as President on 6 September 2008

on 21 November, Human Rights Minister Mumtaz Alam Gilani announced that a new
law was being prepared to facilitate the recovery of disappeared people. He stated that his
ministry had 567 documented cases of enforced disappearance. However, four days later,
on 25 November, the Senate Standing Committee on the Interior acknowledged that
intelligence agencies maintained “countless hidden torture cells” across the country.
Amnesty International stated that new cases of enforced disappearance continued to be
reported in 2009.399 According to a Dawn newspaper article of 5 November 2009,
Islamabad Inspector General of Police Kaleem Imam, Interior Secretary Qamar Zaman
and Rawalpindi Regional Police Officer Aslam Tareen appeared before the Supreme
Court and reported that cases of 416 missing persons had been pending before the apex
court since September 2006. The newspaper indicated that “Their report said the interior
ministry was making hectic efforts to trace the missing persons and 241 people had been
traced while 175 were still untraced. It said that complete particulars of missing persons
were being collected with the help of Nadra and the lists had been sent to the provinces
and law-enforcement agencies to enhance efforts to locate them. A special task force had
also been constituted, the report added.”400
192.

In June 2008, the Asian Human Rights Commission identified 52 illegal

detention centers in Pakistan, where, it stated, “missing persons are held for long periods
of time in order to force them to confess their involvement in terrorist and sabotage
activities.”401

398

“Pakistan”, Amnesty International Report 2009, http://thereport.amnesty.org/en/regions/asiapacific/pakistan.
399
Ibid.
400
http://beta.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/news/pakistan/04-sc-masoodjanjua-qs-08 ; accessed on 16 November 2009.
401
http://www.ahrchk.net/statements/mainfile.php/2008statements/1574/

A/HRC/13/42
Page 117
Philippines
193.

In its response to the request for relevant information from the four Experts,

the Government of the Philippines draws attention to the Bill of Rights of the 1987
Constitution, enacted after the 1986 Philippine Revolution brought an end to the
presidency of Mr. Ferdinand Marcos.402 It explicitly bans “secret detention places,
solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention.” The Government also
points out that the Philippines’ Human Security Act of 2007, i.e. the recent counterterrorism legislation, provides for stiffer penalties for those who violate its provisions
regarding the arrest, detention and interrogation of terrorism suspects. The Government
did not provide any information on cases in which these provisions might have been
violated.403
194.

The Committee Against Torture, however, noted in its concluding

observations on the most recent periodic report under CAT by the Philippines, in April
2009, that it was “deeply concerned about the de facto practice of detention of suspects
by the [Philippine National Police] and the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) in
detention centers, safe houses and military camps.”404 The Working Group on Enforced
or Involuntary Disappearances noted in February 2009 that in the Central Luzon region
of the Philippines “[s]ince 2001, more than 70 persons have allegedly been victims of
enforced disappearances, a number of those previously disappeared have surfaced after
being detained and tortured by military officers, and no perpetrators have been
punished.”405 In its response to a questionnaire about this study, the Philippines
Government stated: “Facilities and practices of secret detention; such practices
contravene the Constitution which expressly prohibits secret, solitary and
incommunicado detention and torture, and are not used. Specific laws provide penalties
for those who violate requirements in relation to the arrest, interrogation and detention of
those suspected of terrorism”.
402

As mentioned above (para. 83), secret detention practices were not uncommon during the presidency of
Ferdinand Marcos.
403
Reply of the Government of the Philippines in Annex.
404
CAT/C/PHL/CO/2, para. 12.
405
A/HRC/10/9, para. 323.

A/HRC/13/42
Page 118
195.

The Experts interviewed one of these victims of secret detention, Raymond

Manalo406, suspected of supporting the insurgent New People’s Army (NPA), whose case
sheds light on the broader situation. On 14 February 2006, brothers Raymond and
Reynaldo Manalo were abducted from their farms in San Ildefonso, Bulacan, by men
belonging to the AFP soldiers and men belonging to a militia established by the AFP to
support its counter-terrorism efforts. They were suspected of being supporters of the
NPA. They were kept in unacknowledged detention in military facilities and safe houses
run by the military for 18 months until they managed to escape from detention on 13
August 2007. A decision of the Supreme Court of the Philippines (dated 8 October 2008)
in proceedings for the writ of amparo brought by Raymond Manalo describes what
happened to him according to his own testimony, which the Supreme Court found highly
credible in spite of denials by the AFP. Other persons suspected of being supporters of
left-wing groups, including two female university students, were secretly detained with
them.407 The detainees were tortured during interrogation to extort confessions regarding
their links to the NPA. The female detainees were raped by soldiers.
196.

Throughout his detention, Raymond Manalo was not brought before any

judicial authority and had no contact with a lawyer. His family only learned that he was
still alive when he was brought before them on one occasion in an attempt to persuade his
parents to drop a habeas corpus petition that they had filed on behalf of Raymond and his
brother. In the habeas corpus proceedings, the AFP staunchly denied that they were
holding the Manalo brothers. Other persons held together with the Manalo brothers
remain disappeared as of to date408, while Raymond Manalo testified before the Supreme
Court that he saw the killing and burning of one of his co-detainees.409 As Raymond
406

Interview of Raymond Manalo,
Supreme Court of the Republic of the Philippines in The Secretary of National Defense and the Chief of
Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines v. Raymond Manalo and Reynaldo Manalo, G.R. No. 180906,
decision of 7 October 2008 and the report “Terrorism and Human Rights in the Philippines: Fighting Terror
or Terrorizing?”, http://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/ph493a.pdf, at p. 39.
408
Terrorism and Human Rights in the Philippines: Fighting Terror or Terrorizing?, p. 39.
409
Testimony reflected (and found credible) in the decision on the Supreme Court of 8 October 2008. In a
communication to five Special Procedures mandates dated 16 July 2009, however, the Government states
that the “non-cooperation of the victims’ families with the Philippines National Police impedes the process
of uncovering the truth on said case.”
407

A/HRC/13/42
Page 119
Manalo narrated in his testimony, and as the Supreme Court of the Philippines found to
be established, high-ranking military officers, including a General, were involved in his
secret detention. Calls for their prosecution remain without results.410 Following their
escape, Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo filed a petition for a writ of amparo (a remedy
recently created by the Supreme Court of the Philippines to protect persons at risk of
disappearance or extrajudicial execution), which was granted on 7 October 2008.
Sri Lanka
197.

United Nations human rights mechanisms and non-governmental

organizations have expressed serious concerns with regard to abductions by police and
military personnel, detention at undisclosed locations, and enforced disappearances. As to
the latter, the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial executions stated in the report on his
December 2005 visit to Sri Lanka that he “was very disturbed to receive reports […]
which appeared to indicate a re-emergence of the pattern of enforced and involuntary
disappearances that has so wracked Sri Lanka in the past.”411 He specifically referred to
complaints of Tamil youths being picked up by white vans, allegedly with involvement
by the security forces.412 In its 2008 report to the Human Rights Council, the Working
Group on Enforced and Involuntary Disappearances remarked that it “remains gravely
concerned at the increase in reported cases of enforced disappearances in the country”.413
Specific cases of Tamil men, possibly suspected of links to the LTTE, reportedly taken to
undisclosed places of detention by security forces in a white van without number plate
and since then disappeared, have been brought to the attention of the Government by
Special Procedures and by non-governmental organizations without receiving a
response.414 The Tamileela Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal (TMVP)-Karuna group, a break410

In the communication to five Special Procedures mandates dated 16 July 2009, the Government argues
that “the Philippine National Police cannot identify nor apprehend the perpetrators basing only on nebulous
allegations without any substantial or corroborating evidence from witnesses. At this point, allegations
pointing to the military behind the abduction, and the reported torture, sexual assaults against …, and the
burning to death of … are without any basis.”
411
E/CN.4/2006/53/Add.5, para. 69.
412
Ibid.
413
A/HRC/10/9, para. 367.
414
See, for instance, A/HRC/10/44/Add. 4, para. 196, A/HRC/11/4/Add.1, paras. 2274-2276,
A/HRC/10/12/Add.1, para. 2349, and a case reported by the Asian Human Rights Commission at

A/HRC/13/42
Page 120
away faction of the LTTE supported by the Government, was also reported to be
responsible for abductions of LTTE representatives and civilians in the area around
Trincomalee.415
198.

In its concluding observations on Sri Lanka, the Human Rights Committee

expressed its regret regarding impunity for abductions and secret detentions: “the
majority of prosecutions initiated against police officers or members of the armed forces
on charges of abduction and unlawful confinement, as well as on charges of torture, have
been inconclusive due to lack of satisfactory evidence and unavailability of witnesses,
despite a number of acknowledged instances of abduction and/or unlawful confinement
and/or torture, and only very few police or army officers have been found guilty and
punished.”416 The Human Rights Committee also “note[d] with concern reports that
victims of human rights violations feel intimidated from bringing complaints or have
been subjected to intimidation and/or threats, thereby discouraging them from pursuing
appropriate avenues to obtain an effective remedy”.
199.

While the conduct of the security forces in “white van” abduction cases is

most likely unlawful and criminal also under the law of Sri Lanka, the Special
Rapporteur on torture417 and the International Commission of Jurists have drawn attention
to the far reaching powers of arrest and detention anti-terrorism laws and ordinances
bestow upon the Sri Lankan security forces.418 Under the Emergency (Miscellaneous
Provisions and Powers) Regulation No. 1 of 2005 (“EMPPR 2005”), persons “acting in
any manner prejudicial to the national security or the maintenance of public order” may
be arrested and held in detention for up to one year, without access to judicial review by
an independent body. Persons may be similarly detained up to 18 months under the
Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act of 1979 (“PTA”) or indefinitely
pending trial. Persons can be held in irregular and unpublicized places of detention,
http://www.ahrchk.net/ua/mainfile.php/2008/2781/.
415
Report of the Special Rapporteur on torture on his visit to Sri Lanka, A/HRC/7/3/Add.6, paras. 12 and
16.
416
CCPR/CO/79/LKA, para. 9.
417
A/HRC/7/3/Add.6, paras. 41-48.
418
International Commission of Jurists, Briefing Paper: Sri Lanka’s Emergency Laws (March 2009),
available at http://www.icj.org//IMG/SriLanka-BriefingPaper-Mar09-FINAL.pdf.

A/HRC/13/42
Page 121
outside of a regular police station, recognised detention centre, penal institution or prison.
Detainees can be moved from place to place during interrogation, and denied prompt
access to a lawyer, family members or authority competent to challenge the legitimacy of
detention419. Section 15(A)(1) of the PTA, for instance, enables the Secretary to the
Minister of Defence to order that persons held on remand should be “kept in the custody
of any authority, in such place and subject to such conditions as may be determined by
him”.420 As a result of his visit to Sri Lanka in November 2007, the Special Rapporteur on
torture concluded “that torture has become a routine practice in the context of counterterrorism operations, both by the police and the armed forces.”421
200.

Responding to questions raised during the Universal Periodic Review process

in May 2008, Sri Lanka’s Attorney General stated that “notwithstanding the serious
nature of the security situation prevailing in Sri Lanka resulting from a reign of terror
unleashed by the most ruthless terrorist organization in the world, the [Liberation Tigers
of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)], it is not the policy of the State to adopt and enforce
extraordinary measures that are outside the framework of the law.”422 He stressed that the
Government “steadfastly insisted that all agents of the State should necessarily carry out
arrests, detentions and investigations including interrogations, in accordance with the due
process of the law”.423 As to allegations of a pattern of disappearances, the Government
was studying credible reports to identify the magnitude of the problem and the possible
identities of perpetrators. The Attorney General assured the Human Rights Council that
“[i]t is not the policy of the State to illegally and surreptitiously arrest persons and detain
them in undisclosed locations”.424
201.

In recent months, since the Government announced victory over the LTTE in

May 2009, reports have drawn attention to the detention of more than 10,000 persons on
suspicion of having been involved with the LTTE. Human Rights Watch reported that it
419

Ibid., pp. 17-18.
Ibid. p. 18.
421
A/HRC/7/3/Add.6, para. 70.
422
A/HRC/8/46, para. 51.
423
Ibid.
424
A/HRC/8/46, para. 52.
420

A/HRC/13/42
Page 122
“documented several cases in which individuals were taken into custody without regard
to the protection provided under Sri Lankan law. In many cases, the authorities have not
informed family members about the whereabouts of the detained, leaving them in secret,
incommunicado detention or possible enforced disappearance”.425 The International
Committee of the Red Cross was reportedly barred from the main detention camps for
displaced persons.426 Amnesty International expressed the same concern about an
estimated 10,000 to 12,000 individuals suspected of ties to the LTTE who are or have
been detained incommunicado in irregular detention facilities operated by the Sri Lankan
security forces and affiliated paramilitary groups since May 2009.427

B. Central Asia
202.

In Central Asia, the Experts gathered information on cases of secret detention

in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.
Turkmenistan
203.

As documented by a range of international organizations (including the

United Nations and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe) and nongovernmental organizations, there are persistent allegations that several persons accused
of an assassination attempt on former President Niyazov in November 2002 have since
then been held in secret detention . On 12 March 2003, Emmanuel Decaux, the OSCE
Rapporteur, reported: “The fact that their relatives remain up to this time with no news
from some prisoners in secret detention, as M. Nazarov or M. Shikhmuradov, nourishes
rumours according to which these individuals – considered as too compromising for the
regime – are said to have already died in prison”.428 The case of Mr. Boris Shikhmuradov

425

Human Rights Watch, Sri Lanka: World Leaders Should Demand End to Detention Camps (22
September 2009), available at http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/09/22/sri-lanka-world-leaders-shoulddemand-end-detention-camps.
426
Ibid.
427
Amnesty International, Sri Lankan Army Clashes With Detainees (24 September 2009),
http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/news/sri-lankan-army-clashes-detainees-20090924.
428
Report on Turkmenistan, ODIHR.GAL/15/03, 12 March 2003.

A/HRC/13/42
Page 123
is currently under the consideration of the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary
Disappearances.429
204.

On 7 October 2005, the Special Rapporteur on torture sent an urgent appeal to

the Government of Turkmenistan concerning the situation of a number of individuals
convicted in December 2002 and January 2003 to prison terms ranging from five years to
life for their alleged involvement in the assassination attempt.430 The Rapporteur noted
these prisoners continued to be held incommunicado, without access to families, lawyers,
or independent bodies such as the International Committee of the Red Cross. On 23
September 2009, Amnesty International issued a “postcard” calling upon the President to
shed light on the disappeared in Turkmenistan with reference to the group arrested after
the alleged attack on the former President in late 2002.431
Uzbekistan
205.

In its most recent report on Uzbekistan, the Committee Against Torture

expressed concern “at the numerous allegations of excessive use of force and illtreatment by Uzbek military and security forces in the May 2005 events at Andijan which
resulted, according to the State party, in 187 deaths and according to other sources, 700
or more, and in hundreds of others being detained thereafter. Notwithstanding the State
party’s persistent response to all allegations that the measures taken were in fact
appropriate, the Committee noted with concern the State party’s failure to conduct full
and effective investigations into all claims of excessive force by officials.” The
Committee also expressed concern about the fact “that the State party has limited and
obstructed independent monitoring of human rights in the aftermath of these events,
thereby further impairing the ability to obtain a reliable or credible assessment of the
reported abuses, including ascertaining information on the whereabouts and reported
torture or ill-treatment of persons detained and/or missing. The Committee has also
received credible reports that some persons who sought refuge abroad and were returned
429

HRC/13/31, para. 579.
E/CN.4/2006/6/Add.1, para. 514.
431
EUR/61/005/2009; available at: http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/EUR61/005/2009/en .
430

A/HRC/13/42
Page 124
to the country have been kept in detention in unknown places and possibly subjected to
breaches of the Convention […]” In this direction, the Committee recommended
Uzbekistan to: “provide information to family members on the whereabouts and charges
against all persons arrested or detained in connection with the Andijan events.”432

206.

On 31 January 2006, Mr. Musaev, an Uzbek national and a UNDP local staff

member in Uzbekistan, was reportedly arrested by the Uzbek National Security Service,
and his family was not informed about his whereabouts for more than 10 days. During his
detention, he was subjected to various forms of pressure, including threats by the
interrogators who forced him to sign a confession. On 13 June 2006, following a
reportedly secret and flawed trial, Mr. Musaev was found guilty of high treason,
disclosure of state secrets, abuse of office and negligence by a Military Court in
Tashkent. The verdict indicated that the information he provided was utilized by
unfriendly forces to organize the disturbances in Andijan. The Working Group on
Arbitrary Detention declared his detention arbitrary in its Opinion No. 14/2008 of 9 May
2008.433 By note verbales dated 27 September 2007 and 25 April 2008, the Government
of Uzbekistan had provided the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention with information
about the detention and trials of Mr. Erkin Musaev. On 9 March 2007, the Special
Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers and the Special Rapporteur on
torture sent an urgent appeal summarizing this case and expressing serious concern for
Mr Musaev’s physical and mental integrity following his alleged transfer to a different
prison.434 On 23 February 2009, the Chairperson-Rapporteur of the Working Group on
Arbitrary Detention, the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right
to freedom of opinion and expression, the Special Rapporteur on the right of everyone to
the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health, and the
Special Rapporteur on torture sent another urgent appeal to the Government of
Uzbekistan. It was reported that, on 26 July 2008, Mr. Musaev had been threatened by
two officers from the National Security Service (SNB) that, if he or his family did not
432

CAT/C/UZB/CO/3, paras. 7-9. See also Report of the Mission to Kyrgyzstan by the Office of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) Concerning the Events in Andijan, Uzbekistan,
13-14 May 2005 (E/CN.4/2006/119).
433
Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Opinion No. 14/2008, A/HRC/10/21/Add.1, p. 141.
434
A/HRC/7/3/Add.1, para. 133.

A/HRC/13/42
Page 125
withdraw their petitions or continued to make complaints to international human rights
mechanisms or to spread news about the above decision, they would face reprisals.435

C. Europe
207.

The Experts received information on examples of current secret detention

policies concerning the Russian Federation, and, specifically, provinces in the North
Caucasus.
Russian Federation
208.

The Council of Europe’s Committee on the Prevention of Torture (CPT)

stated after two visits to the North Caucasus carried out in May and September 2006, that
“a considerable number of persons alleged that they had been held for some time, and in
most cases ill-treated, in places which did not appear to be official detention facilities,
before being transferred to a recognised law enforcement structure or released … As for
places where persons may be unlawfully detained, a number of consistent allegations
were received in respect of one or more places in the village of Tsentoroy, and of the
‘Vega base’ located in the outskirts of Gudermes. Several allegations were also received
of unlawful detentions in the Shali and Urus-Martan areas”.436 In its statement, the CPT
indicated that the problem of what it calls “unlawful detention” persisted in the Chechen
Republic as well as other parts of the North Caucasian region. They described that they
visited an unofficial place of detention in Tsentoroy, the Vega base and the Headquarters
of the Vostok Battalion in Gudermes. Although no more detainees were held there, the
CPT found clear signs that these places had previously been used for detention
purposes.The observations of the CPT are confirmed by judgements made by the
European Court of Human Rights, which has frequently established violations of the
European Convention on Human Rights, some of which involved periods of secret
435

Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, A/HRC/13/30, para. 29.
Public statement concerning the Chechen Republic of the Russian Federation dated 13 March 2007
(CPT/Inf (2007) 17).

436

A/HRC/13/42
Page 126
detention. 437 In October 2009, the Human Rights Committee expressed concern “about
ongoing reports of torture and ill-treatment, enforced disappearance, arbitrary arrest,
extrajudicial killing and secret detention in Chechnya and other parts of the North
Caucasus committed by military, security services and other state agents, and that the
authors of such violations appear to enjoy widespread impunity due to a systematic lack
of effective investigation and prosecution.” The Committee was “particularly concerned
that the number of disappearances and abduction cases in Chechnya has increased in the
period 2008-2009.”438
209.

The Government of the Russian Federation, in its response to a questionnaire

about this study dated 29 June 2009, stated that there were:
- No instances of secret detention in the Russian system.
- No involvement or collaboration in secret detention on the territory of another State.
- All detentions fall within the supervision of the Federal penitentiary and the Ministry of
Interior.
- From 2007-2016 there is a program being undertaken to improve detention conditions.
- The office of the General Prosecutor supervises situations of detention, and if there is a
violation, it is reported.
- All places of deprivation of liberty are subordinate to the Federal Service on the
Execution of Punishment or the Ministry of Interior. The "Federal Action Programme on
the Development of the Penitentiary System" provides for a steady improvement of the
system. The Prosecutor's office monitors that the legislation is respected. 439

437

Some of the most recent decisions on violations involving secret detention: Babusheva and Others v.
Russia (App. 33944/05), Judgment of 24 September 2009; Asadulayeva and Others v. Russia (App.
15569/06), Judgment of 17 September 2009; Mutsayeva v. Russia, (App. 24297/05), Judgment of 23 July
2009; Yusupova and Others v. Russia, (App. 5428/05), Judgment of 9 July 2009; Khasuyeva v. Russia,
(App. 28159/03), Judgment of 11 June 2009; Khantiyeva and Others v. Russia (App. 43398/06)
Satabayeva v. Russia (App. 21486/06); Vakhayeva and Others v. Russia (App. 1758/04), Judgment of 29
October 2009; Karimov and Others v. Russia (App. 29851/05), Judgment of 17 July 2009;
438
CCPR/C/RUS/CO/6, para. 14. See, also, Dick Marty, “Situation in the North Caucasus Region: security
and human rights”, Second information report for the Council of Europe’s Committee of Legal Affairs and
Human Rights, 29 September 2009, AS/Jur (2009 43,
http://assembly.coe.int/CommitteeDocs/2009/ajdoc43_2009.pdf (para. 6) The annex to Dick Marty’s
information report contains several cases of abductions leading to various periods of secret detention from
different Federation Subjects in the Caucasus that corroborate such reports.
439
Reply of the Government of the Russian Federation in Annex.

A/HRC/13/42
Page 127
210.

In its submission to the Human Rights Committee at its 97th session, the

Government of the Russian Federation further stated that criminal investigations have
been opened into several cases of disappearances in the Chechen Republic. Some of these
investigations were suspended due to a failure to identify the person or person to be
charged or the whereabouts of the accused. The authorities have also created a
comprehensive programme on preventing kidnappings and disappearances.440
211.

After receiving the Government's replies to the questionnaire, the Experts

have conducted interviews with several men who testified about secret detention in the
Russian Federation. Because of fear of repression against themselves or their families,
and due to a climate of impunity441, most persons addressed did not want to be
interviewed by the Experts or to be identified. The Experts agreed to preserve the
confidentiality of the sources, as the interviewed persons feared that the divulgation of
their indentities could cause harm to individuals involved.
212.

In an interview conducted on 12 October 2009, X.Z., a Chechen who had

been living in Dagestan, and is now living in exile, explained that he was held in secret
detention and tortured for five days in the summer of 2005, apparently in connection with
a search for a wounded man who had been brought to his house by a friend. Blindfolded
throughout his detention, “he knows very little about the building where the cell was
located. The cell had a toilet (water closet), which was also the only source of drinking
water for the detainee. For food he received only a piece of bread irregularly. He heard a
man screaming close by, indicating that other persons where detained and tortured in the
same building. It had bare concrete floors (in the cell) and could not possibly be a civilian
dwelling”.442
440

CCPR/C/RUS/6
On 29 December 2009 Nurdi Nukhazhiev, Ombudsman of Chechnya reported: "Close relatives of more
than 5000 kidnapped and missing citizens are exasperated by the inaction (throughout many years already)
of the Military Prosecutor's Office and the Military Investigative Department in addressing this problem",
see http://www.eng.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/12126/ and original Russian-language website of the
Ombudsman, http://chechenombudsman.ru/index.php?
option=com_content&task=view&id=708&Itemid=198.

441

442

Interview of X.Z.. (12/10/2009).

A/HRC/13/42
Page 128
213.

In another interview conducted on 12 October 2009, X.X., another Chechen

who had been living in Dagestan, and is now living in exile, explained that he had been
subjected to “harassment and short-term detention since 1991 when he participated in a
demonstration against the war”. This led to his name appearing on a “black list” and he
was detained whenever there was an incident, and was usually held “for 1-2 days at a
time and secretly (incommunicado and without any subsequent judicial procedure)”. In
early 2004, after the Deputy Head of the local branch of Federal Security Bureau (FSB)
was killed, he was briefly detained, taken to a forest, made to dig his own grave and
threatened and beaten, then released. He was then seized again in early March, and held
in incommunicado detention for three days in a prison where torture was used to extract
false confessions. He was then put on trial with all mention of his incommunicado
detention erased from the record. With help from his family he however managed to
avoid conviction and to be released.443
214.

In a third interview, X.Y. explained how he was seized from his house in

Dagestan in late 2007, and taken to “a secret facility which he called a concentration
camp ‘where people do not come back from’, in Gudermes district, Chechnya”, run by
the FSB, the GRU (the foreign military intelligence service of the armed forces of the
Russian Federation) and the ATC (Anti-Terrorist Centre, Russian Federation). He
described being held in an old concrete building, “recalled a terrible smell and walls
covered in blood”, and explained that he was “severely tortured” for ten days, which
included receiving electric shocks, being beaten with iron bars, and being burned with a
lighter. He also explained that he “was never given food and received only one glass of
water per day”, and that he “witnessed a man beaten to death whose organs were then
removed”. After ten days, he was taken to a forest, where he narrowly escaped being
extrajudicially executed. He also said that “several other secret facilities such as the one
where he had been held exist in Chechnya, and since more recently, also in Dagestan”.444

D.
443
444

Middle East and North Africa

Interview of X.X. (12/10/2009).
Interview of X.Y.

A/HRC/13/42
Page 129
215.

Concerning the Middle East and North Africa, the Experts gathered

information on long-standing concerns about counter-terrorist policies involving secret
detention and inadequate or non-existent legal safeguards in Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Israel,
Jordan, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Saudi Arabia, Syrian Arab Republic and Yemen.
Algeria
216.

In its most recent report on Algeria, dated 26 May 2008, the Committee

Against Torture expressed its concern that secret detention centres exist in Algeria, run
by the Department of Information and Security (the Département du Renseignement et de
la Securité – DRS). In this connection, the Committee made reference to “reports of the
existence of secret detention centres run by the Department in its military barracks in
Antar, in the Hydra district of Algiers, which are outside the control of the courts.”445 In
its comments on the conclusions and recommendations of the Committee Against
Torture, Algeria “categorically refuted the allegations with regard to alleged places of
detention that reportedly lie outside the reach of the law. In all the time that they have
been promoting subversion and attacking republican institutions, the people making such
allegations have never been able to put forward any documentary evidence.”
Furthermore, Algeria affirmed that “it exercises its authority over all places of detention
under its jurisdiction and that it has been granting permission for visits by independent
national and international institutions for more than eight years.”446
217.

In its response to a questionnaire about this study, the Algerian Government

stated: “Secret detention is not used by the police services of Algeria. The law precludes
such practice. The methods for dealing with terrorism are within a strict legal framework,
with investigations to be carried out within allowed time limits, and with magistrates
being informed. In an emergency situation in the context of counter-terrorism which
threatens the public order, a Presidential decree may be made of a State of Emergency,
notified to the UN, authorizing the Minister of Interior to take measures of house arrest as
445
446

UN Committee Against Torture, CAT/C/DZA/CO/3, para. 6.
CAT/C/DZA/CO/3/Add.1, paras. 14 and 15

A/HRC/13/42
Page 130
administrative internment. It is in this context, controlled by Presidential decree, that such
rare and exceptional measures may be taken. This is believed to be an effective measure
in the efforts against terrorism.”447
218.

In its briefing to the Committee Against Torture, Amnesty International also

referred to “a persistent pattern of secret detention and torture” by the DRS, noting that
the barracks where detainees were held in secret detention “are situated in an area
surrounded by forest, concealed from public view and not accessible to the public.”448
219.

The Working Group on Arbitrary Detention has reported on two cases in

Algeria in recent years:
220.

M’hamed Benyamina, an Algerian national domiciled in France since 1997

and married to a French national since 1999, was arrested on 9 September 2005 at Oran
airport in Algeria, by plainclothes policemen. He was held for six months in a secret
place of detention, and was released in March 2006 following a Presidential amnesty
decree concerning the implementation of the Charter for Peace and National
Reconciliation of 27 February 2006. On 2 April 2006, he was again arrested by
plainclothes policemen from the DRS, and brought to DRS premises in Tiaret. Officers
told his brother that he had been interrogated and released the following morning, but, in
reality, he was transferred to Algiers, probably to other DRS premises, before being
transferred again, on 5 April, to Serkadj prison in Algiers.449 According to the Algerian
authorities, Mr. M’hamed Benyamina was charged with membership of a terrorist
organization active in Algeria and abroad. On 7 March 2006, the indictment division of
the Algiers court issued a decision terminating criminal proceedings against Mr.
Benyamina and ordering his release. But in reality, Mr. Benyamina, who had been
implicated in extremely serious acts of terrorism, could not benefit from the termination
of criminal proceedings but only from a commutation or remission of the sentence after
447

Reply from the Government of Algeria in Annex.
Amnesty International, “Algeria: Briefing to the Committee Against Torture”, 17 April 2008,
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cat/docs/ngos/AI-AlgeriaApril2008.pdf.
449
Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Opinion No. 38/2006, A/HRC/7/4/Add.1, page 14.
448

A/HRC/13/42
Page 131
the verdict. After bringing the case before the indictment division, the Procurator-General
once again placed Mr. Benyamina in detention.
221.

Mohamed Rahmouni disappeared on 18 July 2007, and was transferred to a

military prison in Blida after six months of secret detention, allegedly at one of the secret
centers run by DRS. According to a communication received from the Government on 2
January 2008, Mr. Rahmouni was questioned by the military judicial police for his
membership in a terrorist organization, and was then released and assigned to a residence
by a decision of the Minister of the Interior and the local community on 6 August 2007.
He was reportedly found at Blida Military Prison (50 km. from Algiers) on 26 January
2008.450
Egypt
222.

In Egypt, a state of emergency has been in force continuously since 1958,

with just one short break from May 1980 until the assassination of President Anwar alSadat in October 1981. In May 2008, it was extended for another two-year period, even
though State officials, including President Mubarak, “had repeatedly said that they would
not seek to renew the state of emergency beyond its expiration on May 31, 2008.”451
223.

In April 2009, the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of

human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism visited Egypt, and
referred in his report to “the emergency law framework that is primarily used to
countering terrorism in the country. The resort to exceptional powers in the prevention
and investigation of terrorist crimes reflects, in the view of the Special Rapporteur, a
worrying trend in which this phenomenon is perceived as an emergency triggering
exceptional powers, rather than a serious crime subject to normal penal procedures”. He
also expressed, inter alia, concern about “relying on exceptional powers in relation to
arrest and detention of terrorist suspects that are then inserted into the ordinary penal
450

Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Opinion No. 33, 2008, A/HRC/13/30/Add.1.
“ICJ Submission to the Universal periodic Review of Egypt”, August 2009,
http://www.icj.org/IMG/UPRSubmission-Egypt.pdf.

451

A/HRC/13/42
Page 132
framework of an anti-terrorism law,” the practice of administrative detention without trial
in violation of international norms, and “regarding the use of unofficial detention
facilities and the heightened risk of torture to terrorist suspects and the lack of
investigation and accountability.”452
224.

On 2 September 2009, the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary

Disappearances and the Special Rapporteur on torture sent an urgent communication to
the Government of Egypt regarding the alleged enforced disappearance of Mohamed
Fahim Hussein, Khaled Adel Hussein, Ahmed Adel Hussein, Mohamed Salah Abdel
Fattah, Mohamed Hussein Ahmed Hussein, Adel Gharieb Ahmed, Ibrahim Mohamed
Taha, Sameh Mohamed Taha, Ahmed Saad El Awadi, Ahmed Ezzat Ali, Samir Abdel
Hamid el Metwalli, Ahmed El Sayed Nasef, Ahmed Farhan Sayed Ahmed, Ahmed El
Sayed Mahmoud el Mansi, Mohamed Khamis El Sayed Ibrahim, and Yasser Abdel Qader
Abd El Fattah Bisar. According to the information received, State Security Intelligence
agents are believed to have abducted these 16 persons for their allegedly belonging to the
“Zeitoun terror cell”, accused of Islamist extremism and of preparing terrorist attacks. It
was further reported that even though the Government publicly recognized the detention
of these persons, they did not disclose their place of detention. Mr. El Sayed Mahmoud
Mansi saw his lawyer by chance in the State Security Prosecution at which time he said
that, following his abduction, he was blindfolded, stripped naked, tied to an iron bed
without a mattress and deprived of sleep. He indicated receiving electro-shocks to his
private parts, nipples and ears. Further information received indicates that Mr. Mohamed
Fahim Hussein and Mr. Ahmed Farhan Sayed Ahmed were brought before the Prosecutor
on 23 August 2009. It was reported that, during the hearing, they stated having been
tortured. It was also alleged that, after the hearing, they were once again taken to an
unknown location and that neither the Attorney General nor the Chief Prosecutor knew
where they were being held. These cases are all still under the consideration of the
Working Group on Enforced Disappearances.453
452

Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental
freedoms while countering terrorism, Mission to Egypt, A/HRC/13/37/Add.2, 14 October 2009.
453
Report of the Special Rapporteur on torture (A/HRC/13/39/Add.1) and Working Group on Enforced or
Involuntary Disappearances(A/HRC/13/31), para.192.

A/HRC/13/42
Page 133

225.

The Experts held an interview with Azhar Khan, a British national who was

reportedly held in secret detention in Cairo for about five days in July 2008.454 During
the interview, Azhar Khan reported that in 2004 he had been arrested for being related to
people accused of committing terrorist acts, but that he was later released without charge.
Moreover, he reported that in 2008 he decided to go to Egypt with a friend, where they
arrived on 9 July 2008. Upon arrival at the airport, Azhar Khan was detained but his
friend was not. Azhar Khan was then taken to a room located before passport control
where he stayed until the following night when he was taken handcuffed, hooded and at
gun-point to a place which he described as an old prison located at about 20 minutes from
the airport. Upon arrival, he was put in stress positions and inflicted short electroshocks
on his ribs and back. Later, he was taken to a room where two people were waiting: an
English and an Arabic speaker. There were also two other people taking notes. The
English speaker asked questions only related to the United Kingdom including about his
arrest in 2004. He was further asked about his personal life in the United Kingdom,
including his religion and the mosque he attended. He was interrogated a second time and
asked the same type of questions. According to Azhar Khan, those questions were
provided by British Security officials. During his detention, he was held handcuffed and
hooded. The fifth day, he was transferred to a police station where an official of the
British Consulate informed him that he was going back to London the following day.
Upon arrival in London, he was not formally interrogated but asked by British Security
officials whether he was fine.
Iraq
226.

With regard to secret detention practiced by the Iraqi government, the United

Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) referred to “unofficial detention” by Iraqi
authorities, notably the Ministry of Interior, in several of its reports.455 One facility, Al-

454
455

Interview of Azhar Khan.
UNAMI Human Rights Report 1 November– 31 December 2005, paras 9-11;

A/HRC/13/42
Page 134
Jadiriya, is mentioned repeatedly in this connection.456 In 2006, drawing attention to the
lack of effective investigations after its discovery UNAMI noted that “One year after the
discovery of the illegal detention centre of Al-Jadiriya’s bunker in Baghdad, on 13
November 2005, where 168 detainees were unlawfully detained and abused, the United
Nations and international NGOs […] continue to request that the Government of Iraq
publish the findings of the investigation on this illegal detention. It may be recalled that a
Joint-Inspection Committee was established after the discovery of the Al-Jadiryia’s
bunker in November 2005, in order to establish the general conditions of detention. The
existence of the bunker was revealed after a raid of the Ministry of Interior’s bunker by
MNF I/Iraqi forces. The Iraqi Government should start a judicial investigation into
human rights violations in Al-Jadiriya. The failure to publish the Al-Jadiriya report, as
well as other investigations carried out by the Government regarding conditions of
detention in the country, remains a matter of serious concern and affects Iraq’s
commitment to establish a new system based on the respect of human rights and the rule
of law.”457 Another unofficial place of detention under the Minsitry of Interior was the socalled “Site 4.” UNAMI described the following: “On 30 May [2006], a joint inspection
led by the Deputy Prime Minister and MNF-I, in a prison known as “Site 4,” revealed the
existence of 1,431 detainees with systematic evidence of physical and psychological
abuse. Related to alleged abuses committed at “Site 4,” a probe by 3 separate
investigative committees was set up. After two and a half months, the probe concluded
that 57 employees, including high-ranking officers, of the Ministry of Interior were
involved in degrading treatment of prisoners. Arrests warrants against them were
allegedly issued, but no arrests have reportedly yet taken place.”458
227.

In relation to Kurdistan province, UNAMI noted in 2006: “Despite concrete

acknowledgement by the KRG [Kurdistan Regional Government] of the arrest of
individuals by […] intelligence and security forces and their detention at unofficial
detention facilities, there appears to be little impetus by the authorities to effectively
address this pervasive and serious human rights concern. There has been little official
456

UAMIT Human Rights Report 1 July – 31 August 2006 , paras 70-73; UNAMI Human Rights Report 1
May –30 June 2006, paras 76-78;
457
UNAMI Human Rights Report 1 November - 31 December 2006, paras 90 – 91.
458
UNAMI Human Rights Report 1 November - 31 December 2006, para 92.

A/HRC/13/42
Page 135
denial of the existence and sometimes locations of secret and illegal detention cells in
Suleimaniya and Erbil which are often no more than rooms in private houses and
government buildings.” UNAMI reiterated in 2007 that “the practice of administrative
detention of persons held in the custody of the Asayish (security) forces in the Kurdistan
region, the majority having been arrested on suspicion of involvement in acts of terrorism
and other serious crimes. Many are said by officials to be members or supporters of
proscribed Islamist groups. Hundreds of detainees have been held for prolonged periods,
some for several years, without referral to an investigative judge or charges brought
against them. In some cases, detainees were arrested without judicial warrant and all are
routinely denied the opportunity to challenge the lawfulness of their detention. UNAMI
also continues to receive allegations of the torture or ill-treatment of detainees in Asayish
detention facilities. […] On 28 January and again on 27 February [2007], families of
detainees arrested by Asayish forces demonstrated before the Kurdistan National
Assembly in Erbil, demanding information on the whereabouts of detained relatives and
the reasons for their arrest […].”459 In 2009, UNAMI further reported that “The KRG
2006 Anti-Terrorism Law, which forms the legal basis for many arrests, has been
extended into mid-2010. […]UNAMI/HRO continues to document serious violations of
the rights of suspects and those deprived of their liberties by the KRG authorities. These
include claims of beatings during interrogation, torture by electric shocks, forced
confessions, secret detention facilities, and a lack of medical attention. Abuse is often
committed by masked men or while detainees are blindfolded. 460
228.

The Experts took up the case of a group of individuals arrested and held in

secret detention for prolonged periods in the spring 2009 in connection with accusations
against Mr. Al-Dainy, a former member of Parliament.461 According to the allegations
459

UNAMI Human Rights Report 1 January – 31 March 2007, paras 73 – 75.
United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq, Human Rights Report, 1 July to 31 December 2008, May
2009; paras. 91,92;
http://uniraq.org/documents/UNAMI_Human_Rights_Report_July_December_2008_EN.pdf. See also:
Amnesty International, “Hope and Fear: Human Rights in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq,” April 2009,
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE14/006/2009/en/c2e5ae23-b204-4b46-b7f506dc1501f62f/mde140062009en.pdf.
461
Report of the Special Rapporteur on torture (/HRC/13/39/Add.1) and report of the Working Group on
Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances (A/HRC/13/31), para. 295.
460

A/HRC/13/42
Page 136
received, several former collaborators of Mr. Dainy were arrested in February 2009, held
in secret detention at a number of different locations. In particular, they were detained in
a prison in the Green Zone run by the Baghdad Brigade. Their families were not notified
of their whereabouts for several months. The current location of eleven persons is still not
known. While being held at the Baghdad Brigade prison, most of them were severely illtreated, including by beating with cables, suspension from the ceiling with either the feet
or hands upwards for up to two days, or electroshocks. Some had black bags put over
their heads and were suffocated for several minutes until the bodies became blue several
times in a row. Also, some had plastic sticks introduced in the anus. They were also
threatened with the rape of members of their families. They were forced to sign and
fingerprint pre-prepared confessions. As a result of the ill-treatment, several of them had
visible injuries on several parts of their bodies. Many lost considerably weight.
Israel
229.

In Israel, the Committee against Torture quoted in its report of May 2009 an

official figure of 530 Palestinians held in administrative detention (while noting that it
was “as many as 700,” according to non-governmental sources), and also highlighted a
disturbing piece of legislation related to holding detainees as “unlawful combatants.”462
As the Committee explained:
[T]he Unlawful Combatants Law No. 5762-2002, as amended in August 2008,
allows for the detention of non-Israeli citizens falling into the category of
“unlawful combatants,” who are described as “combatants who are believed to
have taken part in hostile activity against Israel, directly or indirectly,” for a
period of up to 14 days without any judicial review. Detention orders under this
law can be renewed indefinitely; evidence is neither made available to the
detainee nor to the person’s lawyer, and, although the detainees have the right to
petition the Supreme Court, the charges against them are also reportedly kept
secret. According to the State party, 12 persons are at present detained under this
law.463
462
463

UN Committee Against Torture, CAT/C/ISR/CO/4.
Ibid.

A/HRC/13/42
Page 137

230.

The Committee also mentioned the alleged secret detention facility 1391,

noting with concern that, although the Government claimed that it “has not been used
since 2006 to detain or interrogate security suspects,” the Supreme Court rejected several
petitions urging an examination of the facility. The Committee recalled to the Israeli
Government that it “should ensure that no one is detained in any secret detention facility
under its control in the future, as a secret detention centre is per se a breach of the
Convention.”464 The Committee went further by calling on the Government to
“investigate and disclose the existence of any other such facility and the authority under
which it has been established”.
Jordan
231.

Although Jordan’s involvement with the CIA’s proxy detention program

seems to have come to an end in 2005,465 secret detention in a domestic context remains a
problem. This is above and beyond the sweeping powers of the Law on Crime Prevention
Act of 1954, which “empowers provincial governors to authorize the detention without
charge or trial of anyone suspected of committing a crime or ‘deemed to be a danger to
society.’ Such detention orders can be imposed for one year and are renewable,” 466 and
pursuant to which authorities can arbitrarily detain and isolate individuals at will under
the guise of administrative detention.467 In its 2009 report, Amnesty International
explained that 12,178 men and 81 women (according to figures in 2007) were held
without charge or trial under this provision.468
232.

In 2007, for example, the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention reported on

the case of Issam Mohamed Tahar Al Barqaoui Al Uteibi, a writer and theologian known
in Jordan and in the Arab world, who has been repeatedly accused of “promoting and
464

Ibid.
Human Rights Watch, “Double Jeopardy: CIA Renditions to Jordan”, 7 April 2008,
http://www.hrw.org/en/node/62264.
466
A/HRC/4/33/Add.3, para. 16, FN. 4.
467
A/HRC/4/33/Add.3, Appendix, para. 15.
468
“Jordan”, Amnesty International Report 2009, http://thereport.amnesty.org/en/regions/middle-east-northafrica/jordan.
465

A/HRC/13/42
Page 138
glorifying terrorism” by the security services. He was detained for the first time between
1994 and 1999, and arrested on 28 November 2002, with 11 other people, on charges of
“conspiracy to commit terrorist acts”, as a result of public statements he made through
the media. Tried by the State Security Court, he was acquitted on 27 December 2004.
However, he was not released but was detained again for six months, between 27
December 2004 and 28 June 2005, at a secret detention facility (which later turned out to
be the Headquarters of the General Intelligence Directorate (GID), the Jordanian
intelligence service), where he alleges that he was tortured. He was interviewed after his
release by Al-Jazeera on 4 July 2005, when he condemned the military occupation of
Iraq. Following this interview, he was again secretly detained on 5 July 2005.469 He was
finally released on 12 March 2008.470
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya
233.

In a visit to the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya in May 2009 representatives of

Amnesty International noted that Libya’s Internal Security Agency (ISA) “appears to
have unchecked powers in practice to arrest, detain and interrogate individuals suspected
of dissent against the political system or deemed to present a security threat, to hold them
incommunicado for prolonged periods and deny them access to lawyers, in breach even
of the limited safeguards set out in Libya’s Code of Criminal Procedure.”471 Also Human
Rights Watch has recently reported on continuing practices of incommunicado and secret
detention in Libya.472
234.

In recent years, UN bodies have examined the following cases in Libya: In

2007, the Human Rights Committee adopted its final views in Edriss El Hassy v. Libya
(Communication No. 1422/2005). The Committee held that the alleged incommunicado
469

Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Opinion No. 18/2007, A/HRC/10/21/Add.1.
Alkarama for Human Rights press release, 13 March 2008, http://en.alkarama.org/index.php?
option=com_content&view=article&id=70:jordan-m-issam-al-uteibi-sheikh-almaqdisi-liberated-on-march12-2008&catid=24:communiqu&Itemid=120.
471
“Libya: Amnesty International completes first fact-finding mission in five years”, Amnesty International
news release, 29 May 2009, http://www.amnesty.nl/voor_de_pers_artikel/49650.
472
Human Rights Watch, Truth and Justice Can’t Wait; Human Rights Developments in Libya Amid
Institutional Obstacles, 12 December 2009. See, in particular, Chapter VII on the Internal Security Agency.
470

A/HRC/13/42
Page 139
detention of the author's brother, from around 25 March 1995 to 20 May 1995, and again
from 24 August 1995 "to the present time" constituted a violation of ICCPR articles 7
and 9473. In respect of article 6 of the Covenant, the Committee held that as the author had
not explicitly requested the Committee to conclude that his brother was dead, it was not
for it to formulate a finding on article 6.
235.

In 2005, the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances

received the case of Hatem Al Fathi Al Marghani, who was reportedly held in secret
detention by the Libyan Security Services from December 2004 to March 2005. During
this period, he was not informed of any charges against him or presented to a judge.
Allegedly, he was detained for publicly expressing his dissatisfaction with the arrest and
condemnation to execution on the grounds of endangering state security of his brother.474
236.

In 2007, the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention reported on the case of

Mohamed Hassan Aboussedra, a medical doctor who was arrested by agents of the
Internal Security Services in Al-Bayda on 19 January 1989. The agents had no formal
arrest warrant and no charges were laid against him. His four brothers were also secretly
detained for three years until information was made available that they were detained at
Abu Salim prison. On 9 June 2005, Mr. Aboussedra, who was also held at Abu Salim,
was moved to an unknown location by agents of the Internal Security Services, in spite of
a judicial order for his release. After being sentenced to a prison term of 10 years in 2004,
the Appellate Court ordered his release on account of the years he had already spent in
prison, from 1989 until 2005. However, he was not released. He was kept in detention
and transferred to an unknown location. He has been secretly detained ever since, and has
not been able to consult a lawyer, has not been presented to any judicial authority, and
has not been charged by the Government with any offence.475

473

See also Youssef El-Megreisi v. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (Human Rights Committee Communication
No. 440/1990).
474
E/CN.4/2006/56, para. 331.
475
Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Opinion No. 16/2007, A/HRC/10/21/Add.1.

A/HRC/13/42
Page 140
237.

On 13 October 2009, the Experts conducted an interview with Aissa

Hamoudi, a joint Algerian/Swiss national, who was held incommunicado for three
months in a prison in Libya without knowing where he was detained. On 18 November
2007, while on a business trip in Libya, Mr. Hamoudi was arrested in Tripoli by
policemen conducting a simple identity check. After a day spent in police custody, he
was handed over to the Interior Services, who took him to a prison where he was held for
three months in a cell with four other men, and interrogated every week or every other
week on numerous topics. He was asked very detailed information about his family, and
general questions on his political views, his relationship to Switzerland, and other
countries. In the last month of his detention, he was left in a cell without a bathroom or
water, and had to ask permission for everything he wanted. In this period, he was not
interrogated, but was beaten once when he tried to undertake a hunger strike. He was then
transferred to the “Passports Prison”, run by the Exterior Services, which housed around
4000 detainees, mainly foreigners, waiting to be sent back to their respective countries,
where he was held for 10 days in terrible sanitary conditions, but was never interrogated.
He witnessed other detainees being tortured, but was not tortured himself. It was here that
a representative of the Consulate of Algeria found him, and took steps to initiate his
release. He was never charged with anything, and for his entire stay under arrest he was
held totally incommunicado. His family did not know where he was, and although he was
kept in known places, he was secretly detained.476
Saudi Arabia
238.

Saudi Arabia has a legal limit of six months’ detention before trial, but in

reality the domestic intelligence agency – the General Directorate for Investigations, or
Mahabith, run by the Interior Ministry – functions without effective judicial oversight,
running its own prisons, which are used to hold both political prisoners and those
regarded as having an involvement with terrorism, and ignoring court orders to release
detainees held for longer than the legal limit. In July 2007, the Interior Minister admitted

476

Interview of Mr. Aissa Hamoudi ().

A/HRC/13/42
Page 141
that 9,000 “security suspects” had been detained between 2003 and 2007 and that 3,106
of them were still being held.477
239.

In recent years, UN bodies have focused on several cases in Saudi Arabia,

including the following:
240.

In 2007, the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention reported that nine

individuals – Saud Mukhtar Al-Hashimi, Sulaiman Al-Rashoudi, Essam Basrawy,
Abdulrahman Al-Shumairi, Abdulaziz Al-Khuraiji, Moussa Al-Garni, Abdulrahman
Sadeq Khan, Al-Sharif Seif Al-Dine Shahine, and, allegedly, Mohammed Hasan AlQurashi – were arrested on 2 February 2007 by agents of the Intelligence Services
(Mabahith) in Jeddah and Medina and had been held in incommunicado detention at an
unknown location ever since. The arrest of these men, who comprise doctors, academics,
businessmen, a lawyer and a retired judge, and are all longstanding advocates of political
and social reforms, was ordered by the Ministry of the Interior based on allegations of
financing terrorism and illegal activities. At the time of the report, the Government did
not refute the fact that the men had already been held in secret detention for 156 days,
denied visits, access to a lawyer and the opportunity to question the legality of their
detention. 478
241.

The Experts conducted an interview with Mrs. Hassna Ali Ahmed Al-Zahrani,

the wife of one of these men, Saud Mukhtar Al-Hashimi, a doctor and an advocate for
civil and political liberties, who, at the time, had been held for two years and nine
months, which included many months of incommunicado detention. Mrs. Al-Zahrani
explained that, on the night of 2 February 2007, her husband went out with friends
(including a university professor and a judge) to attend a meeting, but never returned. She
learned of his arrest when the Interior Minister made a public statement regarding the
arrest of some people after a raid, and spoke to him by telephone after ten days, when he
477

Amnesty International, "Saudi Arabia, Assaulting Human Rights in the Name of Counter-Terrorism",
available at: http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE23/009/2009/en/692d9e42-b009-462a-8a167336ea4dfc3c/mde230092009en.pdf.
478
Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Opinion No. 27/2007, A/HRC/10/21/Add.1.

A/HRC/13/42
Page 142
had been held in an annex to a prison run by the Public Investigations Unit (PIU). He was
then held incommunicado in a PIU prison for five months until she was allowed to meet
him, when he told her that he was being held in solitary confinement, and that he was
also being interrogated, sometimes at night. Despite being allowed visits from his wife,
Mr. Al-Hashimi has never been formally charged, has not been allowed access to a
lawyer, and has not been brought before a judge. The reasons given for his arrest and
detention vary – they include allegations that he has been advocating reform, fundraising,
or simply that he is a “suspect”.479
Syrian Arab Republic
242.

When considering the third periodic report of Syria, the Human Rights

Committee noted with concern the state of emergency that is in force in Syria since 1963,
which provides for many derogations in law or practice from the rights guaranteed under
articles 9, 14, 19 and 22 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
“without any convincing explanations being given as to the relevance of these
derogations to the conflict with Israel and the necessity for these derogations to meet the
exigencies of the situation claimed to have been created by the conflict. The Committee
further “noted that the State party has not fulfilled its obligation to notify other States
parties of the derogations it has made and of the reasons for these derogations, as required
by article 4 (3) of the Covenant.” As a consequence, the Committee recommended that
“State parties should ensure firstly that the measures it has taken, in law and practice, to
derogate from Covenant rights are strictly required by the exigencies of the situation;
secondly, that the rights provided for in article 4 (2) of the Covenant are made nonderogable in law and practice; and thirdly, that States parties are duly informed, as
required by article 4 (3) of the Covenant, of the provisions from which it has derogated
and the reasons therefore, and of the termination of any particular derogation.480
243.

The Committee also expressed its concern at continuing reports of torture and

cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, practices that it found to be
479
480

Interview with Wife of Saud Mukhtar Al-Hashimi
CCPR/CO/84/SYR, para. 6.

A/HRC/13/42
Page 143
facilitated by “resort to prolonged incommunicado detention, especially in cases of
concern to the Supreme State Security Court, and by the security or intelligence
services.” As a consequence, the Committee recommended that Syria “take firm
measures to stop the use of incommunicado detention and eradicate all forms of torture
and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment by law enforcement officials,
and ensure prompt, thorough, and impartial investigations by an independent mechanism
into all allegations of torture and ill-treatment, prosecute and punish perpetrators, and
provide effective remedies and rehabilitation to the victims.”481
244.

The Experts note a recent report of Human Rights Watch in which concern is

expressed for the current situation of the Kurdish community in Syria. The NGO
affirmed, inter alia, that the Emergency Law has been used to detain a number of leading
Kurdish political activists without arrest warrants and that 30 former Kurdish detainees,
who were interviewed for the report, have been held incommunicado at the security
branches for interrogations by security forces and that some of them allegedly having
been subjected to torture and other ill-treatments, including sleep deprivation and stress
positions. Furthermore, it is ascertained that these people were only able to inform their
relatives of their whereabouts after being transferred to ordinary prisons. The report
further states that this practice has not only been used against Kurdish activists, but also
against all political and human rights activists.482
245.

During 2009, the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances

transmitted eight cases concerning members of the Kurdish Community of Kamishli who
were allegedly abducted in 2008 and whose whereabouts remain unknown.483
246.

In the context of the present study, the experts conducted an interview with

Maryam Kallis, who was held in secret detention in Damascus, Syria, from 15 March to 7
June 2009.484 According to her report, Ms. Kallis was held in the basement of a building
481

CCPR/CO/84/SYR, para. 9.
Human Rights Watch, “Group Denial, Repression of Kurdish Political and Cultural Rights in Syria”, 26
November 2009, pp. 44-49, http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2009/11/26/group-denial.
483
A/HRC/13/31, par. 546.
484
Maryam Kallis.
482

A/HRC/13/42
Page 144
located in a private area in Baab-Tooma, Damascus, which, she assumed, could have
been run by the Mukhabarat, the intelligence services of Syria. During this period, Ms.
Kallis further reported, she was taken blindfolded around 8-10 times to another room of
the same building for interrogation and, while she was not physically assaulted, she
suffered mental torture and witnessed scenes of torture where men were beaten with
electric rods. Furthermore, on two occasions she met very briefly with representatives of
the British consulate at another venue. She also alleged that her family did not know
where she was being held and that when her husband tried to find out where she was,
British authorities said that they could not disclose the place of detention for two reasons:
they had an agreement with Syria not to disclose this place and, if they did, Ms. Kallis’
sister could go there and put Ms. Kallis’ life at risk
Yemen
247.

In 2008, the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention reported on the case of

Abdeljalil Al-Hattar, who was arrested at dawn on 14 December 2007 by Political
Security Officers at a mosque in Sana’a. He was then handcuffed and taken to an
unknown location. For two months, he was held incommunicado in cells belonging to the
political police. When his family was allowed to visit him, they learned that he had not
been presented before a magistrate to be formally accused of any crime, and had not been
given access to a lawyer. In its response to the WGAD on 19 November 2008, the
Yemeni Government confirmed the arrest of Mr. Al-Hattar, citing terrorist activity, but
claimed that he never disappeared, and that he would be subject to legal proceedings.485
248.

The Experts also interviewed Mr. Al-Hattar. He explained that he had been

held in incommunicado detention for two months and had been unlawfully detained for a
total of 14 months. Asked whether “this arrangement of denying visits for the first couple
of months was a regular method adopted by the authorities for detainees, he stated that
this practice varied from person to person, but the weekly visits are the usual

485

WGAD Opinion No. 40/2008, A/HRC/13/30/Add.1

A/HRC/13/42
Page 145
arrangements for detainees. He was not aware of the detention centre ever being visited
by ICRC”.
249.

Mr. Al-Hattar explained that the reason that had been given for his arrest was

that he had “hosted a wanted person”, who, in fact, “was brought to his home by an
acquaintance, but not known to him personally.” He stated that this is a common local
practice to host travelers, but that it was two days after he had hosted this person that he
was arrested. He also explained that he understood that “his release was the result of an
agreement reached between the Yemeni Government and Al-Qaeda whereby a group of
detainees would be released in exchange for Al-Qaeda ceasing attacks. It was his
understanding that it was up to the Political Security unit to select which detainees would
be released under this arrangement; they selected persons such as himself who had not
been charged and who had been unfairly detained.” He added that “many young people
have been unfairly detained in Yemen.”486
250.

The Experts also spoke to another Yemeni subjected to secret detention. A.S.

was seized on 15 August 2007, from his home in Sana’a and held in incommunicado
detention for two months in an official prison belonging to the Political Security Body –
Intelligence Unit, which is the Political Security prison in Sana’a. For this two-month
period, no one knew his whereabouts and he did not have any access to the outside world,
including any access to a doctor, lawyer or the ICRC. His family was not able to visit him
until two months after his arrest. He was apparently seized because of a call made from
his mobile phone by a relative, and was held for another seven months after the initial
period of incommunicado detention. He was released on 27 May 2008, and in the report
on the interview it was noted: “When he asked, on the day of his release, why he had
been detained, he was simply told that there are many innocent people who are detained,
and he could consider himself to be one such person”.487

486
487

Interview with Abdeljalil Al-Hattar
Interview with A.S.

A/HRC/13/42
Page 146

E. Sub-Saharan Africa
251.

In Sub-Saharan Africa, the Experts gathered information about the secret

detention of political opponents in the Gambia, Sudan, Uganda and Zimbabwe, where
anti-terrorist rhetoric has been invoked. The information collected by the Experts also
shows the widespread use of secret detention in the Democratic Republic of Congo, and
several long-standing and unresolved cases of secret detention in Equatorial Guinea and
Eritrea.
Democratic Republic of the Congo
252.

In its April 2006 report, the Committee against Torture expressed concern that

officials “are still depriving people of their liberty arbitrarily, especially in secret places
of detention.” The Committee took note of the outlawing of unlawful places of detention
that are beyond the control of the Public Prosecutor’s Office, such as prison cells run by
the security services and the Special Presidential Security Group, where persons have
been subjected to torture. Nevertheless, it remained concerned that officials of the State
party were still depriving people of their liberty arbitrarily, especially in secret places of
detention.488
253.

The ANR and the Republican Guard remain widely reported to severely

restrict the safeguards to which detainees are entitled under international law, while at the
same time barring any independent monitoring (including by the judiciary), so that
detention is effectively secret. Detainees are commonly denied the right to be brought
before a judge within the 48-hour time period stipulated by the Congolese constitution,
which has led to a proliferation of detainees who are detained solely on the basis of the
Procès-verbal de saisie des prévenus (PVSP), a document issued by the Prosecutor
General stipulating that detainees should be informed of their rights and of the charges
imputed to them. In relation to ANR facilities, judicial authorities are barred from
488

CAT/DRC/CO/1, para. 7.

A/HRC/13/42
Page 147
carrying out inspections, in clear contradiction with the laws of the Democratic Republic
of the Congo. This state of affairs is compounded by ANR agents’ consistent refusal to
allow the UNJHRO [UN Joint Human Rights Office] access to their facilities in several
parts of the country, particularly Kinshasa, South Kivu, Bas-Congo, North Kivu and
Oriental Province, despite MONUC’s [United Nations Mission DR Congo] mandate and
the existence of a directive from President Joseph Kabila dated 5 July 2005 ordering all
security forces, intelligence services and judicial authorities to provide unhindered access
to UNJHRO staff. Likewise, access to detention facilities operated by the Republican
Guard continued to be denied to judicial authorities and civil society organizations as
well as to UNJHRO staff. 489
Equatorial Guinea
254.

In its report on a mission to Equatorial Guinea in July 2007, the Working

Group on Arbitrary Detention explained that it was “particularly concerned by the
practice of secret detention,” because it had “received information about the kidnapping
by Government agents of Equatorial Guinea, who are taken from neighbouring countries
to Malabo and held in secret detention there. In some cases the authorities have not
acknowledged that the persons in question are held in detention, which means that
technically they are considered to be missing.”490
255.

During its mission, the Working Group interviewed four persons – Carmelo

Ncogo Mitigo, Jesús Michá Michá, Juan Bestue Santander and Juan María Itutu Méndez
– who were detained in secret for 18 months before being transferred to Bata. The
WGAD also reported that “during their secret detention, they wore handcuffs and leg
irons, the marks of which the Working Group was able to observe directly.”491 The report
explained: “These persons were part of a group of five exiles who were arrested in
Libreville on 3 June 2004 by members of the Gabonese security forces for their alleged
489

Report of the High Commissioner for Human Rights on the Situation in the DRC: A/HRC/10/58, paras.
40 and 43.
490
Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, A/HRC/7/4/Add.3, para. 69.
491
Ibid., paras. 71-72.

A/HRC/13/42
Page 148
participation in the incidents that took place on the island of Corisco in 2004. Ten days
after they were apprehended, they were handed over to security officials of Equatorial
Guinea and transported in secret to Malabo. No formal extradition proceedings were
observed. For one and a half years they were held incommunicado and underwent
torture.”
256.

In 2006, the four were accused of rebellion, but had not been put on trial by

the time of the Working Group’s mission. Their lawyer explained that he had had
“difficulties meeting with them since he saw them on the day they were formally
charged”.492
257.

The Working Group also reported that they were unable to interview four

other individuals – Juan Ondo Abaga, Felipe Esono Ntutumu, Florencio Ela Bibang and
Antimo Edu Nchama – who, according to a letter they sent to the Working Group, were
kept in a separate wing of the prison at Black Beach. The report added “According to the
complaints received, these four individuals were transferred to Equatorial Guinea in a
military aircraft and imprisoned in Black Beach. They had official refugee status in the
countries where they were living [Benin and Nigeria]. They were kidnapped and
subsequently detained without the benefit of any legal proceedings”.493 In 2008, the
Working Group on Arbitrary Detention added that they had continued to be detained in
secret locations until their trial, when they were charged with posing a threat to state
security, rebellion, and participation in a coup d’etat on 8 October 2004.494
258.

The allegations of the secret detention of three of these individuals, Florencio

Ela Bibang, Antimo Edu Nchama, and Felipe Esono Ntutumu, were confirmed to the
Special Rapporteur on Torture during his country visit in November 2008. He mentioned
several “reports indicating that Equatoguinean officials have been involved in, or have
committed themselves, kidnapping abroad before transferring the individuals to
Equatorial Guinea and holding them in secret and/or incommunicado detention. This was
492

Ibid.
Ibid., paras. 69-70.
494
Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Opinion No. 2/2008(A/HRC/10/21/Add.1).
493

A/HRC/13/42
Page 149
allegedly the case of three persons who are still being held in secret detention probably in
Black Beach Prison […] who the Special Rapporteur regrettably was not able to meet
because he was unable to gain access to the part of the prison where they were reportedly
held. Also a number of other cases of prolonged secret detention, most often of persons
accused of political crimes, have been brought to his attention. The Special Rapporteur
interviewed one individual who had been arrested in Cameroon, where he used to live as
a refugee some months prior to the visit. He was then handed over to soldiers of the
Equatoguinean Presidential Guard who took him to Malabo. He was detained
incommunicado in solitary confinement, handcuffed and in leg-irons. These restraints
were removed shortly before the Special Rapporteur arrived.”495
Eritrea
259.

In a report in 2004 by the African Commission on Human and People’s

Rights, the case of eleven former Eritrean Government officials was discussed, which has
also been examined by the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention. The eleven persons in
question – Petros Solomon, Ogbe Abraha, Haile Woldetensae, Mahmud Ahmed Sheriffo,
Berhane Ghebre Eghzabiher, Astier Feshation, Saleh Kekya, Hamid Himid, Estifanos
Seyoum, Germano Nati and Beraki Ghebre Selassie – were arrested in Asmara, Eritrea on
18 and 19 September 2001, after they had been openly critical of the policies of Eritrean
Government. They were part of a senior group of 15 officials of the ruling People’s Front
for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ), who, in May 2001, had written an open letter to
ruling party members criticizing the Government for acting in an “illegal and
unconstitutional” manner.496
260.

The Government subsequently claimed that the eleven individuals had been

detained “because of crimes against the nations’ security and sovereignty,” but refused to
release any other information about them – either where they were being held, or how
they were being treated. As the report noted, “Their whereabouts [are] currently
495

A/HRC/13/39/Add.4, paras 53, 54
Seventeenth Annual Activity Report of the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights, 20032004, page 116 (Communication 250/2002-Liesbeth Zegveld and Mussie Ephrem/Eritrea).
496

A/HRC/13/42
Page 150
unknown,” although it was suggested that they “may be held in some management
building between the capital Asmara and the port of Massawa.”497
261.

In submitting a claim of habeas corpus to the Minister of Justice, the

Complainants acting on behalf of the eleven asked the Eritrean authorities “to reveal
where the 11 detainees were being held, to either charge them and bring them to court or
promptly release them, to guarantee that none of them would be ill treated and that they
have immediate access to lawyers of their choice, their families and adequate medical
care”. The report added, “The Complainants allege that no reaction has been received
from the Eritrean authorities.”498
262.

In its opinion in 2002, the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention noted:

“They were detained in isolation for nine months, in one or more secret locations, where
they had no contact whatsoever with lawyers or their families.”499 By 2003, the African
Commission noted that they had then been held in secret detention “for more than 18
months,” and that the only response from the Government regarding their whereabouts
had been a letter from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 20 May 2002, stating that they
“had their quarters in appropriate Government facilities, had not been ill-treated, have
had continued access to medical services and that the Government was making every
effort to bring them before an appropriate court of law as early as possible”.500
Gambia
263.

In its submission to the Gambia's UPR, Amnesty International demonstrated

that since the March 2006 failed coup attempt, alleged opponents of the regime including
journalists, opposition politicians and their supporters, are routinely unlawfully detained
in official places of detention, such as the Mile 2 Central Prison, the National Intelligence
497

Ibid.
Ibid.
499
Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Opinion No. 3/2002 (ERITREA), E/CN.4/2003/8/Add.1,
page 54.
500
Seventeenth Annual Activity Report of the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights, 20032004, page 117 (Communication 250/2002-Liesbeth Zegveld and Mussie Ephrem/Eritrea).
498

A/HRC/13/42
Page 151
Agency (NIA) headquarters and police detention centres. Other official places of
detention include Banjulinding, a police training centre, and Jeshwang and Janjanbureh
prisons in the interior of the country. Others are held in secret detention centres, which
allegedly include Fort Buling and other military barracks, secret quarters in police
stations such as in Bundung, police stations in remote areas such as Sara Ngai and Fatoto,
and warehouses such as in Kanilai. Special units within the NIA, as well as the
President’s personal protection officers and members of the army and the police, are
alleged to have tortured or ill-treated detainees. Torture and other ill-treatment are used to
obtain information, as punishment and to extract confessions to use as evidence in
court.501
264.

Yahya Bajinka, a brother to former presidential bodyguard Major Khalipha

Bajinka who was accused of being involved in the March 2006 coup plot, was arrested in
April 2007 and held for over a year in secret detention. He is known to have been
tortured, and was denied medical attention in an attempt to keep his detention secret in
the maximum security wing of Mile II State Central Prison.502
Sudan
265.

Detention of political dissidents, of persons suspected of involvement in the

activities of rebel groups and of human rights defenders by Sudan’s National Intelligence
and Security Services (NISS) has for a long time given rise to well-documented human
rights concerns. In 2007, the Human Rights Committee “voice[d] concern at the many
reports from non-governmental sources of “ghost houses” and clandestine detention
centers” in Sudan.503 A November 2007 report on the human rights situation in Darfur by
seven Special Procedures mandates noted that the Government had provided “[n]o
501

http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AFR27/006/2009/en/14b4f7a1-fc1c-46d6-aabc74ae3e95e543/afr270062009eng.html
502
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AFR27/001/2008/en/9ec55ad4-ea41-11dc-9a27819d7db3035f/afr270012008eng.pdf
503
Concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee (26 July 2007), CCPR/C/SDN/CO/3/CRP.1,
para. 22. The Committee referred to the case of the arrests during the protests against the construction of
the Kajbar dam in Northern Sudan and noted that, a month-and-a-half after their arrest, the whereabouts of
two of the detainees remained unknown.

A/HRC/13/42
Page 152
information … with regard to the closure of all unofficial places of detention. … There
seemed to be persistent ambiguity over persons detained under national security laws and
the extent to which places of detention were known outside the NISS”.504
266.

The Tenth periodic report of the High Commissioner for Human Rights on the

situation of human rights in Sudan of November 2008 contained a detailed study of NISS
detention practices, including secret detention, based on three years of monitoring by
United Nations human rights officers and interviews with many released NISS detainees.
505

In June 2009, the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Sudan

reported:
“In northern Sudan, the NISS continues to systematically use arbitrary arrest and
detention against political dissidents. … Detainees are often held for several
months without charge or access to a lawyer or their families. The locations in
which NISS detainees are held sometimes remain unknown.”506
267.

Of particular concern, for the purposes of this study, are the cases of the men

detained in the aftermath of the attack on Omdurman in May 2008 by rebels belonging to
the Darfurian Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). Following the attack, Government
security forces rounded up hundreds of Darfurians in the capital, the majority of them
civilians. In August 2008, it was reported that hundreds of these individuals were still
held in undisclosed places of detention, and denied all contact with the outside world.
268.

The Experts interviewed one of these individuals, X.W., who explained that,

after being seized at his place of work, he was taken to the NISS Political Bureau of
Security Services in Bahri, Khartoum, near the Shandi bus terminal, where he was held in
incommunicado detention for nearly two months. Interrogated and tortured during the
first five days, he was then moved from a corridor, where those being interrogated were
504

A/HRC/6/19, page 69.
Tenth periodic report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the situation of
human rights in the Sudan, Arbitrary arrest and detention committed by national security, military and
police (28 November 2008).
506
Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Sudan, Ms. Sima Samar,
A/HRC/11/14 (June 2009), para. 67.
505

A/HRC/13/42
Page 153
held, to a large hall where about 200 detainees were held, and where the lights were
constantly switched on. Moved to Kober prison in July 2008, he continued to be held in
incommunicado detention. X.W. was released in September 2008.507
269.

While X.W. was at no stage brought before a judge or charged with an

offence, many others were brought before Special Anti-Terrorism Courts, which imposed
death sentences in more than 100 cases. In two communications to the Government of
Sudan, five Special Procedures mandates drew the Government’s attention to reliable
reports according to which
“[f]ollowing their apprehension, [the defendants] were held without access to the
outside world for over one month and were not given access to lawyers until after
the trial proceedings opened. … Observers [at the trials] noticed that the
defendants looked tired and appeared to be in pain. The defendants complained
that they were subjected to torture or ill-treatment, but the court did not
investigate these allegations and refused to grant requests by the defendants’
lawyers for independent medical examinations. …
In reaching their verdicts, the courts relied as evidence primarily on confessions
by the defendants which the defendants said they were forced to make under
torture and ill-treatment and which they retracted in court. The court made
reference to the Sudanese Evidence Act which permits the admission to judicial
proceedings of statements obtained by unlawful means.”508
270.

No reply from the Government to these communications was received. At the

time of writing, the Sudan National Assembly was considering a new National Security
Bill. The Bill would confirm the sweeping powers of the NISS, including detention
without judicial control for up to 30 days.
507

Interview with X.W..
Urgent appeals of 11 August and 24 September 2008 sent by the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial,
arbitrary or summary executions, the Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers, the
Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights while countering terrorism, the
Special Rapporteur on the situation on human rights in the Sudan and the Special Rapporteur on the
question of torture, A/HRC/11/2/Add.1, pp. 384-393.
508

A/HRC/13/42
Page 154
Uganda
271.

In 2004, when the Human Rights Committee addressed claims that “safe

houses” were used by the Ugandan Government as “places of unacknowledged detention
where persons have been subjected to torture by military personnel,” the Committee
expressed its concern that “State agents continue arbitrarily to deprive persons of their
liberty, including in unacknowledged places of detention, in particular in northern
Uganda. It is also concerned about the widespread practice of torture and ill-treatment of
persons detained by the military as well as by other law enforcement officials”.509
272.

In 2005, the Committee Against Torture followed up on the HRC report,
stating:
The Committee takes note of the explanation provided by the delegation about the
outlawing of “ungazetted” or unauthorized places of detention or “safe houses”
where persons have been subjected to torture by military personnel. Nevertheless,
it remains concerned about the widespread practice of torture and ill-treatment of
persons detained by the military as well as by other law enforcement officials.510

273.

The Committee recommended that the Ugandan Government “[a]bolish the

use of ‘ungazetted’ or unauthorized places of detention or ‘safe houses,’ and immediately
provide information about all places of detention”.511
274.

As stated by the High Commissioner for Human Rights in her report on the

work of her Office in Uganda “immediately prior to the elections, in early February
violent incidents were reported, with several people injured or killed in various locations.
Opposition politicians, supporters and media personnel were subjected to harassment,
arbitrary arrests and detentions by security operatives, including from the Chieftaincy of
Military Intelligence and the Violent Crimes Crack Unit, and some elements of the Army.
509

UN Human Rights Committee, CCPR/CO/80/UGA, 4 May 2004, para.17.
UN Committee Against Torture, CAT/C/CR/34/UGA, 21 June 2005, para.7.

510
511

Ibid.

A/HRC/13/42
Page 155
Persons arrested in particular on charges of treason claimed to have been tortured or
suffered other forms of ill-treatment in ungazetted safe houses.”512 The report also stated
that “In June 2006, a UPDF spokesperson publicly recognized the existence of
ungazetted safe houses, arguing their necessity for the purpose of protecting witnesses
(protective custody).”513
275.

Nevertheless, in April 2009, Human Rights Watch produced a report

indicating that, between 2006 and 2008, at least 106 people were held in a secret
detention centre in Kololo, an upmarket suburb of Kampala where many embassies and
ambassadors’ residences are located, where the use of torture was commonplace. The
report was based on a detailed analysis of the activities of Uganda’s Joint Anti-Terrorism
Task Force (JATT), established in 1999 primarily to deal with the threat posed by the
Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), a Ugandan rebel group based in the Democratic
Republic of Congo. However, as Human Rights Watch explained, under the cover of its
mandate to deal with terrorism, “individuals allegedly linked to other groups, such as alQaeda, have also suffered at the hands of JATT”.514
276.

Moreover, although Kyanjo Hussein, the shadow Minister of Internal Affairs,

told a meeting of the Parliamentary Committee of Internal Affairs and Defence in July
2006 that JATT was holding 30 Rwandan and Congolese detainees,515 and former
detainees also told Human Rights Watch about “non-Ugandans held in Kololo for long
periods of time”, and explained that “they saw foreigners, such as Somalis, Rwandans,
Eritreans and Congolese, in the JATT compound”, it appears that the majority of cases
involved terrorism – and, specifically, fears of terrorist activities organized by Muslims,
who make up 12 percent of Uganda’s population. As Human Rights Watch noted, “Of the

512

A/HRC/4/49/Add.2, para 5
A/HRC/4/49/Add.2, footnote 1.
514
Human Rights Watch, “Open Secret: Illegal Detention and Torture by the Joint Anti-terrorism Task
Force in Uganda”, April 2009, http://www.hrw.org/node/82082.
515
Charles Kazooba and Jumah Senyonga, "Ugandan MP exposes Rwandan illegal arrests in Kampala",
published in English on the website of the Rwandan newspaper The New Times, 19 July 2006.
513

A/HRC/13/42
Page 156
106 named individuals detained by JATT documented by Human Rights Watch, all but
two were Muslim”.516
277.

Of the foreigners held specifically in connection with terrorism, the most

prominent examples are two South Africans citizens, Mufti Hussain Bhayat and Haroon
Saley, who were arrested at Entebbe Airport on 18 August 2008 and taken to Kololo.
Although the men’s capture received significant news coverage in Uganda and South
Africa, they were held in Kololo for 11 days without charge, and were only freed – and
deported – when their lawyer secured a habeas corpus hearing. Relating his experience
afterwards, Bhayat stated that “questions were read from a roll of fax paper from an
unknown source”, which suggests that JATT is also working with the intelligence
services of other countries.517
Zimbabwe
278.

In Zimbabwe in 2008, in an election year that was marked by extensive

human rights abuses resulting in “at least 180 deaths, and at least 9,000 people injured
from torture, beatings and other violations perpetrated mainly by security forces, war
veterans and supporters of the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU-PF),” 518 the
Government also seized at least 24 human rights defenders and political activists – and
their family members – holding them in incommunicado detention for up to seven
months, and then putting them on trial for acts of sabotage, banditry and terrorism against
the Government, which was a clear manipulation of terrorist-related rhetoric for political
ends.
279.

Those seized included Broderick Takawira, Pascal Gonzo and Jestina

Mukoko, the director of the Zimbabwe Peace Project (ZPP) and a well-known human
rights campaigner, whose case was considered by the Working Group on Enforced or
516

Human Rights Watch, “Open Secret: Illegal Detention and Torture by the Joint Anti-terrorism Task
Force in Uganda”, April 2009, http://www.hrw.org/node/82082.
517
Ibid.
518
“Zimbabwe”, Amnesty International Report 2009,
http://report2009.amnesty.org/en/regions/africa/zimbabwe.

A/HRC/13/42
Page 157
Involuntary Disappearances.519. Between January and September 2008, ZPP catalogued
20,143 crimes committed by those working for the Government, including 202 murders,
463 abductions, 41 rapes, 411 cases of torture and 3,942 assaults.520 Mukoko was taken
from her home by armed men at daybreak on 3 December 2008, and later testified that
she was held in secret locations, where she was tortured in an attempt to extract a false
confession. She said that her captors made her kneel on gravel and repeatedly beat her on
the soles of her feet with rubber truncheons during interrogations.521
280.

Others included Chris Dhlamini, an aide to Zimbabwe’s opposition leader and

Prime Minister in waiting, Morgan Tsvangirai, who was seized from his home on 25
November 2008. Dhlamini said that he was detained in Goromonzi Prison Complex until
22 December 2008, but was moved, at various times, to undisclosed locations where, he
said, “I was subjected to extreme forms of torture to extract false information and
confessions.” He recalled being “suspended from a considerable height” and beaten all
over his body with what felt like a tin full of stones. Describing another incident, he
explained, “I was lifted up and my head was submerged in the sink and held there for
long periods by someone, in a mock drowning, which is another severe form of torture
(water-boarding) to which I was subjected during my unlawful abduction and detention.
This mock drowning went on an on, until I felt that I was on the verge of dying.”522

519

A/HRC/13/31, par. 629.
Jenny Booth, “Zimbabwe human rights activist Jestina Mukoko taken back to jail”, The Times, 5 May
2009,
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/africa/article6225536.ece.
521
Affidavit of Jestina Mukoko: http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/world/2009/JM_Affidavit.pdf.
522
Affidavit of Chris Dhlamini: http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/world/2009/CD_affidavit.pdf.
Also see:
Affidavit of Chinoto Zulu:
http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/world/2009/AFFIDAVIT_OF_CHINOTO_MUKWEZARAMB
A_ZULU.pdf.
Affidavit of Gandi Mudzingwa:
http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/world/2009/AFFIDAVIT_OF_GANDI_MUDZINGWA.pdf.
Affidavit of Zachariah Nkomo:
http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/world/2009/AFFIDAVIT_OF_ZACHARIAH_NKOMO.pdf.
Affidavit of Andrison Manyere:
http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/world/2009/Andrison_Manyere_Affidavit.pdf.
Jestina Mukoko also explained that two of her ZPP colleagues, Broderick Takawira and Pascal Gonzo,
were held in cells near her own in one of the places of secret detention in which she was held.
520

A/HRC/13/42
Page 158
281.

Those who were seized mostly reappeared in a number of police stations in

Harare on or around 23 December 2008, after being handed over by the men who
abducted them, who were reportedly members of the security forces. They were then held
in police detention, and were charged in May 2009. Jestina Mukoko and eight others
were cleared of the terrorism charges against them by the Zimbabwean Supreme Court on
28 September 2009. In a blow to Mukoko’s abductors, the court ruled that “the state,
through its agents, violated the applicant's constitutional rights protected under the
constitution of Zimbabwe to an extent entitling the applicant to a permanent stay of
criminal prosecution associated with the above violations”.523

523

“Zimbabwe: Jestina Mukoko – ‘Not bitter, but better’”, IRIN, 1 October 2009,
http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=86392.

A/HRC/13/42
Page 159
V. CONCLUSIONS
282.

International law clearly prohibits secret detention, which violates a number

of human rights and humanitarian law norms that may not be derogated from under any
circumstances. If secret detention constitutes enforced disappearances and is widely or
systematically practiced, it may even amount to a crime against humanity. However, in
spite of these unequivocal norms, secret detention continues to be used in the name of
countering terrorism around the world. The evidence gathered by the four experts for the
present study clearly show that many States, referring to concerns relating to national
security – often perceived or presented as unprecedented emergencies or threats – resort
to secret detention.
283.

Doing so effectively means taking detainees outside the legal framework and

rendering meaningless safeguards contained in international instruments, most
importantly habeas corpus. The most disturbing consequence of secret detention is, as
many of the experts’ interlocutors pointed out, the complete arbitrariness of the situation,
together with the uncertainty about the duration of the secret detention– the feeling that
there is no way the individual can re-gain control of his/her life.
284.

The comparison of past and more recent practices of secret detention brings to

the fore many common features, notwithstanding considerable variations in political and
social contexts.
Emergency contexts
285.

States of emergency, international wars and fights against terrorism – often

framed in vaguely defined legal provisions – constitute an “enabling environment” for
secret detention. As in the past, extraordinary powers are today conferred on authorities,
including armed forces, law-enforcement bodies and/or intelligence agencies, under
states of emergency or global war paradigms without or with very restricted control
mechanisms by parliaments or judicial bodies. This thus renders ineffective many, or all,

A/HRC/13/42
Page 160
of the safeguards contained in criminal law and required by international human rights
law. In some States, protracted states of emergency and broadly defined conflicts against
vaguely conceived enemies, have tended to turn exceptional, temporary rules into the
norm.
Intelligence agencies
286.

In many contexts, intelligence agencies operate in a legal vacuum with no

law, or no publicly available law, governing their actions. Many times, although
legislation does not authorize intelligence bodies to detain persons, they do so, sometimes
for prolonged periods. In such situations, there are either no oversight and accountability
mechanisms at all, or they are severely restricted, with limited powers and hence
ineffective.
International cooperation
287.

From the Condor Plan in South America through the global CIA network,

secret detention has relied on systems of trans-border (regional or global) cooperation.
This means that many times foreign security forces freely operate in the territory of other
States. It also leads to the mutual exchange of intelligence information between States –
followed by its use for the purpose of detaining or trying the person before tribunals the
proceedings of which do not comply with international norms, often with reference to
state secrets, making it impossible to verify how the information was obtained524. A
crucial element in international cooperation, be it within the Condor Plan methods of the
1970s or the current policies of “extraordinary renditions”, has been the transfer of
alleged terrorists to other countries, where they may face a substantial risk of being
subjected to torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment in contravention of
the principle of non-refoulement. Worse, in some cases, persons have been rendered to
other countries, precisely to circumvent the prohibition of torture and “rough” treatment.
But practices such as “hosting” secret detention sites or providing proxy detention were
524

A/61/259, paras 44-65

A/HRC/13/42
Page 161
supplemented by numerous other facets of complicity, including authorizing the landing
of airplanes for refuelling, short-term deprivation of liberty before handing over the
“suspect”, the covering up of kidnappings, etc. With very few exceptions, too little has
been done to investigate allegations of complicity.
288.

While the Experts welcome the cooperation extended by a number of States

including through the response by 44 to the questionnaire, they express regret that
although States have the obligation to investigate secret detention, many responses were
absent and a majority of those were weak. A lack of access to States’ territories also
meant that a number of interviews had to conduct by telephone or Skype, with those
interviewed fearing being monitored.
Torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment
289.

Secret detention as such may constitute torture or ill-treatment for the direct

victims as well as their families. But as many of the interviews and cases included in the
present study have illustrated, the very purpose of secret detention was to facilitate and,
ultimately cover up torture and inhuman and de-grading treatment used either to obtain
information or to silence people. While in some cases, elaborate rules were put in place
authorizing “enhanced” techniques that violate international standards of human rights
and humanitarian law, most of the time secret detention was used as a kind of defence
shield to avoid any scrutiny and control – and make it impossible to learn about treatment
and conditions during detention.
Impact on other human rights and freedoms
290.

The generalized fear of secret detention and its corollaries such as torture and

ill-treatment tend to effectively result in limiting the exercise of a large number of human
rights and fundamental freedoms. These include freedom of expression and freedom of
association, as they often go hand in hand with intimidation of witnesses, victims and
their families. Moreover, independent judiciaries and secret detention can hardly co-exist

A/HRC/13/42
Page 162
– several examples identified by the experts indicate that the broader use of secret
detention tends to lead to attempts to either influence or, worse, silence judges who take
up cases of secret detention.
Witness protection and reparation
291.

The Experts are extremely concerned that many victims of secret detention

from countries around the world indicated that they fear personal reprisals or against their
families, if they cooperate with the study and/or allow their names to be used. As a matter
of fact, the injustice done by secretly detaining somebody, is prolonged and replicated all
too frequently, once the victims are released, because the concerned State may try to
avoid any disclosure about the fact that secret detention is practiced on its territory. In
almost no recent cases have there been any judicial investigations into allegations of
secret detention and practically no one has been brought to justice. Although many
victims feel that the secret detention has “stolen” years of their lives (the experts learned
about one anonymous case of 30 years) and left indelible traces, often in terms of loss of
their jobs and frequently their health, they almost never received rehabilitation or
compensation.

Recommendations
292.

On the basis of these conclusions, the Experts put forward the following

recommendations. In practice, concrete measures will need to be taken depending on the
specific contexts.
a) Secret detention should be explicitly prohibited, along with all other forms of
unofficial detention. Detention records should be kept (including in times of
armed conflict as required by the Geneva Conventions, including the number of
detainees, their nationality, and the legal basis on which they are being held,
whether as prisoners of war or civilian internees). Internal inspections as well as
independent mechanisms should have timely access to all places where persons
are deprived of their liberty for monitoring purposes at all times. In times of

A/HRC/13/42
Page 163
armed conflict, the location of all detention facilities should be disclosed to the
International Committee of the Red Cross.
b) Safeguards for persons deprived of their liberty should be fully respected. No
undue restrictions on these safeguards under counter-terrorism or emergency
legislation are permissible. In particular, effective habeas corpus reviews by
independent judicial bodies are central to ensuring respect for the right to personal
liberty. Therefore domestic legislative frameworks should not allow for any
exceptions from habeas corpus, operating independently from the detaining
authority and from the place and form of deprivation of liberty. The study has
shown that judicial bodies play a crucial role in protecting people against secret
detention. The law should foresee penalties for officials who refuse to disclose
relevant information during habeas corpus proceedings.
c) All steps necessary to ensure that the immediate families of those detained are
informed of their relatives’ capture, location, legal status, and condition of health
should be taken in a timely manner.
d) Any action by intelligence services should be governed by law, which in turn
should be in conformity with international norms. To ensure accountability in
intelligence cooperation, truly independent intelligence review and oversight
mechanisms should be established and enhanced. Such mechanisms should have
access to any information, including sensitive information. They should be
mandated to undertake reviews and investigate upon their initiative, and to make
public reports.
e) Institutions strictly independent from those which have been alleged of having
been involved in secret detention should promptly investigate any allegations of
secret detention and “extraordinary rendition”. Those individuals who are found
to have participated in secretly detaining persons and any unlawful acts
perpetrated during such detention without delay, including their superiors if they

A/HRC/13/42
Page 164
ordered, encouraged or consented to secret detentions should be prosecuted and
where found guilty given sentences commensurate with the gravity of the acts
perpetrated.
f) The status of all pending investigations into allegations of ill-treatment and torture
of detainees and detainee deaths in custody must be made public. No evidence or
information that has been obtained by torture or cruel, inhuman and degrading
treatment may be used in any proceedings.
g) Transfers or the facilitation of transfers from one State to the custody of
authorities of another State must be carried out under judicial supervision and in
line with international standards. The principle of non-refoulement of persons to
countries where they would be at risk of torture or other inhuman, cruel or
degrading treatment must be honoured.
h) Victims of secret detention should be provided with judicial remedies and
reparation in accordance with relevant international norms.525 These international
standards recognize the right of victims to adequate, effective and prompt
reparation which should be proportionate to the gravity of the violations and the
harm suffered. As families of disappeared persons have been recognized as
victims under international law, they should also benefit from rehabilitation and
compensation.
i) States should ratify and implement the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights and the Convention against Torture. Given that the Optional
Protocol to the Convention against Torture (OPCAT) requires the setting up of
monitoring systems covering all situations of deprivation of liberty, adhering to
525

ICCPR art. 2.3.and art. 9.5. 5..Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment article 14.1. See also relevant standards contained in the Declaration of Basic
Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power adopted by General Assembly resolution
40/34 of 29 November 1985, and the Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and
Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of
International Humanitarian Law adopted and proclaimed by General Assembly resolution 60/147 of 16
December 2005.

A/HRC/13/42
Page 165
this international instrument adds a layer of protection. States should ratify the
OPCAT and create independent national preventive mechanisms that are in
compliance with the Paris Principles, and ratify the International Convention for
the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance. Other regional
systems may wish to replicate the system put in place by the Inter-American
Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons526.
j) Governments have an obligation to protect their citizens abroad and provide
consular protection to ensure that foreign States comply with their obligations
under international law, including international human rights law.
k) Under international human rights law, states have the obligation to provide
witness protection. But doing so is also a precondition for effectively combating
secret detention.

526

Article XIV: “when the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights receives a petition or
communication regarding an alleged forced disappearance, its Executive Secretariat shall urgently and
confidentially address the respective government, and shall request that government to provide as soon as
possible information as to the whereabouts of the allegedly disappeared person together with any other
information it considers pertinent, and such request shall be without prejudice as to the admissibility of the
petition”

A/HRC/13/42
Page 166

Annex I
SUMMARY OF GOVERNMENT REPLIES TO QUESTIONNAIRE

1.

Country
Albania

Response
 No instances of secret detention in the penitentiary system
 No involvement or collaboration in secret detention on the
territory of another State
 No further comments on effectiveness of secret detention
or other counter-terrorism measures or on past experiences
with secret detention.

2.

Algeria

 No instances of secret detention or facilities for secret
detention as a means to counter terrorism.
 Places of custody exist within the levels of the national
security service, the police service and the Department of
Intelligence and Security. The sites are controlled by
personnel who hold the rank of an officer within the
criminal investigation department, and who will be subject
to legal responsibility for disciplinary and penal sanctions,
in the event they act outside of, or in violation of, legal
procedures.
 All sites of police custody are placed under the control of
the public prosecutor (civil or military) which carries out
regular and unannounced inspections.
 The penitentiaries are placed under the authority of relevant
personnel of the Ministry of Justice, who will be held
personally liable at a disciplinary and penal level in the
event of violation of the governing rules of detention
applicable to both accused and convicted detainees. Such
establishments are controlled by magistrates and the heads
of the administration of penitentiaries.
 Noted that, pursuant to an accord signed with the Ministry
of Justice, the ICRC has visited penitentiaries since 1999;
and since 2003 has been allowed unannounced visits to
places of police custody. Also, the penitentiary
establishments are accessible to civil society; regular visits
are carried out by the national commission for promotion of
human rights, by NGOs, UNDP and UNICEF.
 There are various codes which comprise a legal framework
for sites of police custody and penitentiaries, and the Penal
Code provides for sanctions for persons who violate the
laws, such as illegal or arbitrary detention or ill-treatment.
 No involvement or collaboration in secret detention on the
territory of another State
 Secret detention is not used by the police services of

A/HRC/13/42
Page 167

3.

Armenia

4.

Austria

5.

Bahrain

Algeria. The law precludes such practice. The methods for
dealing with terrorism are within a strict legal framework,
with investigations to be carried out within allowed time
limits, and with magistrates being informed. In an
emergency situation in the context of counter-terrorism
which threatens the public order, a presidential decree may
be made of a State of Emergency, notified to the UN,
authorizing the Minister of Interior to take measures of
house arrest as administrative internment. It is in this
context, controlled by presidential decree, that such rare
and exceptional measures may be taken. This is believed to
be an effective measure in the efforts against terrorism.
 No instances of secret detention in the penitentiary system
 No involvement or collaboration in secret detention on the
territory of another State.
 No further comments on effectiveness of secret detention
or other counter-terrorism measures or on past experiences
with secret detention.
 No instances of secret detention in the penitentiary system
 No involvement or collaboration in secret detention on the
territory of another State.
 Recalled the position it took as Presidency of the Council
of the European Union from the beginning of 2006 in
emphasizing the absolute necessity for adhering to all
existing standards of human rights law and international
humanitarian law in the context of the fight against
terrorism.
 On 21November, 2005, the Secretary General of the
Council of Europe initiated an inquiry directed at all CoE
member States where member States were asked how their
internal law ensured the effective implementation of the
ECHR on four issues relevant to secret detention in
countering terrorism. Austria furnished a comprehensive
answer to this inquiry in February, 2006.

No instances of secret detention under Bahraini
law to counter terrorism. The criminal procedure code, in
accordance with the Constitution, sets out requirements
which preclude the lawfulness of secret detention. Antiterrorism legislation regulates procedures for the
investigation and arrest of persons accused or suspected of
involvement in terrorism. Further, Bahraini law guarantees
the rights of persons who are arrested or remanded in
custody, including the right to communicate with family
members and lawyers prior to detention.

A/HRC/13/42
Page 168

6.

Bangladesh






7.

Belarus

8.

Bolivia


No involvement or collaboration in secret
detention on the territory of another State. Noted that
Bahrain has signed numerous international counterterrorism agreements and extradition agreements, which
involve procedures which are applied in conformity with
the Constitution and domestic law. Bahrain has signed
extradition treaties with Egypt and ratified an agreement
between the States of Gulf Cooperation Council
concerning the transfer of persons sentenced to
deprivation of liberty.

Any alternatives to secret detention must be
consistent with the UN conventions which have been
ratified by Bahrain.

No history of secret detention practices.
However, Bahrain has fully co-operated with respect to
counter-terrorism efforts, including having signed
numerous international covenants on counter-terrorism.
Co-operation must be carried out within the framework of
international conventions.
No instances of secret detention in the penitentiary system
as a means to counter terrorism. Constitutional law and the
criminal procedure set out requirements which preclude
lawfulness of secret detention.
No involvement or collaboration in secret detention on the
territory of another State.
Suggests surveillance and advance intelligence as an
alternative to secret detention as a means of countering
terrorism.
No comment on past experiences with secret detention, as
it is unlawful in Bangladesh.

 No information on any persons who have been secretly
detained in the territory of the state.
 No involvement or collaboration in secret detention on the
territory of another State.
 No comment on past experiences with secret detention
 No information on any persons who have been secretly
detained in the territory of the state.
 No involvement or collaboration in secret detention on the
territory of another State. Such practices are not permitted
under Bolivian law.
 Secret detention is not an effective means of countering
terrorism and runs counter to human rights obligations.
 No history of secret detention practices. The current
situation of terrorism in Bolivia has been dealt with within
a legal framework and any actions taken are in the public

A/HRC/13/42
Page 169
9.

Botswana

knowledge, internationally and nationally.
 No instances of secret detention in the penitentiary system
as a means to counter terrorism. Constitutional law and the
criminal procedure set out requirements which preclude
lawfulness of secret detention.
 No involvement or collaboration in secret detention on the
territory of another State.
 No further comments on effectiveness of secret detention
or other counter-terrorism measures or on past experiences
with secret detention.

10 Bulgaria
.

 No instances of secret detention in the penitentiary system
as a means to counter terrorism.
 No involvement or collaboration in secret detention on the
territory of another State.
 No further comments on effectiveness of secret detention
or other counter-terrorism measures or on past experiences
with secret detention.

11 Chad
.

 The Constitution of Chad guarantees the protection of
human rights, including the protection of life and liberty,
and against torture and degrading treatment. Referred to
Chad’s ratification of various international instruments
relating to counter-terrorism. The Chad Penal Code also
punishes terrorist acts.
 No instances of secret detention, nor do secret detention
facilities exist as a means to counter terrorism. There is the
National Security Agency which is charged with
responsibility for this domain.
 No information on collaboration with other governments on
involvement or participation in secret detention of
suspected terrorists in other states.
 No instances of secret detention in the penitentiary system
as a means to counter terrorism.
 No involvement or collaboration in secret detention on the
territory of another State.
 No further comments on counter-terrorism measures.
Detention per se is clearly regulated within Croatian
legislative framework, including the sanctions for any
possible misuse and/or illegal detention
 No further comments or on past experiences with secret
detention. Serious infringements of human rights, as well
as a one dimensional approach to countering terrorism in
past years, have only helped terrorist propaganda.
Therefore, Croatia stresses the need for counterterrorism
compliance with international law.

12 Croatia
.

A/HRC/13/42
Page 170
13 Cyprus
.

 No instances of secret detention in the penitentiary system
as a means to counter terrorism.
 No involvement or collaboration in secret detention on the
territory of another State.
 No further comments on counter-terrorism measures (no
terrorist incidents have occurred in the past 20 years in
Cyprus) or on past experiences with secret detention.

14 Finland
.

 No instances of secret detention or facilities as a means to
counter terrorism. Finland has consistently emphasized the
need to respect human rights while countering terrorism.
 A reference has once been made to the landing of a cargo
aircraft on 16 May 2003. Permission had been granted
because it had been designated by the US declaration as an
aircraft used for the carriage of cargo.
 Finnish legislation contains provisions which control acts
of foreign agencies, and affords safeguards against
unacknowledged deprivation of liberty.
 The Sentences Enforcement Decree prohibits detention in a
penal institution without a written order, and the identity of
the prisoners is always verified; this applies to both Finnish
nationals and foreigners.
 No person suspected of involvement in terrorism have been
placed in Finnish prisons or transported on the order of the
Prison Service in Finland; nor is there any information that
any official or person acting officially has been involved in
the unacknowledged deprivation of liberty or the transport
of persons so deprived.
 No instances of experiences where secret detentions have
been an effective or acceptable measure in countering
terrorism.
 The Finnish Penal Code provides for definition of terrorist
offences and for the right of the Prosecutor General to
make decisions in relation to the bringing of charges.
 No experiences of secret detention in past domestic,
regional or global counter-terrorism context.
 No instances of secret detention in the penitentiary system
as a means to counter terrorism.
 No involvement or collaboration in secret detention on the
territory of another State. Respect for human rights is a
constitutional mandate.
 Germany does not regard secret detention as an effective
tool in countering terrorism and emphasizes that terrorism
must be dealt with in compliance with democratic
principles, rule of law, human rights and international
obligations.

15 Germany
.

A/HRC/13/42
Page 171

16 Greece
.

17 Iraq
.
18 Ireland
.

 No further comments on past experiences with secret
detention.
 Germany referred to the case of Mr. Murat Kurnaz. It
reported that the German Federal Ministry of Justice
became aware of this case on 26 February 2002, when the
Chief Federal Prosecutor informed the Ministry that it
would not take over a preliminary investigation pending
before the Prosecution of the Land of Bremen. Germany
also indicated that the Office of the Chief Federal
Prosecutor had received a report from the Federal Criminal
Police Office on 31 January 2002, that, according to
information by the Federal Intelligence Service, Mr. Murat
Kurnaz had been arrested by United States officials in
Afghanistan or Pakistan.
 Germany also referred to the case of Mr. Khaled El-Masri.
It reported that, on 8 June 2004, the Federal Chancellery
and the Federal Foreign Office received a letter from his
lawyer indicating that Mr. El-Masri had been abducted in
the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia on 31
December 2003, presumably transferred to Afghanistan and
kept there against his will until his return to Germany on 29
May 2004. It also indicated that the Federal Ministry of
Justice was informed about these facts on 18 June 2004.
 No instances of secret detention in the penitentiary system
as a means to counter terrorism.
 No involvement or collaboration in secret detention on the
territory of another State.
 No further comments on effectiveness of secret detention
or other counter-terrorism measures or on past experiences
with secret detention.
 Response received; currently with the translation services;
 No instances of secret detention in the penitentiary system
as a means to counter terrorism.
 No involvement or collaboration in secret detention on the
territory of another State.
 The Constitution of Ireland provides that "No person shall
be deprived of his personal liberty save in accordance with
law’’. The deprivation of a person's liberty can only take
place in defined circumstances, and there is no concept in
Irish law of a detention which is simultaneously both
lawful and secret.
 No further comments on effectiveness of secret detention
or other counter-terrorism measures or on past experiences
with secret detention.

A/HRC/13/42
Page 172
19 Italy
.

20 Jamaica
.

21 Japan
.

22 Lebanon

 Italy’s legal system is designed to ensure the effective
framework of guarantees protective of human rights; after
9/11 Italy adopted urgent measures to combat terrorism,
updating anti-terrorist legislation.
 Italy referred to the case of Hassam Osama Mustafa Nasr
(Abu Omar) with regard to whom a judicial investigation
had been initiated, involving the committal of 26 people for
trial who had served at the Italian Intelligence and Military
Service. The trial is ongoing. Under Act No. 124, the
Services were suppressed, while their tasks were placed
under the responsibly of the President of the Council of
Ministers, as the National Authority for the Security. It is
envisaged that a legal excuse available to personnel would
be that the activities are considered critical for pursuing
institutional objectives. State secrecy has also be redefined
by limiting its application, particularly to be in line with
certain values (integrity; protection of constitutional
institutions; protection of the independence of the state;
protection of the military defense). The Criminal
Procedure Code has also been reformulated to provide for a
privilege for civil servants to plead state secrets to avoid
having to testify in relevant cases. However, there is scope
for the Judicial Authority to apply to the Constitutional
Court to examine documents covered by state secrecy.
 Secret detention is not considered to be an effective tool to
counter terrorism.
 Italy is not in a position to provide specific relevant
practice.
 Jamaica supports the efforts of the United Nations in
general, and the Special Rapporteurs in particular, to
promote and protect human rights and fundamental
freedoms, whilst also countering the dangers of terrorism.
 Have never engaged in the practice of secret or any other
type of detention of terrorist subjects.
 To date, including over the time period specified, no
individual has been arrested, charged or suspected of
terrorism or terrorist activity.
 No instances of secret detention in the penitentiary system
as a means to counter terrorism.
 No involvement or collaboration in secret detention on the
territory of another State.
 No further comments on effectiveness of secret detention
or other counter-terrorism measures or on past experiences
with secret detention.
 (Translated from Arabic) No instances of “arbitrary”

A/HRC/13/42
Page 173






23 Liechtenstein
.







24 Mauritius
.

detention in the penitentiary system as a means to counter
terrorism.
Under the laws in force, suspects are detained pursuant to a
warrant issued by the competent judicial authorities, which
oversee all stages of investigations. No suspects have been
held in “incommunicado” detention.
No one, acting in cooperation with any foreign ally, has
participated in, or facilitated the incommunicado detention
in Lebanon of any person suspected of engaging in terrorist
activities.
No information is available on the use of forcible detention
in the context of countering terrorism at the local, regional
or international levels.
No instances of, or involvement in, secret detention as a
means to counter terrorism, either actively or passively.
Unlawful detention is a crime which is prosecuted, and if a
suspicion of unlawful secret detention by a domestic or
foreign authority or service in Liechtenstein were to have
arisen, the Office of the Public Prosecutor would be
required to immediately initiate a judicial investigation into
an offense of deprivation of liberty, as there no lawful
exception which is applicable to the secret services which
would otherwise limit the Prosecutor’s obligation to
prosecute.
No involvement or collaboration in secret detention on the
territory of another State.
No experiences in countering terrorism can be mentioned
where secret detention has been considered as an effective
tool.
Promotion and protection of human rights constitutes one
of the priority areas in Liechtenstein’s foreign policy, and it
regards full respect of human rights as a vital element to
ensure the effectiveness of any counter terrorism measure.

 No instances of secret detention in the penitentiary system
as a means to counter terrorism.
 No involvement or collaboration in secret detention on the
territory of another State.
 The Constitution guarantees the protection of the right to
liberty, entitling all persons who have been detained with
the right to inform his/her relatives/friend and the right to a
visit. As to measures to combat terrorism – the Prevention
of Terrorism Act 2002 does not provide for “secret
detention” but does allow for “incommunicado detention”
for up to 36 hours with access only to a Police Officer of a
certain rank.

A/HRC/13/42
Page 174
 It is believed that as a counter-terrorism measure, the
Prevention of Terrorism Act 2002 falls within the
International Human Rights framework.
25 Mexico
.

26 Moldova
.

27 Montenegro
.

28 Paraguay
.

 No instances of secret detention in the penitentiary system.
Even within the context of military detentions, there is a
requirement to keep a register of all detainees, and there are
procedural safeguards against secret detentions.
 No involvement or collaboration in secret detention on the
territory of another State.
 No further comments on effectiveness of secret detention
or other counter-terrorism measures or on past experiences
with secret detention.
 No instances of secret detention in the penitentiary system
 No involvement or collaboration in secret detention on the
territory of another State.
 No further comments on effectiveness of secret detention
or other counter-terrorism measures or on past experiences
with secret detention.
 No information or evidence that persons suspected of
terrorism have been arrested or detained on the territory of
Montenegro or that they have been secretly detained. The
relevant authorities or institutions do not possess
information about potential arrest or secret detention of
those suspected of terrorism, nor about any such
imprisonment and/or arrest resulting in death or violence.
 No facilitation of secret detention.
 As to counter-terrorism measures, a number of laws have
been passed which sanction the criminal act of terrorism
and provide for identification of such perpetrators and
establish institutional bodies responsible for detection,
investigation and decision making in cases of suspected
terrorist acts.
 Emphasizes that Montenegro is a member of CAT, OPCAT
and the European Convention.
 No information on any instances of secret detention. All
arrests should be carried out within the legal framework.
 Paraguay does not have any specific anti-terrorism laws, so
that all crimes are dealt with in accordance with the Penal
code. There is a draft law currently being considered in
relation to anti-terrorism measures.
 No information of any secret detention facilities, nor are
there any plans for construction of such sites.
 No involvement or collaboration in secret detention on the
territory of another State.
 Emphasizes Paraguay’s compliance with its international

A/HRC/13/42
Page 175
29 Peru
.

30 Philippines
.

31 Poland
.

32 Romania
.

33 Russian
.
Federation

human rights obligations.
 The Ministry of Interior has no knowledge of any instances
of secret detention in the penitentiary system, nor any
facilities for secret detention.
 No involvement or collaboration in secret detention on the
territory of another State.
 No, secret detention is not an effective measure in
countering terrorism. There has been no case in which such
secret detention has been effective. Peru emphasizes its
compliance with all international obligations.
 There is legislation allowing police to arrest persons who
are caught in the act of committing a crime. They are
informed of the reason for the arrest, presumed innocent,
have a right to physical integrity, and right to lawyer and
doctor, and to communicate with family and friends. There
are also requirements which arise in cases where police
carry out an arrest pursuant to an arrest warrant: to inform
the person of the reasons for the arrest; to inform the
magistrate, the reason of detention and which authority had
ordered the arrest; report the arrest to the magistrate who
needs to put the detainee before the judge who issued the
arrest warrant; and to inform the detainee of their rights.
 Facilities and practices of secret detention; such practices
contravene the Constitution which expressly prohibits
secret, solitary and incommunicado detention and torture,
and are not used. Specific laws provide penalties for those
who violate requirements in relation to the arrest,
interrogation and detention of those suspected of terrorism.
 On 11 March 2008, the District Prosecutor’s Office has
instituted proceedings on the alleged existence of secret
CIA prisons in Poland. This was referred to the Appellate
Prosecutor Office on 1 April 2009. The prosecutors are
gathering evidence which is considered secret or classified.
 To ensure the proper course of the proceedings, the
prosecutors are bound by confidentiality and cannot reveal
the findings. Once the proceedings are completed and the
findings are made public, the Government may respond.
 No instances of secret detention in the penitentiary system
 No involvement or collaboration in secret detention on the
territory of another State
 No further comments on effectiveness of secret detention
or other counter-terrorism measures or on past experiences
with secret detention.
 No instances of secret detention in the Russian system
 No involvement or collaboration in secret detention on the

A/HRC/13/42
Page 176





34 Singapore
.

territory of another State
All detentions fall within the supervision of the Federal
penitentiary and the Ministry of Interior.
From 2007-2016 there is a program being undertaken to
improve detention conditions.
The office of the General Prosecutor supervises situations
of detention, and if there is a violation, it is reported.
No further comments on effectiveness of secret detention
or other counter-terrorism measures or on past experiences
with secret detention.

 Singapore does not practice secret detentions at all, either
alone or in collaboration with its allies.
 Singapore’s approach to detection and rehabilitation of
terrorists, used effectively, with two-thirds of terrorists
arrested since 2001 having been released and reintegrated
back into society, has involved:
 A legislative framework defining the mandate and
powers of the intelligence agencies, ensuring
accountability.
o
the Internal Security Act provides for powers
of preventative detention for security threats, outside
of criminal laws, with:
o
built-in procedural safeguards including a
review panel overseen by a Supreme court judge; and
a right given to the President to overrule Government
decisions on detention.
o
Initial detention beyond 48 hours must be
approved by a Superintendant of Police and reported
to the Commander of Police.
o
Any detention under the ISA beyond 30 days
must be approved by the Minister of Home Affairs
and permission be given by the President.
o
Once detained under the ISA, detention is
reviewed every 12 months.
 Rights of detainees: to written reasons for detention
(within 14 days) and right to appeal, and right to
representation.
 Family members are informed and given the right to
reach the detainee (within the first 30 days subject to
non-interference with the investigation; thereafter,
regularly)
 Justices of the Peace and community members form a
Board of Inspection which is allowed to make
unannounced visits to the detention centers.

A/HRC/13/42
Page 177
35 Slovakia
.

 No instances of secret detention in the penitentiary system
 No involvement or collaboration in secret detention on the
territory of another State.
 In 2006, Slovakia responded to the inquiry of the Council
of Europe’s investigation into allegations of unlawful and
unacknowledged detentions.
 Slovakian authorities are constrained by the rule of law and
in particular the Constitution. Unlawful deprivation of
liberty, interrogation or torture would attract criminal
liability. Persons charged with terrorist offences must be
dealt with in accordance with the criminal procedures.
 Activities of foreign intelligence services on Slovakian
territory are monitored by the two national intelligence
agencies, which are subject to Parliamentary control.

36 Slovenia
.

 No instances of secret detention in the penitentiary system
 No involvement or collaboration in secret detention on the
territory of another State
 No further comments on effectiveness of secret detention
or other counter-terrorism measures or on past experiences
with secret detention.

37 Spain
.

 No instances of secret detention in the penitentiary system
and no secret facilities.
 No involvement or collaboration in secret detention on the
territory of another State.
 No further comments on effectiveness of secret detention
or other counter-terrorism measures as Spain has no past
experiences with secret detention. Secret detention is
incompatible with Spain’s domestic legislation.

38 Suriname
.

 No instances of secret detention in the penitentiary system
 No involvement or collaboration in secret detention on the
territory of another State
 No further comments on effectiveness of secret detention
or other counter-terrorism measures or on past experiences
with secret detention.
 There are no secret prisons or detention centres in
Syria. There are no cases of secret detention and no
individuals are arrested without the knowledge of the
competent authorities.
 No authorization has been granted to the security
service of any foreign state to establish secret detention
facilities in Syria.
 A number of foreign individuals were arrested in Syria
at the request of other States, who were informed of the

39 Syrian Arab
.
Republic

A/HRC/13/42
Page 178
legal basis for the arrests and their places of detention.
These States were also informed whether the individuals
concerned were brought before the Courts or transferred
outside of Syria.
 Individuals belonging to different terrorist groups have
been prosecuted and detained in public prisons, in
compliance with the relevant international standards. They
will be judged by the competent judicial authorities. Court
proceedings will be public and will take place in the
presence of defense lawyers, families, human rights
activists and foreign diplomats. Some will be publicized
through the media.
 The Interpol branch within the Security Service of the
Ministry of Interior cooperates with international Interpol
branches with regard to suspected terrorist and other
criminal activities.
40 Switzerland
.

41 Trinidad and
.
Tobago

 The practice of secret detention is never used, and no
facility for such detention exists in Switzerland. Such
detention is not permitted by Swiss law.
 The Swiss Constitution guarantees the rights of persons
deprived of their liberty, and detention must be carried out
strictly in accordance with prescribed requirements,
including: being informed of the reasons of detention;
make a call to a lawyer; and inform family/friends; being
brought before a judge; to be judged without unreasonable
delay.
 The Swiss Penal Code criminalizes abductions and
detention without legal basis, and unlawful forced
transportation is punishable as a crime, as are attempts or
participation in such acts. Also, Switzerland complies with
its obligations under the 1963 Vienna Convention in
relation to the detention/arrest of foreigners, such that in
the case of arrest/detention of foreigners, the person has a
right to inform the diplomatic embassy. Persons who have
been illegally detained have recourse before an independent
tribunal.
 No further comments on effectiveness of secret detention
or other counter-terrorism measures or on past experiences
with secret detention.
 The practice of secret detention is not used, and no facility
for such detention exists.
 Anti-Terrorism Act 2005 regulates treatment of persons
suspected of terrorist acts. This provides for a process for
seeking a detention order to be granted by a judge in
chambers, with the consent of the Director of Public

A/HRC/13/42
Page 179

42 United
.
Kingdom










43 United States
.
of America

Prosecution. Detention is for an initial period of up to 48
hours, and extended for up to 14 days. Records to be kept
of the place and periods of detention.
No history of using secret detention to counter terrorism.
The Government is not aware of any cases of individuals
having been secretly detained in facilities on UK territory.
In February 2008, the US informed the UK government
(contrary to previous assurances otherwise) that it had used
the UK Overseas Territory of Diego Garcia to refuel
rendition flights. The US has given assurances that there
have been no other such incidents since September 2001,
and have assured the UK that there would be no rendition
through UK territory without express permission, which
would only be granted if satisfied that it would accord with
UK law and international obligations.
The Intelligence and Security Committee is charged with
oversight of the policy of the intelligence and security
agencies. It has produced reports on the ways in which the
agencies seek to ensure that they do not contribute to the
detention of individuals outside of a legal framework. In
one of the reports, the agencies refer to the fact that the US
is clearly holding some Al Qaeda members indention, but
the details and location have not been disclosed to the UK,
although the intelligence gathered from interrogation of
such detainees has been used by the UK agencies.
By mid-2003 suspicions arose regarding the operation of
black sites, so the UK agencies sought Ministerial approval
and assurances from foreign liaison agencies if there was a
risk of rendition operations arising from their operations.
After April 2004 (Abu Ghraib revelations), in view of the
known risk of mistreatment in operations which may result
in US custody of detainees, the UK agencies sought
assurances of humane treatment in any operation which
may involve rendition/US custody.
No further comments on effectiveness of secret detention
or other counter-terrorism measures or on past experiences
with secret detention.

The Obama Administration has adopted the following specific
measures:
Instructed the CIA to close as expeditiously as possible
any detention facilities that it currently operated as of 22
January 2009 and ordered that the CIA shall not operate any
such detention facility in the future.
Ordered that the Guantanamo Bay detention facility be
closed as soon as practicable.

A/HRC/13/42
Page 180
- Required the International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC) to be given notice and timely access to any individual
detained in any armed conflict in the custody or under the
effective control of the United States Government, consistent
with Department of Defense regulations and policies.
- Ordered a comprehensive review of the lawful options
available to the Federal Government with respect to detention
of individuals captured or apprehended in connection with
armed conflicts and counterterrorism operations.
Reaffirmed that all persons in U.S. custody must be
treated humanely as a matter of law.
Mandated that detention at Guantanamo conform to all
applicable laws governing conditions of confinement,
including Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, and
directed a review of detention conditions at Guantanamo to
ensure such compliance.
Ordered a review of United States transfer policies to
ensure that they do not result in the transfer of individuals to
other nations to face torture or otherwise for the purpose, or
with the effect, of undermining or circumventing the
commitments or obligations of the United States to ensure the
humane treatment of individuals in its custody or control.
The resulting Task Force on transfer practices recommended
to the President in August that (1) the State Department be
involved in evaluating all diplomatic assurances; (2) the
Inspectors General of the Departments of State, Defense, and
Homeland Security prepare an annual report on all transfers
relying on assurances; and (3) mechanisms for monitoring
treatment in the receiving country be incorporated into
assurances.
Announced the transfer of at least seven detainees
from military custody to U.S. criminal law enforcement
proceedings, and transferred 25 detainees to date to third
countries for repatriation or resettlement.
Worked with Congress to revise U.S. laws governing
military commissions to enhance their procedural protections,
including prohibiting introduction of evidence obtained as a
result of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment.
Expanded the review procedures for detainees held by
the Department of Defense in Afghanistan in order to enhance
the transparency and fairness of U.S. detention practices.
Detainees are permitted an opportunity to challenge the
evidence that is the basis for their detention, to call reasonably
available witnesses, and to have the assistance of personal
representatives who have access to all reasonably available
relevant information (including classified information).

A/HRC/13/42
Page 181
Proceedings generally shall be open, including to
representatives of the ICRC, and possibly to nongovernmental organizations.
Established more tailored standards and rigorous
procedures for evaluating assertions of the State secrets
privilege, including establishing an internal accountability
mechanism, ensuring that the privilege is never asserted to
avoid embarrassment or conceal violations of law, and
creating a referral mechanism to the Office of Inspector
General where the privilege is asserted but there is credible
evidence of a violation of law. These standards and
procedures were established in order to strike a better balance
between open government and the need to protect vital
national security information.
The Department of Justice initiated a preliminary
criminal investigation into the interrogation of certain
detainees.
The Government indicated that these measures cumulatively
seek to reaffirm the importance of compliance with the rule of
law in U.S. detention practices, to ensure U.S. adherence to its
international legal obligations, and to promote accountability
and transparency in this important area of national security
policy.” The Government also noted that some of the specific
information requested in the questionnaire implicates national
security issues and that, although considerable amounts of
information have been declassified, certain information will
not be released for valid security reasons, subject to extensive
oversight to ensure compliance with the law.
44 Venezuela
.

 No instances of secret detention in the penitentiary system
 No involvement or collaboration in secret detention on the
territory of another State.
 No further comments on effectiveness of secret detention
or other counter-terrorism measures or on past experiences
with secret detention.
 Venezuela noted that secret detentions are contrary to its
domestic legislation and Constitution. Domestic provisions
specifically provide for safeguards against such secret
detention and further criminalize enforced disappearances
and set out criminal sanctions for such an offence.

A/HRC/13/42
Page 182
Annex II
In August 2009, the Experts corresponded with 19 countries across all
geographic regions of the world with a request to conduct an official visit to the
countries concerned in order to conduct private interviews with persons believed to
have been formerly held in secret detention. As one of the essential objectives of the
joint study is to better understand – and ultimately redress – the plight of the victims,
the Experts wanted to engage directly with relevant sources. The Experts wish to thank
the Government of Germany and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland for extending an invitation to visit. Visits to these two States were undertaken
between September and November 2009 for the purpose of conducting interviews. The
Experts were unfortunately unable to visit other States due to the fact that invitations
were either not extended or they were advised that a visit for such a purpose could not
be arranged by the concerned State. In an effort to get direct information from persons
who reportedly had been secretly detained, the Experts did conduct a number of
interviews by telephone and/or interviewed legal counsel or family members as some of
these persons are still in detention or hospitalized and unable to communicate directly.
In total, the Experts conducted 30 interviews with individuals from various nationalities
and regions around the world. This Annex contains 24 case summaries of interviews
conducted. Six interviews were excluded as they were determined either not to be
within the scope of this study or the information provided was not sufficiently detailed
and precise to be included.
Case Summaries
Case 1 - Biographic details
Name of interviewee
Mr. Abdeljalil Al-Hattar *
Nationality/country of origin
Yemen
Gender
Male
Detention
Date of initial detention
14 December 2007
Location of initial detention
Arrested at a mosque in Sana’a district, Yemen.
Grounds of initial detention
Told during interrogation that he had been arrested on suspicion of having harboured
a wanted person.
The authority(ies) involved in the detention
Yemeni Political Security Officers
Total period of detention
14 months (14 December 2007 to February 2009)
Duration of secret detention
Approximately the first 2 months (14 December 2007 to February 2008)
Site(s) of detention, including sites of possible transit
Initially detained at a mosque in Sana’a district, Yemen, and then subsequently taken
to the Political Security Unit’s premises in Sana’a district, Yemen, where he was

A/HRC/13/42
Page 183
detained for a further 1 year and 2 months.
Conditions and treatment
Interrogated during the first seven days of detention. No physical coercion was used.
No complaints generally about interrogation methods used. He had no access to a
lawyer, judge nor doctor during the entire period of his detention.
Judicial proceedings
Never formally charged, never brought before a judge.
Date of release
February 2009. He was released without an apology or compensation. To date, he has
not filed a complaint.
Additional Information
His arrest and detention created some personal problems. He had been due to be
married four days after the arrest, and also, he had applied for a government job at the
time.
*
Information contained is from an interview with interviewee and other credible
sources.

Case 2- Biographic details
Name
Mr. Suleiman Abdallah*
Nationality/country of origin
Tanzania
Gender
Male
Detention
Date of the initial detention
March 2003
Location of the initial detention
Mogadishu, Somalia
Grounds of detention
No charges were ever brought against him.
The authority(ies) involved in the arrest/detention
Somalia: He was arrested by team of Mohammed Dere, a notorious warlord allegedly
working for the United States.
Kenya: He was held by the Kenyan police in Nairobi and was interrogated by the CIA
and the FBI.
Somalia: In Bosaso, he was guarded by Somali soldiers.
Afghanistan: In Afghanistan, he was guarded by Afghan soldiers and interrogated by
officials from the CIA. The Prison of Darkness was allegedly run by the CIA and the
Salt Pit by the FBI.
Site(s) held in detention, including sites of possible transit
1. Mogadishu, Somalia in March 2003 (one day)
2. Jail near an airport in Nairobi, Kenya
3. Bosaso, Somalia; Djibouti (one day)
4. “Dark Prison”, Afghanistan (two months)
5. “Salt pit”, Afghanistan (14 months)
6. Bagram Airforce Base, Afghanistan (four years and two months)
7. Dar es Salaam, Tanzania via Dubai, United Arab Emirates (one day)

A/HRC/13/42
Page 184
Total period of detention
More than five years (March 2003 – November 2008)
Duration of secret detention
Same as above
Conditions and treatment
Upon his arrest in Mogadishu, he was beaten by four men, resulting in broken fingers
and teeth. Afterwards, he was forcibly taken to a hospital, then blindfolded and taken
to the airport, where he was flown to Nairobi.
In Nairobi, he was held in a room with no bed and tiny windows. He was interrogated
by the police and taken to the hospital. There, he was visited by officers who
identified themselves as belonging to the FBI. After eight days in Nairobi, he was
taken to an airport with the same CIA agents who had taken him from Mogadishu.
They tied his hands and legs, blindfolded him, and beat him on his ears. He was flown
to Bosaso, Somalia, where he was taken to a boarding house and forced to sit on the
floor, surrounded by four armed soldiers.
The following day, he was flown to Djibouti. On the flight, he was blindfolded, his
feet were shackled and he was chained to the floor of the plane. He was not allowed to
sleep, and he was hit on his ears every time he started to sleep. He was kept in a
building at the airport. Some people held them while another man cut his clothes off
and raped him. Afterwards, he was put in a diaper, hooded, cuffed, shackled and put
on another plane to Kabul, Afghanistan. Upon landing, he was taken to the Prison of
Darkness. At the prison, he heard strange voices in several languages, including
Kiswahili and Somali, saying things such as “there is no God, no God, no God.” He
was taken to an interrogation room, where his entire body was shaved by the
interrogators in an aggressive and humiliating manner. He was kept in a stress
position, chained to a wall, in a tiny, dark room in solitary confinement. Freezing
water was poured on him; he was often forcibly naked, beaten and raped with foreign
objects. He was kept in solitary confinement for two months, in complete darkness
and with very loud music playing constantly. The interrogators would hang him from
the ceiling in the “strapado” position, so that only his toes touched the floor. The
guards were Afghans. He was fed only every two days, and was given pills on a
regular basis. He was approached by some people carrying ICRC badges who asked
for his personal information, including his mother’s address, but he refused to give
them the information since he believed they were CIA agents.
Around September 2004, he was taken to the “Salt pit”, an underground prison run by
the FBI. There was constant light, and the Afghan guards would sometimes urinate on
the detainees’ food. He had no contact with his family, and he was visited several
times by two FBI agents. After 14 months, FBI officers came to the prison, took his
photograph, shackled him with fiberglass cuffs and blindfolded him. He was taken by
helicopter and upon arrival in Bagram, he was chained and handcuffed, and his eyes
were covered with glasses. He was also made to stand in a box and the rules were
extremely strict. After bathing in the open, he was blindfolded and taken to an
interrogation room. The interrogators were US officials. After he refused to answer
their answers, he was slapped by one of the interrogators and dragged down the
staircase to a wooden cage, where he was forced to stay for approximately one week.
He was then transferred to another cage, where his blindfold was finally removed. He

A/HRC/13/42
Page 185
was first able to see other detainees, but the cages were later sealed so that the
detainees could not see any other people. He was constantly harassed by the soldiers
guarding the prison and bright lights were constantly kept on. The common practice
was for the guards to use teargas on all detainees if one of them caused a problem. Mr.
Abdallah suffered from acute headaches but was not taken to see a psychiatrist, like
other detainees. During his detention in Bagram, he did not have contact with his
family. Women and children, as young as twelve were also detained there.
In November 2008, he was flown to Dar es Salaam and held for interrogation
overnight.
Date of release
November 2008.
Additional information
After three years in detention, he sent a letter to his mother via the ICRC. Starting at
the end of 2006, he was visited by the ICRC three or four times.
After his release, Mr. Abdallah has only been able to eat fruit, as solid food makes
him vomit. He experiences pain in his back, jaw and teeth. He constantly feels dizzy
and confused during the day and has nightmares at night.
*
Information contained is from a phone interview with interviewee and other credible
sources.
Case 3 - Biographic details
Name of interviewee
Mr. Saud Mukhtar Al-Hashimi*
Nationality/country of origin
Saudi Arabia
Gender
Male
Detention
Date of initial detention
2 February 2007
Location of initial detention
Jeddah, Saudi Arabia
Grounds of initial detention
He was arrested as part of a group of nine persons demanding political change. These
individuals were accused of having supported and financed terrorism, and were
conducting illegal activities of raising and transferring funds to suspicious parties.
Total period of detention
From 2 February 2007 until present. He was in detention at the time of this interview.
Duration of secret detention
First 10 days.
The authority(ies) involved in the arrest
Officers of the Public Investigations Unit, Saudi Arabia
Site(s) of detention, including sites of possible transit
He was held in premises of the Public Investigations Unit in Jeddah. For the first ten
days he was held in a building annexed to the public prison, and then moved to the
public prison.
Conditions and treatment
He was held in solitary confinement since the beginning of the detention period,
without any contact with other detainees. He was interrogated from time to time.

A/HRC/13/42
Page 186
Communication with his wife (visits and telephone calls) was sometimes suspended
as punishment, including in one instance, for a period of 5 months, and another period
of 8 months. He was beaten three times.
Judicial proceedings
Never formally charged, never brought before a judge
Date of release
He remains in detention.
* Information contained is from an interview with the wife of the interviewee, Mrs.
Hassna Ali Ahmed Al Zahrani, and other credible sources.
Case 4- Biographic details
Name
Mr. Bisher Al-Rawi *
Nationality/country of origin
Iraq
Gender
Male
Detention
Date of the initial detention
8 November 2002
Location of the initial detention
Banjul, the Gambia
Grounds of detention
No charges were ever brought against him.
The authority(ies) involved in the arrest/detention
Gambia: He was detained by officers from the Gambian Intelligence Agency and
subsequently kept in custody by Gambian authorities.
Afghanistan: Afghani authorities. He was interrogated by American officials,
including officials from the CIA, the MI5 and foreign counter intelligence delegations
from Tunisia, Syria, and Libya, among others.
Site(s) held in detention, including sites of possible transit
1. Safe houses in a residential area in Banjul, the Gambia
2. “Dark Prison”, Afghanistan
3. Bagram, Afghanistan
4. Guantanamo Bay
Total period of detention
More than four years (8 November 2002 to 30 March 2007)
Duration of secret detention
Safe houses in a residential area in Banjul, the Gambia (one month); “Dark Prison”
(three weeks) and Bagram, Afghanistan (one month); and Guantanamo Bay (four
years).
Conditions and treatment
In Banjul, he was first allowed to be free inside the safe houses. He was later placed in
a wooden cage.
On the flight to Afghanistan, he was blindfolded, hooded, handcuffed and his feet
were shackled. At the “Dark Prison”, an old detention center, there was no light or
heating. The guards all wore hoods and never spoke. On the first day, he was placed
in a dark cell and the handcuffs and hood were eventually removed. He was kept in

A/HRC/13/42
Page 187
that cell, which measured approximately 5 x 9 feet for three weeks. It had a steel door,
a bucket, an old piece of carpet and a rusty steel bar. He was kept in the cold and had
to wear diapers. Loud music was played continuously. The only light he saw was the
torches carried by the guards when they gave him food, which was on average less
than once per day. He was kept incommunicado and was not interrogated during this
time.
On around 22 December, two American and two Afghan guards went into his cell,
chained his hands behind his back and hooded him. He was taken away on a
helicopter to Bagram, Afghanistan. He was held at an old factory, which was used as a
secret detention facility. He spent the first three days and several weeks after in
isolation. At Bagram, he was subjected to sleep deprivation for up to three days and
threats. He was subjected to almost daily, long interrogations, and he was always
handcuffed, hooded and shackled.
He was transferred to Guantanamo Bay through a rendition flight on 7 February 2003.
During the trip, which lasted 24 hours, he was handcuffed, had goggles covering his
eyes and his feet were shackled. He underwent multiple interrogations and was kept in
isolation for three weeks.
Date of release
30 March 2007.
Additional information
While in Bagram, he was able to meet with the ICRC and send letters to his family
through them.
*
Information contained is from an interview with interviewee and other
credible sources.
Case 5 - Biographic details
Name of interviewee
Nationality/country of origin

Mr. Maher Arar *
Canadian (national of the Syrian Arab
Republic)
Male

Gender
Detention
Date of initial detention
26 September 2002
Location of initial detention
John F. Kennedy Airport, New York, United States of America (he was in transit on
the way home to Canada, following a visit to Tunisia)
Grounds of initial detention
He was detained on the basis of information provided by the Royal Canadian
Mounted Police (RCMP) that he was a suspected terrorist and a possible member of
the Muslim Brotherhood and/or al Qaeda. Formal charges were never filed in
Canada, the USA or the Syrian Arab Republic.
The authority(ies) involved in the detention
He was detained and interrogated by officials from the United States of America
based on unverified information provided by the RCMP. He was deported by US
authorities and transferred to Jordanian officials and then turned over to the Syrian
authorities, including the Syrian military intelligence who held him under special

A/HRC/13/42
Page 188
powers given to the National Intelligence Services.
Total period of detention
From 26 September 2002 to 5 October 2003.
Duration of secret detention
Approximately 1 month, from 26 September 2002 to end of October 2002.
Site(s) of detention, including sites of possible transit
1. On 26 September 2002, he was detained at JFK airport, NY, USA and held in the
Metropolitan Detention Centre in Manhattan for eleven days (26 September to 7
October 2002).
2. On 8 October 2002, he was transported to the Syrian Arab Republic, via 2
stopovers in Rome, Italy and Amman, Jordan. During this time he was chained and
shackled in the back of a plane.
3. He saw a photo of President Assad which indicated to him he was in the Syrian
Arab Republic. He was later told that he was in Far Falestin detention centre. He was
held here for 10 and half months.
4. On 20 August 2003, he was transferred to Sednaya Prison in Syria until his release
on 5 October 2003.
Conditions and treatment
From the USA to Jordan – He was put on a private plane and chained and shackled.
He arrived in Jordan blindfolded and said he was repeatedly hit on the back of his
head by Jordanian guards.
In transit from Jordan to the Syrian Arab Republic - He was blindfolded and
“bundled” into a van and driven fast over bad roads. From time-to-time he was struck
by one of the guards.
In Far Falestin detention centre, the Syrian Arab Republic – He was kept in a tiny cell,
roughly seven feet high by six feet long by three feet wide. The cell contained only
two thin blankets and a “humidity isolator” as well as two bottles, “one for water and
one for urine”. There was an opening in the middle of the ceiling, roughly one foot by
two feet. There was no light in the cell at all, except what filtered through from the
opening in the ceiling. He recalled two or three times when cats urinated through that
opening. The cell was damp and very cold in winter and stifling in summer. He was
known to guards only by his cell number: two. The first and official recognition of his
detention occurred about three weeks after his deportation to Syria (end of October
2002) with a consular visit by Canadian authorities. He received approximately half a
dozen consular visits while in detention but was not allowed to receive visits from
anyone other than consular officials.
Treatment during interrogations at Far Falestin detention centre On 8 October 2002, Mr. Arar was taken for questioning from around 8:00 pm to
midnight. He was questioned by a man named “George”, who Mr. Arar later
discovered was George Salloum, the head of interrogation at Far Falestin. There was
no physical violence during this interrogation, but there were ominous threats. If he
was slow to answer, “George” said that he would use “the chair” which Mr. Arar did
not understand, but assumed to be a form of torture. On 9 October 2002, he was called
up for interrogation which lasted roughly 10 hours. When “George” arrived, he
immediately started hitting him. The chair on which Mr. Arar was sitting was taken
away, so that he was now on the floor. Mr. Arar interpreted it as a form of humiliation

A/HRC/13/42
Page 189
– lowering the status of the detainee in respect of the interrogators. “George” brought
with him into the room a black cable, which might have been a shredded electrical
cable. It was about two feet long. It was probably made of rubber, but was not hollow.
Mr. Arar says that as soon as he saw the cable he started to cry. George told Mr. Arar
to open his right hand. George then raised the cable high and brought it down hard. He
stood up and started jumping, but was forced back down and the process was repeated
with his left hand. Again Mr. Arar jumped up. No question had yet been asked. From
then on, Mr. Arar was forced to stand near the door, and the questions began. The
constant theme was “you are a liar”. He was given breaks and put in another room
where he could hear other people screaming. Sometimes he was blindfolded and left
to stand in the hallway for an hour or more listening to the screams of women being
beaten and the cries of the babies that some of the women had with them in the
detention centre. When he was brought back into the interrogation room, he would be
beaten about the upper body and asked more questions. Mostly, he was asked about
his relations with various people. On 11 October 2002, this was the most intensive
interrogation as he was questioned for sixteen to eighteen hours, with great physical
and psychological abuse. Mr. Arar was beaten with the black cable on numerous
occasions throughout the day, and threatened with electric shocks, “the chair” and
“the tire”. The pattern was for Mr. Arar to receive three or four lashes with the cable,
then to be questioned, and then for the beating to begin again. After a while, he
became so weak that he was disoriented. Mr. Arar remembers wetting himself twice
during this questioning. He had to wear the same clothes for the next two and a half
months. He was humiliated. After these three days of beatings the interrogation
became less intense physically. There was much less use of the cables, and more
punching and hitting. By the 16 or 17 October, the beatings diminished but the threats
intensified, so that the psychological pressure was extreme. The “chair” was also
invoked to scare him. At the end of each interrogation session an interrogator would
say “tomorrow will be tough” or “tomorrow will be worse for you”. Mr. Arar found it
almost impossible to sleep for more than two or three hours a night.
Sednaya Prison – He said conditions were “like heaven” compared to those in Far
Falestin.
Judicial proceedings
In the Syrian Arab Republic - on the day prior to his release, over a year after his
initial detention, he was taken before a Supreme State Security Court. He was never
tried or convicted of any offence. Canadian officials were not notified of this court
date and no lawyer was present. He was not sure what took place this day, if it was an
actual trial, no one ever advised him of the charges against him and he was not
convicted of any offence.
In Canada - On 28 January 2004, the Government of Canada announced that a Public
Commission of Inquiry would be established to examine the actions of Canadian
officials, including the detention and deportation of Mr. Arar in the countries
concerned, namely in relation to the United States of America, Jordan and Syria. The
Commissioner’s report was released on 18 September 2006.** The Commission
found that the treatment and conditions of Mr. Arar in Far Falestin detention centre in
Syria constituted torture as understood in international law. Upon the conclusion of
the Inquiry Mr. Arar received an official apology from the Prime Minister of Canada

A/HRC/13/42
Page 190
and 10.5 millions dollars (Cdn) in compensation in addition to one million Cdn dollars
to cover the costs of his legal fees.
Date of release
On 5 October 2003, Mr. Arar was released from custody after signing a “confession”
given to him in court by a Syrian prosecutor. He returned to Canada on 6 October
2003.
Additional Information
Mr. Arar experiences serious psychological effects from his detention and torture in
Syria. Since his release, Mr. Arar has a deep sense of isolation from the Muslim
community. Since returning to Canada, he has had difficulty finding a job, despite
having a degree in computer engineering and a Masters in telecommunications. This
has had a devastating effect upon both his psychological state and economically. Mr.
Arar’s relationships with members of his immediate family have been significantly
impaired. He feels guilty about how he now relates to his own family. He often feels
emotionally distant and preoccupied with his own concerns.
* Information contained is from an interview with the interviewee’s legal
representative, Mr. Lorne Waldman, and other credible sources.
** The Commissioner’s report was released on 18 September 2006, following a
Commission of Inquiry. The Toope Report, released on 14 October 2005, was
requested by the Commissioner of the Inquiry to determine the treatment of Mr.
Arar while in detention in Jordan and Syria. The reports are available at:
http://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/206/301/pco-bcp/commissions/maher_arar/07-0913/www.ararcommission.ca/eng/index.htm
Case 6 - Biographic details
Name
Mr. Moazzam Begg *
Nationality/country of origin
United Kingdom
Gender
Male
Detention
Date of the initial detention
31 January 2002
Location of the initial detention
Islamabad, Pakistan
Grounds of arrest
No charges were ever brought against him.
The authority(ies) involved in the arrest/detention
Islamabad: Abducted by unidentified sources, although American officers dressed as
Pakistanis were in the vehicle at the time of arrest.
Kandahar: The detention facility was run by the US military.
Site(s) held in detention, including sites of possible transit
1. Detained in Islamabad, Pakistan.
2. On 21 February, he was taken to a military airport near Islamabad and handed
over to American officers. He was flown to Kandahar, Afghanistan, on an
American military plane, along with six other detainees.
3. The detention facility in Kandahar was located next to an airport.
4. In Bagram, Afghanistan, he was held at a remodeled warehouse.

A/HRC/13/42
Page 191
5. On 7 February 2003, he was transferred to Guantanamo Bay.
Total period of detention
Mr. Begg was detained since January 2002 for nearly three years.
Duration of secret detention
Three weeks in Islamabad (31 January – 21 February 2002)
Guantanamo (February 2003 – January 2005)
Conditions and treatment
During his detention in Islamabad, he was taken to meet with American and British
Intelligence officers in a different venue. He was not beaten and the Pakistan officials
indicated that he had been arrested based on an American instruction.
During the flight to Kandahar, he was held on the floor in a painful position and
received threats from soldiers. He was hooded, shackled and handcuffed.
He was hooded and shackled to the floor during the flight to Bagram. The cells had
dim light and loud music was played all the time. Religious duties were forbidden as
was all communication between detainees; it was thought that they could
communicate with each other if they prayed. He was not taken outside except for
during a few minutes on some occasions.
Since he was considered a “High Value Detainee” (HVD) at Guantanamo Bay, he was
held in secret detention in one of the two cells at Camp Echo. The ICRC was denied
access to him due to “military necessity”. He was later moved to the “Secret Squirrel”
unit, a place where HVD were secretly kept under the custody of the CIA.
Judicial proceedings
He was denied access to a lawyer or consular services during his detention in
Islamabad. His wife filed a writ of habeas corpus to find out his whereabouts but the
Government denied the arrest.
Date of release
January 2005.
Additional information
In Kandahar, he spent the first 4 weeks in solitary confinement in a metallic barn
divided into six cells. He was later held with other detainees. He was held in
incommunicado detention for two months, although he was visited by the ICRC. He
was subjected to heavy torture and was interrogated, sometimes naked, by the FBI, the
CIA, military intelligence and the MI5.
In Bagram, he was subjected to systematic interrogations, during which he was
shackled, and subjected to physical and psychological tortures such as a mock rape of
his wife. He also witnessed two detainees being beaten to death. If the interrogators
did not hear what they wanted, he was taken out of the interrogation room, beaten by
someone other than the interrogators, and then taken back. He was held in solitary
confinement during the initial 6 weeks, and later in communal cells “where detainees
were treated like animals”. In Bagram, he was visited by the ICRC and could send
letters to his family through them.
After his release, he was sent back to the United Kingdom, but he did not have his
passport until mid-2009.
*
Information contained is from an interview with interviewee and other credible sources.
Case 7 - Biographic details

A/HRC/13/42
Page 192
Name of interviewee
Mr. Abou Elkassim Britel *
Nationality/country of origin
Moroccan and Italian
Gender
Male
Detention
Date of initial detention
10 March 2002
Location of initial detention
Lahore, Pakistan
Grounds of initial detention
His initial detention was on the grounds of immigration matters. The second period of
detention was carried out on the ground of suspicion of his involvement in bombings
in Casablanca.
The authority(ies) involved in the detention
First Period of Detention
In Pakistan - Pakistani immigration officers, Pakistani officials and United
States officials, including FBI agents.
In Morocco - Moroccan officers (including the Moroccan secret service) and
United States officials.
Second Period of Detention
In Morocco – he was detained by Moroccan officers, this time en route to
Italy, and was again transferred into the hands of the Moroccan secret service
agency, the Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire. He was subsequently
transferred to a public prison. He remains imprisoned in Ain Bourja prison
Casablanca, Morocco.
Total period of detention
Two periods of detention:
1. Approximately one year (10 March 2002 to February 2003)
2. From 16 May 2003 until present.
Duration of secret detention
1. During the first period of detention: the entire period, approximately one year.
2. During the second period of detention: approximately 4 months (16 May 2003
to 16 September 2003).
Site(s) of detention, including sites of possible transit
First Period of Detention
1. Initially detained at Lahore, in a police station.
2. Transferred to a detention centre in Islamabad, and transported on four
occasions to a villa run by US officials, Islamabad.
3. Transferred on a private airplane and handed into the custody of Moroccan
officials.
4. Detained in a facility run by the Moroccan secret service agency, the Direction
de la Surveillance du Territoire, in Témara, Morocco.
Second Period of Detention
1. Detained in Melilla, and again held at Témara detention facility, this time for four
months.
2. Transferred to a prison in Sale, Morocco.
Conditions and treatment

A/HRC/13/42
Page 193
First Period of Detention
At Lahore police station: his repeated requests to contact the Italian embassy were
denied, and he was accused of being a terrorist, and was ill-treated.
At the Crime Investigation Department, Lahore: he was chained and beaten.
At the villa, interrogations by FBI agents: FBI agents, with Pakistani agents
present, threatened to torture and kill him, if he did not give information.
Transfer by plane to Morocco: US officials forcibly transferred him onto a private
airplane. During the flight, he was chained on his back to the floor of the airplane,
his head was covered with a hood, and he was dressed in a diaper. Tape was put
over his mouth when he tried to ask to use the bathroom. Before landing, the
chains were removed and plastic handcuffs were used to bind his hands, and he
was blindfolded.
At the Témara facility: he was regularly interrogated about his life in Italy, and he
was beaten and received threats of sexual torture, including sodomy and
castration, and threats concerning his family. He was subsequently released
without charge or explanation in front of his mother’s house.
Second Period of Detention
At the Témara facility: he was shackled at all times except for 15 minutes each
day, and was not permitted to have a Koran. He was interrogated while his arms
and legs were tied to a bunk bed, and he was severely beaten. He heard other
persons screaming from their interrogations. As a result of this torture and
coercion, he signed a confession to involvement in terrorist activities.
Judicial proceedings
1. During the first period of detention, he was released without charge, and without
being brought before judicial proceedings.
2. During the second period of detention, he was transferred from the Témara
facility to a prison in Sale, and was then tried on charges relating to participation
in subversive association and taking part in unauthorised meetings. He was
sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment, reduced to 9 years on appeal.
Date of release
At time of the interview he is in prison in Sale serving his sentence.
Additional Information
During his second period of detention in Morocco, his wife searched for him by
asking the Moroccan Ministry of Justice of his status. The office of the Prosecutor in
Casablanca guaranteed that he was not being detained in Morocco. It was not until the
alleged detainee’s brother reported his disappearance on 18 September 2003, that the
family became officially informed that the alleged detainee was being held in prison
in Sale.
According to the alleged detainee’s wife, he now suffers from many physical
problems as a result of the treatment inflicted upon him during his periods of
detention.
* Information contained is from an interview with interviewee’s wife, Ms. Khadija
Anna Lucia Pighizzini, and other credible sources.
Case 8 - Biographic details

A/HRC/13/42
Page 194
Name
Nationality/country of origin

Mr. Omar Deghayes *
Libyan / Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (UK
resident)
Male

Gender
Detention
Date of initial detention
April 2002
Location of the detention
He was detained at his home located in Lahore, Pakistan
Grounds of initial detention
Not formally charged and never brought before a judge. At the moment of detention
he was requested to hand over his weapons.
The authority(ies) involved in the arrest/detention
Pakistan: Pakistani, CIA and UK Security Services officers
Afghanistan: American military, CIA, FBI and UK Security Services officers
Guantanamo Bay: US officers
Site(s) of detention, including sites of possible transit
Police station (April 2002: after arrest and only for some hours)
Building described as an old castle near Lahore, Pakistan (April – May 2002)
Military barracks in Islamabad, Pakistan (May – June 2002)
Bagram Airbase, Afghanistan (June – August 2002)
Guantanamo Bay (August 2002 – December 2007)
Total period of detention
Approximately 5 years and 8 months
Duration of secret detention
Approximately 5 months (April 2002 – August 2002)
Conditions and treatment during secret detention
- Building described as an old castle near Lahore, Pakistan: He was placed alone in a
room. The first 3 days he was interrogated, by Pakistani persons in civilian clothes,
about bombs and about his family’s opposition to the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (his
father was allegedly killed for his opposition to the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya). During
interrogations he was usually handcuffed and sometimes also hooded. He was also
questioned by two people with an “American” accent who did not identify themselves
and who wore no uniforms. During this period, he was punched, beaten, kicked,
stripped, hit in the back with wooden sticks, and subjected to stress positions for up to
3 days and 3 nights by Pakistanis.
- Transfer to Islamabad, Pakistan (by car): He was transferred hooded and handcuffed.
- Military barracks at Islamabad, Pakistan: At first he was placed alone in a room and
then another person of Jordanian origin joined him. On 3 occasions, he was taken to
interrogations; two in a hotel located near the detention centre and the third in a house.
He was taken to interrogations at gunpoint, handcuffed and hooded by Pakistanis in
civilian clothes. Interrogations were carried out by American officers (identified
themselves as CIA) and, at the third interrogation, there was also a British officer
from MI6. During the interrogations he was asked, inter alia, about his father and his
opposition to Libya, his stay in Afghanistan, and his life in the UK. In the barracks, he
was threatened and tortured by Pakistanis (mostly drowning and stress positions) and

A/HRC/13/42
Page 195
there was also a room full of caged snakes that guards threatened to open if he did not
tell and write what he did in Afghanistan.
- Transfer to Bagram, Afghanistan: 45 detainees were taken together by uniformed
American officers. They were put in boxes, with plastic handcuffs, and bundled
together on the floor of the plane.
- Bagram Airbase, Afghanistan: At first, he was held in a very small cell with about
15 other people, always chained in front (hands to feet), and then moved alone to a
very small room (height of a table). Prisoners were not allowed to talk to each other
and, if they did, they were tortured. He was heavily tortured (including being stripped
naked and beaten) and sexually abused by American soldiers. He was interrogated by
FBI, CIA and British Intelligence officers. He was visited by the ICRC after 1 month,
but he was not able to communicate with his family or lawyers.
- Guantanamo Bay: Upon arrival, he was interrogated and then taken to a hospital
where interrogations continued. At Guantanamo, he was kept in solitary confinement
for long periods and he was severely tortured. Moreover, he lost sight in one eye after
a brutal assault by a guard. He reported that his family knew his whereabouts only
when he arrived at Guantanamo.
Judicial proceedings
He was brought before the Combatant Status Review Tribunal when detained at
Guantanamo.
Date of release
Released in December 2007. No compensation was granted.
Additional information
Together with seven former Guantanamo detainees he brought a civil compensation
case against the UK Government.
* Information contained is from an interview with the interviewee and other
credible sources.

Case 9 - Biographic details
Name of interviewee
Nationality/country of origin
Gender
Detention

Mr. Khaled El-Masri *
German (Lebanese origin)
Male

A/HRC/13/42
Page 196
Date of initial detention
31 December 2003
Location of initial detention
The border of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM)
Grounds of initial detention
Initially detained on suspicion of traveling on a false passport.
The authority(ies) involved in the detention
Initially detained by FYROM border officials. Then transferred to FYROM officials
in Skopje. He was detained in the custody of officials of the United States of America,
including CIA. He was visited by Afghani persons and a German Bundeskriminalamt
(BKA) officer during his detention at the CIA-run detention facility in Afghanistan.
Total period of detention
Approximately 5 months (31 December 2003 to 28 May 2004)
Duration of secret detention
Entire period of detention, approximately 5 months.
Site(s) of detention, including sites of possible transit
1. Initially detained at the FYROM border.
2. Transferred to Skopski Merak hotel, Skopje, where he was detained for
approximately three weeks.
3. Transferred to an unknown location and forcibly placed on a plane.
4. Transferred by plane to Afghanistan, and taken to United States of America’s
CIA-run detention facility, known as the “Salt Pit”, where he remained for
approximately 4 months.
5. Transferred by plane and released in Albania.
Conditions and treatment
Detention at the Skopje hotel: he was interrogated in English despite the fact that he
knew little English. His request to call the German Embassy, a lawyer and his family
were refused. He was offered a deal – to confess to being a member of Al-Qaeda and
in return he would be released to return to Germany; he refused and undertook a
hunger strike. He was instructed to make a statement for a video recording to the
effect that he was being treated well and would be shortly returned to Germany.
Transfer to Afghanistan: he was escorted from the hotel in a vehicle, handcuffed and
blindfolded and led into a room where he was grabbed by two persons, his arms bent
backwards and beaten from all sides. His clothes were sliced off, he was thrown on
the ground, and he was sodomized. His feet were bound, his blindfold was removed
and he believes he was photographed. He was then dressed in a diaper and a sports
suit, blindfolded again, his ears were plugged with cotton, and headphones were
placed over his ears. A bag was placed over his head, and a belt around his waist, and
he was forcibly placed into an airplane, with his arms and legs spread-eagled and
secured to the sides. He was forcibly injected twice during the flight.
Detention at the “Salt Pit” facility, Afghanistan: upon arrival at the facility, he was
beaten and kicked, and detained in a small cell with walls covered in crude Arabic,
Urdu and Farsi writing. He was interrogated on three or four occasions, each time
during the night. On one occasion, he was forced to strip naked, photographed, and
blood and urine samples were taken from him. He subsequently began a hunger strike;
an American director demanded that he end the strike and said that although they

A/HRC/13/42
Page 197
knew he was innocent, the detainee could not be released without higher
authorization. He was visited by some Afghani persons urging him to end the strike.
He was refused medical treatment, and after 37 days of the hunger strike, he was
forcibly fed through a tube in his nose, causing him to fall extremely ill. He was
spoken to by a German BKA officer and the American prison director assuring him he
would be released.
Transfer out of Afghanistan: he was handcuffed, shackled and blindfolded and placed
into a jeep and driven to a place where his suitcase was returned to him and he was
given two t-shirts. He was then blindfolded again, had earplugs and headphones
placed on him and driven to an airplane. He was chained to the seat of the plane
during the flight.
Release in Albania: he was driven through some mountains and roads in an unknown
location, and when he was released, his blindfold and handcuffs were removed, he
was given his belongings including passport and instructed to walk down a path
without turning back. He subsequently encountered three armed men and discovered
he was in Albania. He was put on a flight to Germany.
Judicial proceedings
He was never formally charged or brought before any judicial proceedings.
Date of release
28 May 2004. No reparations or any redress upon release.
Additional Information
When he returned to Germany, he discovered that his family had returned to Lebanon,
believing that he had abandoned them.
He suffers severe emotional and psychological distress following his detention
experience. He experiences pronounced difficultly concentrating, sleep disruption and
irritability.
* Information contained is from an interview with the interviewee’s legal
representatives Mr. Steven Watt and Mr. Manfred Gnjidic and other credible
sources.
Case 10 - Biographic details
Name
Mr. Mohamed Ezzoueck *
Nationality/country of origin
British / UK
Gender
Male
Detention
Date of initial detention
20 January 2007
Location of the detention
Kiunga village, Kenya, near the border with Somalia.
Grounds of initial detention
Not formally charged, never brought before a judge. Grounds of arrest: the Kenyan
soldiers who arrested him told him they knew that he and the group of people with
him were Al-Qaeda members as they had seen them on TV. Moreover, during
interrogations, he was accused of having links with terrorists.
The authority(ies) involved in the arrest/detention
In Kenya: Kenyan military, intelligence, anti-terrorism, and other law enforcement

A/HRC/13/42
Page 198
officers; UK Security Services officers (MI5); FBI officers.
Transfer to Somalia: Kenyan intelligence officers.
In Somalia: Somali military officers.
Site(s) of detention, including sites of possible transit
1. Military police station located near Kiunga, Kenya (20 to 21 January 2007)
2. 3 different police stations, all located in Nairobi, Kenya (21 January –
approximately 6 February 2007)
3. Army base in Baidoa, Somalia (approximately 6 – 10 February 2007)
Total period of detention
Approximately three weeks (20 January - 10 February 2007)
Duration of secret detention
Entire period of detention
Conditions and treatment during secret detention
- Military police station located near Kiunga, Kenya: Detained one night. He was
interrogated by around 7 or 8 people in civilian clothes and threatened to be handed to
the Ethiopians or the Somali militia.
- Transfer to Kenya (by helicopter and jet): Blindfolded and handcuffed. Soldiers told
Mr. Ezzoueck that he was going to be executed.
- 3 Police stations in Nairobi, Kenya: In the first police station, he was detained with
another 5 detainees in a cell of about 4x3 feet with no light, which became very cold
at night. The cell was dirty, they were not allowed to clean it, and they had to use a
bucket as a toilet. The first days he was interrogated in the same building by a Kenyan
Army Major and Kenyan Intelligence Service officers about his life, the Nairobi
bombings and his links with terrorist organizations. In the second police station, he
was interrogated by people who identified themselves as FBI officers about his links
with Al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups. During this period, he was taken several
times to a central hotel where he was interrogated by people, who identified
themselves as UK Security Services officers, about his links to terrorist attacks or
terrorist groups. The third police station was located at the Nairobi airport and he
stayed there for a few days. During this last period, he was not interrogated and he
was told that he was being sent back to London. Moreover, Mr. Ezzoueck was told
that British officers from the Consulate tried to see him at this place, but they were
told that Mr. Ezzoueck was being detained at another police station.
- Transfer to Somalia: Blindfolded and handcuffed.
- Army base in Baidoa, Somalia: Placed with 13 other detainees in a dirty
underground cell with no light and with bottles to be used as toilettes. He remained
there for a few days always handcuffed. At this place, he was not interrogated nor illtreated. He could see Somali and Ethiopian military officers through a hole on the
wall. At this place, he was approached by an official of the British Consulate who told
Mr. Ezzoueck that he had been trying to find him for a few days and that Mr.
Ezzoueck was flying back to London via Nairobi.
- Transfer to London (with change of plane in Nairobi): The first part of the trip he
was blindfolded and handcuffed by request of Somali officials going in the plane. The
official of the UK Consulate also took the first flight. In the flight Nairobi-London he
was not handcuffed nor blindfolded and he was well treated by UK military officers.
- London: Upon arrival at Heathrow airport, he was taken by people, who identified

A/HRC/13/42
Page 199
themselves as Scotland Yard officers, to the airport police station. There, he was
interrogated under the Terrorist Act 2000 Schedule 7 and detained for about nine
hours before being allowed to return home.
Judicial proceedings
He was never charged nor brought before any judicial proceedings.
Date of release
He was released on about 10 February 2007.
* Information contained is from an interview with the interviewee and other
credible sources.
Case 11 - Biographic details
Name of interviewee
Mr. Aissa Hamoudi *
Nationality/country of origin
Algeria and Switzerland
Gender
Male
Date of initial detention
18 November 2007
Location of the initial detention
Tripoli, Libya
Grounds of initial detention
Unknown.
The authority(ies) involved in the detention
Libyan Police and Interior Services
Total period of detention
Approximately 3 ½ months
Duration of secret detention
Approximately 3 ½ months
Site(s) of detention, including sites of possible transit
He was detained in a police station for four hours and then transferred to another
police station overnight. He was transferred to the custody of the Interior Services and
detained in a prison where he remained for three months. Although this prison was
publically known, his detention was kept secret. He was subsequently transferred to
the “Passports Prison” (which houses up to 4000 prisoners, many foreigners) of the
Exterior Services for ten days.
Conditions and treatment
At the prison of the Interior Services he was interrogated while blindfolded on a
weekly or fortnightly basis. During the last month at the Interior Services’ prison, he
was left in a cell without bathroom or water. He was beaten once when he tried to
undertake a hunger strike. In the “Passports Prison” he experienced terrible sanitary
conditions. He witnessed the torture of other detainees but was not interrogated nor
tortured himself.
Judicial Proceedings
He was never formally charged with any offence.
Date of release
End of February 2008.
Additional Information
The Libyan authorities never acknowledged his detention nor provided any

A/HRC/13/42
Page 200
information about him. His family repeatedly contacted Swiss and Algerian
Departments of Foreign Affairs to try and locate him. His family also sent letters to
President Bouteflika of Algeria asking the Government to intervene. A representative
of the Consulate of Algeria in Tripoli did visit the prison to clarify the number of
Algerian nationals held in the prison and when this official learned of his detention he
initiated steps which may have led to his subsequent release.
*

Information contained is from an interview with the interviewee and other
credible sources.

Case 12 - Biographic details
Name
Mrs. Maryam Kallis*
Nationality/country of origin
United Kingdom/Pakistan
Gender
Female
Detention
Date of the initial detention
15 March 2009
Location of the initial detention
Damascus, Syria
Grounds of detention
No charges were ever brought against her.
The authority(ies) involved in the arrest/detention
Believed to be the Mukhabarat, the intelligence services of the Syrian Arab Republic.
Site(s) held in detention, including sites of possible transit
Basement in a private complex in Baab-Tooma, Damascus
Total period of detention
Approximately 3 months (15 March to 7 June 2009)
Duration of secret detention
Same period as above
Conditions and treatment
Mrs. Kallis was interrogated for approximately two hours by men, after she had a
body search by a woman. She was then taken back to her apartment blindfolded and
handcuffed. That evening, she was taken back to the basement and kept in
incommunicado detention until 7 June. Upon arrival at the basement, she was placed
in a large cell on her own for four days. She was later transferred to another cell,
which she shared with a woman and her baby for 25 days. She was then taken to a
smaller cell, where she remained on her own, except for two days when she shared the
cell with another woman. She was not allowed to communicate with other detainees
and could only speak to the guards when she needed to use the toilet. She was not
allowed to go outside. She suffered from mental torture and witnessed scenes of
torture where men were beaten with electric shocks.
Date of release
7 June 2009.
Additional information
Mrs. Kallis twice briefly met with representatives of the British consulate at another
location. The British authorities indicated to her family that they could not disclose

A/HRC/13/42
Page 201
the place of detention because they had an agreement with Syria not to disclose it and
because the family could put her life at risk if they went there.
* Information contained is from an interview with the interviewee and other
credible sources.
Case 13 - Biographic details
Name
Mr. Azhar Khan *
Nationality/country of origin
United Kingdom
Gender
Male
Detention
Date of the initial detention
9 July 2008
Location of the initial detention
Cairo, Egypt
Grounds of detention
No charges were ever brought against him.
The authority(ies) involved in the arrest/detention
Egyptian intelligence officers
Site(s) held in detention, including sites of possible transit
Cairo Airport and a former prison in Egypt.
Total period of detention
Approximately one week (9 July to 15 July 2008)
Duration of secret detention
Same as above
Conditions and treatment
He was detained at the airport in Cairo and taken to a small room with approximately
16 other people who were not allowed to communicate with each other. There were
three uniformed guards present. Two Egyptian intelligence officers in civilian clothes
later took him to an office, where he was asked where he was from and sent back to
the first room. He was not allowed to eat or go to the toilet for two days.
On the evening of 10 July, he was handcuffed, hooded and taken away at gun-point by
two guards. He was taken to an old prison in Egypt, where he was interrogated in
English and Arabic. He could hear people screaming and was told that his name
would be number two. Many other people were also kept there, lying on the floor,
hooded and handcuffed. The place was guarded by officers in civilian clothes and
monitored by video cameras. The interrogations took place in a separate area.
While waiting for his interrogation, he was put in stress positions while short
electroshocks were inflicted on his ribs and back. During the first two interrogations,
an English speaking-interrogator asked questions relating to the United Kingdom,
including his previous arrest and his personal life. He was held in this prison for five
days, handcuffed and hooded. He could hear other people being tortured, but could
not communicate with anyone. On the fifth day, he was taken away in a jeep,
transferred to another jeep, and finally taken to a police station. Upon arrival at the
police station, a woman from the British Embassy informed him to leave the country
within 24 hours. His personal belongings were then given back to him.
During the time he spent in detention in Egypt, his family was unaware of his

A/HRC/13/42
Page 202
whereabouts and the Egyptian authorities at the airport affirmed that he had left the
airport.
Judicial Proceedings
He has not initiated any litigation.
Date of release
15 July 2008.
Additional information
Mr. Khan was arrested in 2004 for his relations with people accused of committing
terrorist acts, but he was later released. After his release, British intelligence officers
(MI5) tried to convince him to work for them, but he never accepted the offers.
Upon his arrival in London following his release, MI5 officers were waiting for him.
He was not interrogated and simply asked if everything was fine.
* Information contained is from an interview with the interviewee and other
credible sources.
Case 14 - Biographic details
Name of interviewee
Nationality/country of origin

Mr. Murat Kurnaz *
Turkey. Resident of Germany at the time
of arrest.
Male

Gender
Detention
Date of initial detention
December 2001
Location of the detention
Pakistani police checkpoints, Peshawar, Pakistan.
Grounds of initial detention
No basis disclosed for initial detention.
The authority(ies) involved in the detention
Initially detained by Pakistani police officers.
While in detention, he was under the custody of both Pakistani police officers and
United States officers.
He was then transferred into the custody of the United States at the US airbase in
Kandahar.
Total period of detention
Approximately 4 years and 9 months (late November or early December 2001 to 24
August 2006)
Duration of secret detention
It appears that his family was not informed of his whereabouts for 6 months to May
2002.
Site(s) of detention, including sites of possible transit
1. Initially detained overnight at a Pakistani police station
2. Transferred to another unknown location for interrogation in Peshawar,
Pakistan
3. Transferred to a villa in the city centre of Peshawar which was run by United
States’ authorities but guarded by Pakistani police officers
4. Transferred to another detention facility located underground, in Peshawar,

A/HRC/13/42
Page 203
Pakistan
5. Transferred by plane to Afghanistan and handed over to the custody of the
United States of America at the US airbase in Kandahar, Afghanistan
6. Transferred to Guantanamo Bay naval base
Conditions and treatment
At the villa, detention centre in Peshawar, Pakistan: he was detained in a villa for two
weeks, held in isolation, usually handcuffed and shackled around his feet. He was
blindfolded when taken outside, and regularly beaten. He was regularly interrogated,
including questions about his connection with “the war”.
At the next detention centre in Peshawar, Pakistan: this was an underground facility,
and he was interrogated on one occasion by Americans.
Transfer to Kandahar: - he was taken to a police station and searched, shackled to the
ground and then transferred to a former military airport and, along with between 20
and 30 other detainees, transferred by plane to Kandahar. He was regularly beaten
during the flight.
At Kandahar airbase – he was left outside for periods and exposed to extremely cold
temperatures, mostly isolated from other detainees. US army officers tied him with
chains around hands and feet, and hung him from the ceiling hangar for five days to
obtain a confession of involvement with Al-Qaeda and the Taliban. He was regularly
inspected by a medical doctor who certified that the treatment could continue. He was
allowed to meet with an ICRC delegate, who came to Kandahar airbase once or twice
a year, but only briefly, never in private and Murat Kurnaz was once beaten for trying
to send a postcard through the ICRC to his mother. Already in December 2001 he was
registered by the ICRC, which, however, did not inform his mother or anyone else
about his whereabouts.
At Guantanamo Bay detention facility – he was frequently placed in a room with very
cold conditions. He was informed by an interrogator, whom he believed to be an FBI
officer, “We have paid $3 000 for you”.
Judicial proceedings
Never formally charged or brought before any judicial proceedings.
Date of release
24 August 2006.
Additional information
His family did not learn that he was in US custody until January 2002, from the local
German police, and did not learn of his location of detention until May 2002.
*

Information contained is from an interview with the interviewee and other
credible sources.

Case 15 - Biographic details
Name
Nationality/country of origin
Gender
Detention

Mr. Mohammed Saad Iqbal Madni *
Pakistani / Pakistan
Male

A/HRC/13/42
Page 204
Date of initial detention
9 January 2002
Location of the detention
Jakarta, Indonesia
Grounds of initial detention
He was detained for his alleged link to a person considered a terrorist. Moreover,
during his time in detention, he was interrogated several times about his alleged links
with terrorist acts and organizations.
The authority(ies) involved in the arrest/detention
Jakarta, Indonesia: Indonesian police and immigration officers; Egyptian Intelligence
officers.
Cairo, Egypt: Egyptian Intelligence officers, US military officials.
Bagram Airbase: US officials.
Guantanamo Bay: US officials; UK and Indonesian officials (present at
interrogations).
Site(s) of detention, including sites of possible transit
1. Jakarta, Indonesia (9 to 10 January 2002)
2. Diego Garcia Island, British Overseas Territory in the Indian Ocean (stopover
of around 30 minutes sometime between 10 and 11 January 2002)
3. Cairo, Egypt (11 January 2002 to beginning April 2002)
4. Bagram Airbase, Afghanistan (Beginning April 2002 to 22 March 2003)
5. Guantanamo Bay,(23 March 2003 to 31 August 2008)
Total period of detention
Approximately 6 years and 8 months (9 January 2002 to around 31 August 2008)
Duration of secret detention
Approximately the first 5 months (around May 2002, he was visited by the ICRC at
Bagram Airbase)
Conditions and treatment during secret detention
- Jakarta, Indonesia: Detained one day at a police station.
- Transfer to Cairo, Egypt, (with stopover for refueling at Diego Garcia Island): Mr.
Madni was placed into an open coffin-shaped box covered with a plastic sheet,
hooded, handcuffed, and bound with plastic and shackled so tightly that he could not
move. During the stopover at Diego Garcia, he was unshackled, un-cuffed and
allowed to urinate in a bottle, but never left the plane. Moreover, he was photographed
by people who boarded the plane only for a short time.
- Cairo, Egypt: Mr. Madni was detained at an Egyptian Intelligence office in an
underground cell which was completely dark and smaller than a “grave”. Upon arrival
at the building, he was examined by a doctor but not treated from the bleeding on his
nose, ears, mouth and in his urine. During this period, he was interrogated three times,
around 15 hours on each occasion, by Egyptian officers (there were also other men at
the interrogations –allegedly American military officers— who did not speak and
passed notes with questions to the Egyptians) about, inter alia, his links with Osama
Bin Laden and terrorist attacks. Moreover, he was subjected to ill-treatment: he
received electroshocks to his head and knees, he was given drinks with drugs, and he
was denied medicine for the bleeding. On several occasions he was hung from metal
hooks and beaten. Before being transferred, he was forced to sign a statement saying

A/HRC/13/42
Page 205
that he had not been subjected to torture.
- Transfer to Bagram Airbase, Afghanistan (with stopover in another country, most
probably Uzbekistan): his mouth was taped and he was shackled in a fetal position.
During the flight, American soldiers applied electroshocks and beat him.
- Bagram Airbase, Afghanistan: During this period, he was kept around six months in
isolation and subjected to torture. At first he was hidden from the ICRC. However,
after around one month, ICRC representatives came across him by chance and only
then his family learned where he was being held.
- Guantanamo Bay: During six months, he was subjected to a regime of sleep
deprivation and frequently moved from one cell to another, which was called the
“frequent flyer program.” He was interrogated several times by several people,
including Americans, British and Indonesians. He was questioned about links with AlQaeda and whether he knew of any plans for future terrorist acts. Mr. Madni was
further told that, if he cooperated, he would be given medical assistance.
Judicial proceedings:
He was brought before the United States of America Combatant Status Review
Tribunal.
Date of release
On 31 August 2008, he was taken to a plane where he remained shackled and not
allowed to visit the bathroom. After several hours, the plane landed and he was
transferred to another plane which took him to Islamabad, Pakistan. Upon arrival, he
was taken to a hospital where he remained for three weeks before reuniting with his
family.
Additional information
- Although released without charges, Mr. Madni did not receive any compensation.
- Judicial proceedings were initiated by Mr. Madni’s lawyers after he arrived in
Guantanamo.
- Mr. Madni lost his job and his health severely deteriorated. Currently, he does not
have sufficient financial means to pay for necessary medication.
* Information contained is from an interview with interviewee and other credible sources.
Case 16 - Biographic details
Name of interviewee
Mr. Bashir Makhtal *
Nationality/country of origin
Canadian (born in Ethiopia)
Gender
Male
Detention
Date of initial detention
30 December 2006
Location of initial detention
Border of Kenya/Somalia
Grounds of initial detention
Not known.
The authority(ies) involved in the detention
At border of Kenya/Somalia - detained by intelligence authorities
In Kenya – law enforcement officials
In Somalia – law enforcement/security officials

A/HRC/13/42
Page 206
In Ethiopia –law enforcement/security officials
Total period of detention
Over 2 ½ years (30 December 2006 to 27 July 2009 held in detention). Since 27 July
2009 serving a life sentence in a jail in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
Duration of secret detention
6- 7 months (30 December 2006 to July 2007)
Site(s) of detention, including sites of possible transit
1. On 30 December 2006 detained at a police detention centre at Kenya/Somalia
border.
2. Transferred by car to a prison cell in Gigiri police station, Nairobi, Kenya
(date of transfer unknown)
3. On 21 January 2007, Kenyan authorities put him on an African Express
Airways plane under heavy armed guard by Kenyan police officers (with
about 100 persons onboard) and the plane landed in Mogadishu, Somalia.
4. On 22 January 2007, he was transferred by an Ethiopian military plane to
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. He now knows he was held at Mekalawi Federal
Prison.
Conditions and treatment
In Mekalawi Federal Prison: He had no access to a lawyer and no access to Canadian
officials. He was held in incommunicado detention and was barred from reviewing the
grounds of his detention. Canadian officials came to the jail,but authorities denied his
presence there. He complained about being cold and being held in isolation for a long
time. He said he gave a forced confession as he was under a death threat (a gun was
put to his head). Only on 18 July 2008, did Mr. Makhtal receive his first consular visit
from Canadian authorities. On 1 February 2009, Mr. Makhtal was allowed to meet
with family members for the first time since his initial detention in Kenya.
Judicial proceedings
He was initially brought before a military tribunal which declared him an unlawful
combatant. He had no access to counsel during this time. Formal charges were filed
after July 2008. On 22 January 2009, his case was transferred to a civilian court. He
was tried before the High Court of Ethiopia, and finally gained access to a lawyer.
The Canadian authorities and NGOs monitored the trial and reported procedural
irregularities that amounted to an unfair trial. Mr. Makhtal was unable to meet
regularly with his lawyer and prohibited from meeting in private. He and his lawyer
were not sufficiently advised about the charges as the case was partially disclosed at
the last minute. His lawyer was not permitted to cross-examine prosecution’s
witnesses or call any in his client’s defence. On 27 July 2009, Mr. Makhtal was
convicted on terrorism related charges - inciting rebellion by aiding and abetting the
Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), an armed opposition group in the Somali
region of Ethiopia; being a senior member of the ONLF; and involvement in training
of ONLF members. On 3 August 2009, he was sentenced to life imprisonment. He has
appealed his conviction and sentence.
Date of release
Not applicable, he was in prison at time of the interview.
Additional Information
His relatives were also arrested and detained for some period of time. His wife was

A/HRC/13/42
Page 207
not permitted to visit or have direct access to her husband until the trial commenced.
* Information contained is from an interview with the interviewee’s legal
representative, Mr. Lorne Waldman, and other credible sources.
Case 17 - Biographic details
Name
Mr. Raymond Manalo *
Nationality/country of origin
Philippines
Gender
Male
Detention
Date of initial detention
14 February 2006
Location of the detention
Abducted from his home in Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan, The
Philippines
Grounds of initial detention
He was never brought before a judge or otherwise formally notified of the reasons for
his detention. The interrogations he was subjected to, however, made it clear that he
was accused of being a member of the New People’s Army (NPA), an insurgent group
listed as terrorist organization by some Governments.
The authority(ies) involved in the detention
The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) personnel with assistance of CAFGU
(Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Unit) auxiliaries.
Total period of detention
18 months (from 14 February 2006 until 13 August 2007)
Duration of secret detention
Entire period of detention
Site(s) of detention, including sites of possible transit
1. Fort Magsaysay, the Headquarters of the AFP 7th Infantry Division;
2. a safe-house in San Ildefonso;
3. a safe-house in Sapang;
4. Camp Tecson, the Headquarters of the AFP Scout Rangers;
5. AFP 24th Infantry Battalion detachment in Limay, Bataan;
6. a safe-house in Zambales;
7. a safe-house in Pangasinan.
He escaped from the last place of detention.
Conditions and treatment
Interrogation: During the initial stages of his secret detention he was repeatedly
interrogated about his alleged affiliation with the NPA by military personnel,
including senior officers (he has identified some of them by name in the domestic
judicial proceedings, see below). He was tortured during his interrogations.
Torture: He says he was regularly subjected to torture and other ill-treatment by his
captors in several of the places of secret detention he was held at. He described that he
was hit in all parts of his body. For instance, he was beaten in the buttocks and in the
back with wood. He was beaten with metal chains and with a handgun butt, leaving
him a still visible scar on his left eye brow. Water was poured into his nose to give
him a sense of drowning. His back was burned with a searing hot metal can. His own

A/HRC/13/42
Page 208
urine was poured into his mouth and nose. He was doused with gasoline and
threatened that he will be burnt alive. Both of his forearms were hammered with a
metal hammer twice in one week, leaving him for a long time incapable of the menial
work he was required to do for his captors. In Fort Magsaysay he received medical
treatment for the injuries caused by torture. He cannot tell whether those treating him
were military or civilian medics, as they did not introduce themselves and bore no
name tags. The Supreme Court of the Philippines has found these torture allegations
to be credible (see below).
He also witnessed the torture of his brother Reynaldo, secretly detained together with
him, and was told by a female co-detainee of the torture and rape she underwent at the
hands of the soldiers.
Food: During some parts of the secret detention, for instance in Fort Magsaysay, he
was fed only at night, usually with left-over and rotten food.
Forced work: He and other persons secretly detained with him were forced to carry
out work for their military captors, such as raising live-stock, washing and cooking.
Judicial proceedings
No judicial proceedings were initiated by the authorities against him. During his
secret detention, the parents of Raymond Manalo initiated habeas corpus proceedings
before the Supreme Court of the Philippines. The AFP denied that Raymond Manalo
was in their custody. In June 2006, AFP personnel took Raymond Manalo to his
parents’ home during one night to dissuade them from pursuing the habeas corpus
proceedings. Before that meeting, a senior military commander, Maj.Gen. Jovito
Palparan, told him that he and his brother Reynaldo would be kept alive if their family
stopped taking part in the habeas corpus proceedings, stopped talking to human rights
groups, particularly Karapatan, and stopped taking part in rallies. If the family failed
to comply with these instructions, he and Reynaldo Manalo could be killed any time.
In its decision of 7 October 2008 (see below), the Supreme Court of the Philippines
states that “ [a]part from the failure of the military elements to provide protection to
respondents by themselves perpetrating the abduction, detention, and torture, they also
miserably failed in conducting an effective investigation of the respondents’
abduction” when a habeas corpus petition was filed on behalf of Raymond and
Reynaldo Manalo.
Date of release
On 13 August 2007, Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo escaped from detention.
Following their escape, they petitioned the judiciary seeking a writ of amparo
ordering the AFP to desist from further attempts against their liberty and security, as
well as ordering disclosure of certain information, such as the current whereabouts of
some of the military officers involved in their abduction and detention and details of
the drugs administered to them while in detention. The Court of Appeals accepted the
facts as presented by petitioners, rejecting all the denials of the AFP, and granted the
writ as requested. In its decision of 7 October 2008, the Supreme Court upheld the
Court of Appeals decision against the challenge brought by the Government and the
AFP. The Manalo case is the first case in which the writ of amparo, a remedy recently
created by the Supreme Court of the Philippines to protect persons at risk of
disappearance or extrajudicial execution, was granted.
Raymond Manalo stated that he was not interested in monetary compensation, as

A/HRC/13/42
Page 209
money could not compensate him for what he had gone through. The reparation he
seeks is that those most responsible for his suffering be prosecuted and punished. He
specifically identified some of the military officers allegedly responsible, both at the
command level and among those materially in charge of his capture and much of his
detention. According to the information available, no investigation or prosecution of
the military personnel identified by Raymond Manalo is taking place.
Additional information
With regard to the credibility of Raymond Manalo’s testimony, in its decision of 7
October 2008, the Supreme Court of the Philippines states: “After careful perusal of
the evidence presented, we affirm the findings of the Court of Appeals that
respondents [Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo] were abducted from their houses in
Sito Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan on February 14, 2006
and were continuously detained until they escaped on August 13, 2007. The
abduction, detention, torture, and escape of the respondents were narrated by
respondent Raymond Manalo in a clear and convincing manner.”
The Supreme Court specifically upheld the following factual findings of the Court of
Appeals:
“… the abduction was perpetrated by armed men who were sufficiently identified by
[Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo] to be military personnel and CAFGU auxiliaries.”
“… the reason for the abduction was the suspicion that [Raymond and Reynaldo
Manalo] were either members or sympathizers of the NPA”.
“Gen. Palparan’s participation in the abduction was also established.”
Of great importance to the link between secret detention and other human rights
violations, the Supreme Court stresses the threat to the life of Raymond and Reynaldo
Manalo resulting from their secret detention: “It should be stressed that they are now
free from captivity not because they were released by virtue of a lawful order or
voluntarily freed by their abductors [but because they managed to escape]. It ought to
be recalled that towards the end of their ordeal, sometime in June 2007 when
respondents [Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo] were detained in a camp in Limay,
Bataan, respondents’ captors even told them that they were still deciding whether they
should be executed. […] The possibility of respondents being executed stared them in
the eye while they were in detention.” The Supreme Court further stresses that other
persons secretly detained together with the Manalo brothers remain disappeared.
* Information contained is from an interview with the interviewee and other
credible sources
Case 18 - Biographic details
Name of interviewee
Nationality/country of origin

Mr. Binyam Mohamed *
Ethiopian. Resident of the United
Kingdom.
Male

Gender
Detention
Date of initial detention
10 April 2002
Location of initial detention
Karachi airport, Pakistan (en route from Afghanistan to London)

A/HRC/13/42
Page 210
Grounds of initial detention
Initially arrested on the grounds of travelling on an invalid passport.
The authority(ies) involved in the detention
In Pakistan - Pakistani immigration officers, Pakistani prison officers and Pakistani
Intelligence officers, French officers, United States’ FBI officers, and a UK MI6
agent.
In Islamabad – he was transferred into the custody of United States officers.
In Morocco - Moroccan and US officials, and a Canadian interrogator.
In Kabul - Afghani officers and United States officials, including CIA officers.
At Bagram airbase and Guantanamo Bay –United States officials and soldiers.
Total period of detention
Approximately 6 years and 10 months (10 April 2002 to 23 February 2009)
Duration of secret detention
It appears that after approximately 20 months, his family finally knew of his
whereabouts in June 2004 (10 April 2002 to June 2004).
Site(s) of detention, including sites of possible transit
1. Initially detained at Karachi airport, then transferred to Landi prison, Karachi,
Pakistan where he was detained for 7 days.
2. Transferred to an interrogation centre of the Pakistani Intelligence service in
Karachi, Pakistan for two months.
3. Transferred by plane to a military airport in Islamabad, and then transferred by
United States military plane to Salat airport, near Rabat, Morocco.
4. Detained in three separate unknown detention centres in Morocco over 18
months: the first was a detention centre run by US officials, for approximately
three weeks. He was then transferred to another two unknown Moroccan
facilities.
5. Transferred by plane to Kabul, Afghanistan and then taken to the “prison of
darkness” – a United States CIA-run facility outside of Kabul – where he
remained for four months.
6. He was then transferred by helicopter to the United States’ Bagram airbase,
Afghanistan where he remained for four months.
7. He was then transferred to the United States’ detention facility at Guantanamo
Bay for approximately 4 years and 5 months.
Conditions and treatment
At the Pakistani Intelligence detention facility in Karachi: he was deprived of sleep
and food; beaten with a leather strap by French officers following an explosion in
Karachi killing 12 French persons; beaten by Pakistani officers; and interrogated by
American interrogators.
Transfer from Karachi to Islamabad – under guard supervision, he was taken
handcuffed and blindfolded to a military airport in Islamabad. In US custody, he was
stripped naked, photographed, anally penetrated, shackled, hooded with goggles and
earphones were inserted. He was then put into a US military plane to Sala airport.
At the Morocco detention facilities:
At the first facility – he was interrogated numerous times by Moroccan officials
concerning his contacts in the United Kingdom and shown pictures of suspected AlQaeda members. He was interrogated by a woman believed to be a Canadian, who

A/HRC/13/42
Page 211
threatened that he would be tortured by Americans, including electrocution, beatings
and rape by Americans. He was handcuffed and beaten by men in masks.
At the second facility - his ankles were shackled and tied with a rope to the wall. Over
several days, beaten by a group of men, after failing to give information demanded,
then left hanging for an hour, and then beaten again. Over several months a process
was repeated where he was tied to a wall, stripped naked, and cut over his body with a
scalpel and a salt solution was poured into his wounds.
At the third facility – he was handcuffed and earphones were forcibly placed onto
him, and he was made to listen to music continually day and night. He was exposed to
cold and unsanitary conditions and loud volume from pornographic movies being
played whenever he tried to pray; he had his food laced with drugs, and when he
undertook a hunger strike to protest against this, he was strapped onto a mattress and
forcibly injected with drugs. He was photographed naked, showing his injuries from
the scalpel cuts to his body.
Transfer to Kabul – he was placed into a location where he was chained to the floor
with a strap across his chest, with goggles and earmuffs and a bag over his head.
At the Kabul detention facility (the “prison of darkness”) – he was chained to the floor
in his cell, on one occasion for ten days as punishment; held in darkness most of the
time; given a bucket to be used as a toilet; exposed to loud music and recorded sounds
such as ghost laughter, constantly. He was interrogated almost daily by CIA officers
in face masks, where he was threatened with torture and shown pictures of a person
whom he did not know.
Transfer to Bagram by helicopter – he was lifted painfully by his arms, blindfolded
and had headphones placed on him.
At Bagram airbase – forced to shower in groups, and soldiers discussed openly which
of the prisoners would be worth penetrating. Although he was allowed visits by the
ICRC, the letter he gave to the ICRC was confiscated by the US. He was not allowed
to pray. He was subjected to one 12 hour and subsequent 6 hour interrogations, during
which he was chained, and denied access to food, water or the bathroom. He was
forced to write a confession.
At Guantanamo Bay – he was allowed to send letters. He was kept in unsanitary
conditions with no natural light, and only allowed outside at night time; kept in stress
positions and in overcrowded cells. During his period at Guantanamo Bay, he was
held incommunicado (where he was denied access to a lawyer, the ICRC, and not
permitted to speak with the guards) for several months at a time, on various occasions.
Judicial proceedings
He was never charged nor brought before any judicial proceedings until his arrival at
Guantanamo Bay. While detained at the US detention facility at Guantanamo Bay, he
was eventually charged with conspiracy and brought before a United States military
commission; after the case was halted, new charges were filed but ultimately dropped.
Date of release
23 February 2009.
Additional Information
His family appear to have been told that he was in the custody of Pakistani authorities
shortly after his initial detention, but his family were not informed of his location of
detention until he was in Bagram airbase, in approximately July 2004.

A/HRC/13/42
Page 212
*

Information contained is from an interview with interviewee and other credible sources.

Case 19 - Biographic details
Name
Mr. Abu Omar * **
Nationality/country of origin
British / Born in Lebanon
Gender
Male
Detention
Date of initial detention
Mid-March 2009
Location of the detention
A friend’s house located in Nairobi, Kenya
Grounds of initial detention
Not formally charged, never brought before a judge. However, during interrogations,
he was accused of being an Al-Qaeda member and of being in Kenya to commit a
terrorist attack.
The authority(ies) involved in the arrest/detention
Kenyan anti-terrorism and other law enforcement officials.
Total period of detention
Approximately 4 days
Duration of secret detention
Almost the entire period of detention (his sister was only informed by UK Consulate
officials just before he was transferred to London)
Site(s) of detention, including sites of possible transit
1. Two police stations in Nairobi, Kenya (two days, one day in each)
2. Military barrack located in Nairobi outskirts, Kenya (only the second night)
3. House allegedly belonging to the Intelligence Service of Kenya (one day)
4. Police station in Nairobi, Kenya (one day)
Conditions and treatment during secret detention
- Two police stations located in Nairobi, Kenya: In the first police station, he was
placed in a very small cell with no lights or pillows and he was not allowed to use the
toilet. Abu Omar was told that a woman from the Consulate asked for him at this
place but she did not have direct contact with him. During these two days, he was
interrogated by several people about his trip to Kenya, his life in the UK and his links
with Al Qaeda. Furthermore, he was accused of planning to bomb an Israeli
supermarket in Kenya. He was denied the presence of a lawyer or officers from the
UK Consulate and he was told that in the ‘war on terror’, terrorists have no rights.
Moreover, he was given no food.
- Military barrack located in Nairobi outskirts: Placed for one night in a cell described
as a cave, very dark, dusty and dirty.
- House allegedly belonging to the Intelligence Service of Kenya: He was interrogated
from morning to night. During the interrogations, he was threatened. At this place, he
was given food that he could not eat because it was mixed with cigarette ashes. At
night, after the interrogation, he was taken handcuffed in a car to the forest. After 3
hours drive, he was taken out of the car into the forest and the officers made noises
with their guns. However, he was done no harm and later drove to the prison of a
police station.

A/HRC/13/42
Page 213
- Police station in Nairobi: In the morning, he was given breakfast and he was visited
by an official of the British Consulate. The official asked him whether his family
knew where he was arrested and Abu Omar replied yes although it was not true. Later,
a guard came and asked him how his family knew and Abu Omar replied he phoned
them right before the detention took place. Abu Omar gave the telephone number of
his sister to the Consulate official who later called her to inform her about the
whereabouts of Abu Omar. Later, he was taken to the airport.
- London: Upon arrival in London, he was interrogated by MI5 officers about, inter
alia, his reasons for going to Kenya, his stay in Kenya, and whether he was
mistreated. Later, he was released but his money and shoes were confiscated and he
was left alone in the airport.
Judicial proceedings
He was never charged nor brought before any judicial proceedings.
Date of release
He was released by the end of March 2009 after four 4 days of detention.
Additional information
Abu Omar believes that he is being followed and his friends reported having being
harassed with questions about him.
*
Information contained is from an interview with interviewee and other
credible sources.
** Alias used at the request of the alleged detainee.
Case 20 - Biographic details
Name of interviewee
Mr. A.S.* **
Nationality/country of origin
Yemen
Gender
Male
Detention
Date of initial detention
15 August 2007
Location of initial detention
Sana’a District, Yemen
Grounds of initial detention
Unknown.
The authority(ies) involved in the detention
National Political Security Officers and persons dressed in civilian clothes.
Total period of detention
Approximately 9 months (15 August 2007 to 27 May 2008)
Duration of secret detention
The first 2 months of detention (15 August 2007 to early October 2007)
Site(s) of detention, including sites of possible transit
Prison of the Political Security Body – Intelligence Unit in Sana’a District, Yemen.
Conditions and treatment
He was held in solitary confinement for the first three days of detention, during which
he was subjected to about five interrogation sessions, twice a day, where his hands
were bound, he was blindfolded and seated in a chair. He was interrogated about a
phone number that appeared on his phone and for suspected involvement with a

A/HRC/13/42
Page 214
wanted person.
Judicial Proceedings
Never formally charged, never brought before a judge.
Date of release
27 May 2008. He was released without an apology or compensation. To date, he has
not filed a complaint.
Additional Information
During his detention, his family endured financial hardship as he is the sole provider.
As a result of the detention, his family has suffered ongoing problems – his two
children who have trouble sleeping and bed-wetting.
* Information contained is from an interview with the interviewee and other
credible sources.
** Initials used at the request of the interviewee.
Case 21 - Biographic details
Name of interviewee
Mr. X.W. * **
Nationality/country of origin
Sudan
Gender
Male
Detention
Date of initial arrest
In May 2008, in the days following the attack on Omdurman by rebels belonging to
the Darfurian Justice and Equality Movement (JEM)
Location of initial detention
Khartoum, Sudan
Grounds of initial detention
Believes he was arrested because suspected of ties to JEM members.
The authority(ies) involved in the detention
Believed to be officers of the Political Bureau of National Intelligence and Security
Services, Sudan.
Total period of detention
Approximately 4 months
Duration of secret detention
Most of the period of detention
Site(s) of detention, including sites of possible transit
1. Initially held at the premises of the Political Bureau of Security Services in
Bahri, Khartoum.
2. Transferred to Kober prison, Khartoum, in July 2008.
Conditions and treatment
At the time of arrest, he was blind-folded and beaten, including being stamped on
while being put into the vehicle transferring him to the detention facility.
During the first five days of detention at the Political Bureau of Security Services
detention facility he was interrogated and tortured by six or seven persons, while
stripped naked, and handcuffed. He was threatened with “methods” to extract a
confession, and beaten with stones, wooden clubs and belts to the point of fainting,
and then revived and tortured again. He was placed in a small room with an air
conditioning unit with a machine blowing hot steam causing a suffocating atmosphere

A/HRC/13/42
Page 215
and pulled out and told to confess, and repeatedly returned to room. He was forced to
stand naked under the sun for four hours on the rooftop. He was denied medical
assistance when he requested it.
Judicial proceedings
Never formally charged, never brought before a judge.
Date of release
September 2008.
*

Information contained is from an interview with the interviewee and other
credible sources.
** Initials used at the request of the interviewee. Other details that could contribute
to his identification, including precise dates of detention (which were provided)
have been withheld upon his request.
Case 22 - Biographic details
Name of interviewee
Mr. X.X.* **
Nationality/country of origin
Russian Federation
Gender
Male
Detention
Date of initial detention
March 2004
Location of initial detention
Khasavjurt, Dagestan
Grounds of initial detention
Grounds of arrest unknown, but it appears he was arrested on suspicion of
involvement with a person suspected of killing a Federal Security Service (FSB)
officer. The detention and arrest appears to be another in a series of previous periods
of detention of this individual following his participation in a demonstration in 1991.
The authority(ies) involved in the detention
Two persons dressed in civilian clothes.
Total period of detention
One week and three days.
Duration of secret detention
First three days of detention.
Site(s) of detention, including sites of possible transit
1. Kirovsky detention facility, operated by the FSB, for three days.
2. Transferred to a pre-trial detention facility in Bynaksk. No record was made of
the initial phase of secret detention.
Conditions and treatment
During the first three days of detention, interrogated and presented with false
accusations to which he should confess. During interrogation sessions, handcuffed and
seated in a chair. On the final interrogation, on the third day at the Kirovsky detention
facility, beaten with a wet rug, had a plastic bag placed over his head, and was
punched in the stomach. Finally signed a false confession after being threatened with
rape.
Judicial proceedings

A/HRC/13/42
Page 216
After signing the confession, was formally charged and brought before a judge.
Date of release
March 2004. As a result of his false confession, he faced charges in relation to
manslaughter. He was released after a court hearing. No apology or compensation. To
date, he has not filed a complaint.

*

Information contained is from an interview with the interviewee and
other credible sources.
** Initials used at the request of the alleged detainee.
Case 23 - Biographic details
Name of interviewee
Mr. X.Y.* **
Nationality/country of origin
Russian Federation
Gender
Male
Detention
Date of initial detention
Late 2007
Location of initial detention
Dagestan, Chechnya, Russian Federation.
Grounds of initial detention
Grounds of arrest unknown, but he appears to have been arrested on suspicion of
involvement in the killing of members of the armed forces.
The authority(ies) involved in the detention
Around 10 persons – some dressed in black uniforms, some dressed in civilian
clothes. Some were identified as ethnic Russians, and others as members of the GRU
(“Glavnoye Razvedyvatel'noye Upravleniye” - “Главное Разведывательное
Управление”), the foreign military intelligence service of the armed forces of the
Russian Federation.
Total period of detention
Approximately 10 days.
Duration of secret detention
Entire duration of detention – approximately 10 days.
Site(s) of detention, including sites of possible transit
Detained at a secret facility in Gudermes district, Chechnya, Russian Federation,
which is jointly run by the FSB (Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation –
“Federal'naya sluzhba bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsii” – “Федеральная служба

A/HRC/13/42
Page 217
безопасности Российской Федерации”), the GRU, and the ATC (Anti-Terrorist
Centre, Russian Federation).
Conditions and treatment
He was interrogated by a group for about 10 days, accused of being a fighter and coerced in order to obtain a confession to the killing of members of the armed forces. He
received numerous electric shocks through a wire that was wrapped around his
fingers, legs and feet while his hands were tied around his back. He was beaten with
iron bars, and on one occasion, his captors tried to burn him with a blowtorch, but
when they could not ignite it, burned him with a lighter. He was left without shoes,
and made to sleep on the concrete floor in extremely cold temperatures. He was never
given food and received only one glass of water per day.
Finally, he was brought in a military pick-up truck into a forest in order to be executed
if he did not confess. He managed to escape in the forest.
Judicial proceedings
Never formally charged, never brought before judicial proceedings.
Date of release
10 days after initial detention.
* Information contained is from an interview with the interviewee and other
credible sources.
** Initials used at the request of the interviewee.
Case 24 - Biographic details
Name of interviewee
Mr. X.Z.* **
Nationality/country of origin
Russian Federation
Gender
Male
Detention
Date of initial detention
10 July 2005
Location of initial detention
Dagestan, Chechnya, Russian Federation
Grounds of initial detention
Unknown.
The authority(ies) involved in the arrest
Three persons dressed in uniform and two persons dressed in civilian clothes
Total period of detention
5 days (10 July 2005 to 15 July 2005)
Duration of secret detention
5 days (10 July 2005 to 15 July 2005)
Site(s) of detention, including sites of possible transit
Unknown. Alleged detainee believes that, after being taken blindfolded into a vehicle,
he was driven through a Dagestan checkpoint. Remained blindfolded during his
detention.
Conditions and treatment
He was subjected to interrogation whilst blindfolded and accused of harboring a
wounded person who had been brought to his house by a friend, two days prior to the
his arrest. He was hit with a plank, a club and the butt of a gun. A gun was put against

A/HRC/13/42
Page 218
his head, and then a shot was fired passing his head. Electrical wires were put around
him and he was given electric shocks. He became very weak, often losing
consciousness. The interrogator threatened that he would be taken away, shot and
buried. He was taken out, blindfolded, driven in a vehicle and deposited in a park in
Dagestan.
Judicial proceedings
Never formally charged, never brought before a judge.
Date of release
15 July 2005. He was released without an apology or compensation. To date, he has
not filed a complaint.
* Information contained is from an interview with the interviewee and other
credible sources.
** Initials used at the request of the interviewee.

*****

*

*

*

*

*